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EVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: 
The Case of Fuel Ethanol In Developing Countries 
SUMMARY 
This study suooests an evolutionary approach to the analysis of eneroy 
technology policy. The approach emphasizes economic fluctuations, 
technological change and Institutional re-organlzation through time. The 
l1quld fuel sub-sectors of Zimbabwe and Kenya const1tute dIfferent 
technological systems adapted to the production and utilization of different 
energy forms. They represent different market niches In a techno-economic 
landscape. GasoHne occupies a central role In the energy budget. The 1973-
74 oil crisis created major fluctuations which made it possible to introduce 
fuel ethanol as an alternative liquid fuel. The process of realiZing the 
ethanol niche was largely dependent on the existence of technological options 
whose technical and financial characteristics allowed them to compete 
favourably with conventlonal1iQuld fuels. Niche realization also required the 
modification of the adoptive terrain to reduce the obshcles to the 
introduction of the new technological systems. The entire process takes an 
evolutionary perspective because 1t involves the generation. selection and 
retention of technological options under constantly changing conditions. 
Moreover. the technolooical systems continue to underoo or require 
incremental Improvements after they have been installed. Such 
improvements require the generation of plant-level technical knowledge and 
often lead to the accumulation of local technological capacity. A glance at 
the evolutionary path reveals periods of gradual change. punctuated by 
moments of increased innovations which are often linked to periods of major 
fluctuations. The process is associated with a complex network of 
institutional arrangements which are also re-organized either in response to 
fluctuations or in anticipation of emerging niche opportunities. Institutions 
playa central role because the process is not randomi it is purposive and 
based on socio-economic expectations. It is precisely this point that led to 
major differences In the process of niche realization In Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
although both countries were presented with the same technological options. 
The study draws a wide range of technology policy and research implications 
from these differences. 
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I NTRODUCT ION 
The 1973-74 011 crisis destabilized the world energy market and 
stimulated a search for alternative sources of eneroy. The use of bjomass-
based technologies started to receive renewed attention. The attempted 
transition towards more stable energy mixes brought forth the intricate 
lfnkages between energy, technology and socio-economic change. The energy 
transition involved the international transfer of machinery and know-how as 
well as the accumulation of related technological capacity. 
This study attempts to unravel the major features of technolog1cal 
transition 1n the developing countries and contribute to policy studies by 
using the case of fuel ethanol development 1n Zimbabwe and Kenya as 
examples. There are several reasons why energy technology is an important 
source of insights on technological transition. The fact that no 11fe can exist 
w1thout eneroy flows makes th1s resource v1tal. However. there is a 
tendency among some energy researchers to subject all human activity to the 
physical laws governing energy, especially the entropy law, as has been 
done by Georgescu-Roegen. I The v1ew 1n th1s study 1s that noth1ng 1s poss1ble 
without energy, but energy is not everything. Entropic processes are an 
important consideration in energy matters but such approaches 
underestimate the role of materials. knowledge systems and technological 
innovation in the transition towards socio-economic complexity. It is 
prec1sely th1s evolut10nary transitton that makes energy tmportant. 
The first point to grasp is that energy does not exist 1n readily 
available forms but has to be extracted and utilized using technological 
devices. Energy transitions have tended to move from sources with lower to 
higher energy content as socio-economic conditions have evolved. These 
tranSitions were by no means Kuhnian shifts because various energy sources 
tended to co-exist over long periods. What is important is the fact that the 
I. ·Cuual oblerntion lufficea now to pro.e that. lIur rllill •• CDDIII.it: IiI. , •• d, DD IlIr 
'lIirD"Y. to wit. cloth. lumber. cbina. copper. etc .• all of wbicb are biabJy ordered Itructures.· 
GeorI8lcu-Roegen. EDlro"y l.r .Dd 11111 ECOD06lic Prllc",. pp.277. 
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trans1t10n from one source of energy to another 1s often assoc1ated w1th 
major innovations I some of which have had profound economic consequences. 
This point can be illustrated by the case of the Industrial Revolution in 
Brltaln. 2 
Thomas has suggested an interpretation of the Industrial Revolution in 
which energy transition plays a central role. 3 He argues that wood shortage 
tn the middle of the 18th century created ideal conditions for the use of 
relatively plentiful coal. However I the transition from wood to coal could not 
be made wIthout the lntroduct10n of new technologIcal systems whIch could 
enable pig iron to be refined into bar iron. The breakthrough came with the 
puddling and roll1ng process developed by Henry Cort in 1784. This innovation 
was part of a long history of efforts to use coal In Iron refining. In the 
previous 25 years, there were at least 13 sign1f1cant attempts to solve this 
problem. 4 The Cort process led to major Innovations In machine tools and 
capital goods and subsequently revolutionized industrial productlon. 5 The 
Industrial Revolution (and the associated energy tranSition) was not an 
Isolated phenomenon but a punctuatton In which new technological systems 
associated with the widespread use of coal led to dramatic advances In socio-
economic evolution. 
This study emphasIzes the Interrelationships between soclo-economlc 
change, energy transition and technological innovations tn a historical 
process. There are other advantages in studying energy transition as an 
indicator of long run socio-economic evolution. Energy sources tend to be 
distinct and fairly homogenous thereby limiting the range of production and 
utll1zatlon technolog1es. Th1s Is different 1n the case of other resources such 
2. "The Industrial Revolutlon .. .ln,olved L .. tranlltlon from reliance on renewable enerlY lources to 
dependence upon non-renewable foslil fuell. Tbe coal-ponred Iteam eosine became the beatilll 
beart of industrialism. III triumpb was asociated with other coal-bued enerlY technolOlies, 
notably the Ule of cote for manufacturinl iron." Layton. "The Industrial Evolution," pp. 249. 
3. Thomas, "EnerIY Interpretation-, pp. 1-15. 
4. Morton 'Ill. "The Transition to Cort'l Procesl -, pp. 722-728. 
5. For I limilar ,iew 00 the Ipread of the factory aystem in America. lee Chandler, -Anthracite 
Coal·. pp. 141-1 a I. It should be noted that the use of coal U I lource of enerlY was tnown for 
leveral centuries berore the Indultrlal R"olutlon. Whit made the transition Important. however. 
was the combination between thil enercy lource. new innontionl and leneral economic expansion. 
In other Wordl, the Industrial Revolution WII indeed I bifurcation in the 10111 hiltory or locio-
economic ,",olution. 
as food. There is a much wider range of carbohydrate sources than there are 
liquid fuels, a factor that restricts energy innovations along particular paths 
guided by fundamental physical and chemical laws as well as particular 
patterns of system configuration. The internal evolution of energy systems 
is therefore more confined within what Nelson and Winter have called 
-technol00ical reoimes-. 6 
If these factors did not matter, it would stl1J be important to examine 
alternative energy sources for purely economic reasons. The 1973-74 oil 
crisfs worsened economfc conditfons fn a large number of developino 
countries. The economic disruptions that followed the oil price increases 
made the search for alternative energy sources a worthwhile policy option. 
The share of foreign exchange earnings devoted to 011 imports was large 
enough to warrant such policy interventions. The conventional view that· 
energy consumption expanded in a linear way was brouQht to a sudden end by 
the re-orgcmization of the world energy market. 
But not all the vital lessons from these changes were learnt, 
espec1ally those aSSOCiated w1th efforts to introduce alternative energy 
technologies. Notions about the efficacy of -technical fixes- still dominete 
thinking in this field. It is often assumed that the problem 1s the lack of 
technological systems and not necessarl1y the complex· socio-economic 
setting in which they are expected to operate. One of the most important 
realizations was the close link between enerQY, technoloQY and economic 
change. Many analyses of energy transition over the post-1973 period were 
based on conventional economic models. But these models, as Clark. has 
noted, are incapable of handl1no the lono-term, dynamic, and uncertain 
cher8cteristics of technical chenge. 7 Moreover, there is a large gep 
between economic theory and technology poliCY, a situation that has led 
Clark to suggest that economics, -w1th all its Cartes1an and reduction1st 
overtones, will have to be largely abandoned -- at least in so far as science 
and technoloQY policy is concerned ••• -8 These considerations are even more 
6. Nelsoo and Winter. E~DlutiDD.ry TIJ6Dry. pp. 258. 
7. Clu-t. Politic.' ECDDD.Y III Sci6Dc6. pp. 229-230. 
8. Ibid., pp. 235. 
J 
Important In Issues that require major technological transitions from one 
energy source to another. 
Marchetti notes that the ·prlmary sources of energy, such as wood, 
coal, 011, gas and nuclear, form a sequence where the new sources slowly 
displace the old ones and flna11y replace them In the markee. 9 The 
transition In usually towards enerQY sources with hiQher enerQY content as 
well as wider linkages into the techno-economic sphere. Barnett argues that 
the survival of new energy technologies depends on the physical, economic 
and social conditions prevailing Is a particular market nlche. IO Both 
Marchetti and Barnett suggest (explicitly and impliCitly) an evolutionary 
approach to the development of energy technology. Marchetti alms at 
building mathematical models for the diffusion of energy technologies In a 
manner analogous with the occupation of ecological niches by particular 
species. His hard modelling thus gives relatively smooth ·Volterra curves·. 
Alternatively, the route Identified by Barnett leads to an analysis 
which treats the energy market as an adaptive landscape which is constantly 
changing and which has strong selecting pressures. Technological systems 
are therefore not uniform entities with static internal characteristics. They 
constantly undergo Incremental improvements due to Internal as well as 
external pressures. II These changes (or technological drift) which occur In 
existing systems are not the only sources of structural re-orQanizatfon. 
Major fluctuations in the techno-economic landscape may create favourable 
conditions for the introduction of new technological systems. This study Is an 
t11ustration of such a process of technological change. 
The liquid fuel sub-sectors of Zimbabwe and Kenya are conceived as 
landscapes In which different technological systems are adapted to the 
production and utilization of different energy forms and occupy different 
market niches. Gasoline occupies a central role In the energy budget. The 
1973-74 011 crisis created major fluctuations which made it possible to 
Introduce alternative liquid fuels. The process of realizing the new enerQY 
niches was largely dependent on the existence of technological options whose 
9. Marcbettl. "Swings". pp. 15. 
10. Barnett. 'Iural Enerer Needs". pp. 28. 
I J. This theme bu been extensively explored in the "Iearnina-by-doina" literature. See Fran.man 
,1 ~l (198-4) for uample of such studi8l. 
Ii 
techntcal and ftnanctal charactertsttcs allowed them to compete favourably 
with existing energy ~ources. Niche realization also required the 
modification of the adoptive terrain to reduce the obstacles to the 
introduction of the new technological systems. 
The entire process takes on an evolutionary perspective because ;t 
has a historical dimension and it involves the generation, selection and 
retention of technologicZll options under conshntly chZlnging conditions. A 
glance at the evolutionary path reveals periods of gradual change 
(assoc1ated w1th technolog1cal dr1ft), punctuated by moments of increased 
innovations (both novel and recombinant) which are often linked to periods of 
major fluctuations. The process is associated with a complex network of 
institut10nal arrangements which are also re-organized either tn response to 
fluctuations or in anticipation of emerging niche opportunities. Institutions 
playa central role because the process is purposive and based on socio-
economic expectations. It is through understanding the co-evolutionary 
dimensions of technology and institutions that we can have a clearer picture 
of po11cy issues. It is precisely this point that led to major dIfferences in the 
process of niche realization in Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
This study avoids some of the conventional aspects of fuel ethanol 
controversy. The debate over land-use, especially on the land competition 
between food and energy, is not discussed in this study. This is because the 
two projects do not seem to pose a problem of this nature since they rely on 
8n agricultural base th2lt 1s 8lready devoted to sug2lrc2lne production. If 8 
more general case were to be made against growing sugarcane in the first 
place, then such an argument would have to be extended to other non-food 
crops such as coffee, tea and tobacco as well. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to deal with the optimal choice of crops, especially in conditions where 
they already exist. However. If land was specifically brought under the 
plough to produce sugarcane for ethanol. then issues of land-use conf1fct 
would have to be considered. 
There are other crucial questions rehting to the rationale of investing 
In alcohol itself. The Issue here would be to find out the opportunity cost of 
the project and determine the benefits that would accrue to the country from 
alternative ventures. As the study will show. the projects had their own 
III 
historical dynamics Independent of what was the most suitable use of foreign 
exchange (tn a hypothetical sense), and their potential social benefit to the 
two countries. Such a study, although useful, would illuminate a different 
set of issues from the ones that concern us most, the dynamics of 
technological change. The study will therefore deal specifically with the 
process of change using an evolutionary approach and not the comparison of 
statics. This will be done in eight chapters. 
The first chapter will recapitulate the development of evolutionary 
views of soclo-economlc and technoloolcal chanoe from Adam Smith to the 
present moment. This review will stress those developments which have 
contributed to our understanding of technological change, especially in the 
transttlon away from mechanistic concepts to evolutionary approaches. It 
will be argued that the influence of static and. mechanistic concepts on 
conventional economics weakens its ability to deal with an inherently dynamic 
process such as technological chlmge. A case will be made for an 
evolutionary approach. 
The evolutionary view requires a different epistemological setting for 
conceptualizing the main issues and devising research methods. This will be 
the subject of Chapter 2. It will be argued that an evolutionary epistemology, 
Insofar as it deals with dynamic realftles, Is one of the most su1table tools 
for examining technological change. In Chapter 3, the global resource 
market will be presented as an open system that undergoes constant 
fluctuations. The case of oil and sugar wf11 be presented to illustrate how 
such shifts create conditions for internal re-organization through 
technological Innovations. It wf11 be argued that these fluctuations created 
favourable conditions for the potential introduction of fuel ethanol 
technological systems. This chapter also sets out the key factors which led 
to differences In pol1cy approaches In the two countries. 
The evolution of ethanol technological systems wi11 be outlined in 
Chapter 4. It will be shown here that these systems evolved through a period 
of gradual transition punctuated by rapid Innovation and the generation of a 
wide range of technological options which Zimbabwe and Kenya could choose 
from. The Question of technology selection will be pursued In Chapter 5 In 
which the techno-economic landscape in the two countries will be mapped. 
I ill 
The notions of adaptive parameters and adoptive pre-conditions w1l1 be 
examined In detail in this chapter. Chapter 6 will compare the process of 
ethanol niche realization In the two countries and Identify the main sources of 
differences In project Implementation. It will be emphasized that the 
~ifferences did not arise from the technological systems but from the 
process of Implementation itself. The divergences between Zimbabwe and 
Kenya are further compared in Chapter 7. The last chapter will summarise 
the argument and Identify the main policy and research Implications of the 
study. 
Jiv 
1. EVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: 
A Theoretical Recapitulation 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the development of evolutionary approaches to 
the analysis of socio-economic and technological change. It argues that 
conventional economic approaches rely on Cartesian and Newtonian 
metaphors which are mechanistic and static and are therefore incapable of 
dealing with dynamic processes. The chapter outlines the major influences of 
the CarteSian and Newtonian views on economic thoulJht. with specific 
reference to the analysis of technology transfer. The second section will 
examine the evolutionary views held by classical thinkers. It will deal only 
with those concepts which 1nfluenced the current theor1es of teChnological 
change. The third section covers the post-Marshallian era. In this section, 
the role of technical change in socio-economic evolution is emphasized. The 
fourth section deals with the dominant evolutionary theories of technological 
change. Finally, an alternative approach is offered for the analysis of 
emerlJing energy technologies in developing countries. 
1.1 ConvenUonal Thought and Technolog1cal Change 
The dominance of mechanistic thinking in economics and the purlJing of 
its organic content, prompted Veblen to ask.: ·Why is Economics not an 
Evolutionary Science?-. There are several reasons. First, biology was still 
embryonic at the Ume economIcs was consolldatlnlJ 1tself. Darwin came to 
the scene a century after Adam Smith. Research in the biological sciences 
was largely devoted to classification rather than measurement and analysis. 
I. This 'fiU the title of bis dusic 1898 article. See Hamilton (1953) for a comparison between 
Newtonian and Darwinian approacbes to economic •. 
1 
. 
But even more Important were the efforts made In the 18th and 19th century 
to adopt the Cartesian-Newtonian world view and its Baconian methodology to 
economic analysis. The mechanistic content of economics cannot be 
understood without a glance at the growth of science in general. 
The history of science can be summed up as a relentless search for 
what William James called ·Irreducible and stubborn facts·. 2 Since the 
Greek days down to the Middle Ages, the search for irreducible and stubborn 
facts became a major subject of enquiry. This was brought to a head by 
Gal11eo whose tradition was continued by Newton. Ga1t1eo InSisted that 
scientists should restrict themselves to those vital properties of material 
bodies that could be expressed in shapes, numbers, and movements. 3 The 
stage was set for the coming era of abstractions. And with the advent of 
Newtonian mechaniCS, biological notions (most of which were too dynamic to 
be subjected to the quantitative methods of the day) were banished to the 
periphery of mainstream science." 
The 17th century was the golden era of abstractions. Indeed, 
abstractions are a powerful analytIcal tool. By hlghl1ghtlng the essentials 
they improve understanding of soctal processes and help to rid society of 
numerous fallacies and misconceptions. But they pay little attention to the 
remainder of things. Insofar as the excluded things are significant, the 
abstractions may not necessarily be relevant to the totality from which they 
were initially abstracted. Narrow-mindedness inevitably steps in. 5 
2. WilUam James. quoted io Whitehead. SCI'DC' 6Dd lA, NlJd,rD WlJrld. pp.5. 
5. The attachment to quantification ftI later refined to the Kel'in dictum: -When you cannot 
expresl it io numben. your toowledp il of a .eqre and unlatisfactory tind.· quoted in 
McCloskey. pp. 434. Hume expresled the lame ,i",,: -When we run ewer libnries .•• wbat hUGe .011 
w • .-ate? If we tate in our band any ,olulle -- of di,inity or Icbooilletapbytin. ror instance -- let 
Ullik. DIJ" II clJsuls .DY .1J11r.cl r6.,IJDIDI clJsc,rDIDI f/U.Dllly IJr DU.IJ'rI' No. 
DIJ., il ClJsl.is .sy ,xp,ri.,sl.' r6.'lJsisl clJsursisl •• U,r III l.cl 6sd 
6xi116SC6' No. Commit it then to the rJlIDII. ror It can eootain DOlbiq but sophiltry and 
iUUlion: ilJid.. pp.4&5. 
4. A detailed accouot of bow the Cartelian-Ntnrtonian paradip hu adyen.ly influenced the 
Idences in leneral. and medicine in particular. il prOYided by Capn (1932). 
5. AI Whitebead lays. th. areat thlnten who conlolldated the modern sdentlfic thoupt -applied 
the leventeenth century aroup of scientific abltnctiODl to the analysis or the unbounded universe. 
Their uiumph ... WII cwerwbelmiq: wbateYer did not fit ioto their scheme ftI ipored. derided. 
dilbelieYed. - Whitehead. SCi,SC6 6J1d lA, WlJrld, pp.74. 
2 
Abstractions are usually Instantaneous conf1guratlons of matter 
expressed in the context of time and space. appearing in simple location. as 
Whitehead puts It. He argues that this simple location has led to the error of 
mistaking the abstract for the concrete. the -fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness-. 6 The simple location has therefore -no reference to any 
other times, past or future, It Immediately follows that nature within any 
period does not refer to nature within any other period-. 7 It Is therefore 
clear that such abstractions cannot adequately deal with dynamiC systems 
which have large numbers of Interactions and change over time. The problem 
Is compounded when such abstracttons are translated Into laws of economic 
activity and SOCiety Is expected to behave accordingly; If It does not, It Is 
often branded -frraUonal-. 
This Is the 17th century tradltton to which economists aspired; the 
tradition of hard SCiences. The post-Smlthlan economics relied Increasingly 
on abstractions; mathemattclans endeavoured to make the discipline an exact 
science. This process reached a significant peak with the publication In 1874 
of Walras' Elements ()f Pure Ec()n()mlcs whose general equilibrium 
theory had strong mechanical underpinnings. To him -the pure theory of 
economics or the theory of exchange and value In exchange- was simply a 
-phYSico-mathematical science like mechanics or hydrodynamICS".S The 
need to make economics an exact science was a strong drive during the 
period. Walras says that It Is ·perfectly clear that economics. like 
estronomy and mechanics, is both an empirical and rational science".9 He 
complained that France produced mathematicians with no knowledge of 
economics and cultivated men of letters devoid of any notion of mathemat1cs. 
This, in his view, led to the flourishing of bad mathematicians and bad pure 
economists. He said the 20th century would need to entrust the social 
sciences to men of general culture 1ntUated Into Inductive and deductive 
thinking and who are familiar with reason and experience. -Then 
6. '"Id., pp. 6'. 
7. '"/d., pp.64. 
S. Walru, E16.61111, pp.71. 
9. '"/d., ,p.47. 
3 
mathematical economIcs w111 rank with mathematIcal scIence of astronomy 
and mechanics; and in that way justice will have been done to our work. -10 
But the very discipline that set the pace for economics started 
changIng 1ts course 1n the last century lead1ng to new phys1cs. In the sub-
atomic world there are no irreducible and stubborn facts but relationships, 
no isolated entities but systems. It can therefore be argued that conventional 
• 
economics 15 well ahead of the other social sciences, but in a misleading 
direct10n; even the pace-setter, physics, has changed course. II Other 
sc1ences are chang1ng course too. And as Veblen sa1d, 11 -econom1cs 1s to 
follow the lead or the analogy of the other sciences ••• the way is plain so far 
as the general direction in which the move will be made- .12 The evolutionary 
route. Th1s route, however, was not taken. Instead, evolutionary concepts 
in the post-Marshallian period sought refuge in other theoretical camps and 
co-eXisted with Cartesian-Newtonian frameworks. 
Much of Smith's equl1ibrium, laws of motion and scientific objectivity 
are drawn from Newtonian physics. The economic sphere was a microcosm of 
the celest1al arena; forces of supply and demand, gu1ded by the lnv1s1ble 
hand, would generate 8 near-instantaneous balance, as market forces 
gravitated in the right direction, Newtonian concepts can also be traced in 
the econom1c formulation of human welfare. The ideal social welfare 
balance, like that of Newtonian celestial objects, could be realized through 
some form of Pareto optimality. And of course ptolemy Uves through the 
pages of mainstream economics -- the individual was, and st111 is, at the 
centre of the economic universe. The reification of the Newtonian model by 
economists has left the discipline a set of analytical tools wh1ch cannot 
adequately deal with the complex realities of economic processes. 
Early studies on technology transfer to the developing countries were 
largely influenced by mechanIstIc thInking. Th1s 1s partly because of the 
influence of both the concept of comparative advantage and that of the 
10. Ibid.. pp. 4a. 
11. Goer&escu-Roeaen 11)'1 that 'by the time Jevons and Walta be&lO layiDl the cornerstones or 
modern economlcl, a Ipectacular revolution in physici had already brougbt down the mechanlltlc 
dOiJlla both in the natural lciences and in philosophy. And the curioUi ract II that none 01 the 
archltectl or 'the mechanic. 01 utility and lell-interest' and eYeo none 01 the latter-day model 
builders leem to haYe been anre at \Oy tilH of thil down fall.· lip. cil.. pp.2·3. 
12. Veblen. ·Why il Ecoooaici not E¥olutiooary.· pp. SU. 
"dependency school"" These two schools of thou~ht carry strono mechanisttc 
elements. The concept of comparative advantage assumes a world which is 
reversible and one where the values of each product are known in advance 
and their effects on the balance of trade can be establfshed " priori. The 
international economic scene is viewed throu~h the Hectscher-Ohltn model as 
a balanced system In which countries producln~ labour-intensive ~oods can 
mutually benefit from trade with those producing capital-IntenSive goods. 
This model assumes uniformity In technology and consumption patterns. It 
only aJ]ows for variatIons In factor endowment. 
Slml1ar Newtonian mechanisms dominate the "dependency theory·. This 
theory, at least in Its classical form, assumes a balance where economic 
growth In the Industrialized countries Is achieved at the expense of 
development In the peripheral countries. The economic system is seen as a 
constellatton of economic spheres revolving around 8 centre; hence the 
centre-periphery relationships. Although this is a simpJiflcation of the 
theory, tt captures the mechanistic content of tts central themes. From 
these bases have sprung a series of theories of the transfer of technology to 
the developing countries. These theories assumed that technological systems 
were given units whose values were known or reducible to a few variables 
such as factor proportions. 
A basic tenet of thIs study is that such approaches are incapable of 
dealing with the complex socio-economic and instttuttonal relationships 
surrounding technological systems and the dynamics of social change. 
Moreover, they also Ignore the fact that technological development Is an 
evolutionary process assocIated with Irreversible changes. To capture these 
dynamics, this study proposes to re-examine the literature and Isolate those 
contributions which may help In the construction of an alternative analytical 
framework for studying dynamic technological processes. 
1.2 Classical Antecedents 
Evolutionary views of soclo-economlc development In general, and 
technolo~lcal change in particular, are to be found In the work of classical 
economists. It Is notable that Darwin's work was Inspired by readlno Malthus' 
ESS6Y on PopuI6tion. 13 The application of Darwin's theory to economic 
development was impeded by several factors. First, social chanoe was not 
obviously oradual1st and therefore the theory was not particularly conSistent 
with the observations of social historians. Second, the rules of the hard 
sciences (especially Newtonian physics) combined with Cartesian phl1osophy 
which viewed natural phenomena as automata and the Baconian appeal to 
empirical rioour had become the most leOitimate way of expressinQ reality. 
Economics readl1y adopted this mechanistic world vfew. 
Classical economists recognized the dichotomy of static and dynamic 
systems although they were influenced more by mechanical dynamics than by 
organic evolution. It Is In this context that the dynamics of MI11 and Smith can 
be understood. Smith recognized the evolution of SOCiety through complexity 
and differentiation as exempl1fled by his assessment of the division of 
labour. But he drew a distinction between functional differentiation in 
zoological and social systems by streSSing that unlike animals, human 
beings had spec1f1c attr1butes wh1ch enabled the d1v1slon of labour to emergei 
the ability to truck, barter, and exchanoe. These abf1tties could be brought 
into a common stock ·where every man may purchase whatever part of the 
produce of the other men's talent he has occasion for-. 14 
Species, Darwin came to show, were engaged in a constant struggle 
for survival. They also chanoed throuoh oradual but chance variations. 
These were the cornerstones of his evolutionary theory, which oot a mixed 
reception from his contemporaries. Marx's response was particularly 
interesUno because he used the concept to enrich his Heoelfan heritaoe but 
13, Accordina to Schumpeter. ·the ter.1 Italic and dynamic wer •.. .introduced into economic. by 
John Stuart Mill. Mill probably beard thea frOli Comte. who. in lurn telll UI that h. borrcnred lh8II 
from the molOCilt d. Braioyill •• • TII.llrr II' ECIIDII.ic O.,..llIp •• DI,. pp. xi. Tbau concepts, 
hcnreYer. were orilioalJy obtained from clulicaJ physic.. 
14. Smith, TIIII "'.61111 "' N61illlll, pp. 121. -Th. Itrenath 01 the maliff i. nOl ...• upported by 
.ither the .wIrtnesl of lbe areybound, or by lbe lapclty of lbe .panlel. or by the docility 01 lbe 
.bepberd'. dOl. The effecll 01 lboae different aeniUles and talents ... cannot be broUlbl into a 
common ltock, and do DOl ... contribute to the better lCtommodatioo and conYeniency of the .pecies.-
16id.. pp. 21. See Houthatker (J9~6) '01' an exten.ion of the yiew that Smith'. analysis 01 the 
diyilion 01 labour ".. akin to lpeciatiOD, 
severely attacked Darwin and his followers. I' There are two main reasons 
for this hostlJ1ty. first, the Malthusian content of the theory was 
inconsistent with Marx's own Ideolo(Jlcal position. He saw Malthusianism as 
an apolo(Jia for the establishment and En(Jels asserted that Darwinism was 
more scientific without its Malthusian content. Second, Marx end En(Jels 
contended that their conception of history as a series of class stru(Jgles was 
richer and deeper than the "weakly dlstln(Julshed phrases of the struQ(Jle for 
existence" .16 Marx therefore rejected the application of Darwinian views to 
soclo-economlc evolution. preferrin(J a He(Je1ian approach. However, he 
adapted Darwinian concepts to his analysis of technological change. 17 
Technolo(JY. accordjn(J to Marx, evolves from crude designs to more 
refined systems that benefit from scientifiC disciplines: 
The power 100m was at first made ••• of wood; In Its Improved 
modern form It Is made of Iron... It Is only after 
considerable development of the sciences of mechaniCS, end en 
accumulation of practical experience that, the form of a 
machine becomes settled entirely In accordance with 
mechanical principles. and emanCipated from the traditional 
form of the tool from which it emer(Jed. la 
This occurs In a mutually-reinforcln(J soelo-economic environment. 19 
In this interactive process, the role of Individuals adds only II ltttle to the 
broader evolution. ·A critical study of technology would show how little any 
of the Inventions of the el(Jhteenth century are the work of a sln(Jle 
individual. -20 Marx equated the development of technolo(JY to that of 
blolo(JfcaJ or(Jans. "Darwin has directed attention to the history of natural 
technolo(JV. t.e. the formation of the organs of plants and animals which 
15. When Marx flnt read Darwin', Or/IIII In 1860. be wrote to EDle., that "a1thoup It II 
deYeloped In tbe crude Eqlilb atyle. thl' I, the boot wblcb COOtaiDl tb, 'ui. in DIlural hiatory 
for our 'In." Meet. N.rz .lId EIII,I, 1111 N.IIIJu,. pp. 172. 
16. III/d.. pp. la7. 
17. See Harrll (1934) for • dilcualioo of dialectical and Darwinian economic IYOlution. and Colp 
(1932) for an expOillion of the ayth that Marx wanted to dedicate C.p/I.I to Darwin. 
la. Marx. C.p/I.1. Vol. I. pp.505. 
19. "Social relations are clOiely bound up "Itb productl" lore •• In ICqulrlnc nn productiY, 
lore. IIID cbllll' tbelr mode 01 production: and In cblDllnc tbelr mode 01 production. In cblDllnc 
tbe way or earnllll tbelt 11,1111. tbey cbance aU tbelr loci .. relulODl. The bandam II,n ,oclety 
"ltb the feudal lord: the lteaa-.iII. society "Ith the Industrial capitalist,." Marx. PII~'rIY II' 
Plllllllllplly. pp. J 02. 
20. Marx. C.p/I.1. Vol. J. ,p.493. 
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serve 8S the Instruments of production for sustaInIng theIr I1fe. Does not the 
history of the productive organs of man in society, or organs that are the' 
material basis of every particular organisation, deserve equal attention?"21 
As the tools evolve, they are adapted to the requirements of particular 
applications and professions. 22 This functional differentiation forms one of 
the material conditions for the existence of machinery. Here we see Darwin's 
law of variation applied to technical change. 23 
Marx recognized that technical change continued long after the 
machinery had been Installed, a fact that underscores the evolutionary 
nt.lture of technological progress. As noted elsewhere, he paid particult.lr 
attention to the role of work.ing experience, or the accumulation of 
disembodied technical change. Marx anticipated the modern studies of flrm-
level technical change in the capital goods sector. "When machinery is first 
introduced ••• new methods of reproducing it more cheaply follow blow by 
blow, and so do improvements which relate not only to individual parts and 
details of the machine, but also to its whole construction. "24 He was able to 
blend Darwin's nottons with Hegel1an dtalectlcs to prOVide 8 methodological 
approach to technical change that is unparalleled among classical think.ers. 
Studies which have ignored this fact have missed the vital interactions and 
21. IlJid. Marx laments the &bsense of such a boot. It still does not exist. Marx attempted to wrill 
luch a history. wbich i •• till locted any in unpublisbed notebooks. See Colman. "Short 
Communications.o pp. 234-235. for a list of the unpublished ootebooh. datiq maioly from 1863. 
Recent publication. of Marx'. wort on tecbnolOlY are an.iJabl. io Geraan by Muller (J 981) and 
Wllkellllann (1982). 
22. °ln Birmingham alone 500 nrieties of bammer are produced. and DOt only il IItb one adapted to 
a particular procesl. but leYeraI nrieties ofleD lern .xdUliYely for the different operIliona In 
the lame procesl. The aanufacturiq period limp lin., imprOYel and multiplies the implemenbl of 
labour by adaptinc thea to the .xdUli •• and lpacific fuoc:tiODl of each tiocl of worter." Marx. 
C6piul. Vol. I. pp.46O-461. 
23, 0 AI IODI u the lame part hu to perrora divenJlied wort. we can perhapl lee why It Ihould 
remain nriable. that il. wby natural lelection Ihould oot bave preaerYed or rejected eacb little 
deYllllon of form 10 carefully u wben the part bu to lerH for lome one Ipeclal purpOie. 10 the 
lame way tbIl a tnife wbicb bu to cut alllOl'bl of tbinp may be or almOit any Ibape: wbUlt a tool 
(or lome particular purpose mUit be of lOIRe particular Ihape." (])arles D .... io. Ori,iD III 
Sptlcitll. quoted in 11I1d.. pp.461. 
24. 11I1d.. pp. 523. 
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feedbacks between technology and social change and have erroneously viewed 
Marx as a technological determlnist. 25 
Marx's evolutionary notions were overshadowed by his appeal to 
revolutionary social change and therefore did not have any major Influence 
on mainstream economics. It was Marshall who first attempted to bring the 
notions into mainstream economic thought. 26 To Marshall, the -Mecca of 
economics l1es in economic biology rather economic dynamics. -27 He argued 
that economics was I1te biology because they both dealt with -a matter, of 
which the tnner nature and constitution, as well as the outer form, are 
constantly changing-. 24 For Marshall, the subject-matter of economics was 
-human beings who are impelled, for good or for evil, to change and 
progress-. 29 Although he adVocated the use of b1olog1cal concepts, h1s own 
work paid only token allegiance to the approach, a mere pilgrimage to the 
Mecca of economics. Much of his Principles of Economics (1890) is non-
evolutionary except for the sections which deal with industrial organisation 
and the division of labour. Marshall draws from the concepts of survival of 
the fittest and the physiological views of human behaviour. He sees large-
scale industries as trees of the forest which grow, compete for Hght and 
water, lose vitality, grow old, and die; except for -vast joint-stoct 
companies, which often stagnate, and do not readily die- • 30 
Marshall's evolutionary views differed remarkably from Marx's 
because of his appeal to Darwinian graduaHsm: -Economic evolution is 
gradual. Its progress is sometimes arrested or reversed by political 
catastrophes: but its forward movements are never sudden; for even tn the 
2'. Studi. on Marx'i analysil or tecbnolOCY include HaoIeo (1921), Hellbrooer (1967), SWeezy 
(1968), ROienbera (1976), Shaw (1979), and McKenzie (t934). 
26. For • fftiew or Marshall' ••• mioo that economici ".. • branch or biotocy, lee Hinhteifer 
(19n). Hinhleirer (19&2) baa allo tried to blend ecoootIliCI, taw and etolutionary concepti. For an 
.1.I.ent of the Ull or ecoooaaic .octel. In ecoiOlY, ... Rapport ,Ill (1977). 
27. Marshall, Prilleiplu III Eel1l1l1.iel, pp. xii. 
28. IlIid., pp.637. 
29, lIIid., pp. xUl. But oot for all bullll.O belop becaUie ·economici II a Itudy of ... partlcular 
natlonl, of particular loclal Itrata: and It II only Indirectly concerned with lb, U ... of meo of 
exceptional ,enJUI or exceptional wictedDIII, - lllid.. pp.697. 
30. lIIid.. pp.263. ManhaJl'. analOlY of the -treea of the foreat- baa been tetted by Uoyd-,Jooea 
,I.l (1982) 10 the cue of the cotton loduatry 10 the 19th ceotury and .hoyo to be nJid for the 
period. 
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Western world and In Japan It Is based on habit, partly conscious, partly 
unconscious. -'I But like Marx, he admits that individuals add only little to 
the cumulative changes which have been in the ma~ing long before them.52 
Marshall v1sual1zed some form of equ111br1um 1n the growth of f1rms. 
He states that -a business firm grows and attains greater strength, and 
afterwards perhaps stagnates and decays; and at the turning point there is a 
balancing or equ111brium of the forces of life and decay ••• ·33 But although 
such balances appear dynamic, Marshall did not abandon the Cartesian-
Newton1an world v1ew. For the foundaUons of econom1cs must "give a 
relatively large place to mechanical analo01e8- .34 The fraomentary statics 
were seen as a temporary feature. However, he offered an economic 
methodology under which mechanical analogies would be used In the early 
stages of economic evolution and biological explanations would take over in 
later stages. 55 
Marshall insisted on using mechanical analogies and mathematical 
abstractions. Mathematics was only useful to economics if it could throw -a 
brloht 110ht on some smal1 part of the oreat economic movement rather than 
at representing its endless complexities. -36 As 8 result, the subject-matter 
would have to be reduced to steady-state entities that validate the use of 
mathematics. His tone was Newtonian in his view of the -stationary state-. 
Uke celestial bodies, parts change while the whole remains stationary: 
individuals grow old and die while the population remains stablei businesses 
rise and fall while firm population remains the same; orain prices fluctuate 
with every harvest but the average value of the grain remains stable. 
51. IIJ/tI.. pp. xl. 
32. TbUi •... ID In,entor. or ID orpnizer. or a financial lenlUl may .eem to haYe modified the 
ecooomic .tructure 01' • people almost ata .troke; yet the part of hi. Influence which hu DOt been 
merely .uperficial and lrIDtitory, i. found 00 inquiry to hive dooe little more than brine to • head 
• broad constructive mcwemeot wbich bu IDOl been ID preparatjoo," iIJitl.. pp. xiJ. 
33. I/Jid.. pp. 269. 
34. I/Jid., pp. 12. 
35. "Tbere i. fairly I clOIe aaaJocy between the early .tq .. of economic reuoniq and the deYic .. 
of pbyaical .tatlc •.•• I thlat that In the later 'lII" of ecooomics better aoalOlI .. are to be lot from 
bioiocy rather than from phyalc.: and, Conlequently, that economic reuonlnl .bould .tart on 
method I aoalOioUi with thOle 01' physical ltatica, and lhould p-adually become more blolOlicai iD 
tooe," Manball, "Mechanical and BiolOCicai Analoci .. ," pp.514. 
S6. Ilid.. pp. SI5. 
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To Marshall, the growing command of mankind over nature changed the 
character and magnitude of economic and social forces in a Newtonian way: 
·Our planetary system happens ••• to be a stable equilibrium; but a little 
change In circumstance might make It unstable; might for Instance, after a 
time cause one of the planets to shoot away from the sun in a very long 
ellipse, and another to fall into It. ·37 The law of supply and demand also 
takes, at an early stage, a Newtonian outlOOk: ·In the earl1er stages of 
economiCS, we thtnk of demand and supply as crude forces pressing against 
one another, and tending towards a mechanical equilibrium; but In the later 
stages, the ••• equilibrium is conceived not as between crude mechanical 
forces, but as between the organiC forces of life and decay. -38 Marshall's 
biological notions remained undeveloped as neo-classlcal thought took root. 
1.3 Evolutionary Theories of Economic Change 
Although post-Marshallian economic thought was dominated by 
mechanistic notions, efforts were made to inject some dynamic elements Into 
its content. 39 One of these areas was market competition. Competition was 
viewed In conventional economics as analogous with Newtonian motions where 
resources ·gravitated· towards their most optimal utility and prices were 
57.11J/d.. pp.317. 
58. IIJ/d., pp. 318. Mlraball WII cOIUlitted to the mechanical tbintine of lbe day despite bil 
appeal to biolOlical anaiOli8l. All life il reducible to aatter. the bard Iturr that all tbinp are 
IUPPOIedly made of. Tbil could be undentood lbroucb mecbanical analOlies. And lince lociety il 
not an ordinary combination or inanimate material. we bave to revert to lome orpnic yi_ of 
economic activity. Tbll amblY&lence II reflected In bll analyall or competition. leadlne to lome 
conJUlion oyer perfect and imperfect competition. Hil approacb WII later re-orlentated by tbe neo-
clu.icaJ Ichoal •• peciaJly witb the formulationa of .onopoli.tic competition and imperfect 
competition by Chamberlin (1933) and lobinlon (1933). It il iDl~ti" tbat bil biolOlicaJ yi.". 
baYe been a lubject 01 rldicul. by ~clulical economilts. for example by Samuellon: 'All tbil 
pratUe about the biolOilcal method In ecDDOllllca -- and tbe lut decades' ,enuine procrlll In 
bJolOlY lbroucb tbe tecbniqU81 of pbyaici bu confirlled .y dictum ... tbat talk about a unique 
biolOlJcaJ melbod dOlI represent pratUe -- cannot cbanee tbil fact: any price tater wbo can •• U 
more at tbe lolne price tban be II now olline and wbo bu Ialline .&fllnaJ COlt will not be In 
equllfbrlum. Talt of blrdl and beet. Ilant Ueet In tbe for.t. and decllnlne entrepreneurial 
dynutill II aJl YerY well. but why bUnt at luch an elementary point?' Samuel Ion. ·The 
MonopoUltiC Competition.' pp. 112. 
39. See Spencler U9S0) lor a review of .. olutionary tbouaht In A .... ican ecOOOlllicl lioce 177'. 
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-forced- to the lowest possible levels which could be sustained over the long-
run. Competition therefore guaranteed order and stability in the market just 
as <1 ravitation did a mong Newtonian bodies. 40 This view did not adequately 
account for the competitive beh8vlour of firms. Economic theory was 
bedeviled with the paradoxical concepts of monopoly and perfect competition; 
-both are situations In which the possibility of any competitive behaviour has 
been ruled out by definition- .... 
Chamberlin attempted to re-orientate economic theory by introducing 
dynamic concepts. Although he remained In the orthodox economic 
mainstream, his work carried elements of evolutionary thinking. His 
analysts sought to synthesize monopoly and competition in a way that was 
akin to chemical processes. 42 The chemical synthesiS requires continuous ' 
movement and change, thereby taking an evolutionary outlook under which 
dynamic and static characteristics are clearly distinguished. Moreover, the 
dominant role of continuous product differentiation and the wide range of 
product possibilities suggests an Implfclt evolutionary content. 
Although product variation plays a Significant role In Chamberl1n's 
model, it is not clear whether technology was to be held constant or not. But 
since he stressed product variation, It is reasonable to assume that 
Innovation would play a significant role In the process. Indeed, he 
subsequently admitted that 8n entrepreneur would need to innovate to break 
away from the establ1shed order of things. -The appearance on the market of 
every new product creates pressure in some degree on the markets for 
others, and when products are variable and determined by profit 
maximization some of this pressure Is bound to be exerted on qua1tty In order 
to maintain prices which people can afford to pay. -0 Technical change 
"0. McNulty (196&) bu ,xt.eoded the pbr-icaJ anaJOI)' to equate the concept 01 perfect compeUtioo 
to a perfect ncuum: "not an 'orderJnc force' but rather an UIUmed 'Itate of affaln· ... IlJld.. pp. 
643. 
"1.llJld.. pp.6<tJ. 
42. Chamberlin. NODOpoll,lic Co.,.lilioD. pp. 5 • 
• .,. OlamberJin. -Product U Variable." pp. 131. -ThUI. In a world nOie tecbnolOlY II cODItantJy 
treatina nn producll. it Ibould DOt be lurprilinc to find that a part of the wbole procesl il lbe 
deterioration of other producll in order to .ate roo. for the Oft' ones at the mUI market It"el 
where the populaUoo JI cooceot.rated. - 1I1d. 
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therefore continues to unfold as firms adjust to emerging compettttve 
conditions in the market environment. 
Despite these dynamic aspects, Chamberlin did not seek to recast his 
theory on an expl1c1t evolut10nary forge. This was left to Alch1an who sought 
to replace the notion of profit maximization with the biological concept of 
natural selection. -The suggested approach embodies the principles of 
biological evolution and natural selection by interpreting the economic 
system as an adoptive mechanism which chooses among exploratory actions 
generated by the adapt1ve pursu1t of 'success' or 'prof1t'..... Competlt1ve 
behaviour among firms, he argued, was not determined by the motive of 
profit maximization, but by -adaptive, imitative, and trfal-and-error-
behav10ur 1n the search for prof Us. Success was influenced and re1nforced 
by previous success, not motivation. The fact that successful firms were 
still in the market was not a result of their profit maximizino behaviour but 
because others had been eliminated. The situation 1s clearly Darwinian: 
-[T]hose who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer 
losses d1sappear·. '" He rejects the eff1cacy of the entrepreneur because 1n 
a world of fools there would still be profits. 4' 
Although Alchian gives a detailed assessment of the behaviour of firms 
1n a compet1t1ve env1ronment, he does not offer a convincing account of the 
role of technical change in economic natural selection. Part of the problem 
results from excessive emphasis on imitative behaviour to which much of the 
innovation is attributed. ·Adaptino behavior via imitation and venturesome 
innovation enlarges the model. Imperfect imitators provide opportunity for 
1nnovation, and the surv1val criterion of the economy determines the 
successful, possibly because imperfect, imitators. -47 But those who 
pioneer in innovating do so In response to changing market conditions. 
44. Alchian. ·Uncertainty. Evolution. and Ecooomic Theory," pp. 211. for 10 enlar,ement 01 
Alchian'lapproach, tee EDte (1951). PenrOle (1952) hu provided a critique of Alchiu'l llOdel. 
empbuizina the purpOliye aature 01 the profJt motive and the dangers 01 reJyJnc on biolOSicaJ 
.etaphora. 
45.11I1d., pp.215. 
46. 1IJ1d. • AIIO, lbe areater lbe uncerWotlea or me world. lbe areater II me poallblIIty lbat 
profits would 10 to yentureaome and lucty rather lban to 1001caJ. careful. flCt-ptberiDi 
indiyiduaJ •• " lIJid. 
47.lIJid., pp.219. 
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-Innovation is provided also by conscious wilful action, whatever the ultimate 
motivation may be, since drastic action is motivated by the hope of greater 
success as well 8S the desire to avoid impending failure. -45 This view 
ignores conditions under which innovation becomes a critical competnive 
tool; it sets in motion the imperatives for its constant improvement. 
As in neo-classical approaches, Alchian treats technical change as 
exogenous to economic evolution. It is merely brought into play for purposes 
of adaptation to the changing market environment but does not necessarily 
shape those conditions. But 1n spite of the shortcomings, Alchfan provides a 
useful sta rting point for incorporating innovation into the economic natural 
selection processes. Alchian did not seek to reframe all economic theory 
into an evolutionary outlook. He restricted his analysts to ftrm behavtour, 
especially on the irrelevance of the notion of profit maximization.49 
Institutional economiCS, or institutionalism, provided one of the 
earl1est bases for evolutionary concepts. Institutionalism was not itself a 
coherent package of analyttcal tools, but a diverse collection of critical 
tdeas bunt on 8 theoretical and methodological reJect10n of conventtonal 
economics. It revolved around Veblen, Mitchell, and Commons. 50 They were 
dissatisfied with the neo-classical preoccupation with abstractions, 
demanded the integration of other social sciences into economtc thought, 
and rejected the casual empiricism of conventional economics. 
Veblen argued that economic activity evolved in an unfolding sequence, 
consistent with the the close-knit body of theory required for any 
evolutionary scfence. But conventional economics had remained at the shge 
where -the natural sciences passed through some ttme back-. ,1 The tools of 
economic analysis were stf1l taxonomic. Veblen sought to reformulate the 
contextual setting of economics. -There is the economic Ufe process still in 
.f3. /IUd. 
49. Bouldina attempted to feltructure economici and brina it io tioe with ecolocicaJ dYlWIlicl. 10 
fact. be did 001 recODltructlCODOIDic theory but limply embellilhed it with aD ecolOCicaJ CaDOPY. 
He loupt to defend economiC! u a bard Icieoce, a dilclpline bued on abltraclionl. -.t mUit OeYef 
be forcotteo that economici il aD abltraction, userul aDd 08Cellary u it ii, - Bouldiq, A 
I'CIID,IrIlCIIIID, pp. 3. The main tast or bl1 yort YO -to improye the abIlrIClion, - IIIId., pp. ,. 
'0. See Blaul, ECIIDII.ic Tllllllry, pp. 673. Speqler (1974) loots io detail at foatitulJonaJil. 
lioc:e 1776. See "10 Bouldiq (1957) for • boetile .1 .. I.ent of inltitutiooaJ ICODOtIicl. 
'I. V.bln, lip. &il., pp.334. 
9reat measure awa1tin9 theoretical formulation. -52 Industry and technol09Y 
are the motive power behind this process. -The act1ve material In wh1ch the 
economic process goes on is the human material of the industrial 
community. For the purpose of economiC science the process of cumulative 
change that fs to be accounted for is the sequence of change in the methods of 
doing things, -- the method of dealing with the material means of 11fe.-" 
Veblen was writing at the turn of the century when the role of 
technological change in economic evolution had become apparent, but was 
largely unexplained. To him, everyone was intractably trapped in the 
evolutionary sweep of technological advancement. -Under the stress of 
modern technological exigencies, men's every-day habits of thought are 
fall1nQ into the l1nes that in the sciences constitute the evolutionary methodi 
and knowledge which proceeds on a higher, more archaic plane is becoming 
alien and meaningless to them. The soctal and political sciences must follow 
the drift, for they are already caught in it. -54 
Veblen emphasized the role of technological change, broadly defined 
to Include both hardware and know-how. but his work did not manifest a 
coherent analysis of the role of technological change In economic evolution. 
Moreover. he stressed industrial arts to a point that bordered on 
determinism. The adage. neceSSity Is the mother of invention was reversed; 
invention had become the mother of necessity. Technological change was an 
inherent aspect of social evolution and stil1 took place despite economic 
factors. This line of reasoning has recently been pursued by Gordon In an 
attempt to unify the various elements of institutional economics. To Gordon, 
"a new scientific discovery general1y occurs because it is the next natural 
step In a technological sequence. not because someone wants to solve such 
52. IlJitl.. pp.387. 
53.IIJId. 
54. Ibid.. pp. 397. Veblen pIKed hi. I9Olutlonary conception In an endOieDOUl Inltltutlonal 
CODtext: "From what hu been laid it appears that an I9Olutionary economici mUlt be the theory of a 
procen 01 cultural Ifowtb u determined by the economic Intertllt. a theory of a cu.ulatm 
nquenc:. of ecooomic imtitutiou ltated in ter .. of the proc ... il .. I1.· ilJid.. pp. 393. 
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and such a problem and goes out and does It or because the profit motIve 
called for a labour-saving rather than a capital-saving innovation. ·55 
This view was based on John Dewey's instrumentalist philosophy and 
has become pervasIve In some sections of InstItutional thinkIng In the United 
States. Latter-day advocates of this positfon Include OeGregori who argues 
that there are no limIts to growth as a ·sustainable economy is one that 
continually evolves in the use of science and technology to create new 
resources· .56 This view is not held by all institutionalists. Ayres and his 
followers point out that SOCIal forces can arrest teChnologIcal progress just 
as much as technological change can disrupt social institutions.57 
Gordon obviously elevates Veblen's position to its absurdity, but that is 
a different problem. The Issue at hand IS the self-propelling dynamism that 
is accorded to technological change. There are several problems with this 
pOSition. Firstly. such a view ignores the uneven distribution of the potential 
for technological change; why some societies develop particular technologies 
and others do not. Secondly, this kind of reasoning leads to some form of 
technological fatal1sm based on the assumed Inev1tabl11ty of cumulative 
change; because technological change is inevitable. there would be no need to 
do anything about it, except to wait helplessly for its emergence and 
consequences. Thirdly, and more fundamental. this view underestimates the 
role of external or environmental factors in technological evolution. In this 
view the external factors which shape the selection process and the unfolding 
cumulative sequence are excluded from analysis; the evolutionary context is 
therefore weakened. Veblen often suggested new directions for analysis but 
left them undeveloped. The role of technological change 'n the process of 
economic evolution had therefore to await the analysis of Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter was a neo-classical thinker, yet his work contained both 
Imp11clt and explicit evolutionary notions. He was admittedly Influenced by 
55. Gordon. ISI/i/u/ills.1 EClIslI.ic •• pp. 12. We are furtber told: "The cur .. for the COllUDOQ 
cold and for cancer wm come 11 the appropriate Illie In lbe IYOlution of our technolocy. but DOt 
becalJle we are d .. perate for cur ..... and a Iquad or lcientiltl hu been ulianed lbe tat of findlDi 
these cures. If wilblOl and cOOIcioUily di'ertllll resources to lbe tot could do the lob. w. would 
bp. bad a cure for cancer 10111110.· /11/11. 
56. DeGreaori. "Technological Umitl to Forecaatl or Doom.· pp. I. Thi. yiew I. explored in detail 
in DeGrecori. TlJllorr IIF TIlt'lJslI/olJ'. 
57. Ayrel. TIJ, TIJ'lIrr of Et'oso.l& Prolrllll. 
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Walras and Marx. 53 It is apparent that Schumpeter was influenced by both 
static and dynamic economic theories. By locating economic transition In the 
broader context of social change, Schumpeter adopted an evolutionary model 
In which technological change and the efficacy of the entrepreneur as an 
innovative agent played the most significant role. 59 However, because of his 
Walrasian influence, he used the notion of equilibrium as a theoretical norm. 
The Schumpeterlan economic system carried strong evolutionary 
notions. "The essential pOint to grasp Is that In dealing with capitalism we 
are dealfng with an evolutionary process. "60 The capitalist system can never 
be statlonary.61 What then propels the evolutionary system of capltal1sm? 
"The fundamental Impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion 
comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new market, the new forms of Industrial organization 
that capitalist enterprise creates. -62 The changes -t1lustrate the same 
process of industrial mutation -- If I may use that biological term -- that 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destrOying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of 
Creative Destruction Is the essential fact about capitalfsm. -63 
In his early work, Schumpeter analyzed not the process of evolution 
Itself. but the dynamics which bring it about. ·Not how the economic process 
developed historically to the state in which we actually find It, but the 
workings of its mechanism or organism at any given stage of development, is 
58. "WaJru pnwided the foundations for bit edifice. but Marx IDUelled to bim the Ilethod for 
build ina on that foundation I .tructure that reflecu bll own "llioo'." Smithies. "Memorial." pp. 
la. 
59. Scbumpeter', theory or InnOYllioo In bl, early wort ... IUptly dJrrerentfrOil that presented 
in bil later Itudiel. See Sweezy. "M..-x," pp. 117. and Freeman ,I.l. Us,.pIIlY.'s!. pp. 35-
43.for detaill. 
60. Schumpeter. C.pll.lil •• pp.82. 
61. "And thil eyolutiooary .•. procell J. not merely due to the fact that economic ur"DeI on In I 
locial and natural en,ironment wblcb cbances and by lu cbance It alten the dill of econoaic 
action: thi. fact J. important and theae chanael (,n1'l. revolutions and 10 00) oIten condltioo 
economic chanae. but they are not lu prime 1IIO\'e.n. Nor II thil eyoluUonary cbarlCter due to I 
qual-automatic increase In popUlation and capital or to the nprlea or IIODetary l)'lteml or wblcb 
exutJy the lame thina bold true.- ilid.. pp.82-83. 
'2. Ilid.. pp.13. 
63./lid. 
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what we are to analyse. -64 The influence of Walras and Marx can be noted at 
this metaphorical level In his reference to the mechanism or organism of the 
economic process. He attempts to blend the two. Schumpeter fol1ows Marx's 
cue by reJectfng the hasty generaltzatfons arisfng from the Darwinfan 
·postulate that 8 nation, 8 civtlisation, or even the whole of mankind, must 
show some kind of uniform uniltnear development-. 65 He also rejects the 
Newtonian view of society by asserting that historical ·chanoes constitute 
neither a circular process nor pendulum movements ebout e centre.-" 
There is a difference between Marx and Schumpeter which deserves 
mention. Marx started his analysis With soclo-economlc fluctuations and 
suggested that society would move towards equilibrium as classes disappear 
and fnstitutfons such as the state Wither away. He thus collapsed fnto the 
Cartesian-Newtonian tradition. Schumpeter, on the other hand, started his 
analysis by assuming an equilibrium state but emphasized the manner in 
which the equ111brlum was destab11tzed. Consequently, Marx was more 
interested in the abolition of capitalism while Schumpeter was interested in 
the sources and effects of instab111ty in the economic system. 
For Marx soclaltsm would emerge from the collapse of capltal1sm 
while for Schumpeter it would result from the success of capitalism. 
Ironically, a Marxist position would lead to counter-evolutionary 
consequences as the sources of variability, competition, and selection are 
eliminated. This is a logical impossibility if the view that social systems are 
in constant flux Is accepted. There Is a tendency In the Schumpeterlan 
system for the situation to return to a near-equilibrium state as investment 
opportunities shrint and the role of entrepreneurs becomes obsolete. 
Schumpeter's theory of economic development emphasized the 
endogenous forces which bring about economic evolution. For economic 
development to occur, a society had to do more than just adapt to changfno 
market conditions. If -the phenomenon that we call economic development is 
in practice simply founded upon the fact that the data change and that the 
economy continuously adapts itself to them, then we shall say that there 1s 
64. Sc:bumpet.er. TJJ~orr 01 D~r~/op.~Dt. pp. 10. 
65. IlJid.. pp. 57. 
66. IlJitl.. pp. 53. 
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no economic development· .67 In the Schumpeterian system, development is 
understood as ·changes In economiC Itfe as are not forced upon It from 
without but arise by Its own Initiative. from within·. 6& The transition Is both 
cumulative and pre-conditional: ·Every concrete process of development 
final1y rests upon preceding development ••• Every process of development 
creates the prerequisites for the following". 69 
His evolutionary theory of development transcends the notions of 
circular economic flows and the tendency towards general equilibrium. 70 
The changes In the circular flow and the destabiltzatfon of equt11brlum result 
In the sphere of industry and commerce (on the supply side) not In the area 
of ·wants of the consumers of final products" (on the demand side). The shift 
Is not, by definition, mlnori It is one· which SO displ6ces its equilibrium 
point th6t th6 new one c6nnot be re6ched from the old on6 by 
infinitesim61 steps. Add successively as many man coaches as you 
please. you will never oet a raHway thereby·. 71 
Schumpeter emphasizes further the evolutionary view of economic 
change In his Business Cycles: ·[I]t Is to physiology and zoology -- and not 
to mechanics -- that our science Is Indebted for an analogous distinction 
which is at the threshold of all clear thinking about economic matters·. 72 
He defines economic evolution as the ·changes In the economic process 
brought about by Innovation, together with all their effects. and the 
responses to them by the economic system" .73 
In his analysis. Schumpeter employs the same technique used by 
Marshall In which static abstractions form the theoretical norm: 
67. /!JIII.. pp.63. 
M.III11. 
69. /!Jill.. pp.64. 
70. ·It il lpootaDeoul and dilcootJoUOUl cbanae in the cblDDell of the rtcnr. dilturblDCe 01 
equilibrium. wbicb for...,. aJten and displaces the equilibriull ltate prI"ioUily exiltiq. Our 
theory of deyeloplll8llt il notbiDi but a trnlJDeDt 01 thil pbenomenoo and the procnltll incident to 
it.· ilJitl. 
71. "itl. 
72. Scbumpeter. 8UIID~1I O'e/II. pp.37. 
73. /!JIII.. pp. 86. Circular economic rlon are ,Ietted by Scbumpeter u the circulation 01 blood in a 
dOl. but the Itudy of tbil circulation doea not Ibcnr bcnr dOlI come to exilt at aU. ·ObYiOUlly. we 
haYe hen a different procen Woe. us.lnYolyinc different r.ell and c:ooc:epll luch U lelectlon or 
aulalion or.lenerally • ...,Iutioo.· ilitl.. pp.36. 
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For our present argument we may thus visualize an economic 
process which merely reproduces itself at constant rates: a 
given population, not changing In either numbers or age 
distribution, organized for purposes of consumption In 
households and for purposes of productfon and trade In firms, 
lives and works In an unchanging physical and social 
(instftutionat) envlronment. 74 
By holding such factors constant. various neo-classlcal tools could be 
applied. The production function was one of them. According to SChumpeter. 
the production function -tells us all we need to know for purposes of 
economic analysis about the technological process of production-. 75 
Innovation, the central force In the Schumpeterlan system, Is defined simply 
-as the setting up of 8 new production functfon". 76 More spec1ftcal1y. 
Innovation is understood 8S - 6 ch6nge in some production function 
which is of the first Ind not of the second or I still higher order 
of m8gnitude -.77 
The disequt1ibrium caused by technical change necessitates difficult 
adaptations among firms to the changed environment. The situation starts to 
look ecological; the disruption of homeostasis in the ecosystem also opens up 
new opportunities for adaptation and flourishing of some speCies, niches for 
this matter. Schumpeter aptly ca11s this economic space. 78 The creatfon of 
74. Ilid.. pp. 38. 
75. Ilid. See Attinlon and Stilli~ (1969) fot a critique of the production fuoc:tiOD approacb. The 
article Itretlet Jocal learni .... "bicb II a critical upect of the accumulatioo 01 firm-le"l 
techDoJOIical capability. 
76. Ilid.. pp. 87. "But"bat dominllel the picture of capitalilt life and il more than anytbilll elle 
rllpDDlible for our l.prealiOD of a prlftleoce of decreulDi COlt. CIUlilll dllequilibrla. cutthroat 
competition and 10 OD. il iDDcwatiOD. the latrUlioa Into lbe l)'Item 01 DeW production fuoc:tiODl 
wbicb incealantJy IbiftexiltiOC CGIltcunea: Ilid.. pp.91. 
77. II/d.. pp.94. 
7&. -For lOI8e of the 'old' fir •• DeY opportunltill fot expaoaiOll open up: the DeW methodl or 
commoditiet create New Ecooomic Space. But for otben the emerleoc:e 01 the DeY method. meaDI 
economic death: for .till othen. cODtrKtiOD and driftilll into the bactlound. finally there are 
firlll and indUitrill wbicb are rorced to underlo a difficult and painful prOCIII of aodernlDliOD. 
ratiODalizatiOD and recoo.tructiOD, -111d., pp. 134. He addl: "It Ibould be oblemld that thll' yital 
partl of the mecbanllm of economic eYolutlOD. wblcb are readily IIID to dominate many bUiloen 
lituatiODl and to produce rllultl of fundamental importaoc:e. can DeYer be reyeaJed ltatJltically by 
lIflUuriDi nriatiOD 10 an Index 01 productiOD. or analyzed theoretically io ter •• or total output.-
Ilid. 
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economic space or market niche leads to the swarming towards new 
Innovattons by Imitators as the copying or modification of newly-Introduced 
technoloQies become increaSingly possible. In the Schumpeterlan system 
such opportunities come In clusters and are unevenly dtstrlbuted. 79 The 
changes which result from these disequilibria are not smooth as a Darwinian 
curve would tend to show, but they proceed In Jerks and rushes. But it Is 
stt11 possible to locate their eplcentre. "In every span of historic time It Is 
easy to locate the Ignition of the process and to associate It with certain 
Industries and, within these IndustrIes, with certain firms, from which the 
disturbances then spread over the system. -ao 
Schumpeter vlsualfzes a situation where Investment opportunities 
vanish and the entrepreneurial function becomes obsolete, forcing the 
economy Into near-equilibrium soclalfst practice. al This was a glance Into 
future based on emerging realities. "Technological progress Is Increasingly 
becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what Is 
required and make It work tn a predictable way. The romance of earlier 
commercIal adventure Is rapIdly wearIng away, because so many more 
things can be strictly calculated that had of old to be vlsua1tzed In a flash of 
genlus. oa2 Finally Schumpeter delivers his ultimate prognosis: ·Since 
caplta1tst enterprIse, by Its very achievements, tends to automatIze 
progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous - to break to 
pieces under the pressure of Its own success. 083 
79. °Fint. the innonlions do not remain ilolated "entl. and are not "enly diltributecf in time. 
but. .. they tend to clUiter. to come about in bunches. limply beclUle lome. and then 1I00t. firlll 
follow in the wate of luccnlful Innonlion: lecond. that innonliODllfe not at any time diltributed 
oyer the wbole economic l)'ltell It randoaa. but tend to concentrlle In cenaJn lecton and their 
lurroundinp.· ilid.. pp. 100-JOI. 
aD. /lid.. pp. 102. 
81. °A more or 1811 lta1iooary ltatewould enaUl. Capitanl •• beiDi .lentiaJly an I9Olutiooary 
prOC8ll, would become atrophic. There would be nolhiDi fOf' entrepreneun to do. They would fJnd 
themaelv. in much the lame lituation u lenn. would 10 I .oclety perfectJy lur. or permanent 
peace. Profitl and ... th. rate or internt would conyer,. toward 1erO. The bourllOil Itrata that Ii" on 
the proritl and inter8lt would tend to dilappesr.The 8lIDlllement of IndUitry and trade would 
become a IIWter of current admioiltralion, and the panODoel would unaYOldlbly lequire the 
cbancteriltica of a bureaucracy,- 5chulDpet.er, C.pil.Ii,., pp. lSI. 
82. /lid.. pp. 152. 
83. /lid., pp. 154. 
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AlthouQh Schumpeter did not have much to say about Institutionalism, 
he edmltted thet his system opereted In en Instltutlonel context; ·It must be 
emphasized once more that our model and Its workinQ Is, of course, stronQly 
Institutional In character· .84 The model Is therefore en abstraction built on 
observations In one moment In history end could eastly vary as Institutions 
evolve over time. ·We must recoQnlze ••• that we are deallnQ with a process 
subject to Institutional chanQe and therefore must, for every historical 
record, see whether or not our model, however faithfully copied from the 
history of other periOds, still fits facts. -85 In this spirit, the crumbllnQ 
walls of capitalism constitute both the obsolescence of the entrepreneurial 
function and the destruction of the preval1lnQ Institutional frameworks. 
Schumpeter visualised an economic system that was flung far from 
equtllbrlum by Innovation and one which returned to a stationary (near-
equ111brlum). The return of the economic system to a nea r-equfllbrlum state 
associated with socialist organization suggests that Schumpeter's break with 
the neo-classlcal tradition was not as radical as It appears. The appeal to 
stable or near-stable systems that characterized the post-17th century 
Intellectual tradition Influenced Schumpeter's thinking Just It affected 
Marx's. Schumpeter's work, however, forms a siQnlficant starting point for 
the analysis of non-equtlfbrlum economic systems. 
1.4 [volutlonlry Approlches to Technicil Chlnge 
Schum peter has brouQht us to a crucial turnlnQ polnti from this 
vantaQe pOSition we shall now delve Into the Qlst of our assessment -- a look 
at the evolutionary theories of technoloQlcal change. But to understand 
clearly technologIcal evolution, we shall have fIrst to review the theories of 
the Qrowth of knowledge In Qeneral, and scientific knowledge In particular. 
Kuhn Introduced new ways of 100klnQ at the development of knowledge 
In Qeneral, and scientific knowledge In particular. Kuhn attacked the 
conventional view which attached a larQe measure of rationality to scientific 
84. Sc:bumpeter. Bu.ID' •• Cy,"'". pp. 144. 
85. /I/tI., pp.97. 
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practice and progress. He argued that scientific knowledge did not develop In 
a linear progression but In a series of historical stages of stability and 
disruption, taking a cyclical posture; all occurlng In a soclo-lntelJectual 
community. Before Kuhn, the development of scientific knowledge was often 
viewed as a ·development-by-accumulation" process. a6 But this cumulative 
process makes It Increasingly difficult for historians to account for 
discoveries which undermine the scientific edifice Instead of adding to It. 
This led Kuhn to formulate his sequential approach which starts with 
normal science and advances through anomaly. crisis and finally to 
scientific revolution. Kuhn's method combines both the dialectical 
approaches adopted by Marx and the evolutionary notions advanced by 
Darwln. 17 The Darwinian nottons acquire spec1ftc significance only In the last 
stages of his sequential framework. Normal science is the stage where 
"research is firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements I 
achievements that some particular scientifiC community acknowledges for a 
time as supplying the foundation for Its further practice".88 This Is the stuff 
that Is recounted tn textbooks. Normal SCience Is characterized by a 
dominant -paradigm- under which puzzle-solving is the mode of practice. 
At this stage. the developmen\ of scientific knowledge is cumulative. 
But the emergence of unexpected dlscovertes causes anomal1es In the 
paradigm. forcing the community to make some adaptations to the emerging 
view of reality. The perSistence and penetration of anomaly leads to a crisis 
In the dominant paradigm. -Because It demands large-scale paradigm 
destruction and major shifts In the problems and techniques of normal 
SCience, the emergence of new theories is oenerally preceded by a period of 
pronounced professional Insecurity which Is generated by the perSistent 
fatlure of the puzzles of normal science to come out as they should. -a, The 
16. "J( acieoc:l ia the cooatellatioo of (actl. theorin. and methoda collected in current f.IXtI, then 
lCi8DUI~ .... the ID8D who, luccealfully or DOt. bue atriY8D to contribute ooe or another element to 
tbI1 particular cooatellatioo. Scientific cODItellation becomes the piecemeal procesl fiy wblcb 
thne iteml baYe been added. liOlly and In COIIbination. to the eYIf arcnriOl ltockpile that 
COOltituta Iclentlflc tecbnlqUiand koowledle.- (ubo. Structur, tJr 1'~tJlutJtJJlI. pp. 1-2. 
17. Kubo'laproacb t8l8mbl. the pUDCtUlled equilibrium model 01 biolOClcaJlYolutlon dlYeloped 
by Eldred,e and Gould (1972). 
83. Kuhn. tip. ~Jt.. pp. 10. 
a9. II/d.. pp.97-93. 
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response to the crIsIs Includes a serIes of modIfIcatIons to exlst1ng theorIes 
to accommodate the anomaly. But the situation fs ultimately resolved with 
the emergence of a new paradlgm.90 Paradigms are rejected only after 
alternat1ve ones have been found, after whIch the sItuation returns to normal 
to start another paradigmatic cycle. Scientific revolutions or paradigm 
shifts are therefore major changes in the dominant world view. 91 
There are several problems with Kuhn's view. Although he admits that 
scientific knowledge develops In a socfo-Intellectual context, he does not 
examine the soclo-economlc context whIch shapes the emergence of 
particular paradigms. His approach is akin to Marx's concept of discontinous 
change. In Marx, however, there Is constant struggle which leads to the 
overthrow of one class by another. But In Kuhn, the period of normal science 
is relatively peaceful, with the scientific community subsumed in the 
Intricacies of puzzle-solving. Despite the difference, the theory Is largely 
dialectical; it bears apparent hallmarks of the materialistic conception of the 
development of knowledge. 92 Kuhn admits that he has ·sald nothing about the 
role of technological advances or of external SOCial, economiC, and 
intellectual conditions In the development of the sciences. ·93 He only 
acknowledged the implications of external conditions, especially turning 
anomaly Into a source of acute crisis.'" The fact that Kuhn acknowledges 
these factors and leaves them unexplained does not vindicate him. 
Kuhn emphasizes on the emergence of anomaly and the development of 
crises. This may be useful as an analytical tool, but it also downplays the 
evolutionary process that the development of scientific knowledge 
90. "Often a on pandi&ID emeraes, at leut 10 embryo, before a crlill bu denloped far or been 
explicitly recognized,' IIJId., pp.86. 
9 .. Thil .odel bu receind a wide noaa or critlcil., _ioly froll pbilOlopbical and 
epilteaaolocical lbodpoinll. Kuhn bu I'ftiaed and, lublequently abandoned tbe tena ",andie-", 
nplaclnalt with the notion of "dilciplinary .atrix", IlJid., pp. 1&2. See LatIlOl II 6l (1970) for 
a collection or critici ... qainat Kubo. 
'2. Coben bu araued that "Kubo'l eslay il buicatly dialectical materialilt, thouth Kubo hilllletr 
totes 00 lucb claim, and be apparently falll to lee aU tbe dialectical illplicationa or the 
problem." Cohen, "Dlalecticl and Scientific RevolutlOOl," pp.327. 
93. Kubo, tip. ell., pp. x. 
'4. "The lime exlllple would IIIUltrate the way 10 wblch conditlonl oullide the lciences lDay 
influence the nnee of aJternatiy. anJlable to the lIlao who leeb to end a crilil by propOlina ODe 
• another reYOlutiooary rel._." illid. 
undergoes. As 8 result, the concept of selection becomes significant only as 
anomaly sets In and the crisis builds up. Adaptation occurs In the early 
periods of anomaly but selection has to await the emergence of alternative 
paradigms. The resolution of the crisis Is merely the selection of the fittest 
way to conduct research. Here Kuhn takes the position of rtJv()/uti()nlJry 
selecti()n, a dialectical method indeed. 95 This also implies that at anyone 
moment there Is only one dominant paradigm, a factor that underestimates 
the growth of diversity In theories and testing methods. 
By emphasizing anomalies and revolutionary sh1fts, the Kuhnlan 
framework does not reveal much about the cumulative changes which 
constitute technological evolution. This problem Is more pronounced when 
dea11ng w1th technology, for technological systems either work or they do 
noti the triumph of one technological system over another Is much more 
complicated than would be assumed in the case of scientific work. Many of 
the determining factors originate from outside the technical imperatives 
themselves. These external factors also influence the path and 
characteristics of puzzle-solVing. Although Kuhn thought that the applfcation 
of his method to technology would add an Important analytical dimension for 
scientific evidence, not much has been done along these lines. An Interesting 
attempt was made by Constant In his study of the turbojet using a model that 
"parallels Thomas Kuhn's model for science". 96 
Constant adopts the Kuhnian approach with minor modifications. He 
defines a technological paradigm as being more than "just a device or 
process, but like a scientific paradigm, Is also rationale. practice. 
procedure. method. Instrumentation. and a particular shared way of 
perceiving a set of technology". 97 Normal technology Is viewed as the 
95. "The net result or , lequeDCe or luch re9olutiooary IIlectiODl. leparated by perioda or noraal 
.... earch. il the wODd ..... ully adapted Ht of inltruments yt call aodern Identific tnowledle. 
Sueceali.e Itqea in that d8gelopmental proceu art marted by an iocr .... in articulation and 
.pecialization. And the enUre proceal may haye occured. u we now suppose biological eYoluUon 
did. without benefit of • let 1011, • permanent fixed Icientific truth .••• • ilid.. pp. 172-173. 
96. CoosllDt •• A Model for TechoolOlical ChlDle.· pp. 553. Other attempts to apply the pltldipa 
concept to technical cbanle Include Freeman (1979), who arauea that the demand-led IMontlon. 
and technolOlY-pUlh chlD8ea are analOioUi with the Kuhnian concepts of normal Idence and 
p..-.diplhilts. 
97. Illd.. pp.554. 
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articulation or appltcation of technical change to conventtonal systems. Uke 
in Kuhn. e paradigm shift Is only significant in the limited area of 
practitioners -and has no connotation of social or economic magnitude-. 93 
Everything remains in the domain of practitioners. 99 
It is not clear when the revolution starts because what are considered 
as -tradition- and -slgntf1cant minority- remain so vaguely defined that they 
provide no coherent meaning in the model. Part of the problem lies in the 
fact that Constant does not treat technological change as part and parcel of 
the socio-economic transition. He prefers to restrict his analysis to the 
community of practitioners as If the group operates in a socio-economic 
vacuum. As we have already argued, if technological change is the motive 
force behind economic evolution. then its dynamics would have to operate 
within the socio-economic setting. As a result of this inadequacy. the study 
is reduced to a description of what happened, without analysing how and why 
it did; its exphnatory power has been undercut. Constant deals with a wide 
range of technological options along the historical path of the turbojet engine 
but the 1ssue of select10n Is not seriously addressed. 
The concepts of selection and cumulative change are vitel in 
evolutionary theory. But they would be meaningless if they did not include 
perception. imitation. learning and thought; if they were not located In an 
epistemological context. Popper's work in epistemology manifests a strong 
evolutionary approach, which he claims developed independent of the post-
Darwinian thinkers. tOO -[W]hat characterizes the empirical method is its 
manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to 
be tested. Its aim Is not to save the Uves of untenable systems but, on the 
contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing 
98.111d. 
99. -In t.ec:booiocy, u in leienee, that r8901utioo oceUR wben a lilllifielllt portion or the re18911lt 
cOIIUDunity IbUta ita prol' ... ional COIlJIlltmellt to a new pandiam and beclnl a new noraal 
t.ec:hoolocy ... le¥olutloo occun oot wben the new I}'1tem II operational. oot wben Ita uol,enally 
accepted. not when It lint wortl. but wh81lit i. adopted u the foundation of a Dormal tecbnoJOCfcal 
tradition by a Ilpificlllt minority 01 the rel8ftllt COIIUDunity. - i/Jid.. pp.556. 
100. Popper. O/Jj.cli,.. KDO"I.dlll.. pp. 67. -My OW'D approacb bu b88ll lomewblllDdepeodeot 
or IDOIt of these Influeocn, thoup I read with &real internt Dot ooly D .... in ... but allO Uoyd 
Morpo IIld Jeooinp durilll the yean before writJIlI .y fint boot .•• J laid &real Itrnl upon the 
diltinc:tloo between two problems 01 toowledce: llileoeail or hiltory ••• aod the problem 01 Ita truth. 
nJidity. and 'iustificdion' on the other.· 1I1d. 
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them all to the fiercest struggle for survival. -101 In Popper's world. 
theories are selected l1ke species in a compet1tive environment. 
The preference of a theory is not based on experimental justification 
or its logical reduction of the theory to reality. but on selection. I02 A 
theory which cannot be falsified is therefore not scientific. Popper's 
evolutionary epistemology undertakes to recapitulate the development of 
language from animal to human stages, on one hand, and to re-state the neo-
Darwinian position of error-elimination. on the other .103 This -error-
elimination may proceed either by the complete elimination of unsuccessful 
forms (the k111ing-off of unsuccessful forms by natural selection) or by the 
(tentative) evolution of controls which modify or suppress unsuccessful 
organisms.-or forms of behaviour, or hypotheses. -11M 
Popper has thus offered a natural-selection epistemology embodying 
variation, selection and retention of adaptations which cover a hierarchy of 
knowledge processes, including thought, viston, imitation, language and 
scientific method. It may appear that Popper was only concerned with 
epistemology as it relates to science. This is not the case because he 
extended his analysis to cover what he called -exosomat1c evolution-. or 
technology for that matter. The evolutionary process and its knowledge 
content continues long after the evolution of organs has ceased. 105 
101. Popper, Llllic III' ScilJlllil'ic DilcllJOlJry. pp.42. 
102. ·We cbooee the theory which belt hold. ill own in competitioo with other thlOl'iel: the ODe 
which, by natural •• Iectioo, proy .. ill.lf the fitlelt to luni ••. Thil wil~ be the one which DOt only 
baa hitherto ltood up to the I"erelt tesll, but the ODe whicb il allO testable in the moat riCoroUi 
way. A theory il I tool wbicb we test by applyinc it. and wbicb WI Jud.e u to ill litoe .. by the 
reault of illapplicalion, -llJitl., pp. 108. Popper (1963) expandl thil theme to include trial-and-
error methodl: or conJecturea and refutatlODl. 
J 03. -And It conllill of a certain yin of I'olution u a arcnriq bierarcbical I}'1te11l or plutfc 
controls, and of a certain yin of orpni ... u incorporatiDi -- or in the cae of aan, eYOl.ine 
eXOIIOIDllically -- thil crowine bien.rcbicall)'ltea of plutic controll. The neo-Darwinian thlOl'Yof 
.. olution Is alumed: but it II restated by pointine out that ill '.utationl' lilY be Interpreted u 
aore or Iell accidental trlaJ-and-error pmbill, and 'natural selection' u ODe way of eontrollinc 
them by error elimination: Popper, OlJjlJ&ll" KDD,,16d,6. pp.242. 
104. IlJitl. 
105. -AIII •• /6'II/uIIDDproceedllarply, thouah not extlUliYely, by the modification of orpns 
(or beh •• iour) or the emerlenc. of ow orpnl (or beha.lour). HU •• II 1J'II/ulllIlI proceed., larlely, 
by d"elopiq nn orpn. IIUllid. tlur IJlldilJ' Dr plJrllllll: 'exOiOIDatically' •.• Theae nn orllDS 
are tooll, or weapons, or aac:hiDel, or houaer.. -'lJltI., 233. See Campbell (1974) for • detailed 
expo.ition or eYOlutionuy episa.e.olOlY. 
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Th1s concept has profound 1mp11catlons for the process of 
technological evolution. Although the acquisition and accumulation of 
knowledge, as we shall see later, has come to be recognized as a vital 
aspect of technological evolution, epistemological theories are still a11en to 
this field. This Is partly because the study of technological change has 
largely been treated as a domain for economists while epistemology has 
remained a sub-set of philosophy or psychology. 10' 
Recent approaches which take epistemological issues into 
conslderatton Include Constant's work. Constant starts from the Popperlan 
premise that technology ·is knowledge, and as such is qualitatively no 
different from any other knowledge that Is the property of any other 
entity· .107 From the simplest micro-organism to the height of human 
geniUS, knowledge Is seen to be based on the mechanisms of random 
variation and selective retention. Although the behaviour of the oroanlsm is 
limited by the genetiC coding, the selection of mutants (those which contain 
successful characteristics) Is mediated by the environment. Constant builds 
his model on this analogy. 
He retains the fectors which characterize the Kuhnian normal science 
phase, but introduces the notion of selection. The articulation or application 
of 8 conventional system under new or more stringent conditions may lead to 
its failure. The selection of a solution to this functional faf1ure depends on 
• ex post compet1t1on among proposed alternatives· .103 The process of 
selectino a solution does not come from the community of practitioners, but 
from those acquainted with the technological tradition. This selection often 
106. Ulher'l elulle NI,llIry III N,ell'IIIe,1 /11"11//11111 YU one of the earliest Iltempll to 
examine technolOlical ebln&e in an epiltemolOlical eOOlext. "The Cieslalt analylil preaenll tbe 
Khie.ementa or &reat men U a .pecial elal or KlI or iDlipt, which imotte synthesil or IIIJI)' 
items deri.,ed from other Kta or iDliaht. In ill entirety, the locial procesl or iMcwllion thus 
cOOIilta of Kta or inliaht or different d8p'MI or import.aocl and Il lIIIOy I ... tl or perception and 
thouaht. Theae leta coo.,er., in the coune or ti .. toward "'Iin syntheses,· ilJid., pp. 61. See 
atlo Ruttan. ·Ulher and Scbumpeter,· .,p. 602. See allo Solo (1951) for a critique of the 
Schumpeterian diltinction between imention and iMOYllion. 
107. Constant, Orlllll' III III, TurlJllj,l, pp. 6. Thil Popperian .iew baa been expanded by 
Campbell (t 966; 1974) to cOIlItitute what be calli a nested bierarchy of lelecU.,e-retentlon 
proces.es. Constant (1983) baa atlo applied the Popperian coocept or testability to tecbnicil 
cbanp. 
108. Constant, Orililll, pp. 13. 
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rel1es on the co-evolution of similar devices. "Transported to technology, 
the concept of co-evolution implies that the development of one set of 
devices may be linked intimately to the development of other devices within 
the same macrosystem, and that the two sets of devices may exert powerful, 
mutually selective pressure on each other. -109 
In this model, economic factors are recognized as significant, but do 
not play a homogenous role in the selection of technological systems. 
-Economics acts as a direct selector both for entire macrosystems and for 
1ndiv1dual subsystems. Perce1ved econom1c factors operate as v1car10us 
selectors during the process of technological change, and may serve in the 
first place to inspfre efforts towards such change. -liD The role of economic 
factors as selectors tends to vary with time and 1n the hierarchical levels of 
technological practice. This partial emphasis on economic factors is 8 result 
of Constant's limited area of study; he restricts the formal unit of analysis to 
the community of practitioners. ttl This view ignores the complex 
interl1nkages between technological, economic and institutional factors. To 
get away from th1s l1mited approach, we shall examine recent evolutionary 
theories of technical change from en economic viewpoint. 
Recent efforts to explain technical chanoe as an evolutionary process 
fall into four broad categories; those which examine innovation at ftrm-
level, those which .look at firm behaviour, those which emphasize 10no 
economic cycles, and those which view the market as a configuration of 
niches .112 The first one emphasizes the concept of learning. while the 
second stresses search and selection mechanisms. The third approach 1s 
concerned with technology development and diffusion while the fourth one is 
concerned with the evolution and market penetration of technological 
systems. The schools reject the neo-classical production function as a tool 
for analysis. The -learning-by-doing· school has a long history bunt on the 
growing rejection of the production function, especially with the recognition 
109. II/d., pp. 14. See ConItant (1978) for. detailed explanatioo of the Co-eyoJutionary procesl. 
110. II/d.. pp.27. 
. 111. -It il men, not instltutionl or Ioyernmenti. who ramrod the deyelopment 01 wbal to others may 
leem an unlikely deyice to the point 01 community uceptance, "11I1d.. pp.52. 
112. These categories exclude Itudies which eXlJlline internal technical deYelopmenti. See Sabal 
(1985) lor • Itudy which looks at the relatiooabip between Ii. and Itrvclure in technical 
.,.,lutloo. 
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that productfv1ty at firm-level could Increase without changes In factor 
inputsi the so-called -Horndal effect- .115 The concept of learning has been 
extensively analyzed by David and has given rise to a series of studies in the 
developing countries, especially In relation to Infant Industries .114 
David treats -technological progress as fundamentally In historica! 
evo!utionary process -, under which -the future development of the 
system depends not only on its present state but also upon the way the 
present system was developed- .115 There Is an element of historical 
Indlvlslbl11ty In this approach which enables one development to be linked to 
another. But the technical developments are local, neutral and stochastic: 
local because they are adaptive and Incrementali neutral because they do not 
have any factor-saving bias; and stochastiC because they do not manifest the 
Markovian processes which are drawn from classical mechanics. This 
process in not only endogenous but irreversible. 116 
David combined the Darwinian concepts of survival for the fittest with 
what he calls -the Mendelian principle of hertulity - .117 This establishes a 
l1nk between factor prices t chofce of technique and the rate and dlrectfon of 
global technological change in a -fundamentally evolutionary character- .lIa 
Moreover. the -drfft of technological developments generated over time 
within a fairly stable economic environment needs to be viewed ••• as a 
distinctively historicl! phenomenon, Inasmuch as it may arise through the 
myopic selections past producers made from amono the different speCies of 
techniques with which they originally had to work. -119 This approach 
provides a useful starting point for examining firm-level technical change. 
However, 1t lonores the various extra-ftrm factors such as Institutional 
mechanisms which influence selection. Furthermore. the selection 
115. The detaill Ire pr",ideeS in ArrfW (1962). 
114. These Itudies .... characterized by. Itqes-approach. u exemplified by Dahlman .t .l 
U9SI). 
115. David. T,cIJDlc.' Clllllc," pp.76. 
116 .• AI • result. •. previoUi economic confiaurationa become Jrr,,.lIc."y 100t. and in tryinc to 
wort backward I by entertainiq counterfactual nrlationl on the pment. one cannot hope to 
exhibit the wortlnc or hlltorlcal procesles. -"'If.. pp. I'. 
117. IIid.. pp.76. 
II S. /lilf.. pp. 61. 
119. Illilf. 
30 
presupposes a search process that can only be understood by examining 
market characteristics end firm beheviour. For an evolutionary approach 
that includes both search and selection, we shall turn to Nelson and Winter. 
Nelson and Winter reject the view that firms seek profit maximization 
and adopt the Alchfan approach which stresses economic natural selection. 
Like Schumpeter. they discount the value of general eQul1ibrlum theory. But 
un1tke Schumpeter, they discard the production function. Although the 
model is an attempt to break from neo-classical thinking, It stt11 uses tools 
adopted from mechanical physics such as the Markov chain, a fact that has 
led David to argue that the model still -remains fundamentDlIy neoclassical 
in spirie. 120 This claim is based on the assertion that since the Markov 
chatn Is bul1t on the present and not past situations. it Is ahlstorlcal. 121 
However, the notion of search and selection, which Is central to the model. 
assumes the pre-eXistence of technological posslbi11t1es: It must assume a 
historical retroaction. The process of Innovation therefore Involves both 
creating and discoverlngi both of which need a historical basis to take an 
evolutionary posture. -In many technological histories the new 1s not Just 
better than the old; in some sense the new evolves out of the old. One 
explanation for this is that the output of today's searches is not merely a new 
technology, but also enhances knowledge and forms the basiS of new bul1dlng 
blocks to be used tomorrow. -122 
The model rests on three basiC concepts. First, firms have a set of 
oroanizational routines which set out what is to be done and how it is done. 
Routine is the oenetic code of the firm; it carries the adaptive information 
required for competition and survival. The Information In the oenetlc code 
chanoes over time as experiences are selected and retDined. Second, firms 
undertake a search process which includes the evaluation of their routines 
for possible modification or replacement. Search routines stochastically 
generate innovations, or mutations for that matter. Third, there is the 
selection environment which Includes all the tactors which influence the 
well-being of the firm. This covers both the conditions prevai11no outside the 
120. Duid. lip. ~II .• pp. 76. 
121. For a defence or the Nellon-Winter model. He E1lter. Expl.i.I., CII •• ,#' pp. 156-157. 
122. Nellon and Winter. E,.I1II1III1 •• r)' TII_IIry. pp.255-256. 
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firm and the behaviour of other firms. "Differential growth plays much the 
same role tn our theory as tn biological theory; tn particular, it is tmportant 
to remember that tt ts ulttmately the fates of populations or genotypes 
(routines) that are the focus of concern, not the fate of Individuals. -123 
The model rejects the concept of profit maximtzation. It ts suggested 
that firms adopt a sattsfictng behavtour because ftrms that are suffictently 
profitable do not search for alternattve techntques. -They stmply attempt to 
preserve their existing routines, and are driven to consider alternatives 
only under the pressure of adversity. -124 The search process could either 
be local, concentrating on techniques close to the current ones; or tmitative, 
looting to what other firms are doing. And at firm-level tnnovatton tends to 
occur In a cumulative way following some natural trajectories wh1ch are 
defined by technical tnter-relatedness. 125 
Nelson and Winter did not apply their model to any spec1f1c firm or 
technological system, except for computer simulations which validated some 
of their theortes on techntcal change and competitton. Dost has attempted to 
apply 8 modified version of the approach to the study of the semiconductor 
sector. Dosi's work is interesting because it singles out those elements 
which are specific to technological change and synthesizes them with other 
theoretical frameworks to arrive at an analytical model that exposes the 
technological mechanisms which underly structural change. He combines the 
approach provided by Kuhn with the Rosenberg trajectories (which are 
modified in Nelson-Winter to become natural trajectories), and evolutionary 
concepts. The model reveals continuous progress along a defined 
technological trajectory wh1ch Is triggered and pulled by the endogenous 
mechanisms of Schumpetertan competitton. And this is associated with -the 
complementarities between different technologies and tndustries jointly with 
straightfoward economic Signals, such as changing relative prices, relative 
profitabi1ities and distributive shares·. 126 
123. lIid.. pp. 401. The lenetic analOlY i. explained in detail in Winter (1975). 
124. Jjid.. pp. 211. See al.o I"ai (1984) for • neo-Schumpeterian model or innovation and 
1.lmloo. 
125. Netaon and Winter, "In Search of a Useful Tbeory," pp.56-60. 
126. Doel. T,cIlAic.1 CII.AIII, pp. 2&1. See Puinetti (19&1) lor • macroeconomic model akin to 
Doar •. 
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Major contrIbutIons to the neo-Schumpeterlan tradItion have been 
associated with the study of cycles in economic development. The cycles, 
according to Mensch, are associated with a cluster of basic Innovations which 
establish new branches of Industry. The resulting economic expansion 
reaches limits and consequently a technological stalemate Is reached. 127 
The stalemate or depression then tnduces Innovations which come again tn 
clusters and put the economy on another orowth path. In Mensch's view new 
basic innovations are cal1ed upon during depression to replace those whose 
growth potential has been exhausted. 
This vtew ts rejected by Freeman tit 61. t who argue that the bunching 
of innovation associated with fundamental breakthrouohs tn science and 
technology lead to the availability of related families of technological 
systems. It Is this swarmino effect that leads to economic expansion, and 
not depression inducement. 128 While Mensch emphasizes the clusterino of 
tnnovations, Freeman tit III. stress the linking together of basic Innovations 
to bring about new technological systems that contribute to a Kondratiev 
upswIng. The escape from technological stalemate therefore depends on a 
combination of Innovations made before and during the depression as weH as 
during recovery. DepreSSion, Freeman 8t II. admit, may bring about 
changes in the political and social c1tmate which are favourable to the 
adoption of new technological systems. 129 
These neo-Schumpeterian studies, tnsofar as they emphasize 
evolutionary processes. assume technology 8S embodying known 
characteristics. They therefore do not engage with the process of Innovation 
itself but emphasIze Its consequences. However, the market environment tn 
which the innovations compete changes unevenly and therefore the prospects 
of entry are unevenly distributed over time and economic space, a view that 
casts doubts on the al1eoed periodicity of the Kondratlev long waves. 
127, Menlch. SI.ltlJ •• I, ID T'CJJDtJltJIYo pp. pH-pHi. 
128. ·Once narmlnc does ltart it bu powerful multiplier effects in leoeratlnc additional demand 
on the economy for capital ,oadl (of new and old types). for materiall. componenll. diltribution 
facilities, and of coune labour. Thll. In turn. Induces I further n,e of procesl and appUcltlona 
Innontlonl. It II lbll combination 01 related and Induced Innontlonl which IIYe rll' to 
explDlionary efrect. in the economy u • wbole,· Freeman ,t .l. lip. cil .• pp. 65. 
129. Pi ore and Sable (1984) haYe extended the role 01 iOltit~tiool in the adoption 01 new 
techno1oai ... 
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Moreover, the chanQlnQ market environment requires products to adapt to 
the new conditions. The market therefore becomes a configuration of niches. 
Consequently, 8 product Is designed to embody those characteristics that 
wtll enable it to adapt to a particular market niche. This Is the message 
provided by Abernathy til al. In the model of technological de-maturity. 
In this model. a product is a configuration of desiQn concepts which 
are adapted to particular market conditions. But the introduction of another 
Innovation may disrupt the market niche. making the exlstlnQ capital 
equIpment, labour skf1ls, materIals, components, manaQement culture and 
orQanlsetlons cepebtlttles obsolete: 
The stabtltzation of design concepts, In which industry 
maturity consists, makes productive units increasingly 
vulnerable to chanQes tn technology. market preference, and 
relative prices. As does a biological species that has become 
perfectly adapted to 8 particular environmental niche, 
mature Industries carry wIth them the Implicit threat of 
extinction or, at lent, catastrophe if environmental 
condItions should suddenly or radically shlft.nO 
If the disruptions are non-trivial, then the firm can adapt by making 
Incremental changes. But If they are substantial, then the firm is thrown 
back onto a new learnlnQ process. Such is the logic of de-maturity. lSI From 
this vantage point, the market can be conceived as an adaptive landscape 
where both products and the external environment (as well as the related 
Institutions) constantly chanQe. 
130. Abernathy 61 .l. IDdusui.1 I'D.lss.DC6, pp. 28-29. Ellewhere, Abernathy ,1 .l 
(l98~) ltate: 'AI the product and procen whoolOCies "olye and d"elop, they become lIore tobutt 
in the way they accoauDOClm the fullnnae of nrlety In the IxiltiqlDYironment. Lite the tr .. 
that d8Yelop an exteDIiYe root l)'IleID to weatber the dry 111000 It mUit occuionaUy face, 
lIWlI&8SDent refines and penec:lI a product oyer time to better Kcomodate the noal or nrialion in 
the martet. Yet a product and proc.I whDoloeY that becomes .ore hiahly orpoil8d and 
efficlent .. Jt allO bec:OIDSI more YUlnerable to ludden and unanticipated nriatiool in the 
lIOyirooment. The hi&bly productiYII, efficient and d8Yeloped product unit il allO more YUlnerable to 
economic death,' pp. IS. 
lSI. The concept or martet nicbel i, allO explored by Uoyd III .l (l97~), Kwunicta 61 .l 
(1983), and Businoo (1983). 
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1.5 Energy Martets as AdapUve Landscapes 
The previous sections have outUned some of the major contributions of 
evolutionary concepts to the economic as well as technical change 
literature. These contributions have gradually undermined the conventional 
approaches to technological change, especially those bunt on the 
mechanistic Cartesian-Newtonian world view. Conventional approaches, 
including those that appeal to evolutionary processes, do not adequately deal 
with the dynamics of technological change. This study offers an alternative 
approach where the energy market is seen as a techno-economic landscape 
in which different technological systems are adapted to the production and 
conversion of different energy forms. The landscape or terrain includes 
technical, economic, social, institutional and political int8rr8/ationships. 
The approach 18 therefore hol1sUc. 
1.5. 1 The structural setting 
Operating technological systems occupy dynamiC market niches which 
are maintained through technical. economic. social. polttfcal and 
institutional interactions. The niches are part of an open economic system. A 
techno-economic landscape Is an adaptive zone In which the technological 
system and the external soclo-economlc environment (together with 
institutions) constantly undergo fluctuations. The changes result from 
Innovations In the operating technical systems or from the Introduction of 
new technological systems. Alternatively. disruptive fluctuations (such as 
the lQ73 011 crisis) in the external environment may restructure the 
configuration of the niches and create suitable conditions for the Introduction 
of new technological systems. The changes are mediated by political and 
economic interests which form the basts of soclo-economlc expectations. 
The structure of the liquid fuels market. which constitutes the 
environment. defines the range of technologies that can be utt11zed. But the 
application of different technologies Is pre-determined by both technical and 
Botio-economic parameters. The techno-economic niche is therefore not a 
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stattc space In which 8 particular technology fits, but a result of changing 
technical and socio-economic configurations. The environment is not steble. 
It undergoes constant change. These changes can vary from the trivial to the 
drasttc. Under trivial environmental change, various energy systems 
undergo efficiency and reliability improvements as well as cost reduction. 
These are simply continuous adaptations to changing conditions. 
-But there are situations which are marked by major surprises in the 
environment. These changes may come from within the system, like the 
introduction of a new technology. But other changes may come from outside 
the existing technological systems, as in the case of the 1973 oil crisis. Such 
changes, if drastic, will lead to the restructuring of the configuration of 
nfches. Exfstfng technological systems may be adapted to the new condft1ons, 
but the creating of new niche possibilities may also generate conditions for 
the Introduction of new technological systems. The restructuring of the 
energy environment may lead to Intense innovatton efforts to take advzlOtage 
of the emergent niches. This is the origin of a wide range of renewable 
energy technological systems. Whether these technologies take root or not 
depends on their ability to adapt to the environmental conditions, the 
alignment of various interest groups. Not only are they thought by the key 
actors to meet technical, ffnancfal and economiC reqUirements, but their 
suitability would be extended to their social and ecological impacts • 
An interesting phenomenon in this development relates to the sources 
of innovation. There are three main sources of innovation. First, there are 
those innovations which have hitherto been unknown and their Invention is a 
result of the creatton of new niches. Second, there are those energy 
technologies which have hitherto remained unexplolted. Third, there are 
those innovations which are transferred from other sectors because the 
emerging conditions make them suitable. This last case Is Interesting 
because it calls into question changes in the adaptive mechanisms that were 
applied In the previous sector to fit the new conditions. Conditions may arise 
where the adaptive parameters introduced into the technological system do 
not enable it to compete with existing technology. If these limitations are 
largely technfcal, arisfng from the Internal constraints of particular 
processes, then the system Will be described as being in a tl1chn%gic4/ 
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stasis. Such a s1tuatlon 1s character1zed by l1m1ted opportun1t1es for 
process improvement end declining merginel geins from scele economies. A 
departure from this stasis may require a significant technical breakthrough 
or selection of alternat1ve technological systems. 
Political imperatives may malee it difficult for people to ebandon 
technological systems In stasis; their survival would therefore have to be 
guaranteed through subsidies and other forms,of institutional support. This 
brings into our analysis the role of Institutions in the generation, selection 
. and retention of technolog1cal systems. The government may opt to 
underwrite the Infant stages of the e particular technological system to II 
point where It has taken root. Alternatively, the government may Simply 
remain a source of support for systems that are not adequately adapted to 
prevailing market conditions. By setting regulations, the government defines 
some of the criteria that the adaptive mechanisms of the technological 
systems and the adopting features of the environment must meet. Some 
governments define these parameters by giving entrepreneurs more 
opportun1t1es to shape the market conditions. 
The emergent niches create new chains of potential Interrelationships. 
This Implies that new energy systems that occupy the market-niches relate, 
at different levels, with existing technological systems 1n the economy In 
general, and in the energy sector In particular. This symbiotic relationship 
may take at least three different forms. In the first case, the special 
(technical, financial, economic, or ecological) features of the existing 
systems may be modified to provide support to the new technologies. This 
could lead to some losses In the existing systems If Interventions such as 
cross-subsidies, partial protectionism, or controlled market entry ere 
applied. Alternatively, the modes of Intervention may be neutral (or even 
beneficial) to the existing technological systems. The annex1ng of fuel 
alcohol plants to existing sugar m11ls from which they draw surplus 
resources for their operations fs a case of technological symbiosis. 
The fact that the developing countries have to import technological 
systems complicates further the evolutionary process. First, the Importing 
37 
countries need to search the international market for viable technoloQies. 132 
Viabl1ity 1n this sense stmply refers to those technologies wh1ch have 
adequate adaptive characteristics and which are likely to take root in the new 
environment. The search process 1nvolves the Qatherino and analysis of 
information on both the key adoptive conditions of the potential niche and the 
candidate technolooical system. Here the question of technical flexib11ity 
starts to acqu1re some slgn1flcance. It 1s not possible to know 1n advance all 
the key factors in the niche, especially the combined effects of the known and 
unknown factors. Likewise, it is not possible to predict all the effects of the 
1nteraction between the candidate technolog1cal systems with the market. 
The process of research and development (R8J» attempts to equip the 
technological system with key 6d6ptive p6r6meters which enable the 
technolooY to operate under particular conditions. The incorporation of these 
technical parameters into the design of the technological system 
presupposes some knowledoe of the dominant features in the 6doptive 
terr6in, or the market zone in which the technological system is expected 
to operate. Apart from the technical parameters, the candidate 
technological systems also need to be equipped with non-technical adaptive 
requirements. These include factors such as capital cost and technology 
transfer conditions. The process of R!J> is therefore not free of pol1tical and 
social values. The fact that the parameters of the adoptive terrain need to be 
known, at least partially, suggests that the process of innovation anticipates 
the external environment. Since the operating environment is soc1al, the 
desion of technological systems is largely a process of antiCipating and 
planninQ social chanoe. 
The search process is therefore not Just a way of minimizing costs I 
but also of establishing the wide ranoe of parameters that are necessary for 
technological adoption. Knowledge of some key features 1n the adoptive 
terrain plays a sionificant part in the search and choice processes. The 
Implementation process not only Involves the IntroductIon of the chosen 
technology. but also its continued operation (or retentfon). The 
Improvement then becomes a learning process under which the useful 
132. It aUit be Hlpbui8ed that the d8gelopilll countrilll do Dot alwaYi .earch the iDterDational 
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aspects of the learntng process are themselves retatned In some cumulattve 
form. This framework has profound implications for how we understand the 
. process of policy formulation. It must be clear by now that the process of 
policy formulaUon and Implementation goes hand In hand with the 
evoluUonary process; It is In fact a constituent part of It. 
1.5.2 Purpose and function In technological systems 
A technological system is a combination of several technological units 
which evolve at different rates. They are brought together to perform 8 
certain function. This makes technological evolution a purposive and not a 
random process. The Importance of the evolution of Individual units Is 
explained by the structure and function of the whole system. A technoloolcal 
system Is therefore viewed as 8 convergence of co-eXisting functional units. 
The patterns of change among the units. both functional and allometric. is 
ooverned by the purposive Imperative of the whole system. and not vice 
versa. This Is mainly because the technological system is designed to fulfil 
certain pre-conceived goals which could be achieved by various technical 
configurations. The range of such technological systems Is narrowed down 
through 8 selection process that attempts to match the adaptive parameters 
of the systems to the key features of the external techno-economic 
environment. The increased matching of these parametric sets may be 
viewed as an increase in techno-economic performance. 
There Is no technological system that Is perfectly adapted to the 
environment or has the ultimate techno-economic performance. Thts Is 
partly because of Umttations in the Internal structure of the systems 
themselves and the constant changes that occur In the external environment. 
What technological Innovation does Is to constantly Improve the adaptive 
parameters of the system either by matching previously unmatched 
39 
environmental features, or by adapting to new changes. 133 This is the logic 
of increased techno-economic performance, whtch does not necessartly 
mean a perfect adaptive fit. This process of raising the techno-economic 
performance takes on a new phase if the environmental changes are radical 
and disruptive enough as to threaten the survival of hitherto existing 
systems. This may require radically new technological systems with new 
adaptfve features. Alternatfvely. the d1scovery of e1ther a techn1cal un1t or 
a system that has a higher techno-economic performance may threaten the 
existing system. The displacement of technological systems is often 
accompan1ed by per10ds of co-evolution. 
If the design of a technological system is taken 88 the unit of 
selection, then conjectural technological variants are not generated through 
blind, random or unjustified variation. However, the variants still have to be 
further tested in the operating environment through the process of niche 
real1zation. This suggests that the process of error-elimination continues 
from the point of the conception of a particular technological possibility to 
the staoe of niche realization and beyond. Moreover. shifts in the 
environment may require changes which can be achieved through incremental 
improvement and not necessarily by the scrapping of the technological 
system. ExoQenous pressures as well as internal technical imperatives 
induce incremenhl innovDtions. The process of plDnt-level improvement 
involvinQ incremental technical changes shall be referred to as technical 
drift. 
The initial entry of a technological system into the market is therefore 
not the end of the story; the system will constantly be subjected to both 
internal and external pressures requfring constant fnnovatfon. Thfs means 
that the system remains in a homeodynamic state of partial success until 
competing systems dislodge ft. The rate at which systems are dislodged is 
complicated and depends on factors such as the size and characteristics of 
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the market, the economiCS of scrapptno, costs of research and market 
entry, perceived profits and production scale. What is important here is the 
process of the oeneration of conjectural technological variants, which is 
usually through research, development and demonstration. 
Changes in the environment may also lead to the movement of 
technological sytems from one niche to another without any form of 
distinctive divergence. Such divergence is a common aspect of technological 
evolution. For example, the Caterpillar farm tractor developed at Stockton, 
California in 1904 was later turned into the m11ltary tank and used in the 
First World War. 13" The two technological systems occupy different niches 
and continue to change in functional and systemic complexity by tak.ing on new 
technical characteristics. What is Interesting Is not a taxonomy of 
technological systems and the associated dendrograms, but the mechanisms 
of technological variation, their selection and retention. 
Apart from distinctive divergence, systems may also be moved from 
one niche to another without undergoing major internal changes. This may 
happen at times of major environmental changes which open up new 
opportunities for systems which could not otherwise have survived. The fuel 
ethanol example is an illustration of this. The technological system evolved 
In the beverage envtronment and although tts energy potentfal was known, the 
dominance of petroleum made it uncompetitive in the energy environment. It 
was not until the oil shock that the potential for real1zing the ethanol niche 
were enhanced. This made it possible to use on a large scale the 
technological systems from the beverage In the energy environment. 135 
1.5.3 The selection process 
A central feature of an evolutionary process is adaptation through 
variability and selection. To accommodate adaptation In this approach 
134. See Wit. 'The American farm Tractor: pp. 126. Technological Ipeclatlon II cbaracterlzed by 
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technical evolution Is viewed as the process through which a conjectural fit 
between a technological system and the market environment Is Improved. 
The adaptfve relationshfp between technological systems and the changing 
market enVironment, referred herein as verisimilitude, Is Improved by 
incremental or radical technical changes in the main adaptive features of the 
technological system • .,6 The selection process Is bounded by the limitations 
of the technological system, both by physical and chemical laws as well as 
by the historical path of the deSign concepts. The selectfon process is also 
Influenced by external factors such as patterns of corporate control. This 
means that Issues that belong to the domain of political economy marlc the 
wider technological regime within which the selectfon mechanisms operate. 
The evolution of technological systems goes through different levels of 
verisimilitude, forming a hierarchy (of functional units, system 
configuration, and techno-economic performance). During the process of 
raising the techno-economic performance, Incremental Innovations reach 
limits which can be transcended through quantum shifts associated with 
marked punctuations In the evolutionary process. These shifts are 
accompanied by re-organlzations In the industrial structure. The 
evolutionary process goes through variability and selection of the adaptive 
features. The hierarchy of verlslm111tude starts with functional units 
which are core sections of a technological unit which fulfil 8 particular 
function. Technological systems, depending on their complexity, have 
varying numbers of functional unit. 
Raising the verisimilitude at the level of functional units involves 
increasing efficiency, prolonging operating life, and reducing material and 
production costs. Research and development at this level is aimed at 
achieving an adaptive fit to a set of technical parameters. These parameters 
provIde operative limns to the functional unit and therefore serve as 
selecting pressures. The list of parameters may not be exhaustive and new 
ones may even emerge during R~D. The parametric environment fs therefore 
not static. A functional unit is designed to be adapted to as many selecting 
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parameters as possible. A technolooical system ts usually a configuration of 
different functional units and the role of each unit is subject to the 
performance of the whole system. The raisino of system verisimilitude is 
therefore a co-evolutionary development of different functional units. At 
this level, the verisimilitude becomes a matter of technical performance. 
The third level of Includes soclo-economic parameters as selecting 
pressures. Socto-economic parameters will usually vary among different 
technological systems. In the case of energy technologies, new systems 
must be able to compete favourably with conventional technologies or their 
own variations. Socio-economic parameters usually feed back. to the level of 
systems and functional units, forcing deSigners to search for more adaptive 
functional units or system configurations. This search Involves diversity in 
functional units and system configurations. The selection process favours 
the systems which have higher techno-economic performance. At anyone 
moment, the system is only conjectural, since it can be easily dislodged by 
others with higher verisimilitude. This displacement may occur through 
incremental innovations or rad1cal shifts In functional units or system 
configurations. 
Technologies which have low levels of verisimJlitude (which are poorly 
adapted to actual conditions) may require non-market R&D support. This Is 
partly to hedge against the uncertainties that may lead to failure. Related to 
this is the need to generate the varlab11ity from which functional or system 
concepts that promise improved verisimilitude may be selected. Public 
sector institutions may support the early stages of technological evolution 
unttl a competttive level of techno-economic performance Is reached. This Is 
usually marked by the steady creation of economic space or market niches. 
Product diffusion increases as variations of the technological system create 
new markets or compete In markets dominated by traditional technological 
systems. 
The process of technical evolution Is governed by both functional. 
system and economic uncertainties which need to be underwritten. Although 
the potential benefits from a technological system may be clearly 
vlsual1zed. the evolutionary route may be difficult to determine. The process 
of getting there is therefore one of conjecture and selection; one of purposive 
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and Incessant trIal and error. ThIs necessarl1y requtres an Incessant 
generation of conjectural variability. One of the ways of dealing with the 
uncertainties is to enlist the support of the public sector. 
1.5.4 Institutional and pol1cy considerations 
The fact that technological change 1s purposive and is associated with 
both hierarchical and non-hierachical forms of organization requires an 
institutional setting which guides the evolutionary process. There are 
several reasons why technological change Is closely associated with 
institutional change. In the first place, innovation is e social process which 
requires mechanisms for bringing different ideas, individual or groups of 
people together. The very act of creating such a network Impl1es the 
neceSSity for institutional arrangements. Second, since the direction and 
consequences of any evolutionary path are difficult to determine in advance, 
institutional arrangements are required to provide a forum for identifying, 
selecting and retainino particular ooals and tactic81 methods. 
Stnce an evolutionary process requires the generation, selection and 
retention of options, patterns of policy formu18tion also take II similar 
outlook.. Technology policy may hence be viewed 8S guidelines for the 
appraisal, search, generation, selection and retention of technological 
options. Since the process of implementation is associated with constant 
chanQe, policies themselves get enriched by the implementation process 
because of cumulative learnino. This would lead us to the partial conclusion 
that policy itself could be 8 result of the process of implementation just as 
Implementation could arise from policy. 
The process takes place in a holistic environment influenced by 
technical, economic 8nd political factors. Policy formulation and 
Implementation are articulated through instnutlonal mechanisms. ThiS, 
however, does not mean that the articulation Is restricted to institutions 
alone. Far from it. This 8rtlculation is a complex interplay between 8 wide 
range of actors. We have identified institutions because they are specifically 
linked to the process of change 8nd their patterns of change are directly 
related to the process of soclo-economic evolution. 
The very existence of uncertainty over the consequences of any 
evolutionary route leads to differences in expectations, atrategies and 
tactics. This suggests that Institutions are not homogenous and manifest 
extenstve Internal dtfferences which may lead to conflicts. Thts ts what gives 
Institutions their political character. It Is therefore not a coincidence that 
national politics (and its ideological underpinnings) Is largely about the 
generation, selection and retention of broad development paths. Institutions 
such as the state which sit at the top of the hierarchy playa central role In 
the evolutionary process because they have the power (and occasionally the 
mandate) to overrule lower institutions in generation, selection and 
retention of options. The very existence of a nested hierarchy of Institutions 
Impl1es that the tnfluences worle tn a complex way that cannot be determined 
by examining a unidirectional flow of authority. 
The main advantage of this approach Is that it enables us to deal 
directly with real events instead of mediating them through static 
abstractions. The appeal to realism makes the approach relevant for policy 
formulation and Implementation. The normative references of the study lead 
to conclusions that cannot be easfly reached using conventional approaches. 
let us examine some of the general context in which the different conclusions 
are likely to emerge. 
In the first place, the view that economies are non-equflibrlum open 
systems enables us to appreCiate the significance of fluctuations such as 
energy or resource price shifts and the uncertainties associated with the 
Internal re-organlzation of economic systems. This view leads to 
conclusions and policies which emphasize system-wIde changes. 
Alternatively, theories which conceive economies 8S closed systems will 
emphasize equilibrium notions. Policies which 8re Informed by such views 
tend to pre-occupy themselves with the behaviour of economic systems In the 
neighbourhood of equfJibrium. Instead of concerning themselves with the 
sources of change, they tend to aim their policy Interventions at restoring 
the assumed equilibrium. Such policies may Inhibit positive changes In the 
system. An evolutionary approach would Instead focus on system-Wide 
changes whose consequences depend on the degree of fluctuation and 
possibilities for major bifurcations within the system. 
Second, the approach emphasizes the flow of events and resources 
through timlt and pays particular attention to the specific historical 
conditions surrounding investment projects. Long-term dynamics cannot be 
adequately analyzed without taking time Into consideration. The notion of 
time brings into focus the concept of irreversibility. Policies which take into 
consideration Irreversibility are likely to pay more attention to pre-
Investment planning and distribute the learning efforts over the entire life 
cycle of the project. 
Third, by treating economic systems as holistic, the study w111 move 
away from the analysis of discrete units to the study of Interrelationships. 
Whereas conventfonal approaches would tend to be reductionist, the 
evolutionary approach underscores complexfty, diverSity and varlab111ty. 
Such key characteristics of technological change cannot be adequately 
handled without taking a holfstic approach. The notfons of complexity, 
diversity and variabtlity link the time dimesion to the systems approach and 
enables us to study in detail how technological options are generated. 
Fourth, the evolutionary approach treats both technology and 
institutions as endogenous to the process of economic change. This Is 
precisely because the approach focusses on the sources and dynamics of 
change and re-organlzatfon within economic systems. An approach that 
treats technical change as endogenous to economic development will 
emphasize non-market support for R!tD while other approaches would tend to 
use economic returns to R~D as a basis for funding. 
Fifth, most conventional approaches tend to stress Iin81rlty In their 
analysis of economic events. The emphasis on linearity Is also associated 
with an appeal to prediction. Alternatfvely, this study analyzes non-linear 
changes and does not concern Itself with predictfons. However, the approach 
lays emphasis on expectatfons and 6nllclp6t1on. Predictive approaches may 
lead to the formation of rigid institutional structures whereas an antiCipatory 
world view may lead to Institutional flexibllfty and adaptive behaviour. The 
policy implications of the two approaches are significantly different. On the 
whole, the evolutionary approach seems to be more suited to the analYSis of 
dynamic processes than the conventional economic theorIes. 
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ConclusIon 
This chapter has outlined some of the major contributions of 
evolutfonary thought to the economic as well as technical change l1terature. 
It has examined how these contributions have gradually undermined the 
conventional approaches to technological change, especfally those buflt on 
the mechanistfc Cartesfan-Newtonian world vfew. I have argued that 
conventional. approaches, Including those that appeal to evolutionary 
processes, do not adequately deal w1th the dynamics of technological 
change. The chapter has suggested II non-equilibrium approach in which the 
energy market is seen as a techno-economfc landscape in which different 
technological systems are adapted to the production and conversion of 
different energy forms. The approach therefore emphasizes the relationship 
between technologfcal systems on the one hand, and the economic as well as 
the institutional network on the other. 
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z. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presented an evolutionary approach to the 
analysis of techno-economic change. Such a research agenda requires an 
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alternative philosophical basis for its methodological approaches. 
MethodoloQlcal Issues do not simply Involve the various ways of dolnQ 
research but encompass a cerhln epistemological outlook. This chapter 
sketches the main features of this alternative view. Understanding techno-
economic change requires an evolutionary epistemology which can capture 
Its Internal and external dynamics. This chapter also discusses the research 
methodology and data base used for this study and their limitations. 
2.1 Epistemological Setting 
This study alms at Identifying long-term technology policy issues 
under constantly changing international and national cond1tlons. It Is a study 
about economic re-organlzatlon under fluctuating conditions. The very fact 
that the external environment, technology and Institutions constantly change 
as the economic system Is re-organlzed imposes a different methodological 
approach from, say, that which could be used in the analysis of systems 
wh1ch are assumed to be determinate. Such a methodology has d1fferent 
epistemological underpinnings and conventional approaches would use 
reducUonfst methods. Conversely, this study appeals to holism, 
Irreversibility and realism. Such an appeal presupposes a phl1osophlcal 
setting that is suited to the assessment of dynamic situations. We shall 
therefore offer an evolutionary epistemology as a methodological guide. 
Evolutionary epistemology is largely about the changing inter-
relationships between adaptive units and their environment as a function of 
knowledge and information flows. Apart from Its ability to deal with change, 
evolutionary epistemology allows us to deal with real s1tuations, which Is a 
significant pre-requiSite for technology policy studies. The suitability of 
using evolutionary epistemology is underscored by the fact that technology is 
part of the human efforts to adapt to a constantly changing environment. The 
economic system can be conceived as a sophisticated ecological zone with 
extensive generation and use of exosomatfc hcf1;tfes. Thfs, however, does 
not mean that all technology 1s about human survival. But the type of 
technologies that concern us, those which are important in socio-economic 
tranSition, are Indeed part of human evolution. This makes evolutionary 
epistemology a suitable philosophical guide to such studies. 
It is important also to emphasize that policies are key features of an 
evolutionary process and cannot be concefved outsfde the changfng socfo-
economic conditions. With thfs fn mind, the study treats technology policy as 
an institutional settfng for the fdentificatfon, generatfon, retention and 
evaluation of techno-economic options under changing conditions. This makes 
the evolutionary character of policy issues more explicft, although it does 
not mean that policy studies would be unnecessary under assumed statfonary 
conditfons. The richness of the evolutionary approach lies in the fact that it 
allows us to deal specifically with the dynamiCS of constant change as 
opposed to a tendency towards some equ111br1um state. 
The first main feature of an evolutionary approach is that it 
emphasized hOlism. Under reductionist approaches, the study would be 
required to state precisely its vantage pOint in a narrowly defined way. This 
would be difficult to do for several reasons. First, matters to do with 
technology policy tend to stretch across a wide range of diSCiplines. A 
priori selection of areas of focus reduces the ability to analyse the 
interactions of the key aspects of the subject-matter. This is a crucial point 
because this study treats technological change as a process that occurs 
within a socio-economic system compriSing heterogenous sub-systems. 
Second, this approach accords specific importance to time. By this we 
mean that past, current and future development are enfolded in a historical 
process where past actions and decisions influence future trends, and 
current decisions ant1clpate future developments. Technological change Is 
therefore bounded in history. A reductionist approach would require us to 
freeze time and extract 1nstantaneous snapshots from the seQuence of events 
for 21n2l1ysis. Although this would enable us to isolated the events according 
to the desired academic orientation it would also purge the process of its 
evolutionary content and undermine Us usefulness as a policy guide. The l1nk. 
between holism and time is 211 ready apparent. What follows from this is the 
Irreversibility Question. 
The fact that technologic2l1 development is enfolded in time makes the 
process irreversible. This message has far-reaching consequences for 
polley. There are at least two ways of looking at Irreversibility. First, 
irreversibility is associated with the arrow of time. It ascribes linearity to 
development processes. But this need not always be the case. Secondly. 
1rreversibllity Is also associated with the re-organlzation of systems. Such 
non-l1near Irreversibility Is fundamental to open systems which undergo 
constant change because of both Internal and external factors. 
The historical context of this study has two methodological facets. The 
first one is related to time and Irreversibility. The second is linked to the 
fact that technological processes are evolutionary also because they are 
part of a larger process of biological evolution. The essence of evolutionary 
epistemology In this context Is that technological change Is part of human 
evolution and has a d1rect historical link with biological evolution. What we 
have therefore Is an 6rgument by homology. This point needs elaboration 
because the use of evolutionary approaches In the social sciences, 
especially In economics. evokes confusion over homology and analogy. 
Evolutionary epistemology as presented by Popper and Campbel1. 
appeals to the historical link between all organic forms through the gradual 
and cumulative development of knowledge as mediated by natural selection. 
Organic evolution is therefore a long historical process of problem-solVing 
which Is InevItably l1nked to the development of knowledge. TechnologIcal 
change Is thus conceived as part of human exosomatlc evolution. Homology 
therefore provides the historical context of this evolutlnary process: from 
amoeba to Einstein. to use Popper's favourite example. Popper's view implies 
linearity as natural selection leads to higher organisms o~ theories. 
In addItion to Popperlan selectlonlsm, thIs study emphasIzes the role 
of fluctuations and related non-l1near re-organlzatlons. Soclo-economlc 
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structures are Indeed open systems whIch underoo re-oroanlzatlon due to 
tnternal and external factors. Adaptive tools such as knowledge systems 
equally undergo non-linear re-organlzation. The degree of fJuctuation within 
the system Influences the rate of the generation of adaptIve tools, of whIch 
the generation of knowledge Is paramount. Popperlan selection Is therefore 
more effective as an eplstemoloQlcal framework tf viewed as operating within 
a system that undergoes non-linear re-organlzatlon but Is still subject to 
Irreversibility and the arrow of time. 
A systems approach also allows for the analysis of 10cal1zed 
knowledge and co-evolutionary processes. This Is tmportant for this study 
because the concept of techno-economic niches requires an understanding of 
the generatIon of 10cal1zed knowledge wIthIn a larger system undergoIng non-
linear fluctuation. Some of the pressures generated by the re-organlzatlon 
of the system as a whole lead to local bifurcations which, In turn, re-
organize the system. A purely selectionlst approach would conceal such 
Internal dynamics and confine us to traCing historical trajectories left by the 
selected theorIes or organisms. The selection processes themselves are 
part of the re-organlzation of the system and cannot be well understood 
without examining the dynamics of the system itself. 
The potential of a bIfurcatIon to have system-wide re-organlzlng 
effects Is largely InfJuenced by the degree of Instab11fty or fluctuation within 
the system. Local1sed bifurcations tend to have system-wide amplifications 
under conditions of extreme Instabiltty or rapid flux. For example. dramatic 
changes In the availability or prices of strategiC resources may lead to the 
rapId generation and dIffusIon of knowledge about alternative resources. So 
long as systems undergo fluctuations (which Is IS key characteristic of open 
systems such as economies) major changes akin to Kuhnlan paradigm shifts 
may result from 10cal1zed bifurcations. For the purpose of this study. the 
positions held by Popper and Kuhn are complementary because they deal with 
two key features of an evolving system. 
CrItiCS of evolutionary approaches often perceive them simply as the 
application of bIological analogies or metaphors to soclo-economlc 
processes. ThIs perception carrIes a CartesIan dIchotomy of human and non-
human processes. The dichotomy cen be made Irrelevant by recognizing that 
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socio-economic and biological processes share homology. Whereas 
homology presupposes historical links or common descent, analogies 
develop because of exposure to slmtlar circumstances. A more detailed 
discussion of these notions wt11 show their potential uses and limitations. 
One of the main criticisms of usIng analogies is that they can be 
fallacious. This Is not a problem because we do not Intend to crudely 
transfer known biological features to the workings of techno-economtc 
systems. A more serious problem is that analogies can eastly overshadow 
historical links. In constructing an analogous argument, for example, one Is 
required to view technological change and biological evolution as parallel 
processes in sImilar cIrcumstances which lead to slmflar results. Such a 
Juxtaposition would not enable us to examine the evolutIonary path, but the 
construct would be useful 8S a source of heuristics in identifying specific 
features of the evolutionary process. For example, allometrlcs would 
suggest the study of size and structure in technologICal systems. The 
analogy here arises from the fact that differentfal growth is a key feature of 
both internal technical change and organic development. 
Homology requires that the study be a long argument In which history 
itself is allowed to tease out the main features of technological change.' This 
allows us to free ourselves from analogy as a methodological approach and 
to rely on the data. Therein lies our appeal to realism. By accepting 
homology, we do indeed have a certain view of biological evolution and expect 
to find some fe2'Jtures of biological evolution in technological change. For 
example, both homology and analogy would predict variability, selection and 
retention In technological systems. These features are part of the 
t1vOllltion8ry logic. 
Evolutionary logic, however, differs from theories or basic laws 
because 1t enables us to cope with the causes and effects of change. It allows 
one to deal more comprehensively with technology policy matters because 
they are already contained In the process. The heurlsttcs from homology and 
I. Araument! by bomoiocy bile their dl1llen u well, especially under conditionl of re-
orpnl zatl on, morpbogenesll, differentIation and blerarcblcal Itructures. Such changes tend to 
introduce new reaturn or reiationibipi wbicb cannot be undentood by bomolOiOUI Ifaument!. In 
lucb cues, limilaritin may result more frOil external conditJOOI and therefore aate analOCOUl 
..... OIliDl more relenoL 
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analooy lead to a resonant process where the theoretical base Is constantly 
re-organized as research progresses. Simultaneously, the preliminary 
research findings also help to guide subsequent lines of analysis. 
z.z Dati Sources Ind Research Methodology 
To build a clear picture of the sequence of events required extensive 
collection of relevant data over a specified historical period. The data base 
also had to allow us to examine the workings of socio-economic systems. 
Some sections of the study, especially those dealing with global trends, 
relied on readl1y aval1able secondary data. The data were used mainly to 
fllustrate the existence of fluctuations and not to analyse the causes of these 
fluctuations in detail. The secondary material aval1able was therefore 
adequate for the purposes of this study. 
The analysis of national trends relied on both secondary and primary 
data. These came from publ1shed materials, unpubl1shed government 
studies, corporate reports, and interviews. The study also benefited from 
unpublished studies by international agencies. Those materials that could not 
be quoted were used as sources of back.ground Information and also provided 
the basis for further investigation. Because of the controversial nature of 
the projects, the research required that the details be well documented. 
The case studies relied largely on primary data. The Information was 
not concentrated in anyone place and had to be collected virtually half-way 
around the world. The research process Involved data collection In Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, West Germany, SWitzerland, Sweden, Britain, BrezH, 
Canada and the US. Most of the work was done In Kenya and Zimbabwe but 
some vltal1tnlcs In the sequence of events could not be made w1thout specific 
pieces of information which were not available In these countries. Moreover, 
It was necessary to collect data on the supply side of the technology to get a 
comprehensive picture of the technoloolcal change process. 
Successful data collection required knowledge of the key Institutions 
and Individuals Involved In the Investment projects. A study of the 
organizational struture of investment had to be done before the data on the 
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proJects could be collected. Every project had a complex network of 
institutions from which data on various aspects of the investment could be 
obtained. The networt changed over the project time. Some institutions that 
were associated with the project in the early stages were no lonQer involved 
in later periods. The links between technoloQY and institutional change were 
imposed on this study at the pre-research stage. 
By understanding this complex network, it was possible to identify 
those institutions which had certain types of information. In some cases, it 
was necessary to apply investiQative techniques to collect information that 
was not otherwise easily available. This approach was necessary because 
very little published information was available on the projects and because 
the controversies surroundinQ them reinforced secrecy. Conventional 
sources such as newspaper clippinQs and Hansard were extremely deficient. 
The study did not rely on a pre-defined boundary within which data could be 
collected. The limits to data collection were implied in the extent of the 
information available on the projects. The aim was to produce a 
comprehens1ve, h1stor1cal p1cture from wh1ch key trends could be 1dent1fied. 
The analysis and presentation of the data was Quided by the need to 
identify tey policy issues which could serve as a Quide for 10nQ-term 
technolog1cal change. The analys1s and presentatton had therefore to rely on 
evolutionary epistemology, emphasizing observation so as to expose the 
dynamics of techno-economic transition. To give a holistic picture of the 
study, the relationships between the various aspects of the system studied 
had to be presented as they occured. Explanations of parts of the system are 
presented in a manner that enables the links with the whole system to be 
established. This is precisely why the study emphasizes structure and 
function because they enable us to deal with the internal (hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical) oroanization of fluctuat1no systems. The analysis of 
various aspects of the study are only meaningful as part of the whole 
system. It is the nature of the system and its internal organization that 
dictates the method of explanation and not vice versa. 
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Z.3 Research Um1taUons 
This research project faced a number of obstacles: data availability, 
political sensitivity, official secrecy, limited InstitutIonal memory, and 
biases In Information. Its study required that data of similar types be 
collected so as to allow comparisons to be made. The study also required 
that the unfolding sequence of events be as well-documented as possible. 
There are gaps In the study In both cases. The Zimbabwean case Is wel1-
documented In the early years but data on the construction perIod are 
fragmented. This Is due to the war conditions that prevailed at that time. 
Government files were reportedly purged before the present government 
came to power and the study had to rely extensively on Interviews for 
Information on developments over this period. 
Similarly, data on plant technical performance for Kenya were not 
available and It was not therefore possible to conduct comparative 
as~essments of operating efficiency. Production figures are used as a proxy 
In the case of Kenya. The same problem also app11es to data on eneroy 
balances. The study therefot:'e carries Inevitable Imbalances with regard to 
the amount of Information available at the various stages of the development 
of the project. These obstacles made It Impossible to conduct a direct 
comparison of the two countries' projects. What Is contained herein Is 
therefore a study of fuel ethanol in Kenya aoalnst the backdrop of the 
Zimbabwean experience. The -backdrop comparison- Is, however, adequate 
for the purposes of the study. 
This study relied to a certain extent on Interviews, especially given Its 
historical nature. Although most of the key Institutions an,d individuals 
Involved In the Kenyan projects were Identified, It became difficult in some 
cases to collect reliable Information through Interviews. This was mainly 
because of short institutional m8mory, partly resulting from the rapid 
moblJ1ty of staff in the civil service. This problem was worsened by the 
controversies surrounding the projects. In addition, the government wanted 
to retain a certain measure of credibility among International donors and 
therefore did not wish to release much relevant Informat1on. 
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This problem was compounded by the very nature of the institutional 
arrangements of the investments. The projects involved government equity 
to a scale that made them in effect parastatal organizations. This status 
subjected all tnformation on the proJects to the Official Secrets Act, which 
meant that the process of data collection had to be conducted largely through 
government channels, with considerable delay. The problem was to a certain 
extent lessened by the fact that some sections of the government were 
concerned about the long-term Implications of Kenya's Investment strategy 
and were therefore wl111ng to provide the requested Information. A new mood 
of self-criticism, which is so essential for institutional learning, was 
already emerging within the civil service. Despite these limitations, the data 
collected were comprehenstve enough to provide the h1storlcal material 
needed to meet the methodological requirements of this study. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sketched the philosophical underpinnings of the 
methodology used In the study. It has also presented the research methods 
used, the state of the data base and Its ltmltatlons. Evolutionary 
epistemology deals specifically with the dynamics of change under real world 
conditions, making it relevant to the polley analysiS of techno-economic 
Issues. Issues such as holism, Interrelationships, fluctuations, adaptation 
and Irreversibility which are central to this study can adequately be 
understood from the vantage point of evolutionary epistemology. 
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3. RESOURCE FLUCTUATIONS AND ECONOMIC RE-ORGANIZATION 
Introduction 
This chapter will show that major fluctuations in the prices of 011 and 
sugar created opportunities for the Introduction of fuel ethanol technology. 
It wtll be argued that the introduction of fuel ethanol in Zimbabwe and Kenya 
was part of the re-organization of the economic system in response to the 
declfne In sugar and molasses prices and rise In 011 prlces. The re-
organization was influenced by the national socio-economic expectations and 
the institutional arrangements as well as policies formulated to Qulde the 
economy. It will be suggested that differences In the expectations of the two 
countries on the future of energy supply and prices largely influenced the 
patterns of Institutional reform In the two countries. 
3. 1 Fluctuations In Resource Prices 
3.1.1 Disruptive shifts In oil prices 
The disruptive effects of fluctuations In ofl prices depend largely on 
the share of this resource in the commercial energy budget. The share of oil 
in the world energy configuration (measured in energy units) rose from 13 
per cent ln 1925 to 45 per cent ln 1970. The rise was linked to the economic 
upswing of the post-194S period. However, the share and rates of increase 
had marked regional differences as shown in Table 3.1. The figures are 
based on the world consumption of 011, coal, natural gas and electrfclty but 
do not include wood and other non-coventional energy sources. 
The share of ofl in the commercfal sectors of the developing countries 
expanded rapidly over the post-World War II period from nearly 14 per cent 
in 1950 to about 60 per cent in 1970. This dominance made the economies 
more vulnerable to price fluctuations and access restrictions. The uneven 
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dIstrIbutIon of thIs resource worsened the rIsks of dIsruptIon. The rIsks 
were outweighed by the fact that oil was becoming relatively cheaper than 
coal, was easy to use and allowed for flexibllity in end-uses. Joint 
government and Industry lntervenUons were used to k.eep the price of 011 low 
in relation to coal to facilltate the transition to oil use •• The developing 
countries therefore easily joined the oU-based industrial orowth. 
TABLE 3.1: Percentage Share of Oil in Commercial Energy (B TUs) 
Region 1925 1950 1970 
USandCan~ 19 39 44 
Western Europe 3 14 56 
Japan 4 6 69 
Communist areas 11 14 25 
Others 12 40 59 
Source: Griffin 61 6l (1980). 
FIGURE 3.1: Trends in Oil Prices (liS [)ol/ars per Berrel) * 
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Moreover, the fact that these countries relied on oil-based capital 
stock from the industrial countries made the use of oil almost inevitable. 
The switch to oil was helped by cost reductions from improved production 
technology and economies of scale In transportation. The discovery of more 
oil fields made 011 easily available at cheap prices and helped to facilitate 
the diffusion of Oil-using technologies. The discovery of new oil fields in the 
Middle East in the 1930s helped keep prices even lower. As a result of low 
entry barriers (to both producers and consumers) in the oil market and 
technological advancement, real 011 prices fell In the 1950s and 1960s, 
providing producers with the incentive to set up a cartel to raise prices. The 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 
1962 but did not have any significant 1mpact on 011 prices untl1 the 1973 011 
embargo. Figure 3.1 shows the changes in oil prices between 1950 and 1981. 
The 1973-74 011 shock, which was sparked off by geopolitical factors 
and led to the realizetion of OPEC's long-standing policies on higher oil 
prices, raised questions concerning the exhaustibility of this resource. It 
was not Just an issue of pr1ce increases but also a matter of resource 
management. The effects of the price increases were different in the various 
importing countries. Petroleum was so firmly tied into the economic process 
that Immediate adjustments to price shocks were difficult to malee. Various 
countries tended to adjust consumer prices, reduce Imports and cut back on 
some economic activities. Many of the developing countries turned to 
external borrowing as a short-term measure to ease the impact of high oil 
price on their balance of payments. 2 
The 011 shock found the developing countries already tied Into 8 (Jlobal 
economic system with worsening terms of trade. 3 This problem was coupled 
2. The loanl allO l!ned U I way or recyclina the npidly-accumulatina oil revenues althouah the 
bulk of the fundi went to I few countries, the ID-called newly-indultrialiaina countries (NIC.). 
3. The declinina terms of trade ".. already I major concern amona d .. elopina country economillJl 
and the United Nationl in the 19501. Ulina an index or 100 for 1950, the deYelopina countries' 
terml or trade declined to 86 in 1961 ,.is-6-,.is the industrialized countrill, ICcordina to 
Hallwood 616l, Oil, 06/)1 6DtI 06'610jl_6DI, pp. 10-11. Concern oyer tbe r.mna terma of 
trade led to two major international initialiYII. Fint, tbe UN launcbed tbe Fint Development 
Decade aimed al redreslina tbe imbalance through an accelerated GNP arowtb me (of no 1111 than 
5.0 per cent). Second, trade and denlopment nesotialiona were launched through the UN Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), wbicb later became a permanent UN body concerned tarcely 
with alobal trade imbalances. 
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w1th the fact that as many as 64 of the 92 ol1-lmportlng developing countries 
depended on oil for over 75 per cent of their commercial energy." This 
meant that any slight shift in the prices or availability of oil would have far-
reaching effect on the economies of these countries. Between 1972 and 1974 
alone, the 011 import bfll of the oil importing developing countries rose by 
450 per cent to reach USS21.5 billion. 5 The disruption caused by these shifts 
were reflected in deteriorating current account deficits particularly with 
OPEC and Industrialized countries. 
Moreover, economic growth (as measured In GOP) dropped In most 
developing countries over the post-1973 period. The average annual rate of 
growth in GOP in the 011 importing developing countries over the 1967-1972 
per10d was 6.1 per cent. It rose to 7.3 per cent In 1973 but declined to 5.3 
per cent in 1974, and 4.1 per cent in 1975. 6 This decline was also 
assoc1ated with economic recession in the industrialized countries. These 
changes worsened the debt problem although the increase in borrowing was 
not specific to the 011 crisis. Indeed, international borrowing among 
developing countries was already significant in the post-1945 period. 
Medium and lon<rterm borrowing rose at an average annual rate (at 
current prices) of 14.8 per cent in the 1955-1960 period and 16.5 per cent 
over the 1960-1965 period. The fjgure rose to 16.8 per cent over the 1967-
1972 period and 21.0'per cent over the 1972-1976 period.' The borrowing 
which started in the 1950s was facilitated and expanded by the oil shock. It 
is notable that concern over the riSing debt burden had become a matter of 
concern in the late 1960s, prompting the Pearson Commission to note that the 
debts al ready contracted by the developing countries ·cast a pall over the 
short- and long-term management of their economies·. 8 
The Oil-importing developing countries tried to reduce the effects of 
higher 011 prices and keep the1r borrow1ng level by draWing from their 
foreign exchange reserves which had accumulated from SOR1S billion in 1960 
-t. World Bank, EIl6rlY ill O"6/opilll COUlllri", pp.4. 
,. Hallwood, op. cit., pp.79. 
6. Ibill.. pp. 164. 
7. Ibill., pp.75. 
8. Pearaon Commiaaion, P.rlou, /0 DIlr'lIloPIIIIIOI, pp. 74. The debt contracted in the 1950. was 
larlely government-to-government borrowing. However, much of the borrowing in the post-1973 
period .,.. throulb printe financial !'I)ltilutiool. 
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to SDR33 billion in 1973.9 These reserves were reduced by about 25 per cent 
In the first two years following the 011 shock. It should be noted, however, 
that the worsening balance of payments did not result from oil price 
increases alone. Price shifts were associated also with other fluctuations in 
the exports end imports of these countries, ItS well as changes in the terms 
of trade with the industrialized countries. 
The effects of the hlQh 011 prices were reflected In hlQher consumer 
prices, limitations on employment and a general economic slow-down in the 
oil-importing developing countries. Some of the effects were articulated at 
the pol1tlcal level, leading to pol1t1cal upheavals In various African 
countries. Long-standing problems of income Inequality were aggravated by 
real or anticipated effects of the high oj) prices. The effects, both economic 
and political, were Irreversible. Existing 011 importation patterns and 
practices had to be reconsidered. Most of the developing countries had no 
energy policies or contingency measures to deal with such dramatic shifts. 
The energy crisis led to the search for short-term adjustment 
mechanisms. Whereas some countries responded with short-term price 
adjustment and import cut-backs, others considered long-term solutions and 
the search for different demand patterns. These included intensified oil 
exploration, diversified sourcing of petroleum and a search for alternative 
energy sources. This latter option is interesting because it required a shift 
away from conventional approaches which sought for solutions within the oil 
sector itself. As pOinted out earlier, the range of substitution in the energy 
sector is usually very limited. And where alternatives exist, the transition 
entails the introduction of new technological systems. 
The range of technological options or diversity In the liquid fuels sub-
sector was limited to a few sources, mainly methanol and ethanol fuels. Of 
these, ethanol was the easiest to select and implement because of at least 
three reasons. First, it could be blended with gasoline up to 20 per cent 
without requiring engine modification. Second, the technology for producing 
It could be transferred easily from the beverage sector and Incremental 
adaptation could also be easily undertaken. Third, the conventional raw 
materials for producing fuel ethanol, sugar and molasses, were undergoing 
9. Hallwood ,1.1.. Oil. pp.8t. 
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dramatic price reductions at that time and hence could be diverted to fuel 
production with minimal opportunity costs and political acceptability. The 
next section looks at the recent trends in the world sugar market to show the 
convergence of factors In commodity prices which created the opportunity 
for the development of fuel ethanol niches in some developing countries. 
3.1.2 Trends In world sugar prices 
The previous section underscored the fact that rising prices of oil 
opened up opportunities for structural re-organization in the world 
economy, of which the production of fuel ethanol was one. It was also noted 
that the production of fuel ethanol was facilitated by declining sugar prices, 
a feedstock for ethanol production. The history of sugar is different from 
that of oil. The main differences are summarized in Table 3.2. Apart from 
the basic differences, the future of sugar is also currently being threatened 
by a wide range of artificial and natural sweeteners. Over the years, sugar 
prices have tended to fall while at the same time leaving excessive 
oversupply. These two trends have created favourable conditions for the 
Introduction of fuel ethanol as an alternative outlet for sugar. 
The world sugar economy has been associated with dramatiC 
fluctuations and uncertainties, forcing the governments of producing 
countries to Introduce measures to stabilize the situation. One of the 
earliest effort were undertaken In Brazil with the formation of the Institute 
for Sugar and Alcohol (IAA) In 1933. Among other things, this Institute 
aimed at converting some of the surplus sugar to fuel ethanol 8S 8 way of 
maintaining artificial scarcity and therefore stabilizing prices. The 
formation of IAA was not an Isolated act, but a rea11zatlon of cumulative 
efforts that had been Initiated in the previous century to stabilize the world 
market for sugar, especially with the advent of new challenges from sugar 
beet in Europe. The volatility of the world sugar marlcet Is therefore not a 
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recent phenomenon but a long-standing problem. IO More recent trends in 
the production, trade and prices of sugar have been even more dramatic. 
TABLE 3.2: t1ain Characteristics of Sugar and Oil 
Characteristic Sugar 011 
Importance to importers Non-strategic strategic to all 
economic sectors 
~mpos1tion of prooucers Numerous and small Few and large 
~mpos1t10n of m1ciilemen Numerous Few 
Range of substttutes Numerous Few 
Market structure Tied to long-term Concentrated in 
agreements industrialized 
countr1es 
Demand feature Fa111ng Rising 
Income elastic1ty of oomand Low H1gh 
World sUQar production has nearly doubled since 1960, risinQ from 52 
million tons to 101 million tons 1n 1982 (Figure 3.2). Over that period, there 
were only seven years that saw reductions in output and these were caused 
by crop fanure. Pr1ces tended to rise dramat1cally 1n response to these 
failure-induced deficits. As a result of these price rises, major investments 
were underta~en to benefit from a seemingly recovering industry. The 
1nvestments, wh1ch represented mass1ve pr1vate and government f1nanc1al, 
material and human inputs, added more sugar to an already flooded mark.et. 
Over this period, there was no major increase in sugar consumption, except 
that which could be accounted for by population growth. It appears from 
these trends that national polic1es on investment 1n the sugar industry in the 
develop1no countries were not influenced by a close examination of the 
behaviour of the world sugar mark.et. 
10. See Nunberl (1978) and Gordon-Alhworth (1980) on the role or the ltate In the Bruilian IUpr 
iodUitry. 
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FIGURE 3.2: Trends in World Sug6r Oulpul6nd Prices (1982 Prices) 
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Protectionist measures such as price guarantees, import duties 8S 
well as import quotas wea~ened the efforts to stabiltze the international 
sugar market. The European Econom1c Commun1ty (EEC) for example, 
maintained high price guarantees as we11 as an export restitution system 
under which producers were refunded the difference between world export 
prices and the guaranteed prices to EEC farmers. This system was stopped in 
1981. II The refund operated only for export quantities that fell within the 
range of production quotas, set at 110-115 per cent of consumption. 
However, exports outside quota limits were st111 profitable and as 8 
result EEC sugar production rose from g.O mi11ion tons in 1970 to 15.0 
mt11lon tons In 1982, adding some 5.0 to world production capacity. 
Considerations of resource self-sufficiency in the EEC fo11owing the OPEC oil 
shock Influenced production pol1cles, as reflected in the raising of EEC quota 
levels by over 20 per cent. This output was also associated with major 
technological advances which raised beet productivity and the range of 
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varieties, a direct threat to developing countries which had reJied for a long 
time on sugar as a major source of foreign exchange. 
In the meantime, developing countries embarked on sugar expansion 
programmes, especially following the 1913-14 sugar price increase. It was 
assumed in the industrialized countries then that prices of commodities were 
generally going to rise and therefore an increasing number of developing 
countries initiated major investment projects in this sector. Inter-
governmental lending agencies were equally willing to fund new sugar 
projects or revamp exlsUng ones. The high sugar prices In the 1913-74 
period led to a reduction in consumption In 1915, which then rose again In 
1976 as sugar prices dropped. Meanwhile, production continued until bad 
weather hit aga1n 1n 1979/80 -- tr1pl1ng real pr1ces. Th1s was reduced by 
half the following year and since then sugar prices have remained lower than 
production costs.· And this is happening in a sector where world output Is 
well in excess of demand. The 1984 consumption level was about 95 million 
tons, leaving a surplus of about 6.0 million tons. The production capacity is 
far larger than the current output. Moreover. the response period is also 
very short. For example, following the 1980 price increases, the world was 
able to add some 17 ml11fon tons of sugar to the market tnjust 24 months. 
Sugar Is traded under two different market forms. In the first place 
some 25-30 per cent of the traded sugar Is handled under speCial 
arrangements llke the Sugar Protocol of the Lome Convention, Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreements and other arrangements among the socialist economies. 
The second type is the free market which accounts for the rest of the sugar 
trade. Ironically, the free market is a residual forum because It only 
handles the sugar that has not been bought under the special arrangements 
or consumed locally. Out of the 90 million tons produced in the early 1980s, 
about 70-75 mill10n tons were consumed locally. Some 15-17 m111ion tons 
were traded on the free market and 3-4 million tons traded through 
preferential transactions. The international sugar market is influenced by 
extensive political considerations which govern policy formulation, 
preferential arrangements, licensing systems, control devices and other 
aspects of the industry. The free market exists only Insofar as prices are 
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not administered. But efforts have been initiated to keep prices within certain 
ceilings, especially under the International Sugar Agreement. 12 
TABLE 3.3: World Hf'CS Production ('000 tonnes, dry b8Sis) 
~untry IRegion 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
USA 2045 2540 2900 3385 3800 4100 
Canooa 42 85 110 140 165 190 
EEe 185 192 187 185 185 185 
Other West Europe 60 85 85 95 110 120 
E8St Europe 15 30 45 75 80 100 
Japan 365 525 590 625 660 690 
South Kor~ 16 55 92 95 115 140 
Other Asia 1 5 8 10 40 100 
Letin AmeriCl! 40 45 50 65 80 110 
Africa 20 40 
World total 2765 3562 4067 4675 5255 5775 
Source: Tboaw (1985). 
It is not just the decline of sugar prices that threatens the industry. 
Alternative sweeteners are also slowly penetrating the market. 
Interestingly enough, the entry of some of the sweeteners has been made 
possible by the efforts to maintain high sugar prices. One of the alternatives 
Is the conversion of olucose contained In corn to hlOh fructose corn syrup 
(HFCS). This is produced by the enzyme isomerase which yields a liquid 
sweetener of the equivalent of 60 per cent sucrose in water. The world 
output of HFCS rose from 136,000 tons in 1974 to 500,000 tn 1975 and was 
expected to account for about 2.5 per cent of the world sugar production by 
1980. 15 The olobal sale for HFCS for 1980 was estimated at 2.8 million tons. 
It rose to 4.7 million tons in 1983 and 5.8 millton tones tn 1985 (Table 3.3). 
By 1980, the price of HFCS was about 47 per cent less than that of sucrose in 
the US and Japan .... As a result, companies such as Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola 
have switched from sugar to HFCS for some of their products. I, 
Another technical possibility which has increased the potential use of 
HFCS ts the combtned productton of ethanol and HFCS In the same wet milling 
12. UNCTAD. Studies ID rAe ProcesslDI or COllllllodltles. pp. "-5. 
13. Withen. "The Trade and Technology of Sugar". pp. "'4. 
14. VuiUeumeir. "World Outlook for Syrup.". pp. 34. 
15. flid. 
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process. Furthermore, innovation in enzyme technoloQY has helped reduce 
HFCS production costs. The industry has increased the application of 
immobilized enzymes which have high isomerization, are more permeable, 
flow better and result In higher conversion efficiency. The substitute Is being 
used In Industrial sectors where sugar has been dominant; beverages 
accounted for over 60 per cent of the 1985 output. bakinQ 12 per cent. 
canning 12 per cent, food processing 8.0 per cent, dairy 'products 6.0 per 
cent and rest going to confections. Over 50 per cent of the sweeteners used 
In the beverage Industry are now accounted for by HFCS. The penetration of 
HFCS is likely to have profound effects on the sugar market given the number 
of countries that are increasing or planning production. They include the US, 
Canada, MexIco, ArgentIna • Uruguay. Brazn. Peru. Venezuela. Spain, 
Portuga I, Hungary. Yugoslavia. Bulgaria. Soviet Union. Egypt. Morocco, 
Sudan, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, China, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
There are other threats to sugar. A wide range of natural sweeteners 
are now being discovered and considered for large-scale production. The 
·sweetness Qene· of the West African plant ThalJmat()c()ccClJS danlelll, 
which is over 1.600 times sweeter than sucrose. has been inserted in 
bacteria, making it possible to produce natural sweeteners in conventional 
vats. Thaumatin Is now being marketed as a sugar blendstock by Tate and 
Lyle in Britain under the trade name of Talin and is used in candies. chewing 
Qum, piCkles, jellies, soups and other products. This Is not the only 
candidate. The so-called miracle fruit (Synsepa/lJm dlJ/cificlJm) from 
West Africa is a protein-based candidate that might lead to a new range of 
non-fattenlnQ sweeteners. The berry contains no calories .16 
Also from West Africa is the Serendipity berry (Oi()sc()re()phylllJm 
clJmminsil) which Is 3,000 times sweeter than sucrose. From Paraguay is 
Stevia relJalJdiana whose leaves are 300 times sweeter than sucrose; it Is 
already being marketed in Japan. A Chinese fruit, l1()m()rdica gr()sven()ri, 
which is sold in southern China and Hong Kong is a potential candidate for 
large-scale sweetener production. The new hunt for natural sweeteners has 
also led to the re-discovery of lippia dulcis, which the indigenous South 
16. My ..... W'6111J 01' Wild Sp,ci". pp. 166_ 
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Americans reportedly enjoyed chewlnQ at the time of the conquest of the 
Aztecs. This candidate is 1, 000 times sweeter than sucrose. I ' 
So far the penetration of natural sweeteners has been limited to a few 
products and their Impact Is yet to be felt on a large scale. However, there 
are several factors which Indicate that they wf11 pose long-term challenges 
to the sUQar industry. In the first place, the natural sweeteners do not have 
uniform taste so they will offer diversity in the food Industry, whose growth 
is largely influenced by product differentiation. Secondly, the use of genetic 
engineering malees it possible to extract the relevant genes from the plant 
and Insert them in another organism, thereby freeing production from the 
complicated agricultural process that is associated with cane or beet 
production. Thirdly, with the very high levels of sweetness, even extremely 
low conversion efficiencies would yield substantive amounts of sweetener. 
Fourthly, the discovery of protein-based sweeteners is likely to create a 
new marleet for those concerned with the health effects of sucrose or 
saccharin. And of course the search for new varieties opens up more 
possibilities for the discovery of more suitable substftutes. 
The previous two sections have illustrated some of the resource 
changes that have unfolded in the world in recent decades. First was the 
rising prices of 011 whIch caused a wide range of disruptive effects In the 011-
Importing developing countries. Second was the falling prices of sugar and 
the entry of various substitutes in the sweetener market. These trends have 
weakened the position of sugar as a foreign exchange earner and 
strengthened the position of oil as 8 foreign exchange consumer. A possible 
reconcl1latlon of the two divergent trends has resulted from the fact that 
sugar can be used as raw material for producing fuel ethanol to meet some 
of the energy needs of the oil-importing countries while at the same time 
finding a new market for sugar. 
3.1.3 The molasses resource base 
The production of fuel ethanol in the post-1973 period was linked to the 
aval1abl1lty and relatIve cost of raw materIals, molasses for thIs matter, at 
17. Vietmeyer. "How Sweet". pp. 28. 
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the national level. This section examines the major trends In the production 
and availability of this resource 8S 8 feedstock for fuel eth2lnol production. 
It will be shown that the availability of molasses created an independent 
resource-based search for possible end-uses which only became Important 
for ethanol because of the changes in the energy environment. 
The production of sugar leaves large amounts of residual molasses 
which has a high sugar content. The range of option2l1 uses for molasses 
depends largely on the composition of the raw material, which varies 
according to cane variety, clImate, soil type, agrIcultural inputs and 
farming techniques. However, molasses generally comprises 75 per cent 
water and 25 per cent solids. Nearly one half of the solids constitutes 
fibrous material and the rest is soluble solids (12 per cent). About 10.5 per 
cent of molasses is accounted for by sugar and the rest of the soluble solids 
include non-sugar substances such as proteins, amino-acids, carboxylic 
acids, shrch, W2lX, fats, phosphatides, gums, minerals and unidentified 
substances. IS Molasses (from beet and cane) has a wide range of end-uses 
which fall· Into five main categories: animal feed; desugarlzatlon; 
fermentation; human consumption and technical applications. 
In animal feed, molasses is used as a source of nutritional energy. 
Desugarized liquids are usually prepared for the recovery of glutamic acid, 
betain, potash and amino acids. The category of fermentation yields 8 wide 
range of products including baker's yeast, food and feed yeast, fat yeast, 
ethyl alcohol, rum, acetic acid, citric aCid, lactic aCid, glutamiC aCid, 
itoconic aCid, aconitic aCid, fumaric acid, malic aCid, butyriC acid, 
propionic aCid, gluconic acid oxalic aCid, butanol, acetone, 2.3-butylene 
glycol and glycerol. The range of human uses of molasses include caramel 
and edible colours, coffee surrogate, edible molasses, mycelial protein, 
pharmaceutical products, production of arrat and sake. 
Molasses fs also used as bleaching agents (activated carbon), binders 
for insulating materials, blackening agents (Iron and steeD, brlquetting 
agents (c02l1 dust, coke slack, nwdust), den2lturants (cattle salt), 
fertilizers, binders in foundry work, fuels (direct combustion), granulating 
agents in mineral fert111zer, seal1ng compounds, wood seasoning agents, and 
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soil structure stabilizers. This range of end-products UJustrates the variety 
of merket niches that can be opened up by mo18sses. 
The process, however, is determined largely by the relative costs of 
production and the compet1tlveness of the products. The creation of market 
niches requires a recognition of the production possibJities associated with a 
particular resource. Both Zimbabwe and Kenya exported large shares of 
their molasses. But changes in the world molasses price led to the search 
for local niches for molasses products. The search for alternative end-uses 
for molasses In Zimbabwe started long before energy became a major 
concern. Changes in the traditional export market for Zimbabwe forced the 
country to examine the local market as an outlet for new products. 
It was the view of the government, as expressed In a Ministerial 
report on molasses in October 1964, that export of surplus molasses 
brought little benefit to the economy and high transportation costs at times 
of depressed prices undercut any gains from exports •• 9 This concern 
prompted the government to look into the possibilities of downstream 
molasses processing. -It Is ••• deslred to see whether by upgradIng molasses 
into some other form, these difficulties might be overcome and, if pOSSible, 
to interest an overseas company in establishing a processing plant in 
Rhodesia. "20 It is notable that this view was expressed In a government 
report, which illustrates that the state joined the private sector in the 
search for possible market niches. 
The government's view was also based on an understanding of changes 
in the international molasses market. For example, the government 
su"ggests that the risIng utll1zatlon of molasses as anImal feed had led to 
higher prices, which in turn had "caused 8 switch from fermentation to the 
petroleum chemical route in the manufacture of a number of chemicals". 21 
The knowledge of the international market and resource trends led the 
government to conclude that the availability of cheap petroleum reduced the 
competitiveness of molasses 1n making siml1ar products. 
19. See cbapter 5 for pre-196-t errorts to utilize molul •. 
20. Ministry of Trade,lndultry and Development, PossiIJ16 Oilpol.1 0' )/01.1161, pp. ii. 
21. IlJid. 
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The fact that the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Development 
produced a report on this issue may give a misleading impression that the 
search for alternative markets for molasses was mainly a government 
endeavour. The Initiatives were supported by the private sector through the 
Rhodesia Sugar Association (RSA). This was indeed a smal1 group of people 
with converoino interests. Two estates, Trianole and Hippo Valley, produced 
virtually all of Zimbabwe's sugar. The detailed information that the 
government used in the preparation of the molasses report was provided by 
the RSA. It Is notable that this informatton was compl1ed to enable a 
Ministerial delegation visiting Britein to negotiate with industrialists 
interested in setting up a plant. -Their visit provides an opportunity for 
discussions with Industrialists who might be able to advise on, or ••• be 
interested in establishing a plant. •• with the object of securing a long term 
supply of rectified spirits, or some other product. -22 
Concern over the future of molasses m2lrkets W2lS based on prOjected 
surplus. Although Zimbabwe exported large quantities, it was felt that the 
country would In the short-run have large surpluses if new local market 
were not found. The export contract was expected to expire in 1968, leaving 
the country with nearly 100,000 tonnes of surplus molasses (Table 3.4). 
Already, the country was using part of Its molasses for Industrial and 
potable spirits production, yeast manufacture, and animal feed. 
TABLE 3.4: Zim/)o/)we t1olosses Export ondSurplus ('000 Tonnes) 
Year Export 
1965 22,200 
1966 33,800 
1967 48,300 
1968 52,000 
1969 
Source: Ministry of Trade Industry and Development (l9~). 
Surplus 
35,000 
40,000 
43,000 
45,650 
100,000 
The ch2lnces of securing export markets for Zimbabwe's molasses 
were reduced by the trade sanctions which followed the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UD!). This not only reduced possible external 
22. IlJid., pp.4. 
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Investment In the molasses market, but they also reduced the chances of 
selling molasses itself. Moreover. the war and its effects on transport 
routes through Mozambique forced the country to rely on South African ports 
for exports. The costs of shIppIng molasses through South Africa became 
increasingly prohibitive and the molasses producers were forced to dump it. 
Consequently. the search for local markets became even more urgent. 
Over the period, Kenya exported most of its molasses until the 
combined effects of transportation costs and declining world prices changed 
export prospects. Most of Kenya's molasses was produced from four sugar 
mi11s in western Kenya. The yield varied according to the recovery efficiency 
of the various sugar mi11s in the country (Table 3.5). These variations were 
partly influenced by the age of the mitts. Older mitts were less efficient In 
the recovery of sugar and therefore left molasses with higher sugar content. 
Other factors such as production scale and operating efficiency also 
influenced the recovery of both sugar and molasses. Kenya exported its 
molasses mainly to Europe. the US. and Canada. Exports rose steadl1y over 
the 1967-1977 period while export prices were marked by sudden variations 
(Table 3.6). Although average prices rose over the IO-year period. 
transportation costs steadily reduced the net income, subsequently making it 
IncreasIngly necessary to look for local uses for molasses. 
The local demand for molasses Is difficult to estimate. The Kenya 
Sugar Authority (KSA), an advisory parastatal wing of the government. uses 
a residual approach under which the exported quantities are subtracted from 
the reported factory output. The residual value is taken to represent local 
consumption, most of which Is allocated to animal feed. This approach may 
be misleading because it does not take into account unreported uses such as 
the production of local rum or gin, which is a common economic activity in 
the sugarbelt. Moreover. the maIn sugarbelt Is located near the Uganda 
border and it is not known how much molasses is smuggled across the 
border. A survey by the Industrial Survey and Promotion Centre (lSPC) of 
the Ministry of Commerce Z1nd Industry reported that some 10-19 per cent of 
molasses produced in Kenya in the mid-1970s was used as animal feed. This 
represented an annual average consumption of 12,000 tonnes. The absence of 
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data on this end-use led to pol1cy confl1cts between the Ministry of Livestock 
Development and the promoters of fuel ethanol!n the leIte 1970s. 
TABLE 3.5: Sugar and 110lasses Recovery In K'enya (1980)* 
Mill Commisioned Capocity (tid) Sugar yield (Z) Molossesyield (Z) 
Miwani 19208 1,200 7.0 3.40 
Ramisi 19208 1,530 7.5 3.75 
Muhoroni 1966 1,800 9.3 3.75 
Chemelil 1968 2,235 9.4 3.30 
Mumios 1973 7,000 11.0 2.97 
Nzoia 1980 2,000 11.2 2.58 
Sony 1980 2,000 10.6 3.77 
-The fisurea are bued on interTiewl with the manqement of tbe IUgar milll and tbe Kenya Sugar 
Authority, Nairobi, September 1984. The molules yield (llures are bued on alix-year average. 
TABLE 3.6: K'enyal1o/asses Production, Export and Surplus 
Yetlr PrOOuction ('000 t) Export ( '000 t) Price (KShs.lt f.o.b) 
1967 24.2 14.6 NA 
19&8 32.6 17.4 NA 
1;69 46.2 25.3 NA 
1970 50.1 34.2 85 
1971 49.6 25.0 100 
1972 36.9 21.5 138 
1973 55.2 31.0 273 
1974 65.8 28.5 354 
1975 63.8 .. 1.9 258 
1976 55.0 3604 365 
1977 56.0 34.0 330 
1978 75.8 4004 248 
1979 97.9 62.9 .. 66 
1980 132.9 68.6 580 
1981 120.2 67.1 657 
Sources: Kenya Sugar Authority, Nairobi; East African Storqe Company, MombuL 
The Ministry of Uvestock Development identified molasses 8S 8 
strategic feed in national plans to boost 1ivestock production. The Ministry 
estimated that anlma1 feed was claiming some 30,400 tonnes of m01asses in 
1980, near1y ha1f the exported quantity, and wou1d need to rise at the rate of 
of 7.0 per cent per year in order to meet the country's livestock 
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development targets. The basis for these estimates could not be justified, 
either on the current or projected l1vestoc~ nutrit10n patterns. KSA, on the 
other hand, estimated a growth rate of 3.0 per cent in the livestock. demand 
for molasses. 23 But If the required molasses were avatJable, distribution 
and transportation costs would sti11Hmtt the extent of utl11zatlon. 
The only major Industrial use of molasses was the Miwanl Distillery 
which used about 4,800-5,000 tonnes a year. The distf11ery produced spirits 
estimated to have about 40 per cent ethanol (on a volume basis). The annual 
output ranged from 336,722 Htres to 362,279 litres over the 1971-1976 
period. The dlstt11ery also produced Industrial spirits for the local market 
and exported small quantities. On the whole, the search for local markets 
started much earlier In Zimbabwe than In Kenya. This was partly because of 
the differences In soclo-economlc expectations between the two countries. 
The next section wiJ1 show that not only did the differences In expectations 
Influence perceptions on resource utilization, but they also affected the 
patterns of institutional re-organizatlon, especially In relation to energy. 
3.2 Socto-economtc Expectations and Institutional Ch'ango 
3.2. I The formative years 
This section will examine the institutional backQround which 
subsequently accompanied the process of niche realization In the two 
countries. It will be stressed that although Zimbabwe and Kenya had some 
basic similarities In their historical development, the Institutional settings 
under which their energy strategies were formulated were different. The 
Kenyan development plans were characterized by expectations based on 
assumed normalcy In international trade while the Zimbabwean approach 
relied on presumed shortfalls in the supply and prices of liquid fuels. These 
differences led to variations in policies and administrative interventions. 
Understanding the configuration of energy niches in Zimbabwe and 
Kenya in the post-1960 period requires 8 more detailed understanding of the 
23. Inter.iewa. Kenya Supr Authority. Nairobi. September 1984. 
sources of socio-economic expectations and Institutional reform. Kenya 
inherited an economic structure wMch had been designed to emphasize 
agricultural production. This feature moulded the patterns of commercial 
energy use. The early 1960s were marked by rapId growth In International 
trade and the developing countries hoped to Increase their foreign earnings 
by expanding the export of theIr raw materials. The post-colonial poliCies in 
Kenya were therefore aimed at first maintaining the existing institutional 
structure whl1e at the same time raising agricultural production and 
Increasing Industrial output. Not only were the traditional export markets 
maintained, but efforts were made to find new ones. The expectations also 
shaped the political outlook and became part of the rul1ng Ideology. Those 
who suggested major reforms in the economic base were ejected from theIr 
political positions while those who proposed minor changes were absorbed in 
the main pol1tical party; a development that made Kenya a de facto one-
party state soon after independence. 24 
This first decade also saw rapid economic growth. As an Indicator, 
total GOP rose at an annual average rate of 6.6 per cent over the 1963-1973 
period. Whtle agriculture grew at 4.7 per cent over the period, 
manufacturing rose at 8.4 per cent per year. 25 These high growth rates 
resulted from land redistribution, rapid hybrid maize diffusion, and small 
holder agricultural expansion. They also influenced industrial output. The 
increased agricultural incomes (Jenerated demand for industrial (Joods. As a 
result, the government liberalized foreign direct investment poliCies, 
provided protection for the locally produced goods, and participated in joint 
ventures w1th the pr1vate sector. All these 1nstitut10nal changes were based 
on the assumption that the high growth rates would continue. 
The situation in Zimbabwe was different. The impOSition of sanctions 
against the country by the UnIted Nat10ns led to the Inference that the country 
would face difficulties in the supply of raw materials. Disruptions in the 
economic sphere were expected and therefore the (Jovernment introduced a 
wide range of measures to guarantee local self-sufficiency in strategic 
24. The country remained I d, jur, one-party Iwe until 1952 Yben erroru to form another 
political party upiriDl to different socio-economic expectaliona fon;ed the pemment to amend 
the conatitution and leaitimize the d, f6CI" ltatUi. 
25. World Bank, X'IIY6: &r",,11J 611d SUllclur61 CIJ6DItI, pp. 1-3. 
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industrial inputs. The pol1cies formulated and the institutions set up to 
devise policies to realize the policies clearly indicate that the government 
was concerned about the possible economic disruptions. The new measures 
and institutions represented a set of adaptive features geared towards coping 
with uncertainty. The major responsibilities for this institutional and policy 
adjustment lay in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The ultimate goal 
of the government was to m2lintain politic2l1 and economic stability which 
would guarantee increased private enterprise participation. 
However, the looming uncertainties increased state intervention. The 
Minister for Commerce and Industry summed up the situation thus: "Here in 
Rhodesia we have seen the stultifying effects of political uncertainties and we 
know that unless businessmen have conffdence In a country." .that 
Government will not forget that its first duty is to govern, to maintain law 
and order; then no amount of physical development or financial incentives 
will induce them to invest" "26 The most critical challenge to the government 
was to intervene in industrial development without necessarily having 
excessive control over its operations. The aim was to pave the way for 
private interests. It was felt that some degree of government control was 
necessary, but the proclaimed tendency was "to control as little as possible 
and to remove these controls If the need for them has passed. "27 
Before UDI, the government supported industrial development through 
the Customs and Excise Tariff as well as tax concessions. The level of 
protection was limited to competing imported goods. Moreover. ta riff 
relaxations were also extended to the use of local materials. thereby 
stimulating demand for local Industrial output. But following UDI. new 
elements were added to the customs and tariff regulations. The most 
important of these was the net foreign exchange benefit of industrial 
projects. This requirement was based on the presumed shortfalls tn the 
availability of foreign exchange to the country due to sanctions. 
These expectations were converted Into policies and implemented 
through new institutional frameworks. In 1964. for example, the National 
Export Council was set up to assist exporters in finding markets for their 
26. MUllett. "Government'llndustriaJ Policies". pp.7. 
27. IlJid.. pp. 7. 
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products. The search process Involved the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and was operated in l1aison with the country's diplomatic missions 
abroad. This followed the formation of the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) the year before. IDC was set up by an Act of Parliament °to 
faCilitate, promote, guide and assist in the financing of new and existing 
industries and industrial undertakings·. 23 
The post-UDI industrial policies were heavily protectionist. However, 
they st111 required the investments to operate under competitive conditions. 
The Import control policies were therefore subject to constant review. Again 
the Minister for Commerce and Industry stressed that °It would make no 
economic sense for Government to encourage the development of new 
Industries which would only survive under the permanent umbrella of Import 
control. It would not be in the national interest to permit the entrenchment 
of unsound and inefficient enterprises·. 29 One of the ways of ensuring that 
government control did not lead to inefficiency was to use customs tariffs. 
The choice was different from Kenya where equity participation and 
subsidies were common modes of state Involvement. Moreover, Kenya 
introduced regulations which facilitated the use of imported machinery to 
meet the growing local demand for industrial goods. Uke Zimbabwe, Kenya 
used customs and tariffs to ensure control. However, the policies applied 
were different. While Zimbabwe emphasized the use of local materials and 
foreign exchange saving, Kenya introduced policies which were inimical to 
the use of the local industrial base, local raw materials and the saving of 
foreign exchange. For example, whole machinery would be allowed in at 
lower duty (or even duty-free) than the semi-processed materials required 
for local machinery production. The imported machinery, on the other hand, 
was often not obtained through competitive means such as open tender and 
therefore had high chances of being overvalued. 
Indeed, there was no immediate reason for Kenya to worry about 
foreign exchange because the country showed high growth rates 1n its foreign 
reserves and there were no indicators that any shortfalls would in the 
medium-run (defined as operating with the tenure of the current development 
28. Jllitl., pp.9. 
29. Jllitl.. pp. 12. 
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plan) emerge In the foreign reserve base. The assumptlve normalcy that 
obtained in Kenya led to the formation of institutions simf1ar to those in 
Zimbabwe but operating on different expectations and using different policies 
with different outcomes. 
A look at the expectations which shaped the industrial strategies and 
the relevant institutional and policy frameworks reveals more complex 
adaptive dynamiCS. The expectations which influenced industrial poliCies also 
applied in more or less similar ways to the energy sector. There are at least 
two Important reasons for this. First, energy (especially Imported 
petroleum) was an important industrial input. Second, energy could not be 
considered in isolation without the relevant conversion technological 
systems. The policies which governed Industrial activities also applied to 
energy investment and technology acquisition strategies. 
3. Z. Z Energy and Boclo-economlc expectatlona 
The high growth rates in the Kenyan economy In the 1960s were closely 
associated with increases in the consumption of commercial energy sources. 
Of the various commercial energy needs, transportation emerged as the 
largest consumer of commercial energy resources and the country built a 
refinery to meet local and export markets. The refinery was in itself part of 
the import substitution strategy which was combined with meeting the needs 
of the neighbouring countries I especially Uganda which imported most of its 
products. The refinery's contribution to the economy was partly reflected In 
its post-investment expansion. It was initially built to handle 1.8 million 
tonnes of crude oil a year but was expanded in 1969 to refine 2.5-4.8 million 
tonnes. The bul1dlng of the refInery added another 11nt In the Interlocking 
web between energy and economic development. Not only was the refinery 
providing energy inputs into socio-economic activities I but it became 8 
source of foreign exchange. The introduction of the refinery in the energy 
environment not only consol1dated the gasoline niche but also made it 
dlrflcult to introduce alternative liquid fuels. 
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Uke Kenya, Zimbabwe built the Feruka refinery (in 1964) to meet local 
demand and export requirements, especially to Zambia. However, the 
refinery was closed down after a year of operation due to the international 
sanctions. It was owned by 011 firms, none of which controlled more than 20 
per cent of the shares. The closing down of the refinery was a major source 
of concern over future I1qufd fuel supplfes. The uncertainty was compounded 
by the fact that the country was land-locked. Not only did Zimbabwe rely 
heavily on South African refineries, but it also made efforts to beat the 
international sanctions. The country Is well endowed with Indigenous supplfes 
of coal and has considerable hydro-power supplies. 
However, neither of these energy resources could serve as a ready 
substitute for imported liquid fuels. This situatfon generated a search for 
alternatives. Attempts were made to obtain liquid fuels from coal as well as 
to develop electric vehfcles. 50 These responses suggested that the polfcy 
makers had already institutionalized their expectations over possible 
disruptions and geared the economy towards the generation of alternative 
eneroy technological systems. None of these efforts led to major 
commercial application and the country continued to depend on imported 
liquid fuels for fts transportation sector. Although the expected disruptions 
Induced the search for alternatfves, petroleum was already too tightly Inter-
locked with economic activities. 
Many of the options that were proposed fatled laroely because they 
could not meet the criteria set up by the government for all Investment 
projects. The 1973 oil crisis had profound disruptive effects on both Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had already Introduced a laroe number of 
institutional measures aimed at coping with shortfalls or disruptions but .the 
situation in Kenya was different. The country had Jived over a decade on 
30. Zimabwe's effortl to produce liquid fuels from coal failed larcely becaule there wu no proven 
tecbnology that could be adapted to the local conditions. "Direct bydroeenation is not just an 
indifferent performer on our coals. It is definitely the "rone type of technoloev to thrust upon 
countries with limited industrial capability. The development of these routes bu tested the 
ancineering and process stJlls of the top Industrialised countries to their utmost. yet In the US. for 
instance. none of the projects coming falteringly into commercial operation (and deemed worthy 01 
finance by tbe coyernment) is • direct bydroeenation plant. These are still regarded u too risty to 
lIIerit the biB buch." Hollaway. "Rhodesia's Search lor Synthetic fuels." pp. 35. 
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assumptive normalcy and did not have at hand any operating mechanisms 
aimed at deallng with disruptions In strategic resources such as 011. 
3.2.3 011 crisis and institutional responses 
The 011 crisis was a surprise to both Kenya and Zimbabwe. But the 
Zimbabwean economy had already instituted policies which dealt with 
disruptions In 011 supplies. As pointed out earlier, the use of local materials 
was now coupled with the maximintion of foreign exchange savings as a 
fundamental aspect of the industrial development strategy. But in Kenya the 
developments were built on the assumptions that economic growth would 
expand without major interruptions. 
Kenya's economy was particularly vulnerable to fluctuations In oj) 
prices, not because it was not prepared for it, but because of its high 
dependence on the international market for its major products, to changes in 
international trade. The 011 crisis In this case represented a major shift In 
the international economic scene. The effects of the high oil prices were 
reflected first in changes in the average growth rate of GOP, which had 
expanded by 6.5 per cent over the 1963-1972 period and was reduced to less 
than 1.0 per cent over the 1973-1975 period. It also increased the rate of 
inflation and recession, forcing the government to freeze employment and 
promotions. Changes in the supply and demand patterns of petroleum 
products over the 1974-84 period are presented in Table 3.7. 
Before the 011 crisis, Kenya registered marginal net expenditures on 
oil imports. This was mainly because of the value of refined products 
exported to the neighbouring countries. By 1972 the net import of petroleum 
and petroleum products accounted for only K£0.6 million. This rose to 
K£3S.1 million in 1974 and K£200.1 million in 1981. Net 011 imports accounted 
for only 0.3 per cent of the total foreign exchanoe earnings (or 0.6 per cent 
of non-oil foreign exchange earnings) of the country by 1972. This rose to 
20.9 per cent In 1977 and 65.6 per cent in 1981. The changes in the allocation 
of foreign earnings led to balance of payments difficulties. But as pofnted out 
earlier, the export of refined products helped to balance out the expenditure 
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on 1mported petroleum. In the meant1me, the share of exported petroleum 
products dropped as that of local consumption increased. It is notable that 
oil represented over 85 per cent of the commercial energy used in Kenya, 
with 12 per cent from electricity and the rest from coal and coke. 
TABLE 3.7: Kenya's Petroleum .supply and Demand Balance ('000 Tonnes) 
1974 1976 1973 1980 1982 1984 
DEMAND 
LPG 12.2 14.7 17.6 21.5 20.9 21.6 
Motor Ipirit 225.7 241.0 290.5 300.8 269.3 257.7 
Aviation spirit 5.6 5.7 6.5 5.6 6.1 5.6 
Jet/turbo fuel 238.9 305.2 328.0 347.9 281.8 259.4 
lIluminatill8 terOline 53.1 53.2 78.0 85.6 82.2 81.4 
Power terOline 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Light diesel oil 250.1 288.3 244.2 408.5 373.1 420.1 
HeaY)' diesel oU 40.4 44.7 29.0 38.9 27.6 2.5.2 
fuel oil 412.0 503.3 463.9 462.1 428.3 411.4 
TOTAL 1.238.6 1.456.5 1.537.9 1.671.0 1.489.3 1.482.4 
Refinery ua188 114.1 107.0 122.0 97.2 84.0 71.1 
TOTAL LOCAL DEMAND 1.352.7 1.567.5 1.6.59.9 1.768.2 1.573.3 1.553.5 
Petroleum fuels export 1.588.7 1.472.0 1.173.3 1.581.8 868.0 68.5.3 
TOTAL DEMAND 2.941.4 2.935.5 2.832.2 3.350.0 2.441.3 2.238.8 
SUPPLY 
Crude oil Import 2.902.9 2.496.7 2.369.2 3.075.5 2.162.5 1.874.3 
Petroleum fuels import 129.9 47.7 258.3 166.5 101.6 100.6 
TOTAL 3.032.8 2.544.4 2.627.5 3.242.0 2.264.1 1.974.9 
Adjustment-
-91.4 391.1 205.7 108.0 177.2 263.9 
TOTAL SUPPLY 2.941.4 2.935.5 2.833.2 3.350.0 2.441.3 2.238.8 
-Adjustment due to production losles and inventory changes 
Source: CentrIJ Bureau of Statiitici. Nairobi. 
Changes In the availability of wood fuels such as charcoal and fuelwood 
increased the use of petroleum products. For example, extensive shortages 
of charcoal in 1977-78 for urban use led to increased use of kerosine. The 
demand for 111umlnatlng kerosIne was 53,000 tonnes In 1971. It remained 
more or less unchanged in the following two years. However, charcoal 
shortages increased its demand to 78.000 tonnes in 1978 and 89,300 tonnes 
In 1979. The charcoal shortages were felt mainly In the urban areas. It Is 
not known to what extent the current rate of deforestation In the country and 
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the related shortage of fuelwood has contributed to the shift towards 
kerosine use. Such changes contributed to the growino imbalance between 
supply and demand for petroleum products. By 1980. the demand for motive 
fuels. kerosine and LPG outstripped local supply and the refinery had to be 
supplemented by imports. 31 
But even more disruptive were the indirect effects of the high oil 
prices on the Kenyan economy. These effects were largely associated with 
the country's high dependence on external trade. First. the high oil prices 
led to increases in the prices of goods manufactured in the industrialized 
countries. Kenya depended laroely on Imported machinery whose prices had 
risen due to high manufacturing costs resulting from high oil prices. This 
dependence was a result of the import-substitution strategy which favoured 
the Importation of Intermediate and capital goods. In the meantime. the 
prices of raw materials occasionally declined. reducing the country's 
foreign exchanoe earninos. Trends in Kenya's exports of coffee and tea were 
uneven during the post-1973 period. Fortutious upswinos in the prices of tea 
and coffee in the 1976-1977 period eased the pressure on the country's 
foreton reserves. As a result. the country did not take the Issue of 
petroleum seriously before 1979 when the second oil crisis led to a major 
reduction in the country's foreign reserves. 
The 1973 crisIs did not induce any major changes In 011 consumption. 
The growth of GOP and oil consumption showed a one-to-one correspondence 
between 1972 and 1976 when the effects of hiOh oil prices started to affect 
the economy. The oil crisis came at a time when Kenya was recording high 
growth rates and the expansionary trends required even higher amounts of 
petroleum. Some of the growth that occured over the period was aimed at 
increasing export earnings as a way of coping with the foreign exchange 
problem. Yet this itself required higher oil consumption. This situation 
continued untl1 1976 when the country showed a reduction In the consumption 
of energy which was not directly associated with correspondino changes in 
GOP orowth. The reduction In 011 consumption could be explained by the 
delayed effects of the high retail prices which had been effected since 1973 
(Figure 3.3). 
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FIGURE 3.3: Changes in Retail Petroleum Prices In Kenya (KShs./litre) 
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Concern over petroleum as a strategic form of energy was first 
reflected in the country's development strategy in the late 1970s. Before that 
matters pertaining to energy policy had been articulated through an inter-
ministerial committee operating through the National Council for Science and 
Technology. The Council was an advisory body under the Office of the 
President. The fact that energy matters were treated by an inter-ministerial 
committee indicated that the issue went beyond the boundaries of existing 
ministries. However, the hct that energy was for several years handled by 21 
committee under a council without direct ministerial backing suggested that 
the issue was not yet a matter of major concern. It was not untl1 November 
1979 that the Ministry of Energy was formed. Meanwhile, the oil sector was 
relatively inflexible and major reductions in consumption could not be 
achieved without adverse effects on industrial output. 
Investment in the energy sector may serve as an indicator of concern 
over the various sources of eneroy. Most of the investment was 1n electricity 
oeneration. The investment in the oil sub-sector was concentrated on oil 
exploration, refinery construction and expansion, as well 8S the building of a 
pipel1ne to transport refined products. Between 1959 and 1978. pr1vate f1rms 
manaQed to sini( 12 wells at the cost of K£12 million, none of which showed 
any prospective results. The refinery was built in the early 1960s at the cost 
K£25.4 million. The energy sector as a whole registered low levels of 
capital formation. Energy investment over the 1972-1979 period accounted 
for less than 10 per cent of total investments. Over the period, energy 
investment as a percentage of GOP rose at the rate of 2.9 per cent. 
Prior to the 1979 oil price increases, Kenya continued investing 
largely in the electrical power sub-sector. The country invest in large dams 
and also diversified Into electricity Qeneratlon using geothermal resources. 
The only Significant oil-related investment over the period was the 
construction of the 300-mile Mombasa-Nairobi pipeline at an initial cost of 
K£40 m11110n. This did not alter the uncertainties surrounding the aval1ablllty 
of this resource. The pipeline is managed by the Kenya Pipeline Company 
(KPC), which Is wholly-owned by the Qovernment throuQh the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Energy. It operates as a service, charging the oil 
companies for the products delivered. It handles about 1.2 million tonnes of 
refined petroleum products per yeari 1ts pumps operate on electrlc1ty. 
The situation in Zimbabwe was different. The responses to the energy 
crisis were influenced largely by the expected fluctuations in prices and 
availabil1ty of liquid fuels. In the first place, the closure of the Ferulea 
refinery forced Zimbabwe to import refined products. This change tended to 
conform with the constantly changing patterns of 1fquid fuel use in the 
country. Moreover, the importation of refined products gave the country 
more flexibility in changing the patterns of use through polfcy interventions. 
Whfle Kenya maintained almost the same llquld fuel composltfon over the 
post-1964 period, Zimbabwe's consumption patterns changed considerably 
both as a result of policy interventions as well as changing patterns of 
demand (Table 3.8). For example, pol1cy Interventions encouraged the use 
of diesel. As a result, the use of diesel in Zimbabwe rose from 1,121,000 
barrels in 1964 to 2,289,000 In 1980. 
Over the same period, the use of petrol rose from 1,310,000 to 
1,597,000 barrels; a marginal increase compared to that of diesel. The 
demand for aviation fuel dropped from 294,000 barrels In 1964 to 94,000 
barrels In 1966 largely because of the effects of international sanctions. 
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However, the demand for the fuel rose aQa1n reach1nQ 616,000 barrels in 
1978. This rise was largely accounted for by the mllitary use of this fuel. 
Such shifts could not have been met by the refinery and would have still 
required add1t1onal Imports. The country's total Import of 011 products rose 
• 
from 2,999,000 barrels In 1964 to 4,608,000 In 1980. The total Import bill 
rose from Z$9.0 million in 1964 to Z$166.0 million In 1980, a rise of about 
1800 per cent. The share of imported fuels rose from 10 per cent of total 
imports in the mid-l 960s to ovel' 25 per cent in the late 1 970s. 
TABLE 3.8: Zimbabwe's Petroleum Imports (Current Prices) 
Year Total barrels Cost (ZS m1l1ion) ZS/barrel 
1964 2.999 9.0 2.99 
1965 1.229 3.9 3.17 
1966 2.183 15.5 7.11 
1967 3.101 12.8 4.12 
1968 3.167 tl.6 3.68 
196CJ 3,394 11.4 3.35 
1970 3.446 11.5 3.34 
1971 3.829 13.7 3.58 
1972 4.508 17.7 3.49 
1973 5.013 lS.9 3.76 
1974 4.374 38.1 8.72 
1975 5.359 ".2 10.98 
1976 4,754 66.1 13.91 
1977 4.698 71.8 15.29 
1978 4.864 76.2 15.67 
1979 4.204 Jot 4.3 34.32 
1980 4.608 166.8 36.20 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Commerce. HarIr'e. 
Unlik.e Kenya, Zimbabwe was less integrated into the international 
market for its Inputs and products. A wide range of pol1cy measures were 
Introduced to enhance economic self-rel1ance. The Import-substitution 
strategy and the administrative rationing of Imports reduced the Indirect 
effects of high energy prices that are embodied In Imported Intermediate and 
capital goods. The overall strategy was to optimize the use of foreign 
exchange. This policy was effective In the non-fuel sectors because of higher 
substitution elasticitfes. However, efforts were Initfated not only to 
undertake fuel switching, but also to look for alternative sources of fuel. 
The country Is well endowed with hydro power resources and has substantial 
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coal reserves. End-uses that had earlier been met by petroleum products 
end could now be met with either coal or electricity were converted. Railway 
electrification and the use of coal-fired engines was one of the conversions. 
Factor substitution was also noted in the mining, agriculture, manufacturing 
and construction sectors; oil had to some extent been replaced by labour, 
whfch had subsequently been replaced by electrfcfty.52 
Although the costs of oil did not seem to have put much stress on the 
Zimbabwean economy, it was seen as a strategic resource. The country 
mob1lized fts research institutes to look 1nto possible alternattves to 
imported oil products. This wes in recognition of the long-term effects of 
disruptive fluctuations 1n the supply and prices of oil products. Energy-
related issues were handled at the level of the Prime Minister's Office with 
the help of a technical advisor. Various technological systems were designed 
and tried. The generation of these options was guided by the need for import-
substitution and were therefore based on the use of local resources. 
The search for alternative sources of energy was a jOint endeavour of 
the the pr1vate sector, the government and research 1nst1tutes. It also 
involved external support, especially in the provision of technical assistance 
in the evaluation of various technological options. In all these efforts, the 
government maintained that the market should be the ultimate selecting 
mechanism although the existence of regulatory institutions provided the 
direction 810no which the economy was to follow, depending on the dominant 
expectations. The initiatives were therefore conducted through IDC which had 
a team working on alternative transport fuels. 
The project narrowed down the proposed technologies to ethanol, coal 
liquefaction, vegetable o11s, diesel-ethanol blends , gasoline-ethanol 
blends, and electrical vehicles. Much of the worle was to monitor 
international trends 1n these fields wh1le at the same time estab1fshlng 
technical contact with experienced firms and research establishments in the 
industria1fzed countries. In addition to Zimbabwe's own efforts in technical 
monitoring, much information was also obtained through South Africa, with 
which various firms had technical agreements. The monitoring was based on 
the view that the 011 crisis was not Just an ephemeral problem but a 
32. Suc:tlina, En,rlY Prj"", pp.95-97. 
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disruption which had lono-term effects. It was because of this that IDC 
started monitoring the use of electric vehicles although this technology was 
still far from market realization. The main aim was to identify technologies 
that could occupy Isolated techno-economic niches; 1t was a search for 
technologies that would be feasible alternatives in selected areas. 53 
The late 1970s saw Increased particlpatfon of research Institutes In the 
generation and testing of a range of candidate technological systems. The 
Department of Research and Specialist Services of the Institute of 
Aoricultural EnoIneer1no played a s10nlflcant role In the search of alternative 
motive power. Apart from workino on different ways of extendino 
conventlonal1iquid fuels with ethanol and vegetable oft, the department also 
embarked on a project to ·show the feaslbfllty of converting a standard diesel 
powered tractor to a solid fuel fired steam engine· .34 These links 
underscored the co-evolutionary nature of technolo0ical imperatives and 
fnstitutional re-organization. 
This project aimed at using the country's coal resources 8S a source of 
thermal energy to run tractors that had previously been fuelled by diesel. A 
complementary project was designed to ·Investlgate the feasibility of using 
vegetable oil such as sunflower Oil, soya-bean 011 and cottonseed oft as a 
fuel for diesel engines under practical operating conditions·. 35 These 
projects were discontinued after independence and the institute reverted to 
monitorinQ international developments. Kenya did not have any such 
initiatives. Although energy-related institutional frameworks emerged in the 
late 1 970s f they did not have any specific R&D agenda. The differences In 
Kenya and Zimbabwe came to play Important roles In shaplno the reaUzation 
of ethanol niches In those countries. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sutJoested that the major fluctuations In the prices of 
oil and :sugar created opportunities for the application of fuel ethanol 
33. IDC. EI6Glric Y61Jic16S. pp. 2. 
54. Institute of Acricultural Engineeril1l. AlJlJu.llllport 1974-79. pp.65. 
35. l6id.. pp.67. 
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technoloQY in Zimbabwe and Kenya. It has argued that the introduction of fuel 
ethanol was part of a re-organization of the economic structure in response 
to the decline in sugar prices and rise in oil prices. However, the re-
organization was Influenced by the soclo-economlc expectations of the 
countries and the institutional arrangements as well 8S by policies which 
emerged as a guide to economic paths. It was suggested that differences in 
the expectations of the two countries on the future of oil supply and prices 
largely Influenced the patterns of Institutional reform In the two countries. 
The ethanol option, however, could not be pursued without the existence of 
the relevant technological systems. The next chapter looks at the evolution 
of ethanol technological systems. 
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4. EVOLUTION OF ETHANOL TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that the drastic changes in the 
International 011 prices disrupted the configuration of the enerQY niches and 
forced the two countries to look for alternative sources of liquid fuels. 
These same disruptions also stimulated renewed Innovation in the field of 
fuel ethanol production as a candidate for real1zlng the potential niche. This 
chapter identifies the major features of the evolutionary path followed by 
ethanol technological systems. The systems first originated in the beverage 
sector and were later relocated in the energy market. It shows that the 
development of the ethanol technological systems proceeded with minor 
incremental changes. But the changes In the energy environment created new 
conditions to wMch it could not effectively adapt without major technical 
changes. The process of innovation, supported by the private and public 
sector, generated a wide range of conjectural technologIcal variants whOe at 
the same time improving the ability of the existing technological systems to 
adapt to the changed market conditions. 
4.1 Ethanol as a fuel option 
Ethanol, also known ethyl alcohol, has been on mankind's l1st of 
beverages for time immemorial. Babylonian records reveal a 6,OOo-year 
history; and historians have pushed the European record baclc to the period 
after the th1rd ice age, some 10,000 years ago. The commercialization of 
this liquid was started in Europe by monks around AD 800. But it was not until 
the 19th and 20th century that alcohol was produced on a large commercial 
scale. Ethanol is conventionally obtained by breaking down simple sugars 
with an enzyme (zymase) contained in yeast (usually Sacchar()myces 
cere vis 18 e) • The process also releases carbon dioxide and heat. 
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The type and complexity of the production process depends on the 
feedstock used. In the case of sugarcane or molasses, the process is shown 
in Appendix 1. The cane is cleaned and crushed and the juice is extracted. 
This may be done through conventional crushing or by diffuser technology. 
The juice or molasses resulting from sugar production is then pre-treated 
for fermentation and the resulting beer is distilled and dehydrated (if 
anhydrous ethanol is required). The fermentation is done using yeast grown 
for separate batches or recovered from fermented beer depending on the 
type of process used. The process therefore goes through the stages of 
feedstock preparation, fermentation, distillation, and dehydration. 
TABLE 4.1: Physic61 Properties of Selected Fuels 
Property Ethanol Gasoline Diesel 
Formula CH3CH2OH C4 to CIl C14 to C.9 
Energy content (MJ/kg) 26.60 43.80 42.80 
Energy content (MJ/l) 21.00 32.00 36.40 
Specific gravity 0.79 0.73 0.85 
Research Octlme Number 106-111 79-98 NA 
Motor Octane Number 89-100 71-90 NA 
Cetene Number 0-5 5-10 45-55 
Molecular weight 46.10 100-105 240.00 
Autoignition temperature 423.00 257.00 
Flash point oc 13.00 -43 38.00 
NA: Not Applicable 
Source: World Bant (1980). 
The use of ethanol as a fuel is as old as the internal combustion engine 
itself. When Nikolas Otto designed his first internel combustion engine, he 
tried it on ethanol, not gaSOline. Numerous studies were conducted on the 
use of fuel ethanol at the turn of the 20th century. Henry Ford descr1bed 
ethanol as the -fuel of the future- and designed his Model A to run on ethanol, 
gasoline or a combination thereof. Its phYSical characteristics malee it a 
suitable fuel for use in internal combustion engines. Various countries have 
used fuel ethanol at one stage or another. It was the discovery of oil and its 
spread that stalled the development and appl1catlon of ethanol as a fuel. 
One of the most important features of any liquid fuel is the amount of 
energy it contains by volume or weight. This is important because the weight 
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and space occupied by var10us components of mobl1e systems such as 
vehicles is significant in its efficiency. As Table 4.1 shows, a kilogramme of 
ethanol contains 26.6 megajoules (MJ) as compared with 43.8 MJ in gasoline 
and 42.8 MJ 1n diesel. Although it would appear that there is a large 
differential between ethanol and the other fuels, the gap narrows when the 
fuels are compared by volume. These differences, however, imply that fuel 
ethanol has less energy content that the other fuels. 
Because of its low calorific value, ethanol has an unfavourable fuel 
economy compared to diesel and gasol1ne. However, ethanol burns wtth a 
Slightly higher thermal efficiency which partially off-sets the calorific 
differential. Morever, the higher octane value of ethanol can help 
1ni mprovlng the fuel economy. At normal compression ratios, ethanol 
delivers about 5.0 per cent more power than gasoline. This can be raised to 
15 per cent by increasing compression ratios from 8: 1 to 14:1. Such engines 
have already been designed and are operating in Brazil where over 2.2 
million cars now run on neat hydrous ethanol. Ethanol can be used 1n blended 
fuels partly to boost the octane rating and partly to replace the lead that 1s 
conventionally used to eliminate engine knocking. 
Ethanol 1s completely soluble in these fuels so long as there is no 
water 1n the system. This enables ethanol to be blended with these fuels (to 
varying degrees of ignitability and combustibility). But if water is present in 
the system, the blend separates into two phases, one rich in gasoline and the 
other mainly an ethanol-water mixture. Ethanol has an infinite miscibility 
with water. The ethanol-water phase would stall the engine and can cause 
considerable corrosion to engine parts. Phase separat10n 1s a critical 
problem in case of engine mismanagement. Evidence from Brnil indicates 
that most petrol tanks contain small amounts of water which do not pose any 
phase separation problems. 
Ethanol requires more heat for vaporization than gasoline. This makes 
starting difficult, especially 1n temperatures below lODC. The Brazilian 
ethanol cars are fitted with small gaSOline tanks which are used for cold 
start. For additional pre-heating, the exhaust manifold of the engine is 
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placed in contact with the intake manifold. This ensures that the intake air is 
pre-heated by the exhaust air without any additional fuel cost. 1 
One of the significant advantages of fuel ethanol is that it is based on 
biological materials which are renewable and relies on global energy flows 
as opposed to energy stocks. Moreover the entropic Implications of using 
renewable biomass resources are lower than those of relying on non-
renewable resources. Simple sugars can be obtained directly or indirectly 
from a wide range of biological materials. Where simple sugars are not 
readlly available, starch can be converted to simple sugars and then 
fermented to produce ethanol (Table 4.2). 
Crop 
Sugarcane 
Sweet sorghum 
Sugar beet 
F ockEr beet 
Wheat 
Barley 
Rice 
Maize 
Sorghum 
Irish potatres 
Cessava 
Sweet potatoes 
Grapes 
Molasses 
TABLE 4.2: Ethanol Yield from Biomass Resources 
Yield (tonne/ho/yr) 
50-90 
45-80 
15-50 
100-200 
1.5-2.1 
1.2-2.5 
2.5 
1.7-5.4 
1.0-3.7 
10-25 
10-65 
8-50 
10-25 
L itres/tonne 
70-90 
60-80 
90-100 
90-100 
340 
250 
430 
360 
350 
110 
170 
167 
130 
245 
Source: National Academy of Sciences. Wubington, DC. 
[thono) 
l itres/ho/yr 
3,500-8,000 
1,750-5,300 
1 ,350-5 ,500 
4,400-9 ,350 
510-714 
300-625 
1,075-2,150 
600-1,944 
350-1,295 
1,110-2,750 
1,700-11,050 
1,336-8,350 
1,300-8,000 
As can be seen from the table, laroe amounts of ethanol can be 
obtained from various crops. However, sugarcane is suitable because it is 
readily available and is an established crop in a large number of countries. 
However, hypothetical aval1abl1ity cannot turn the resource readily 1nto 
ethanol. Economic considerations such as the opportunity cost of switching to 
other products need to be considered. It 1s the context of rising 011 prices 
l. Details on innovation in ethanol engines are bued 00 interviews with car and truck 
manu(acturen in Sa6 Paolo. Brazil in February-April. 1985. 
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and falling sugar pr1ces that the switch to ethanol m1ght be Just1r1ed. The use 
of this fuel ts therefore 8 result of the structural re-organization of the 
relative position of oiJ and sugar tn the fnternatlonal economy. 
4.2 The Origins of Ethlnol Technologicil Systems 
The significant functional units of the ethanol technological system 
used In the field of energy originated fn the beverage environment where 
development was marked by 8 series of incremental innovations, largely in 
response to external selecting pressures such as competition, regulation, 
taxation and other fnstltutfonal fnterventlons. 2 The external pressures on 
brewing not only constituted quantifiable market mechanisms but also 
Included factors such as taste and habit among consumers which tended to 
stall the tempo of technical change as the system settled into particular 
deSign configurations and practices associated with consumer taste. 
Significant developments in brewing occured long before organized 
scientific research became a major input into industrial production. In 8 
detailed study of the industry in England over the 1700-1830 period, Mathias 
concluded that the industrial transformation of brewing rel1ed on traditional 
techniques and ·occured in a generation unhelped by a major invention".3 
Fermentation, the most important biochemical process in brewinQ, was 
extensively used but its scientific aspects remained unknown for a long time. 
2. To illustrate this point we sbaH limit our analysis to the fermentation ltaae of the procesl. Thil 
anaJyticaJ boundary is baed on nrioUi reuons. Fint. fermentation is the stage that bu leen most 
innOYations. Second, it il the core part of the wbole process: it II at lbis stage that elbanol II 
ICtually produced. The process of ethanol production Itretcbes from agricultural production to 
waste treatment (with lbe intermediate stages of feedstock production, fermentation, distillation 
and debydration). This section includes feedstock preparation in the fermentation process. 
Subsequent sect;ona, howr ...... will look at innontion in all th. major stag .. of ethanol production. 
3. Mathia, TIIII Brllrilll IIIdu6try ill E1I11611d, pp. 63. "But industriaJ luccesS or thil order 
itself induced the learcb for. and application of. new techniques. Wben conditions are propitious, 
the .irus of economy and efficiency is an infectious one, u mucb u lbe sickness of inertia wben 
lbey are not: and men toucbed with lbe bope of pin by reorpnilifll their breweries bad their wits 
Ibarpened in the learcb for profit by other means. Moreover. the problems of IUCCesS, U well u III 
opportunities. Itimulated ICtiyity towards preseninl the conditions whicb allowed it, mat inc lbe 
role of innontion a cumulati.e one," jlJjd. 
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Ironically. the growth of fermentation knowledge was partly retarded 
by institutional rigidity in the scientific community as influential scientists 
believed in false concepts. The leaqing German chemist Leibig believed that 
fermentation was caused by the motion set up In the l1quld by some 
decomposing substance. The theory by the Frenchman Cagniard de La Tour 
and German chemists Knetzing and Turpin in the late 1830 that yeast was a 
vegetable organism that caused fermentation by its own development was 
strongly opposed by Leibig for over 20 years. It was Louis Pasteur who, in 
1860, showed that yeast was Indeed a living organism whose natural changes 
led to alcoholic fermentation. Brewing continued without much scientific 
input although British chemists were calling on brewers to take advantage of 
the systematic knowledge that was accumulating among chemists. <t 
However, the increased availability of technological knowledge and the 
changing economic as well as legal pressures gradually led to the 
application of scientific knowledge to brewing. It is notable that although 
scientific knowledge relevant for some aspects of brewing was available, it 
was not applied to brewing until changes In the external environment 
generated pressures which required the use of available innovation. This is 
consistent with the adaptive landscape approach in that the changes In the 
external envlroment created suitable conditions for the application of 
particular innovations originated in other sectors of the techno-economic 
field and which were then relocated in the brewing sector. 
The first significant innovations were the introduction of the 
thermometer and saccharometers, both of which were associated with 
quality control and regularity. The innovations were adopted by the industry 
from other fields; the saccharometer was merely a hydrometer which had 
been calibrated to measure the specific gravity of beer. With the 
thermometer the mashes ceased to be measured in terms of 'blood heat', or 
'milk heat' or the 'temperature which the elbow may just tolerate', or 
'whereat the surface of the liquid ••• gives a perfect, still reflection when 
just about to steam'.5 The thermometer eHminated these vague estimates of 
the temperature and enabled the brewers to determine the right 
<t. IlJid., pp. M-65. 
5. IlJid.. pp. 65-64. 
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temperatures. The hydrometer, on the other hand, provided accurate 
measurements of both beer and distilled alcohols. 
The application of scientific knowledge to brewing did not occur in a 
smooth way but advanced unevenly Is association with changes in the external 
pressures which led to competition among different instruments. The 
external pressures set selection criteria and at the same time stimulated 
competition among Instrument makers. This process of Instrument selection 
was bound up with institutional issues, especially in relation to the 
leo1tlmatlon of particular Instruments throuOh leQal endorsement. 
legalization became important because most of the pressures on brewers 
originated from the government and were related to state regulation. The 
Innovation process, as will be seen later, became largely a series of 
incessant attempts by brewers to find technical ways to circumvent the legal 
process. It is because of this that scientific knowledge was imparted to (as 
well as generated from) brewing. 
The use of the hydrometer in the gauging of spirits tn England, 
especIally for excIse duty collection was Itself an Interestlno case of 
-technological falsification-. Following their selection by the authorities in 
the late 1750s, disputes arose over the accuracy of the two instruments 
used. Modifications were Introduced In one of the Instruments, ostensibly to 
raise their accuracy or verisimilitude. It took up to 1803 for a selection to 
be made among the competing hydrometers, even though efforts continued to 
challenge the selected instrument for another 15 years when the choice was 
legally confirmed by the Hydrometer Act of 1818. Subsequent inventions in 
Scotland were more accurate and challenoed those used In England. The 
degree of accuracy in hydrometers was important because minor deviations 
could lead to loss of profit among producers. 
The Instruments provided valuable Information which was later appl1ed 
to the costing of various inputs and the setting of product prices. Since the 
operative unit in feedstocks was the amount of fermentable substances, as 
expressed in the form of sugar, the saccharometer became useful in 
establishing the value of the raw material. With the thermometer, it became 
possible to control brewlno temperatures and therefore keep the Industry 
gOing in summer 8S well. The proposal for this sort of innovation first went 
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to the naval brewhouses, which often faced unexpected fleet arrivals in 
summer, forcing them to brew under unfavourable temperature regimes. 
With the piped circulation of water at controlled temperatures, it became 
possible to brew beer In summer. Whl1e the Instruments allowed for qual1ty 
control and enabled production efficiencies to improve, they also freed the 
industry from dependence on suitable weather and climatic conditions. 
Moreover, instrumentation increased the ability to control fermentation and 
consequently reduce losses arising from contamination. 
Major advances occured In the Industry as a result of state fIscal 
pOlicies, many of which were aimed at reducing the export of Scottish alcohol 
to England. 6 For example, increased taxation in the 1780s based on the 
quantIty of malt forced ScottIsh dlst111ers to Increase the amount of raw 
grain. This showed the lack of scientific knowledge in the field of enzymatic 
hydrolysis. The authorities did not know that the amount of diastase in the 
malt (even if it accounted for only 20 per cent of the entire feedstock) was 
enough to turn the starch in the raw grain into fermentable sugars. 
On discovering this Innovative response among dlstf11ers, the 
authorities moved to impose duty on the wash. It was thus assumed that each 
unit of the wash yielded the same amount of alcohol. In response. the 
distf11ers raised the concentration of fermentables In the feedstock by adding 
sugar and treacle. Subsequently duty was determined by hydrometers 8S In 
England. The advances made both in innovation and policies illustrate the co-
evolutionary re-organlzation that resulted from the interactions between 
technology and Institutions. Because technological practice advanced faster 
than the related scIentifIc knowledge, Instftutfonal changes had to await the 
latest developments. Moreover, there was no way of te11ing in advance which 
innovations were likely to result from new administrative pressures. 
A 1788 legislation in Scotland led to significant Improvements In 
distillation. It restricted and based the levy on the size of the stills used. 
Distillers responded to this by raising the pace of distillation and 
consequently increasing throughput. One way was to make the stf11s 
shallower and thereby Increase the rate of dist111ation. James Watt, after 
finding out that l1Qulds bo11ed at lower temperatures under reduced 
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pressure, tried the technique on st111s but there was no widespread use at 
the time. ShDl10w distillation led to new problems such as saturated carbon 
dioxide which caused froth in the stm. Soap was added to the still to 
el1mlnate this problem. These Innovations were Incremental and did not alter 
the basic design concepts of the process. All sub-processes were operated 
in batches. Flows and controls had not been introduced in the system on a 
large scale. Although the production process appreared disjointed, it 
constituted a technological system. The various processes from feedstock 
preparation to d1st1llaUon const1tuted a purposive structure whose 1ndlvldual 
units could only be explained by the workings of the whole system. 
As production expanded, the need for alternative sources of power to 
replace horses became more pressing, especially for pumping and m111lng. 
Unlike in other sectors such as the woollen industry, steam-engines could be 
easily adapted to the industry without much internal re-adjustment or delay. 
A large engine could be easily fitted to an existing horse-mill. But the engine 
had to be made rotative, to fit the technical needs of the breweries. The 
rotative des1gn had to be tested against the then operative plans of eight 
horses; its triumph in this test led to widespread interest among brewers. 
The diffusion of the steam-engine was so rapid that by 1800 all the major 
operations of brewing had been mechanised and production scales which had 
not hitherto been envisaged were reached. 
As suggested earlier, the scientific details on fermentation remained 
unknown until Pasteur's work. Even after his discovery, it took 23 years 
before the knowledge was turned into technological practice. The cultivation 
of pure yeast was f1rst successfully appl1ed by Hansen at the Carlsberg 
brewery in Copenhagen. This was a significant advancement because artificial 
selection was applied to yeast for the first time. Hansen admittedly 
Introduced Into brewing the technique of artificial selection which was being 
widely used in agriculture. This not only eliminated the wild yeast varieties 
that caused contamination but also guaranteed that a robust strain could be 
propagated and used on a large-scale resulting in increased culture 
uniformity and higher possibilities for controlled fermentation. But the 
technique required lower fermentation temperatures, preferably achieved by 
artificial refrigeration, a factor which was partly used to explain the initial 
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reslstence among British brewers, where plants operated at higher 
temperatures (120C-130C) than on the continent (50C-60C). 7 Lower 
temperatures were also required for storage. But the elimination of wild 
yeasts would also have removed the distinct flavours of the British beers, on 
which part of the demand was based. 
The Hansen approach was also in response to problems arising from 
brewing practice. The approach constituted a recombination of existing 
pieces of knowledge. On the one hand, the fact that fermentation was caused 
by a wide variety of living organisms was central to the Innovation. Second, 
the fact that these organisms could be isolated and propagated on a large-
scale enabled him to suggest a way of eliminating the contamination problem. 
The Innovation was a recombination of scientific knowledge originating from 
brewing as well as from the agricultural sector. 
Thus much of what constitutes ethanol production Is based on the 
convergence of different functional units introduced over 100 years ago. The 
changes which have since been introduced into the system have been adaptive 
and Incremental. Most of them did not originate in the sector itself but were 
adopted from other uses. The system is built around fermentation and 
dist111ation processes. The feedstock phase of the process has drawn 
technological Inputs from the agricultural sector while chemical engineering 
has enriched the distillation and purification phase. But the convergence of 
these different technical units is governed by the inner logiC of the structure 
of the ethanol production system viewed as a whole. 
These developments, which firmly established ethanol production 
technology In the beverage environment also prepared the ground for Us 
relocation to the energy environment. This is mainly because the technical 
characteristics of ethanol made it a candidate source of liquid fuel. But the 
beverage sector had slightly different selecting pressures than the energy 
environment. Whereas the technological system was relatively established 
in its beverage environment, a shift to the energy environment would mean a 
7. Teich, "fermentation Theory and Practice", pp. 130. See also Signortb, "Science and tbe Brewing 
Industry", pp. 536-550, for I rejection of tbe notion tbat scientific advance bad any revolutionary 
impact on Britisb brewing; and Cochnn, T/J6 P6iJsI Br6PiDI CII.p6DY, pp. 102- I 28, on tbe role 
of science in American brewing. Glamann, "The Scientific Brewer", pp. 186-198, lives an account of 
lbe rote of science iOlbe rise of lbe modern brewing indUilry. 
whole new process of niche realization under which both the technolooical 
system and the environment would be transformed in unpredictable ways. 
The next section lool(s at the relocation of this technology to the 
energy sector. It will be noted that raising the verisiml1itude of the 
technological system required major innovations superior to the incremental 
changes in the earlier evolutionary staoes. Some of the innovations 
constituted major changes in the system through recombinant innovZltion and 
the application of scientific knowledge. These major innovations were largely 
1nfluenced by the fluctuat10ns 1n the energy env1ronment. 
4.3 Technological Relocation 
The previous section traced the evolution of ethanol technological 
systems Zlnd their adaptZltion to changes in the beverage sector. This section 
will examine the application of the technological system in the energy 
environment. It wf11 be shown that the development of the technological 
system in the new environment was subject to new pressures which required 
changes in its internal structure. These pressures resulted from the prices 
and types of inputs, energy balances, ethanol prices, and ecological 
considerations. However, the initial relocation was not associated with any 
major changes in the ethanol technological system. 
Ethanol as 21 source of energy was used in isolZlted niches protected 
from market competition. It is equally important to identify the different 
reasons for produc1ng fuel ethanol. Its productton (and use) in Braz11 1n the 
1920s and 1930s was largely aimed at reducing surplus sugar and stabilizing 
the international sugar market. The operations were not conducted with any 
competitive considerations In mind. For example, the cost of ethanol was not 
viewed in relation to alternative sources of liquid fuels. As a result, there 
were no major external pressures on the manufacturers to Improve the 
efficiency of ethanol production. Moreover, production was conducted by the 
government. Since the purpose of the technological systems was to reduce 
surplus sugar, the directors of the programme argued that the efficiency of 
the plants be assessed in those terms and not in terms of economic efficiency 
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or the competitiveness of the by-product, ethanol. S This purpose could be 
ach1eved w1thout any improvements in the technological systems. 
The case of Brazil in the 1930s indicates that the relocation of ethanol 
technoloQical systems was not a major shift towards the creation of a new 
energy niche 8lthough the ethzlnol W22S used 225 fuel. The progr22mme W22S 
aimed at normalizing the sugar market. As a result, there were no strong 
internal or external pressures influenclnQ the internal evolution of the 
technological systems. The system remained uncompetitive with gasoline and 
relied on the same techniques applied in the beverage environment; it was a 
batch process with long fermentation periods. The system also relied on 
conventional sources of raw materials as used in the beverage environment. 
Further still. the use of the systems was not associated with a lobby of 
scientists and technologists who wanted ;t institutionalized. For such a 
development, we turn to the historical and institutional efforts to establish a 
more permanent ethanol niche In the US In the 1930s as an Illustrative case. 
These efforts were associated with the Farm Chemurgic Council which 
flourished between 1935 and 1939, sponsored by the Chemical Foundation. 
The councl1 beHeved In the efficacy of scientific knowledge, especially 
chemistry, to revolutionize agricultural production and raise the US economy 
from depression. The council believed that -modern science has placed new 
tools in the hands of man which enable a variety of surplus products of the 
soil to be transformed throuQh organiC chemistry into raw materials usable 
tn tndustry·. 9 This was based on the view that 8 bundle of sctentiftc 
knowledge was available which could be used to transform agricultural 
surpluses into industrial chemicals and may have been influenced by the 
3. See Nunberg. SI6I6 11I16r~6111Io11 III 1/J6 SII16r S6Clor III Dr.,I!. for I detailed reYi.", of 
ethanol production in Bruil oyer this period and the institutional forces that sbaped the 
utilization of ethanol then. 
9. Chemical Foundation, "Declaration of Dependence". pp. 32. The lianing of the declaration was 
adorned by aymbolic political parapbenalia: I replici of the Hall of Independence wbicb Henry Ford 
u host to the conference erected at hil outdoor museum: I replica of the inkltand used in 
Philadelphia on July 4. 1776: I desk that belonged to Thomo Jeffenon: I table and chain that 
were once owned by Abraham Lincoln. Henry Ford lupported the declaration becaule of his 
interest in alternative automotive fuell following fuel Ihortagel durinl the WIt. He YO allO 
interested in producing pIa tics from agricultural resources. See Wit. "Henry Ford'i Science and 
TecbnolOlY for Rural AmericI·. for an IIleslment of Henry Ford', interests in agricultural 
d8Yelopment. 
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success of chemists following the extensive use of the products of this 
discipline in World War 1. 10 
The Chemical Foundation obtained finance from nearly 5,000 German 
chem1cal patents seized by the US federal government from Germany during 
World War I, many of which belonged to the I.G. farben complex. JJ The 
patents were sold to the Chemical Foundation by the AHen Property 
Custodian, who later resigned from the government and became the President 
of the foundation. Government action brought against the foundation In the 
Supreme Court was defeated. Not only did the US chemical Industry exploit 
the patents, but the government also imposed a protective tariff against the 
products of a reviving German chemical trust. The 1922 tariff system 
remained intact until the 1964 Kennedy round of tariff negotiations. J2 
The Farm Chemurgic Councl1 provided a framework for the application 
of the existing stock of scientific and technical knowledge to the oenration of 
a permanent source of energy. This stoclc of Icnowledge had accumulated 
during World War I when fuel shortages stimulated interest in this source. 
The fear of further shortages in the post-war period served as an Impetus In 
both innovation and institutional reform. Legislation was introduced which 
distinguished industrial alcohols from alcoholic beverages. Efforts to 
expand the use of ethanol1n the 1920s hUed because of technfcal problems 
such as corrosion as well as the discovery of more oil fields, technical 
advances In petrol refining and the use of tetra-ethyl lead 8S an octane 
booster. Attempts to enlist institutional support for fuel ethanol were 
overwhelmed by counteracting advances in the petroleum sector. 
Most of the ethanol produced In the US after World War I was obtained 
from fermenting blackstrap molasses. This was relatively eDSY because 
molasses contains readily fermentable sugars. But the 1930s were 
aSSOCiated with surplus corn which was not readily fermentable. This 
required changes in the molasses-based ethanol technological systems to 
incorporate a section for the hydrolysis of starch Into Simple sugars. The 
technology for doing so was already available and had been used in the 
10. See Purtell. "The farm Chemurgic: Counc:il'. pp. 307-310 for detaill. 
11. Bortin. CriJIJ6 .'11/ PUDisIJJII6DI IIll G. F.rIJ6D. pp. 150-153. 
12. Purtell. lip. cit. pp.308. 
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beverage environment for a long time. What was needed was recombinant 
innovation to edapt a hydrolysing unit onto the existing molasses-based 
technological system. This process represented a departure from the 
previous ad hoc proJects to a more systematic approach to ethanol 
production which required some institutional reform to legitimize the 
realization of ethanol niches in the corn-growing states such as IllinOiS, 
Iowa, Indiana and Nebraska. 
The introduction of such reforms required changes in the criteria used 
to evaluate fuel ethanol; It was no longer an Issue of reducing farm surplus 
but a technological intervention whose economic viability had to be judged 
against other options. Since the production of corn had already Incurred high 
costs, especially through energy Inputs, the production of ethanol had to 
account for these costs.13 As a result of criticism, the legislative reform 
efforts were defeated. It Is important to note that the Department of 
Agriculture was not in favour of using agricultural surplus for industrial 
products but preferred restrictions of acreage. 14 Although studies had 
Identified a wide range of raw materials that could be used for producing 
ethanol, the Department of Agriculture was unwilling to support any ethanol 
project. I, Deprived of any support the Chemical Foundation decided to go it 
alone, setting up the first ethanol plant at Atchison, Kansas in 1936. 
The plant was based on a variety of raw materials obtained in the 
region. It encountered enormous legal and raw material supply problems In 
its first six months. It came on stream In 1937 and produced ethanol at a 
cost five times higher than the refinery price of gasoline. Although ethanol 
from the plant was widely marketed, the council had to subsidise Its 
production. The foundation withdrew its support for the council in 1937 due 
to the running out of its German patents and therefore signalled the end of 
13. Giebelhaul. "Farmill8 for Fuel". pp. 179. 
14. Pursell, Dp cit., pp.309-3JO. 
I'. The decision was laraely influenced by political differences between aoverDment officiall and 
the promoten of fuel ethanol, especially on agricultunl policy. It appears that wbile the 
lovernment was unwillill8 to move Immediately into JarKe-scale agro-Industrlal projects lucb as 
fuel ethanol, they indeed considered them u an option that needed to be punued more carefu1Jy. In 
the meantime, the New Deal IUpporten mUlled to haye their approach Itcepted more readily. The 
cboice of technological optionl WII therefore influenced by broader political issues pertaining to 
the direction or locio-economic evolution. 
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the project. 16 The plant was finally shut down in 1938 after the Foundation 
had invested US$600,OOO. Subsequent efforts to revive the plant failed 
because the management could not raise the US$IZ5,OOO needed to match a 
loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The failure of the project 
beceme en issue of political conflict in the state. involving cleims end 
counter-claims against the oil industry. I' 
The collapse of the Atchison plant was l1nked to a wider conflict 
between government policies (as enshrined 1n the New Deal) and the appeal to 
the role of science in reducing agricultural surpluses and increasing farm 
Incomes. Whl1e the government favoured financial payments to farmers. the 
chemurgic movement advocated the use of chemical knowledge to turn 
agricultural surpluses into industrial products. The issue became a political 
conflict between the government and the council on whose board well known 
critics of the New Deal served. The government defused these conflicts by 
establ1shfng four research laboratories devoted to the ut111zatfon of farm 
surpluses in 1938. 
Although the government refused to subsidise the Atchison plant, the 
project had demonstrated the technical feasibility of fuel ethanol application. 
Interestingly, the government was more wi11ing to pursue the ethanol option 
as an experimental project and not as a commercial venture. The US 
Department of Agriculture decided to build a smal1 ethanol plant at Its 
Peoria laboratory producing 300-500 gallons a day for experimental 
purposes under the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act. And Indeed, the 
government subsidized ethanol production during World War II. The Atchison 
plant went into production again during this period but not for the energy 
market but as an Industrial feedstock. The ethanol was used for munitions 
manufacture and synthetic rubber production. Again the World War II period 
demonstrates that ethanol was drawn into the industrial sphere to solve 
enomalies generated in other economic sectors. These conditions did not 
provide major incentives for the internal evolution of the ethanol technology. 
The Atchison plant showed that a technoloolcal system that could provide an 
16. The alcohol moyement lost the IUPPort or the Foundation'l President Francil Garno when be 
died in 1937. a year after the patents be lold to the Foundation run ouL 
17, GiebelhaUi. lip cil .• pp. '82. 
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alternative energy source was available. But this system could not compete 
with conventional sources of liquid fuel. 
Moreover, the economic boom that followed World War II and the 
related rise In employment. combined w1th the rise of physIcs (followIng the 
success of nuclear detonations) as the new frontier for scientific and 
industrial advancement, made the chemurgic movement less relevant. And 
so were the innovations that it sought to promote such as fuel ethanol. The 
innovations that came later to be applied in ethanol technological systems 
had emerged In other disciplines. Many of these applications had to await the 
market opportunities created by the 1973 oil crisis. OVer the 1930-1973 
period, the technological system changed only marginally. There were no 
major enVironmental pressures that could have faCilitated technical 
advances or induced system-speCific innovations. The main feature of the 
system remained its batch configuration. 
4.4 Technical Change and Corporlte Restructuring 
The structure of the technology marlcet remained heterogenous with 
established suppliers of traditional batch systems still playing a large role. 
Most of the large engineering firms possess the capacity to design and bulld 
ethanol plants. There Is no distinct ethanol technology marlcet except for 
some speCialist firms that have for 8 long time supplied dist111eries to the 
beverage sector. Some of these firms are subsidiaries of large engineering 
corporations. But these firms did not playa slgn1f1cant role In the supply of 
technology to the developing countries In the 1970s. This was largely 
because the main marlcet for ethanol technology was Brazil. The supply of 
ethanol technology to the energy sector was therefore dominated by Brazll1an 
firms such 8S Codistil (a subsidiary of Oedinf). Zanlni and Conger. 
At the time of the oil crisis. these firms had established themselves 
as major suppliers of ethanol technology but mainly for the beverage sector. 
The crisis Simply necessitated the relocation of their supply to a different 
market wIthout any major changes In theIr teChnologIcal capacity or 
management techniques. The largest five ethanol technology suppliers in 
Brazil had the capability to produce more than 128 distilleries per year 
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producing up to 120.000 11tres each In the early 1980s (Table 4.3). Codlstl1 
alone could supply about 60 per cent of this output. This meant that the real 
market structure of ethanol technology was dominated by BrazWan firms. 
TABLE 4.3: Distillery Production Capacity or Brazilian Firms (1980)* 
Firm 
Dedini 
Conger 
Zanini 
fives Lf11e 
Piretininga 
-Eilimaled capacity of 120.000 lilres per day. 
Source: Serccwicb (t 983). 
Cap~ity 
75 
20 
18 
10 
5 
Share (I) 
59 
16 
14 
8 
3 
TABLE 4.4: Change In Codlstll's Plant and Capacity Production 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Plants Sold 
2 
16 
24 
33 
46 
58 
33 
47 
46 
25 
37 
30 
Aver~ C8poclty 
( L ftres per day) 
50.000 
86,000 
68,000 
87.000 
89,000 
85,000 
105,000 
123,000 
117,000 
97.000 
117,000 
109,000 
The Brazilian firms increased their production capacity by large 
margins (measured in ethanol output per day) over the post-1973 decade. 
Codlstl1. for example. Increased the average capac1ty of Its output from 
86.000 litres per day 1974 to 109.000 litres a day in 1984. As shown in Table 
4.4, the capacity rose to 123,000 litres per day in 1980 and then declined 
thereafter. Much of the decline ;s accounted for by the diversification into 
smaller distilleries as well as the sale of experimental plants produCing 
:5.000 l1tres a day. Over the period. the desh~n conflgurat1ons changed only 
marginally to incorporate scale expansion. Codistil shrted selling 120,000-
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lttres-a-day plants in 1974 for the first time. Plants with the capacity of 
220,000 litres a day were first sold in 1976 and those producing 240,000 
litres a day were first supplied by Codistil in 1981. By 1983, Codistil started 
supplying plants with the capacity to produce 300,000 11tres a day. 
Brazilian firms increased their capacity to export ethanol plants in the 
1970s. This was based on the experience Qained in the supply of technoloQY to 
the diverse Brazilian conditions. Whereas Codistil exported only one plant 
(to Bolivia) in the 1960s, its export in the 1970s and 1980s increased to 
include destinations such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, ParaQuay. Bolivia. Cuba. 
Peru, Hani and Pakistan. In addition, Conger and Zanini also exported plants 
to Peru, Venezuela and Kenya. The size of the Brazilian market and the 
export potential led a number of firms in the industrialized countries to 
establish offices in Brazil. Without such linkages, the technological potential 
amonQ industrialized country firms to manufacture ethanol technology could 
not be adequately utilized. 
Brazilian firms also established 11n"s with some firms in the 
industrialized countries with the aim of oettlno access to emeroino 
technologies as well as supplying technologies to the industrialized 
countries. For example, Zanini entered joint ventures and technical co-
operation agreements with Zahnraederfabrlk Renk A.G. of West Germany and 
Foster-Wheeler of the US. The Foster-Wheeler deal included the supply of 
distilleries to the US market. Conger, on the other hand. took up 5.0 per 
cent shareholding in Vogelbusch of Austria in order to have access to 
stillage-reducing technology. Conger acquired the "now-how but did not 
market the process as widely as had been expected. 
It is notable that the suppliers of ethanol technology such as Codistil 
also had the capacity within their industrial complex to supply other 
technologies related to sugarcane production. The complex deSign 
configuration of various technical units and scientific knowledge associated 
with ethanol technological systems made it relatively difficult for new small 
firms to emerge in this sector. Much of the relevant know-how in the early 
stages had already been embodied in capital goods and operating skills 
associated with batch processes. But the new deSign configurations with 
potentially higher performance embodied knowledge that was possessed by 
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fIrms that already exIsted In dIfferent sectors. Moreover, some of the 
established firms supported university research, especially in the US by 
allowing researchers to patent their innovations while the financiers retained 
the right to license the technology. 
The post-1Q73 trends did not see major market restructuring with any 
significant concentrations like those witnessed in photovoltaics .18 This is 
partly because no large markets were envisaged and the radical innovations 
could not be easily brought to commercial application. Moreover, ethanol 
technologIcal systems constItuted a large number of dlst1nct untts whose 
deSign control was distributed over a relatively large number of firms. Even 
more important was the fact that no major mark.et niches were perceived 
outside the Brazilian energy environment. It was expected that the Braz11tan 
market would be an open terrain in which new technological systems would be 
tested and adopted. However, the country relied on locally-produced batch 
processes as part of its policy to protect the local industry. 19 
The firms that brought their expertise to ethanol R&.D or initiated new 
R~D efforts Included chemlcal and pharmaceutIcal fIrms, engIneerIng 
companies, food and drink corporations, biotechnology-dedicated companies 
and 011 corporations. Firms such as Novo Industri (Denmark) and Gist-
Brocades (Netherlands) wh1ch had long-standing capab11tty 1n enzyme 
production could bring their expertise to the ethanol sector, espeCially in 
the prospective area of enzymatic hydrolYSiS. With capability in enzymology 
and process engineering, Novo Industri designed a continuous fermenhtion 
process but did not find a market for it. Diamond Shamrock. entered the 
ethanol market by bufldlng an exper1mental plant 1n the US, whl1e at the same 
time funding research at the University of Arizona. Their entry into the 
market was clearly to acquire some competence in the field while at the 
same time passing on some of the R&.D work to univers1ty SCientists. Again, 
this illustrates the fact that corporate strategies were not built on instant 
enthusiasm over the immediate expansion of ethanol niches. The support for 
univerSity research was mainly aimed at widening the range of potential 
18. Juma, PIJolo,ol16Jc, is 06'6lopisl Coustri61, pp.22-3". 
19. Effortl to open up tbe Bruilian martet for fweiER tecbnolOBY under a World Bant project failed 
a local firm won mOlt of the bidl. Thil wo expected lince tbe competition wo larcely baed on 
capital costs, a factor wbicb pY' the Bruilian firm a competiti., edS' over forailn .uppli ..... 
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technological variants in ethanol production systems. Other chemical firms 
involved in ethtlnol production include W.R. Grece end Union Cerbide. 20 
Market restructuring also resulted in interesting corporate 
recombinations. The engineering firm UHDE GmbH Joined expertise with the 
chemical firm Hoechst to develop an innovative continuous process based on 
tower fermentation, one of the simplest and advanced ethanol technolooical 
systems unveiled in the post-1973 era. Pilot plants are operating in West 
Germany, Brazil and an imitation of it has been developed by the Brazilian 
firm Zanlni with additional scientific input, especially in dense yeast 
selection done at a Brazilien egricultural university.21 This process hed been 
deSigned for the US market but was later transferred to Brazil. 
Another form of corporate restructuring Involves the formation of 
Swedish AC Biotechnics by Alta-laval and Cardo of Sweden. AC Biotechnics is 
responsible for marketino, amono other biotechnolooY process, the Biost11 
process. AC Biotechnics obhined resources and expertise on genetic 
engineering, fermentation and other bio-processing techniques from Alfa 
laval and Cardo. It also Inherited experience in process desl0n, 
engineering, equipment and plant construction and has now turned to 
marketing the process outside Brazil. Other engineering firms have bought 
out small traditional ethanol technology suppliers. For example, the German 
firm Krupp has acquired Hermann BuckaulWolf which established the first 
ethanol plant in Africa. 
Oil firms also registered their interest In ethanol technology by 
funding university research. Atlantic Richland Company (ARCa) for example, 
supported the research at Arkansas Unlvers1ty on enzymatic fermentation. 
The involvement of ARCa end Texaco was lergely to acquire expertise in the 
field while at the same time funding university research. This strategy 
enables them to stay on the forefront of sclent1t1c advancement without 
necessarily commiting massive financial resources and building in-house 
capability on technological systems whose prospects are still uncertain. 
The corporate restructuring that foltowed the 1973 oil crisis did not 
result in many major increases in the use of ethanol technology. This is 
20. UNCTAD. leDe".IJ/e EDerlY TecIJDIJ/IJIYo pp. II. 
21.Intervi8WI. Coneer. Pin.cicaba. Brazil. March 1985. 
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partly because there were no sl~nlflcant market prospects outsIde Brazn. 
Furthermore, technological innovations were restricted to process 
optimization and there were no major departures from the already 
estab11shed functional units. The competition was largely over the marketing 
strategies of various firms and their Jinks in countries where potential 
niches existed. By the late 1970s. the competin~ systems w~re mainly batch 
although semi-continuous processes were starting to enter the market. 
4.5 Technological Diversity and Complexity 
The oil crisIs represented a significant turning poInt In the evolutIon of 
ethanol technological systems. First, it opened up opportunities for the 
extended diffusion of the systems tn the ener~y environment. The rtsln~ 011 
prices changed the relative competitiveness of fuel ethanol. Production costs 
which were previously considered too high were brought Into a reasonably 
competItive ran~e wIth Imported gaso11ne. But even more sIgnifIcant was the 
possible emergence of ethanol niche opportunities In areas that had been 
dominated by oil. This had four main effects. First, it stimulated 
recombinant innovations to improve the performance of ethanol technological 
systems using existing know-how. Second, it set in motion new R&D efforts. 
Third, new institutional arrangements were made In various countries to 
support these research efforts. FinaJJy, the shifts led to a restructuring of 
the international market for ethanol technology. 
All these chanoes were underpinned by two maIn features. First, 
innovation was directed at Improving the performance of ethanol 
technological systems in a relatively new environment (with added selection 
criteria such as ecological and energetic consideratIons). Second, the 
process of technological evolution was marked by increased diversity in 
technological variants. Given the uncertainties surroundino the technolooY 
and the lack of a favourable track record in niche realization, the diversity 
tended to widen the scope for selection and adaptive prospects for 
technoJot,;Jlcal systems. 
One of the most significant parameters in the energy sector was the 
cost of fuel ethanol. As indicated earlier, ethanol had been used in niches 
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which were protected from competition with gasoHne or with other 
alternative l1quid fuels such as methanol. But for it to operate within 
acceptable competitive limits t ways of reducing the production costs of 
ethanol had to be Identified. This set In motion a wide range of efforts to 
rationalize the efficiencies of the various functional units which constituted 
the technological systems. One of the areas which received much R&D 
interest was improving fermentation. Whereas the history of the ethanol 
system had been dominated by batch fermentation systems, the post-1973 
efforts were directed at generating technological variants using continuous 
processes with higher volumetric efficiencies. Research was also directed at 
improving the conventional batch processes. The variants that have so far 
been operated or tested fall Into three broad categories: Improved batch. 
semi-continuous (or cascade) and continuous fermentation processes. 
The batch process involves the repeated emptying, cleaning, 
sterilizing and refilling of the tank. The fermentation cycle In this process 
takes 36-48 hours under temperatures held at 20oC-30oC with an Initial pH of 
4.5. The conversion efficiency falls In the 90-95 per cent range and yields 
ethanol concentrations of to-t6 per cent (weight/volume). The yeast used in 
batch processes is grown separately and innoculated into every tank. Batch 
processes are easy to use and require little highly skilled labour. 
Moreover, the risks of yield loss are low because the fermentation process 
is distributed 1n several tanks. But the low fermentation productivity due to 
long down-times represents an obstacle to improved process efficiency. One 
of the first improvements on this process involved the recycling of yeast. 
This does not increase the fermentation efficiency but 1t reduces the time 
needed to grow yeast for each batch. 
Cascade systems embody improvements over the batch process. 
Tanks siml1ar to the ones used In batch processes are connected In series 
allowing the substrate to be fed into the first tank constantly while at the 
same rate betno withdrawn from the last tank. This process uses the same 
number of tanks as in batch systems but it takes less fermentation time 
because of the cascading flow of the substrate through the process. Not only 
does It save down-time, but It also reduces the chances of Infection by 
allowing air contact between ambient and internal fermenter surfaces. Such 
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systems may also use yeast recycle untts. Substrate flow In the process Is 
done either with the use of gravity or pumping. The cascade process was 
developed through modifications on the batch process on the basis of 
available engineering concepts on volume-control and flow regulat10n. 
Improvements on the cascade design have led to the concept of 
continuous fermentation in which both the substrate and yeast are recycled. 
This process has resulted also in a large number of variants which have 
reached different stages of development. The change from batch to 
continuous fermentation has been matnly to reduce down-time and Increase 
volumetric efficiency. It has also contributed to savings in the time and 
substrate needed for growing fresh yeast for every batch per unit of output. 
Because of higher volumetric efficiency, the systems employ less capital 
equipment and space. But on the other hand, the systems are more 
sophistfcated and require skilled operators. The use of centrifuoes, for 
example, raises the capital cost of the technology in comparison to the batch 
process. It was not just production efficiency that called for improvement. 
Issues related to feedstock aval1ab111ty oenerated new pressures. 
Raw material costs and availability played I!I significant role in the 
Viability of fuel ethanol. It has been stressed that most of the early ethanol 
programmes were atmed at reductng surplus aoricultural products such as 
sugarcane or corn. The latter resource led to the introduction of starch-
based fermentation processes in the energy field. But for the technological 
system to establish a long-term niche, raw material supply had to be 
guaranteed. The use of corn or any other grain raised questions related to 
POSSible competition between food and eneroy despite the fact that many of 
the early projects were based on surplus agricultural yield or residues. 
Guaranteeing long-term raw material availability required either intensified 
agrtcultural yield tn the traditional supplies or diversification 1nto new 
areas, espeCially where resource conflicts are minimal. One such area is 
the use of starch or cellulosic material such as aoricultural residue or 
muniCipal solid waste (MSW) for ethanol production. These resources often 
have a low opportunity cost and might therefore be economically turned into 
ethanol. But thts reQutred Improvements and modifications in the 
technological systems to enable them to convert cellulosic material to 
HI 
fermentable sugars. The field of cellulosic fermentation (Jenerated a range 
of novel technological variants. 
Starch-based plants have been attractive in the industrialized 
countries because they provide a way of getting rid of surplus grain. One of 
the main problems in starch-based plants has been the low energy balance 
because of the absence of fibrous residues such as bagasse for steam 
generation. This problem has been overcome by advances in process energy 
optimization and recent plants now operate at positive energy ratios. Firms 
such as Buckau-Wolf (formerly Gebr. Hermman Buckau Walther) are now 
supplying energy-efficient starch-based plants. Similarly energy-efficient 
plants are now operating in the US. For example, the Staley Manufacturing 
Company plant at Loudon (Tennessee) uses only 21,000 BTUs for a gallon of 
ethanol produced, more than 20 per cent less than in conventional plants. 
The plant produces 40 ml1Hon oa11ons of anhydrous ethanol a year from 
corn, making it the second hlrgest ethanol plant in the US. 22 
Concern over other uses for surplus grain led to research on 
cellulosic mater1als as another ethanol feedstock. Although cellulose Is the 
most abundant renewable resource available for conversion to fuel, it is 
also one of the most difficult to break down into fermentable constituents. 
Cellulose occurs as a crystalline form that Is reinforced by a l1gnln-
hemicellulose complex. Various ways of degrading it include biological, 
chemical, mechanical, and thermal methods. Any of these methods would 
lead to a Slightly different system configuration whose techno-economic 
performance at any stage can only be established through testing. 
The use of weak acid to deorade cellulose was not a new technique. 
Dilute and concentrated acids had been used In cellulose deQradatlon during 
World War I. The conjectural technological variants that were being 
developed at various US universities included the application of new scientific 
knowledge and technical advances to this established concept. The key 
technical problem in the acid hydrolYSiS include low sugar recovery, 
corrOSion, and unfavourable economics even in the long-run. As a result, 
the R&D efforts have not been able to bring the pilot plants to commerical 
appl1catlon although resea rch st111 contfnues. 
22. Morril, 'Hute Plant for Ethanol-. 
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A slon1r1cant achievement In continuous fermentation was made by 
Alfa-Laval engineers who designed 8 process that util1zes concentrated 
feedstock. This system was designed to reduce the amount of st111age 
released during ethanol production. Instead of the 11-15 l1tres of stillage 
normally released for every litre of ethanol produced In batch process. the 
Biostil process releases 0.8-4 litres dependinQ on the concentration of the 
substrate (Table 4.5). The process was designed to deal with the 
environmental problems associated with ethanol production. The process 
differs considerably from other techniques. The ethanol Is continuously 
stripped from the fermenter broth at low concentration thereby eliminating 
the need to dilute the substrate with massive amounts of water. The dilution 
ts required to protect the yeast from poisoning. 
TABLE 4.5: Comp6rison of Biosti/6nd Convention6/ P/6nt in Br6zi! 
Parameter 
Yield ( ~ of theoretical1imit) 
Sti11~ { litre/litre of ethanol 
Personnel requirement 
Spoce requirements (cubic meters) 
Biostil 
94.5 
0.8 
3.0 
350.0 
Tbe figures are bUed on planll produc:ing 150,000 titrea a dq. 
Sourte: Alf.-Lan.l, SIo Paulo, Brazit. 
Conventional 
87.0 
11.0 
7.0 
1350.0 
The Blostl1 process had another adaptive parameter which most other 
continuous processes did not have. Most other continuous processes ran the 
risk of ethanol loss throuQh contamination. The Biostl1 process was desioned 
to reduce the risk of contamination. First. the internal deSign of the process 
allows the yeast to undergo pasteurization thereby killing off the bacteria. 
Second. the feedstock ts subjected to h10h osmotic pressure. low suoar 
concentration. 4.5-5.0 per cent ethanol, and high yeast concentration In the 
fermenter. These conditions do not favour the orowth of bacteria. 23 
The technology was targeted for the Brazl1 but several factors 
hindered its widespread use. First. the process was about 20 per cent more 
23. Garlict, -Fermentation of Molulea-, pp. 15. 
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expensive than the conventional batch processes and there was no pressure 
on Brazilian producers to invest In efficient systems. Second, the process 
required carefully controlled operating conditions and relied on skilled 
personnel and therefore had high labour costs. Third, Braz11 gradually 
increased the use of stillage as fertilizer and therefore undermined one of 
the most important attributes of the Biost11 process. As a result. the 
process has not had the expected rate of commercial application in Brazil.24 
TA8LE '1.6: Production Cost of Ethanol by Enzymatic Hydrolysis 
Component Annual Cost ( $M) Cents/Oa 11 on US$/tonne 
Raw materials 30,838 61.68 206.50 
Utilities 10,279 20.58 68.85 
Operating costs 9.799 19.60 65.6' 
OVerheoo expenses 9.980 19.96 66.83 
By-proouct credit 
-12,208 -2'1.'12 -18.75 
cash cost of proouctlon '18,688 97.38 326.03 
Depreciation 33,080 
Net cost of proouct1on 81,768 163.54 547.54 
Sales price at 15~ DCF 212.60 711.80 
These 1982 cost estimates are for • plant produciQl 50 million pitons. year (149,335 toooes) 
with I total fixed inventOf)' of US$ 193.6 million. 
Source: Isaacl (1984). 
According to Alfa-laval officials. the firm had turned down offers 
from Braz111ans they suspected would replicate the plant and Introduce 
cheaper versions on the market. Alternatively some 8ruilian distillery 
manufacturers contended that the Biostil process was too sophisticated for 
Brazl1 and there would be no need for repUcatlon. It ts tnteresting to note 
that the Brazilian government, through the Secretaria de Tecnologia 
Industrial (STI) funded the development of the Flashfern process to 8 pilot 
scale. The core concepts of the Flashfern were similar to Biostil's.25 The 
development of local versions of the Biost11 process could have retarded its 
diffusion as potentfal adopters waited for the new variants which were likely 
to be cheaper and more appropriate to the Brazilian conditions. 
24. Inteniews, AUI-LanJ. sao Paulo, Brazil. March 1985. 
25. Another version of the Biosti) concept. the EnBenbo Noyo procesl ".. lupported by the 
Financiadora d, Eatudoa , Projetoa (FINEP), which allO co-Iponlored the Bioatil plant at S10 Lui •. 
One of the most innovative variants In ethanol production has been the 
application of genetic engineering to the cellulose degradation. Studies on 
cellulosic degradation in the US originated in the military, especially in 
trying to reduce rotting among ml11tary suppl1es In the tropics during World 
War II. A research programme at the US Army Natick Development Centre 
set out to investigate -the causal organisms, their mechanism of action, and 
the development of methods of control not requiring the use of pesticides-. 26 
This led to major advances in enzymatic hydrolysis which were later applied 
to ethanol production, especially using the sol1 fungus Trichoderma. This 
area has also attracted the use of cerefully selected and genetically 
engineered organisms to produce energy.27 
TABLE 4.7: Typical Energy Balance for Ethanol Production 
Ethanol 
Crop Yield Produc:ed 
EnerlY (Mcil/hectare/year) 
EnerlY Input EnerlY Output 
(tlhalyr) (l/balyr) Agricultural Indultrial Ethanol Residue 
SUivcane 54.0 
CasSIYa 14.5 
Sweet lorium 62.5 
3.564 
2.523 
5.165 
Source: Da Silva 61.l (1978). 
4.138 
2.573 
8.021 
10.814 
8,883 
16.500 
18.747 
13.271 
27.168 
17.500 
19.110 
Balance 
+21.345 
.1,815 
+21.757 
This approach not only represents a change In the source of raw 
materials but also in the methods and disciplines applied to ethanol 
production. Many of these innovations have remained at laboratory level. 
The main obstacles to the commercial application of these processes has 
been high capital costs. By 1981 the capital cost estimates were in the range 
of US$3. :>-US$5.:> per annual oallon of capacity. Then the figure for corn-to-
26. Reese. -History of the Cellulose Prouam" pp.9. 
27. See White (1983) for I description of the nrioullCid and enzymltic procesles funded by the US 
government and their ItatUS. Wort i. allo undenflY to improve yield. from S6cc1J6rolllyc6s. 
especially through immobilization. The Japan Gas Company (jGC) bu developed I continuous 
procesl wbicb uses immobilized yeat. The procesl allon fermentation to be completed in (i,e 
boun and ICbilWes 11.01 alcobol concentration. BioJllul Dilllli. Vol. 6. No. I. pp. I. January 
1984. 
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ethanol was US$2. 5. 23 A large share of the cost was accounted for by high 
feedstoc~ prices (Table 1.6). The feedstoc~ costs could be reduced by 
further research into more efficient ways of reducing cellulose. 
TABLE 4.8: Energy and Capita! Costs for Separation Units 
Energy' Installed 
Unit Type Qlncentrat ion _Requirement Capital Cost 
(wt~) (Btu/gaD* [$M (106 gal/yr)] 
Comentional distillation 10-99.9 27.000 1.6 (25) 
Vapour re-U1e distillation 10-99.9 18.000 2.0 (25) 
Cantrell/Petret (DirrOilion 
carrier pal 10-85 9.900 (39000) 
Jntertechnology lSolar 1St ience 
Applications. Inc. (Solyent 
extraction) 30-99.9 2350 
7200 (J 0-30>--
Georaia Tech (SoIYent 
(extraction) 26-98 12.600 (2.600) 3.7 (27) 
5.000 (10-26>--
Hydrocarbon Research Inc. 
(Ethanol aetectin 
adsorption) 15-99.9 25.000 (12.600) 
Purdue (Ethanol selectiye 
absorption) 91-99.9 2000-3000 
Shoct Hydrodynamics 
(Ethanol selection 
absorption) 
Southern Research Institute 
(Ethanol selective 
mebranes) 
GKSS (Membrane 
dehydration system) 8-99.5 13.200 
-The number in parentheses represent the thermal equinlent of the electric enerlY required with 
the a heat-to-electricity efficiency of 0.33. 
DApproximate energy requirement to concentrate ethanol Crom 10 Wi I to the concentration shown. 
Source: Doualu 81.l (t 983). 
28. I/Jid.. pp. 30. 
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Apart from the the development of new variants. research efforts 
were also directed et reducing the energy used in the production of ethanol. 
Ethanol production typically showed positive energy balances (Table 4.7). 
However, the questfon of energetics became slgntflcant as critics of ethanol 
programmes argued that it was irrational to use more energy in producing a 
unit of fuel than was contained in the unit itself. The notion of net energy 
balance is broad and accounts for the ratio between all the energy used in 
ethanol production to that contained in the final ethanol and by-products; it 
therefore covers agricultural production as well. The case for -energetic 
determinism- has its own limitations. 
The central question is not the production of energy as measured in 
standa rd un1ts, but 1nvolves the econom1c costs of SUbstituting one form of 
energy for another. Energetic determinism ignores the fact that the range of 
energy resources that can be used in the same conversion system is so 
limited that it can be justified to convert, for example, solid biomass into 
liquid fuels since particular technologies w111 only use the latter. This. 
however, is not a vindication of inefficient energy conversion and use. The 
concern over energy balance was therefore Important in Identifying areas 
which potential energy savings in the ethanol technological systems. 
Innovations in this field concentrated on dlstt11atfon (or separation), 
which accounted for 25-50 per cent of the energy used In ethanol production. 
Innovation in separation units took three routes. First, existing technology 
was improved through incremental modifications. Second, technical 
advances made in other engineering fields were introduced in ethanol 
technological systems. 29 Third, radically new technological variants were 
proposed. These fell into two main categories; disti11etion end non-
disti11ation. The non-distillation variants represented 8 departure from 
conventional dlst111atlon techniques. The new approaches used solvent 
extraction, adsorption/absorption, membrane. and diffusion techniques 
(Table 4.8).30 Although their energy requirements were less than those of 
conventional distillation, the installed capital equipment remained relatively 
29. Ealien '161.. 'Energy Conserntion in Ethanol Production-. pp.31. 
30. For a detailed technical review of these techniques. lee Douglu ,1 .1.. E~6lu6lion 01 
EIIJ6nol S,p6r6lion Prot'''''', pp. 11-27. 
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higher. But some of these systems, especially solvent extraction and grain 
adsorption, have reached competitive levels and additional Improvements 
would enable them to displace conventlona I techniques. 
The IncreaSing complexity of ethanol technological units and pressures 
for systems control have led to the increased application of Information 
technology in fermentation. As pointed out earlier a technological system 
functions 8S a whole under the pressure of functional Imperatives. 
RationaliZing this process requires the ability to process, transmit and 
control various pieces of operative Information. This requirement has led to 
the increased use of computers in ethanol technological systems. 
This use of computers is largely a continuation of the Instrumentation 
and control process that started with the Introduction of saccharometers and 
hydrometers. While the instruments measure Isolated variables, computers 
can handle combinations of variables and system performance. With 
computers, advanced system configurations can be designed and the 
fermentation process can be closely monitored, controlled and adjusted to 
maintain optimal performance. Many of the computer-aided fermentation 
(CAF) techniques have been relocated from the pharmaceutical environment 
which, for example, has applied the approach in the production of penicillin. 
The early applications of CAF were in experimental and pilot plant levels. 31 
4.6 Technological I mperatives and Institutional Reform 
The Introduction of a new technological system Is usually associated 
with 8 process of sociaHzing k.nowledge and providin(J a framework. within 
which options can be generated, selected and retained. Furthermore, such 
an Institutional framework. provides also a forum for the continued 
assessment of the external environment so as to (Jive direction to the 
evolutionary process. This makes institutions endogenous to the process of 
technological change. The demands or imperatives of the ethanol 
technological systems made it necessary to reform existing institutions or 
create new ones as well as establishing new forms of Institutional alignment. 
31. Cooney. ·Computer Applications in Fermentation". pp.2. 
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The early staoes of renewed oeneratlon for ethanol technoloolcal 
variants was characterized by institutional support. This was partly to 
underwrite the high costs of variant generation and the losses that might 
result due to the uncertainties inherent in new technological systems. Publ1c 
sector support varied from direct support for increasing production capacity 
as in the case of Brazil to support for R&D proorammes such as in the case of 
the US and other industrialized countries. These differences. however. were 
not mutually exclusive. BraZil. for example, mobilized its civl1lan and 
ml1ftary research instftutes Into R&D, especIally on the end-use s1de. New 
engines that utilized hydrated ethanol were designed and marketed largely 
through the collaboration of local research institutes (mainly the air force) 
and the private sector.32 The US. on the other hand. concentrated Its support 
on the generation of new ethanol production systems. 
The US biomass fuels prooramme had lono-term objectives with 
specific targets to the year 2000. These targets embodied the need to raise 
the performance of the conjectural technological variants and also specified 
the desIred sIze of the ethanol nIche. For example. the cost tarQet for 1.0 
million BTUs was set at no more than US$3.5 (at 1977) prices for the year 
2000. To achieve the objectives, the plan emphasized the technological co-
evolutIon of dIfferent un1ts. It was envIsaged that thIs approach. coupled 
with the extensive generation of conjectural variants. would offer a higher 
chance of bringing some of the emeroinQ technological systems to the 
commerical stage. Indeed. the approach was aimed at raising total system 
performance; the subsystems or units were only significant 1n relation to the 
whole system. It Is notable that the support for ethanol technologIcal 
systems was not an isolated development but part of a larger programme 
aimed at increasing the role of biomass in general in the energy 
envIronment. 33 Support for fuel ethanol was given by both federal and state 
governments, leading to siginificant R&D advances. 
However, these technol00ical advances did not immediately reach the 
market and as a result most of the technological systems used 1n ethanol 
32. Brazil fJ8tablished the Moat elaborate institutional network on fuel ethanol. For • dfl8cription of 
the networt, lee World Dant, 8r.liJ. 
33. US ERDA, Prlllr •• PI.I1I, pp. 1-3. 
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production before and after 1973 were predominantly of the batch process 
type. The largest market for such technologies was Brazil t which launched 
its national ethanol programme in 1975 using traditional batch systems 
manufactured In the country. The prospects for extended market niches 
brought on to the scene a new form of market restructuring in which firms 
with relevant scientific and technoloQical know-how increased their R&D on 
generating technological variants. 
TABLE 4.9: [)oE's Renewable Energy Budget, 1981-1985 (l1il/ion lISI) 
Carter Reapn Budeet Budeet Budeet Reapn 
Request Request Authority Authority Authority Request 
111981 9/1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
PhotOYOltaicl 161.60 54.1 75.0 58.00 50.4 47.5 
Solar Thermal 149.&0 57.5 76.0 61.10 60.3 46.3 
Biomus Energy Systems 55.50 18.0 20.5 16.00 28.1-
Alcohol Fuels 32.60 8.8 10.0 5.00 28.-1 
Wind Energy Systems 73.60 18.3 3 ..... 31.40 26.5 23.3 
Ocean EnerlY Systems 36.&0 20.& 10.50 5.5 3.5 
Renewable Energy Inlor. 12.70 3.5 6.7 3.00 3.3 6.0 
Renewable EneraY Inter. 13.00 8.8 -t.0 10.00 0.5 0.5 
Programme Support 3.5 1.00 0.8 0.5 
Solar Rsslne Account 12.3 
Programme Direction 6.90 ".0 ".0 5.80 6.0 ".9 
Total 558.96 170.1 268.2 201.94 181.7 163.6 
-Amount includes lundslor a1coholluels. 
Source: Krait ~/.l (1984). 
The development of ethanol technological systems in the US in the 
1980s were also influenced by fluctuations In the Institutional cJlmate. Much 
of the R&D and other tax incentives to stimulate the application of the 
technology were started during the Carter Administration, which was more 
favoureble to alternative energy options. Government support under Reegen 
has dwindled and many of the new research routes that had been earlier 
perceived fruitful have now been abandoned (Table 4.9). This change in the 
institutional climate was not directly related to changes in 011 prices but to 
perceptions about the role of government in alternative energy sources. 
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On the whole, the evolution of ethanol technoloQlcal systems was 
muked by increa~ed complexity, adaptive flexibility end ~y~tem diversity. 
The drift towards complexity and fJexibility was helped or retarded by the 
public sector and other Institutions. Although efforts were undertaken to 
introduce radically new process recombinations, the International market 
was still dominated by batch processes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Some of the new R&D routes that had been initiated in the 1970s were 
abandoned or curtailed as oil prices started to fall in the 1980s. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the major features of the evolution of ethanol 
technoloQical systems. It has showed that the technoloQlcal system, as a 
purposive configuration of various technicel units, edv8nced through 
incremental improvements and recombination of technological units that had 
co-evolved In other sectors. The 1973 011 crisis created prospective 
conditions for the diffusion of technological systems into new market niches. 
In response, a wide range of technological variants were introduced as 
technical change drifted towards complexity and higher techno-economiC 
performance. These changes were also associated with institutional as well 
as corporate restructurinQ. However. the commerciallY-Viable 
technological options were dominated by batch processes in the 1 970s. It is 
against this background of fluctuation and limited diversity in conjectural 
technoloQlcal systems that Zimbabwe and Kenya embarked on their fuel 
ethanol programmes. 
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5. MAPPING THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the evolution of ethanol technological 
systems and pointed out that the systems went throuah lona periods of 
Incremental and recombinant innovations. However, the 1973 011 shock 
stimulated new innovations which resulted In a limited range of 
cOmmerCially-viable technological variants In the 1970s. This chapter maps 
the key features of the techno-economic landscape which were significant for 
the real1zatlon of ethanol nfches In Zfmbabwe and Kenya. These features are 
divided into two categories; adoptive pre-conditions and adaptive 
parameters. It will be shown that the techno-economic landscape is 
constituted not only by technological and economic factors, but it also 
includes institutional variables. 
5.1 The Adoptive Terrain 
5.1.1 Initial niche exploraUon 
The availability of surplus molasses and the identification of potential 
niches in the energy market led to efforts to ascertain the techno-economic 
feasibillty of fuel ethanol 8S 8 pre-condition for the rea1izetion of these 
niches. The earliest explorations to ascertain the techno-economic 
feasibility of fuel ethanol were made In Zimbabwe. The fact that the process 
was first Initiated In Zimbabwe fJJustrates the fluctuatfons In molasses 
trends and energy availabilIty as shown In chapter 3. The use of molasses to 
manufacture ethanol was Identified In 8 1963 government survey of Industrial 
opportunities 8S a potential feedstock for Industrial applications and energy 
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source •• The UDI necessitated the search for alternative Uquid fuels due to 
the expected dIsruptions and shortfalls followIng the ImposItion of trade 
sanctions. 
FollowlnQ a Zimbabwean ministerial trade mission to BrItain In 1961, 
the Alcohol Company of London expressed Interest in buying 750,000 gallons 
or 3,000 tonnes of rectified cane spirit annually from Zimbabwe. But the 
BrItish proposal was pre-empted by a decIsIon by AfrIcan Dlst111ers company 
(ADC) to undertalce the large-scale production of rectified spirits. Following 
this deCiSion, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry decIded to stop 
promoting the production of ethanol. But because of ADC InactIon, the 
ministry decided to resume work on ethanol with new priorities In mind. In 
1955, the ministry clearly stressed the potential strateQlc Importance of 
ethanol as a fuel: -In view of the sanctions which have been Imposed on 011 
supplies ••• It Is now necessary to consider the project and Its priority from 
the strateQlc point of view as well as economiC point of view. -2 
The ministry suggested two possible ways of prodUCing fuel ethanol. 
First, they considered turning surplus molasses to fuel. The country had 
some 37,100 tonnes of surplus molasses In 1966 which could yield only about 
1,850,000 Qallons (8.42 ml1lion litres) of ethanol. This amounted to about 
3.86 per cent of national oasollne requirements. It was recognized by the 
government that this quantity had Httle strategic importance although It had 
potential economic benefits. -While the establishment of a factory to produce 
this Quantity of alcohol would have little strateolc Importance. the Industry 
In normal times could bring about a useful economic contribution to the 
country If 1t could export alcohol. -3 But this was overly opttmlstlc and 
contradicted the general view that export markets were likely to shrInk. 
Another suggestion was to replace 25 per cent of the gasoline demand. 
which Is the technical limit that could be reached without requlrlnQ any 
modifications In motor engines. This option required about 10 million gallons 
of fuel ethanol. To produce this quantity would have taken all the surplus 
molasses and additional cane Juice processed from about 565,000 tonnes of 
I. Federal Minillry or Commert., OpporlllD/lill1 'or IDdllllry. pp. 57-60. 
2. Miniltry of Commerce and Indultry, PfJr,r A ICfJllfJl. pp. I. 
3. I~/d.. pp. 2. 
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cane. This diversion of cane would have led to a reduction In foreion 
exchenge eernings from sugelf. It wes estimated by the government that the 
substitution of refinery gasoline with locally-produced ethanol would save 
about Z$302,000. Its export could have earned the country Z$700,000 In 
foreign exchange. The price of a tonne of sugar (ex-refinery) was about 
Z$20 and the 565,000 tonnes of cane would produce about 70,000 tonnes of 
sugar. The project would have cost the Treasury about Z$54,000 annually In 
foregone excise duty on gasoline. The recovery of fermentatton by-products 
such as potaSSium sulphate and potassium chloride were considered but 
there was no evidence that it was economical and would Improve the overall 
economics of ethanol production. 
This optfon did not look viable from the start because It required the 
government to forego taxes and excise duty In lieu of direct subsidy. 
Already at this moment, the Universal on Products (UOP) of South Africa had 
submitted a proposal to the government which was conditional to the removal 
of excise duty, subsidized rail rates for ethanol transportation, and the 
aval1ab111ty of f1nance for pre-Investment work such as feas1b11lty study 
preparation. Alternatively, UOP suggested to drop the demand for waived 
excise duty If ethanol were to be sold at the price of oasol1ne." The 
government could not meet any of these conditions and the UOP proposal was 
passed on to IDC for further evaluation. 
The second option looked attractive as a strategic consideration but 
could not be justified on economic grounds. The government estimated that 
the Treasury would lose about Z$800,000 annually from foregone excise duty 
and the retail pr1ce would be almost twice that of oasol1ne. It was estimated 
by the government that the capital cost of building the plant was about Z$1.4 
million. The Projects Committee of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
decided that the large-scale option should not be pursued -because the 
economic costs far outweighed the strategiC benefits·.5 It was decided that 
work on small-scale ethanol production be Investigated by IDC. The decision 
by the government to pass on the responsibility for further evaluation to IDC 
was Influenced by two factors. First, the Initial proposals required 
4. IlJid.. pp.7. 
5. ProjectJ Committee. Millul., IJ/IIJ. S."IJlld M •• lilllo pp. 3. 
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CJovernment financial 1nput and other administrative Interventions which 
would have caused conflict with other interested parties. For example, the 
decision against special rail rates for the UOP proposal was partly based on 
the view that the manaoement of the ral1ways would not accept to offer 
special rates. 6 Second, much of the pre-investment work at the time was 
being done at IDC which had been set up partly to liaise between the 
CJovernment and the private sector. 
The government in this case was providing a regulatory framework 
within which the ethanol niche could be realized. The conditions prevailing 1n 
Zimbabwe then created conditions which enabled those with adoptive skills to 
make proposals. The UOP proposal, for example, was built of expertise 
which had been Oalned at the National Chemical Industries (NCI) of South 
Africa. The founder of UOP had worked in NCI on ethanol-related activities 
and had therefore gained experience· required In the production of fuel 
ethanol. It Is notable that UOP did not Intend to be fully Involved In the 
venture but only to offer management expertise while leaving the economic 
risks to borne by other investors. 
As soon 8S the prospects for fuel ethanol emerged, Hippo Valley 
conducted technical studies on the feasibility of using ethanol-gasoline 
blends. This was possible because Hippo Vaney already operated a small 
distillery for potable ethanol. The results were communicated to the oil 
companies who were getting Interested In the use of fuel ethanol. The 
evaluation of the technical feasibility of fuel ethanol was continued by the oil 
companies, especially after the Ferulei refinery was shut down because of 
disruption tn the suppl1es of crude 011. It was on the basts of the techn1cal 
feasibility of the fuel that the oil companies (BP, Caltex, Mobil, Shell and 
Total) confirmed to the CJovernment that they would accept to blend ethanol in 
gasoline. The assurance given by the 011 companies on marketing ethanol was 
conditional. First, they could not give long term guarantees. It was felt that 
lono-term guarantees would have mainly helped the suoar Industry find a 
local market for its produce. 
Moreover, the 011 companies did not want to foreclose the option of 
returning to fun gasoline utl1lzatlon In case the Situation returned to 
6. Miniltry of Commerce. POFllr A It'lIlJlll. lip. I'll. pp. 7. 
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normal.' Indeed, the companies, some of whom had shares In the refinery, 
remInded the government of the Refinery Agreement which gave the refinery 
the fu11 mandate to supply the petroleum products needed by the country 
whenever it was able do so. Second, they Insisted that the price of ethanol be 
equal to the ex-refinery gasoline delivered to mixing depots. FlnalJy, they 
required that the additional costs of tankage and blending facilities be borne 
by the oovernment. S 
The declaration of Intent by the oil companies was prompted by 8 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry request on the position of the oil 
companies on the matter. The Ministry, however, was also responding to 8 
suggestion by IDC that it would stop working on the promotion of fuel ethanol 
unless a market was guaranteed, preferential rail costs provided and excise 
duty waived. These, indeed, were the same demands put forward by potenttal 
investors in ethanol production. The IDC position was reached after their own 
evaluation which showed that ethanol could not be competitive unless it 
received some form of fin~mcial support. The government, however, was 
unwilling to lose revenue. All they did was to seele assurances from the oil 
companIes on the posslb11ttles of marketing ethanol. 
At this stage the government was considering yet another proposal 
submitted in February 1966 by Lepage, Urbain ~ Cie of France through Hall, 
Longmore and Company of South Africa. This proposal offered a turn-key 
plant to produce 36,400 Htres a day at a capital cost of ZS324,OOO. The 
proposal Included supplier'S credit terms of five years and proposed to sell 
ethanol on par with gasoline. Most discussions on the project were done by 
Hall on behalf of Lepage, Urbain & Cie and the government took an actfve role 
In dIscussing the project with other sectors of the Industry, especially the 
oil companies. Although the project generated much interest in government 
and private Circles, it did not receive much support from Hippo Valley where 
7. A letter to the Miniltry of Commerce and IDdUItry dated April 27. 1966 Ilped by the oil 
eompanies ltates: -Members of the Oil Industry would Jite to mate Jt dear that duriocany period 
of uncertaJnty lurroundiq oil lupplies and wbIJlt the Feruta Refinery II It I ltandltill due to 
lack or crude 011 lupplIes, they would extend III posllble eo-operation In order to ablorb the 
production or Absolute Ethanol In Motor Spirit. However. It appean u II the IUpr producln. 
companies are lookina to the lodUitry ror lone term anurancea and this we are afraid we cannot 
,ift.- pp. J. 
S. Stuckey and JulD&. PDr,r Ale-DADI iD X'DY •• Dd Zi.IJ.lJr., pp. 57. 
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It was l1kely to be located. HIppo Valley objected to Lepage's labour cost 
estimates and questioned the proposed effluent disposal method. 
No major decisions were taken on ethanol development either by the 
MInIstry of Commerce and Industry or IDC durIng the rest of 1966. It Is 
notable, however, that the submission of the Lepage proposal and the 
Insistence of IDC on a market guarantee created conditions which in the lono 
run reduced possible conflicts between the oil companies and the sUQar 
industry. Moreover, the problems of niche realization were now limited to 
the technIcal and economic Issues related to ethanol production since the 
institutional obstacles of market entry had been reduced. In the meantime, 
IDC continued to conduct studies to ascertain the most probable costs and 
benefIts of fuel ethanol. 
A report in February 1967 by IDC put an end to the Initial efforts to test 
the prospects of realtzlng the fuel ethanol niche. It noted that the ex-
refinery cost of gasoline was 21.3 pennies per gallon and a parity price of 
ethanol would only be reached with subsidies of 12.8-40.3 pennies per ga110n 
dependIng on the raw material types and production techniques used. The 
report stressed that fuel ethanol had no strategic importance since it 
contributed only about 20 per cent of the gasoline demand. While the by-
products of ethanol productIon had no vIable markets, the large-scale 
uti1ization of cane for ethanol would lead to a subsidy of Z£16 per tonne of 
suoar. The subsidies would be difficult to revoke as they would stili apply 
even If the sugar market returned to normal. 9 
The IDC study pre-empted the consideration of several other 
proposals. For example, J. Dupont and Company of South Africa proposed In 
Ma"rch 1967 to supply a turn-key plant with a capacity of 10,000 tonnes (2.75 
million gallons) per year. The proposal required that several conditions be 
met by the government. First, the company requIred the right to supply up to 
20 per cent of motor spirit and legal assurance that the otJ companies would 
be compelled to blend a maximum of 20 per cent ethanol In their motor spirit 
even after the trade boycott of the country was lifted. Second, the company 
asked for land to be made available next to an existing sugar mill which 
would also provide process steam to the distillery. Third, they requIred the 
9. Cambitzil. EIAyl AJcIJAIJllrlJ. SUI.r. pp. 6. 
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government to Issue an Import licence for the plant and equipment. But 
despite the support of sections of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
this proposal was shelved. to 
The decision to shelve the Idea of fuel ethanol was partly based on the 
short-term economics of ethanol production. However. there were long-
term considerations as well. There was the view that any Investment In fuel 
ethanol would hce political uncertainties which would affect the long term 
returns on the investment. For example, the removal of the trade embargo' 
would suddenly chanoe the economics of ethanol production. It was from this 
understanding that J. Dupont insisted on the legal right to continue the supply 
of fuel ethanol even if the embargo was lifted. It is notable that most of the 
proposals presented to the government In the feaslbf1lty exploration stage 
were external turn-key projects. Then, there was not much local k.nowledge 
on the large-scale production of ethanol. 
The IDC report coincided with a memorandum by the South African Cane 
Growers' Association (SACGA) urging the government to support a fuel 
ethanol programme under which each of the 20 sugar factories In South 
Africa would be suppl1ed (at government expense) with a standard-size 
distillery producing 5,000 gallons of ethanol a day at the capital cost of 
RSOO,OOo. The total output of the dlst111erles could provide about 3.0 per 
cent of the country's gasol1ne demand. The memorandum suggested that an 
Increase In the number of dlstt11ertes, depending on the mt1l1ng capacity, be 
Included In the second phase of the project. II The SACGA proposal to the 
South African government tended to heighten the suspicion held In sections of 
the Zimbabwean MinIstry of Commerce that South AfrIcan sugar producers 
were not interested in seeing a low-cost ethanol Industry developed In 
Zimbabwe. 12 
10. Walter, PropoI.llro • .f. Dupoll/, pp. l. J. Dupont were already in the molules bUlinesl 
in South Africa and made other proposall to import lome of Zimbabwe', .urplu. molulea. 
I J. SACGA, TIJ6 Produclioll 01 Por6r AlcolJol, pp.7. 
12. These luggestionl are recorded in a procres, report prepared by the Miniltry or Commerce and 
Indultry on April 16, 1966. It lublcribes In part to the -Yin-point that the South African alcohol 
producen ...... e DOt anxious to lee a Icnr-cOlt producer denlop in Rhodesia-, pp. 2. It il ironical 
that the SACGA memorandum wu Uled in 1973 in Zimbabwe to Justify the production or fuel 
ethanol. 
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At the end of this phase, a number of issues crucial to ethanol niche 
realization had been identified. Moreover, the period was ma~ked by an 
extensive search of the local market for potential molasses uses. With 
potential market niches already identified, subsequent periods were 
dominated by more focussed approaches, concentrating mainly on reducing 
the economic costs of producino fuel ethanol. This period also enabled the 
sugarcane producers to start building firm-level ethanol-related capability. 
Hippo Valley already had a distillery and firm-level expertise in ethanol 
production. Triangle started looking Into the feasibility of bufldino a 
distillery during this period although they did not present any proposal to the 
government. 
Kenya went through this similar process but with marked differences. 
As indicated elsewhere, proposals to produce ethanol were presented to the 
government as early as 1973. Kenya did not review the early Initiatives as 
carefully and in detail as the Zimbabweans did. This Is partly because the" 
molasses problem was not acute and therefore the country stfll relied on the 
international market as a disposal medium. The first major study to look at 
molasses with the intention to produce ethanol was conducted by Tate ~ Lyle 
Technical Services in 1975. This study built its case for ethanol, not only on 
the baSis of export earnings but on the fact that Kenya's molasses contained 
large amounts of sugar which could be better used through the local 
manufacture of by-products. 
The study led to the submission of a pre-feasibility study to the 
government in July 1975, thereby prompting the government to look into 
potential local markets for molasses by-products. At that time the disposal 
of molasses was starting to acquire importance. One of the earliest 
government studies on the feasibility of utl1tzlng molasses linked the issues 
of molasses disposal to energy. -This study IS ••• Intended to assist the 
Goverment in taking informed decisions on the economic utilization of 
molasses which is an important effluent in the sugar Industry and Is also a 
potential source of energy. -13 This is not surprising since the Tate S& Lyle 
study was completed a couple of years after the oil crisis and coincided with 
the international publ1c1ty over the launchlno of the Brazilian prooramme. 
13. ISPC, Pr,-F, •• ilJility Study 1111 NIII." ••• pp. 2. 
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The government Identified various derivatives of ethanol which could 
be manufactured locally. It was thought that molasses could form a besis for 
an organic chemical industry. Molasses, the government argued, created a 
serious problem of disposal and envIronmental pollution. -But thIs problem 
can be easl1y solved and wasted molasses can be effectively put to profitable 
uses by making It a base for an oroanic chemical Industry In the country and 
en Important foreign exchange saver. -14 The production of fuel ethanol was 
Identified by the Kenya government as an Initial step In the development of a 
broader organic chemical Industry. The vIew of the government was largely 
Influenced by the Tate ~ lyle study on which the government relied heavily 
for technical data. However, the Tate ~ lyle proposal did not get much 
attention In the government and offtclals claim that thIs was because of 
l1mited foJ1ow-up by Tate ~ lyle. 15 This View, however, tends to Ignore the 
fact that the Tate 8c Lyle proposal was soon followed by other proposals 
which were more ambitious and much larger. 
The ethanol proposals presented to the Kenya government in the early 
and mld-1970s were not associated wIth a consistent policy to look for 
alternative molasses uses. Government activities were merely responsive to 
private sector initiatives. The capacity to assess the viability of the 
proposals was so ltmlted that the pre-feaslbl11ty studies were often the very 
source of data that were reproduced in subsequent evaluations. Moreover I 
technical possibility was often mistaken for economic feasibility. For 
example, all the by-products that could technically be recovered from 
molasses were treated as if their production was economically viable. It Is 
this assumption which led to the ambitious view that fuel ethanol could be an 
interim by-product of molasses -till the various Industries ••• are able to 
fully absorb the locally produced alcohol- .16 
On the baSis of mere technical posSlb111ty and private sector Interest, 
the government made clear its support for fuel ethanol, promising to 
promote viable proposals. -The Government would promote any viable 
proposal for the industrial utilization of molasses. It would in particular 
14. IlJid.. pp. 5. 
15. InteYiewJ.lndustriai Survey and Promotion Centre. Nairobi. September 1934. 
16. ISPC. tip. cil .• pp. 4. 
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encourage a working relationship between the sugar m111 and the 011 
companies which may be Interested In participating In the manufacture of 
power alcohol In the country. -17 It Is notable that the government extended 
Its support for the manufacture of molasses by-products Including those 
which were not being commercially produced anywhere in the world. Here 
Kenya differed remarkably from Zimbabwe because the latter had 
considerable commercial and technical links with South Africa and had 
information on technical possibility as well as economic viability. 
Moreover, government records reflect extensive knowledge of 
tec~nological trends In other countries. For example, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry was aware of attempts in India to produce fertilizer 
from molasses by-products and the problems associated with the process. 
Kenya, on the other hand, thought that this was a possible way of improving 
the economics of molasses utilization. Unlike Kenya, there was a more 
critical review of proposals In Zimbabwe. And 8S will be shown later, the 
ready willingness of the Kenya government to invest In new projects 
compl1cated the evaluation process. The critical evaluation of projects In 
Zimbabwe served 8S 8 vicarious mechanism for selection. Costly errors 
were ellminated during the pre-investment phase of niche testlno or 
exploration. 
The identification of molasses uses In Kenya was conducted In isolation 
of other Industrial activities although they were governed by broad 
government poliCies on import substitution. These policies were not 
associated with the active search of the local market for alternative uses as 
was the case In Zimbabwe. In Kenya the search was conducted by both local 
and foreign entrepreneurs without promotion work by the government. This 
was the case despite the fact that the Kenya government had set up the 
Industrial Survey and Promotion Centre (ISPC) whose main functions included 
market Identification. Although ISPC did its own Internal surveys I most of 
their work was In response to Initiatives by potential investors. 
The approach taken in Zimbabwe was slightly different. Market 
identification and promotion work was given much priority and Involved the 
highest levels of the Institutional hierarchy. Some of the senior government 
17. Ilid.. pp. 14. 
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officials and even ministers In charge of commerce, trade and Industry had 
some business background and not only maintained linka with the private 
sector but were themselves aware of the intricacies of business practice. It 
was therefore not a surprise that B.H. Mussett, who had been In business 
for more than 10 years, was appointed Minister for Commerce and Industry 
in 1965. The links between the private sector and government officials made 
communication much easier and deCision-making faster. 
The borderl1ne between business and government In Zimbabwe was 
difficult to distinguish because of the Intense Interaction between the two 
sections of the society. IS Most of the top bureaucrats In the Kenyan 
government In the early and mld-1970s were career civil servants who had 
been trained mainly In bureaucratic administration. And ministerial positions 
were not necessarily held by people with any relevant skills although it was a 
tradition in Kenya for the President to appoint people with an economics 
background to hold the finance and economic planning portfolios. 19 
Zimbabwe also engaged Independent consultants who regularly 
reported to the government (through IDC) on potential marlcet niches. The 
conSUltants emphasized the use of local resources and explored the local 
Industrial potential In the manufacture of various products. This Is 
exempltfled by the work of the London-based consulting chemical engineers, 
Cremer and Warner- who looked at the potential for the local manufacture of 
nitrogen fertl1izer. They were later asked to undertake similar exploratory 
work on the possibilities for the local manufacture of ethanol plants. Armed 
with such Independent studies. the government was In a better position to 
judge the possible success of proposed Investments and therefore to make 
more Informed deCisions. There were no comparative efforts in Kenya to 
search the local economy for manufacturing capability. 
It appears that the process of niche real1zation started with Initial 
exploration which was usually characterized by pre-feaSibility studies with 
limited technical and financial data. Since this phase was highly conjectural 
(and Involved large margins of uncertainty), It was not assocfated with laroe 
13. E.M. Seward. former IDC Dlrettor. Personal communication. Harare. September 198'. 
19.1nlen'ien. Office 01 the President. Nairobi. September 1984. A •• hown earlier. Hnb between 
the bUline .. community and the IOVerJUlleDt were weakened by the di.tinct diflereocea between 
IOaHI bureaucratic pnctice and buei .... t entrepreneurship. 
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financial and technical Inputs. This Is partly why those who already had 
technical and economic knowledge of the field were the first to make 
exploratory proposals. Those with other relevant resources such as 
production technology, finance, or raw materials tended to follow with their 
proposals, basing their judgement on the Initial exploration. Here the role of 
knowledge flows becomes crucial In the process of niche realization. 
Two Interesting difference between Zimbabwe and Kenya emerge from 
this understanding. In Zimbabwe the exploration stage was followed by a 
period of reduced activity In the field of fuel ethanol. The files were 
seemingly closed until the 1973011 crisis led to new Initiatives characterized 
by robust proposals. The lessons learned In the exploration phase were 
Incorporated Into subsequent activities. In Kenya, however, the exploration 
period was soon followed by robust proposals. This rapid transition meant 
that the problems which could have been eltminated at the exploration stage 
(through more careful evaluations) were embodied In robust proposals and 
subsequently Incorporated into the investment projects themselves. As we 
shall see later. the elimination of some of these errors could only be done 
through the removal of the investments themselves, with massive financial 
and credibility costs. 
Equally important in the exploration stage was the re-arrangement of 
adoptive interrelations to make the realization of the niche relatively easier. 
In the case of Zimbabwe. the exploration phase helped to Identify those key 
problems and constraints that needed to be solved or removed before fuel 
ethanol could be Introduced. Not only were these requirements Identified. 
but some of them were fulfilled as In the case of assurances from 011 
companies. It Is notable that some potential ethanol Investors asked for 
legal reforms to legitimize the ethanol niche. Similar institutional re-
arrangements did not occur In the case of Kenya and the exploration phase 
passed without any major efforts to identify the potential obstacles to fuel 
ethanol prodUction and utilization. Niche exploration did not necessarily need 
to be followed by a long period of inaction. What was Important was the 
Identification of the possible obstacles to niche realization and the related 
market and Institutional re-organlzatlon In view of the overall national 
development strategy. This could only be done with the generation of 
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knowledge spec1rlc to the process of niche rea1tzatlon. The next section wt11 
look et the relationship between the inithll exploretion stage end that of 
robust proposa Is. 
S.I.2 Robust proposals 
The previous section looked mainly at the initial exploration for 
potenttal niches and Isolated the main differences between Zimbabwe and 
Kenya. This section will look at the stage of robust proposals, which is 
usual1y associated with detailed financial. economic and technical feasibility 
studIes of proposed projects. ThIs stage was different from the exploratIon 
phase In many respects. First, ft was marked by confidence In the feasibility 
of financial benefit on the part of the Investors (not necessarily project 
success 8S will be shown later). Second, it involved financial commitment, 
especially in the preparation of the feasibflity studY; a factor which 
underscores the level of confidence In potential financial (Jatns. Third. the 
stage Included the most elaborate corporate and institutional arrangements 
required for the attainment of the implicit (Joals of the investors. Fourth, 
robust proposals were Initiated mainly by those who controlled the strategic 
resources in the realization of particular niches, molasses or gasoline 
distribution in this case. 
It Is Important to note that the explicit goals. as embodied In 
feasibility studies and public declarations were not necessarily the main 
motive behind Investment strategies. The real mottves of some of the 
investors were different from their explicit declarations. Some Investors, 
as wfll be shown later, were mainly Interested In the benefits from the sale 
of machinery and not from the long-term viability of the project. Such 
motives can be -discerned by a careful examination of the corporate 
arran(Jements surrounding a specific project and the condittons to be met by 
other Investors (In case of joint ventures) or the government. 
The emergence of robust proposals In Zimbabwe was associated with 
the 1973 011 crisis which forced the government to re-conslder ethanol In 
view of the changed conditions In the energy environment. This period was 
marked by Increased activity In this field and spread to Include other 
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resources. Not only did the government and the private sector consider the 
cene-based options, but studies were aho conducted on the possibility of 
producing ethanol from maize. 20 The turn to maize was partly based on the 
fact that the records of the sugar Industry did not show any ample surplus 
molasses at the time of the 011 crisis to justify large-scale ethanol 
production. The government relied on the previous evaluations to determine 
the prevailing possibilities. Previous studies, especia1Jy the 1967 IDC report 
were updated with information requested from the sugar industry. 
This renewed government attempt to promote fuel ethanol did not meet 
with much success as the private sector had al ready found local markets for 
surplus molasses. The cotton industry, for example, was already using 
about 9,000 tonnes of molasses a year and a large share was being devoted 
to animal feed. Hippo Val1ey claimed that their long-term availability of 
molasses had been prejudiced by a proposal from a French 'ir,m to set up a 
, plant to produce 3.3 m01ion gal10n of potable spirits for export. When the 
government enquired on the possibility for producing molasses with high 
sugar content (which simply meant the mtlls would produce less refined 
sugar), the sugar industry rejected the idea. However, Hippo Valley was 
willing to turn cane juice directly into fuel ethanol but suggested that the 
juice be valued at the market price of refIned sugar. 
Triangle, on the other hand, said they did not anticipate any surplus 
molasses in the next five years. These obstacles, now on the raw material 
side, put an end to the second attempt to produce fuel ethanol and the 
government was left with no option but to pursue the maize alternative. 
Complementary work was subsequently initiated to produce vegetable ol1s to 
replace diesel. It appears from the sequence of events that the sugar 
20. Althoup the details or the Ilarcb-bued ethanol project wHl DOt b, dilcusled iD thil Itudy. the 
proposal illUitraleI the lerioUinesl with which the ICWerDJDeDt approached the liquid fuell 
problem. Much of the wort on maize-bued ethanol .... done by the National Foodl Ltd .• at Bullnyo 
which louaht tec:bnoloev from H.L.S. of linei. The proposed add hydrolyai. plant W'U estimated to 
COlt 1$.5.0 million at a production capacity of 60 million litr .. a Yilt. National Food. estimated 
that they could have laved about 20 per ClDt of the forelp excbanae cosll if lome 01 the componlDli 
were fabricated locally. The linell tecbnoloev wu lolne to be bued on AmerlclD patlDli. Thil 
plant .... planned to produce enzyll .... well. ObtaJnine ethanol frOli CorD ltarch i. more 
expen.ive thlD fermentiOCliolul .. or CIDe juice because 01 the extra capital in ... tment required 
to coovert .tareh to limple lupn. 
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Industry was Interested In producing ethanol only If It undertook the task 
itself. If this view is correct, then it was In its interest to delay the 
introduction of ethanol until it was itself in a position to undertake 
production. This view can be supported by the fact that only a few years 
after Hippo Valley and Triangle had told the government that they could not 
guarantee surplus molasses for fuel ethanol production, they presented 
proposals to the government. 
The proposals were not the exploration-type that dominated the 
earlier phases but were robust and carefully worked out to Include all the 
major pr~conditions for the epplication of fuel ethanol. At this time, 
further technical tests as well as economic evaluations had been carried out 
by the 011 Industry to establish the leey factors which Influenced the use of 
fuel ethanol under Zimbabwean conditions. Although the technical review was 
positive on the feasibility of using ethanol, the oil Industry was negative 
about its economics. A pOSition paper by Shell, for example, had earlier 
concluded that the loss of revenue to the country coupled with negligible 
return on molasses and refining made the proposition seem not worthwl1e. 21 
Triangle, which was known to be working on possible ethanol 
prodUction presented a proposal to the government in 1975. This was the 
first robust proposal to be submitted to the government from the sugar 
industry. The proposal, however, was not favourably received by the 
government as it was belfeved then that the most viable alternative for the 
country was grain ethanol. Moreover, the previous insistence by the sugar 
industry that there was not enough molasses In the country could not be 
easl1y reconcl1ed with the submission of a proposal to produce ethanol from 
molasses. This proposel was subsequently rejected by the government on 
economic grounds. The following year, Hippo Valley, a subsidiary of the 
South African conglomerate, Anglo-American, and a rival of Triangle In 
sugar prodUction, submitted their proposal to the government. 
Hippo Valley proposed to produce about 12 mt11ion Ittres of absolute 
ethanol and another 3 million Iitres of potable and Industrial ethanol to be 
sold to the African Distillers who were already operating a small distillery 
annexed to their sugar mill. The project was estimated to cost Z$3.25 
21. Shell Ltd .• Su ••• ry III Curr'DI PlJlilillD CIJDc'rDi~, PlJr,r A/CDIJDI. pp. 3. 
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m1l110n (without working capital) of which about Z$I. Z:S million was 
estimated to be In foreign exchange. The firm was prepared to enter 8 Zo-
year contract (subject to a five-year review) with the government 'on the 
supp1y of fuel ethanol. Because the project was seen to be sensltfve to the 
price of de1lvered coa1 for steam generation, Hippo ValJey suggested that the 
price of ethan01 be fixed at 16.5 cents but raised by O. I Z cents for each 
Z$1.00 Increase In de1lvered coal prices. The suggestion was to 
accommodate possib1e f1uctuations In coa1 prices. 
The price was a1so senslttve to capital costs and the proposal required 
an Increase or decrease of O. 15 cents for a corresponding movement of 
Z$1 00,000 in the u1timate cost of the project. Then, the average landed cost 
of gasoline was about 13 cents per litre. It was esttmated on the basis of 
calorific differences that ethan01 was 5.5 cents more expensive than 
oaso11ne. The figures assumed that the government was prepared to waive 
excise duty of 3.853 cents per litre of motor spirit. This option seemed 
attractive to the government provided the foreign content of the project cou1d 
be obtained and there were no technical problems In markettng the blend. 22 
FolJowing a detaiJed Interna1 government reView, the proposal was rejected, 
1arge1y on the basis of low potenttal foreign exchange savings. 
The post-1975 perIod was significant because the source of feasibility 
studies had been narrowed down to Triang1e and Hippo Va11ey who control1ed 
nearly a11 the molasses produced In the country. This Indicated that the two 
firms had also accumulated enough knowledge about the feaslbtJity of fuel 
ethanol and had considerable confidence about their proposals. The two 
firms also competed to submit the most attracttve optton to the government. 
The preparation of feasibility studies at this stage Involved technical Input 
from the mother firms In South Africa. While Hippo ValJey drew expertise 
from AnglO-American, Triangle worked In close col1aboratton with Hulett's. 
There were two dimensions to these links. In the first place the links were 
part of the normal arrangements on technical services between Zimbabwean 
and South African firms. Second, Zimbabwe had developed extensive links 
with South Africa as part of their strategic response to the UN sancttons. 23 
22. Walter. Po"er AlcolJDllro. Nol.,,, •. pp.I-2. 
23.lnt.nhnn, Trilnlle Ltd •• Trilnlle. Dece.ber 1984. 
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The early period of robust proposals was not successful. However. It was 
associated with the competitive improvement of the proposals. 
Kenya did not not go through this lengthy period in their transition 
from InlUal exploration to robust proposals. Following the Tate ~ lyle stUdy. 
the government received robust proposals from local entrepreneurs who had 
worked closely with the foreign machinery supplters. The three robust 
proposals which were later to realize (with one failed attempt) the ethanol 
niches In the two countries were all submitted in 1977-78 period. In 
Zimbabwe, the successful proposal was presented to the government by 
Triangle while in Kenya the two proposals were submitted by two groups, 
Madhvanl and Mehta. Both groups were managed by local Asian famllfes who 
had long-standing experience In the sugar fndustry fn East Africa. Madhvanl's 
activities had previously been concentrated In Uganda. They moved to Kenya 
after the expulsion of Asians by President Idl Amln In the early 1970s. The 
Mehta group controlled the Eest African Sugar Industries (EASI) and the 
South Nyanza Sugar Company (SONY) through management and equity 
fnvestment.24 
The roots of the divergent paths that were subsequently taken by the 
two countries are partly embedded in the context of the proposals. The 
process of doing the main feasibility study presupposes a parUal 
establishment of the main actors in the investment project and the 
relationship between the project and the broader Issues of macro-economic 
poltcy. This Is Important because feastbtltty studies are usually judged on the 
basis of some expltclt or Impl1clt pol1cy gutdeltnes. In some cases such 
guidelines may be distorted or Ignored by decision-makers due to vested or 
2 ... It i. lempUne to explain the entry of the two firm. into ethanol production in term. of the 
traditional rinlry between theae two I .. iliel. Indeed •• Mebta croup manlier claimed that • 
lIember 01 the Madbnni 'gUy lot the idea of d"llopilll luel alcobol IrOlll a pre-leuibility Itudy 
which happened to be Iylne on the table at the Mehta bome. The Madhnnl 'gUy lIember WII 
alleeedly .tayine with the Mebtal alter beine expelled Irom UpndL He then quietly IIcwed to 
propose the project 10 order to pre-empt the Mehto. Thi. family anecdote addl lome fJ.your to the 
lotrlgue 01 eotrepreoeunblp but does not r"eaJ lbe fuodamental dyoamlc. 01 technological 
"olutioo. The World Bank recollmended to Upoda. wbere the Madvanll were the domlolDl IUpe 
producen, to loot ioto the pOllibilitfea of producine luel ethanol u far bact u 1,61 follcnrilll an 
ecooomic lunIY lIi •• ioo, World Dant. £&IIDII.I& 06Y6111p.6Dlllf U,.Ddl. pp. 281. 
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personal Interests. Decision-making Institutions do not usually act In 
accordance with the laid down guidelines. 
The Triangle proposal represented a cuI mination of the cumulative 
efforts that had started in the early 1960s to produce fuel ethanol. At this 
time. the price of oil had risen to levels where ethanol was starting to look 
Increasingly favourable. Moreover. the hope that the political situation 
would return to normal was slowly sinking and the strategiC importance of 
ethanol was rising. A look at the Institutional context of the preparation of 
the feaslbll1ty study shows significant configuration of Interests which gave 
the propose 1 the robustness that was later to see it accepted by the 
government. 
In the first place, the feasibility study was conducted by a local 
engineering firm. Jager and Associates (J&A) who understood the local 
engineering base and could establ1sh with reasonable accuracy the potential 
for the local manufacture of the various components of the plant. The firm 
had built up consulting experttse In the field of petroleum technology and was 
we11-equlpped to deal with fuel ethanol technology. In Kenya, the feaslbl11ty 
studies were conducted in conjunction with foreign firms. Whlle Madhvanl 
collaborated with a Switzerland-based firm, Process Engineering Company 
(PEC), the Mehta group's feaslbiltty study was conducted by Vogelbusch, a 
subsidiary of the Austrian state-controlled engineering firm, Vereinigte 
Edelstahlwerke AG (VEW). 
The J&A feasibility study was conducted in collaboration with Hulett's 
R~D, a division of Hulett's of South Africa which not only controlled Triangle, 
but also provided technical support to the mills. The J&A study dealt with 
process technology, market acceptability, pricing. capital investment, 
operating costs and the interaction of ethanol with Triangle's other 
activities. The study looked at the various possibilities of using molasses 
under different economic and political conditions before drawing its 
concluslons. 2' The J&A study shows that Triangle had accumulated 
considerable knowledge of the market environment before deciding to 
produce fuel ethanol. In Kenya, Madhvani proposed to produce fuel ethanol, 
Citric aCid, baker's yeast and vinegar while Mehta opted for fuel ethanol and 
25. Jqer and AIIOCilln, Alcohol PIMDt. pp. I. 
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baker's yeast. The chOice of products became a slgnflcant aspect In the 
implementation of these projects, especially In relation to market 
availability and capital Investment. 
Both Metha and Triangle remained modest In their objectives, 
concentrating on financial returns but Madhvanl presented grandiose 
promises which Included major foreign exchange savings through export 
earnings and Import subsftution, employment Increases, domestic sub-
contracting and on-the-job fabrication, stimulation of the economy through 
technology diffusion, employment for Kenyan speCialists, Improvement In 
food and nutritional situation, and superior products for local 
consumptlon. 26 While the Mehta and Trianole proposals were based on 
certain guarantees of the availability of molasses, Madhvanl could not make 
such an assurance and they did not own any sugar mf11. Indeed, they reHed 
on the possible supply of molasses from existing sugar mt11s but could not 
secure long-term supply arrangements. This problem later became a major 
source of commerCial and Institutional conflict. 
The Triangle and Mehta proposals were technically superior to the 
Madhvani feasibility study. Madhvani used assumptions which did not seem to 
be based on technical studies. While Triangle and Mehta based their 
estimates on laboratory tests and were therefore more reliable, Madhvanl 
sent samples for analysis after the proposal had been submitted to the 
government and agreed upon. Even more crucial were the aggregations used 
In the Madhvani proposal. Whereas the other two proposals provided II 
detal1ed break-down of the the various items Involved In the entire project 
with their estimates, Madhvanl's proposal subsumed all the Items In broad 
categories such as plant end facilities, purchase and preparation of land, 
erection and start-up, training, water treatment and bulldings. 27 This 
approach made Independent evaluations or comparisons d1ff1cult to 
undertake. 
Furthermore, the estimates made on the price of molasses were too 
low compared to the prevall1ng export prices. Slml1arly, long-term 
projections in the price of molasses tended to downplay possible up-turns In 
26, Madbnni Group. FiD.1 PrDpD •• I.. pp ... 
27. IlJid.. pp.2. 
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the world molasses market. Indeed, thIs perIod was marked by Increases In 
molasses prices. What was equally ignored was the fact that if molasses 
prices were not fixed (which was the case then), the mere introduction of 
new sources of demand would tend to raise the price above the prevIously 
assumed levels. But Madhvani hoped to overcome such problems through 
state Intervention since the government was the majority shareholder In the 
jOint venture. 
S.1.3 The finance-technology nexus 
The choice of technology In the two countries was largely Influenced by 
the existing fnstitutional arrangements governing financial matters. The 
choice of technology was therefore not a simple fnstantaneous decision but 8 
complex process that was linked to both finance policies and subsequent 
project implementation. Triangle's technology choice process was largely 
influenced by the government pol1cy which required that all Investment 
projects recover their foreign exchange component in one year. This had 
far-reaching implications for the design of industrial projects. Feaslbt1fty 
studies were requIred to Include a search of the local market to Identify the 
possible sources of local inputs which might reduce foreign exchange costs. 
Although the government guaranteed some foreign loans through local 
banks, the repayment of the loans had to be met by the savings made by the 
borrowing firm. The guarantee was therefore made against expected foreign 
exchange savIngs. By restrIctIng the foreIgn exchange content of proJects, 
the government reduced the level of guarantee and therefore took minimal 
risks. Triangle operated under these constraints and had to rely on local 
Inputs for most of the components of the plant and Imported only crItIcal 
parts. The potential technology supplier had to take Into consideration the 
financial I1mlts of Triangle and be wflling to supply the know-how without 
inSisting on the supply of hardware. The search team, which included 
Triangle staff and J&A visited various European countries, the US and Braztl 
and fInally settled for a Herrman-Buckau Walther (West Germany) 
technology. 
loft 
This search process was not merely to Identify potential technology 
Suppliers but it was elso a learning process. The team carefully studied the 
technologies offered and made their decision on the basis of their capacity to 
fabricate the chosen optton. Matters pertaining to quality standard were 
discussed and negotiations were carried out on the technical specifications of 
the materials to be used in fabrication. This was important because Triangle 
was gOing to rely largely on local technological capability and Herrman-
Buckau were concerned about their technical specifications on which their 
reputation was based. But even more important was the fact that the search 
team carefully studied the various fabrication techniques used in the firms 
they Visited and made choices on the basis of their local aval1abflity.23 
TABLE 5.1: Original Finance Structure 
Source of Finance US$ m11110n Per cent 
MADHVANI 
Equity Kenya eovernment 12.0 19.9 
Moohvani Group 3.0 5.0 
Chemap Group 5.0 6.3 
Loans Ex -Swi tzer 16lld 24.7 40.8 
Ex-Austri8 14.6 24.4 
CommercIal 1.0 1.6 
Total 60.5 100.0 
MEHTA 
EQUity Keny8 eovernment 5.3 26.3 
East African Sugar Industries 0.7 3.3 
Mehta Group and Associates 0.7 3.3 
SUpp 1fers' credit 10.6 52.8 
eovernment l06n 2.5 12.3 
Bank fac111t1es 0.4 2.0 
Total 20.2 100.0 
Source: lodUitriat Suney and Promotion Centre, Nairobi. 
25. loteni.",l, Triangle Ltd., Triangle, Zimbabye. The leartb procesl YU conducted uoder dilcuiae 
becaule of tbe InternationallinctiOOl lPinat tbe c:ountry. Wbite Triangle rues on tbe trip to Weat 
Germany were marked "BruW. tbe record. or Hermann-Buc;hu refer to tbe project u "Durban II'. 
lupposedly destined for Hulett', in Soutb Africa. 
1-42 
The institutional imperatives of finance operated differently in Kenya. 
The country's technology-related policies, especially those on machinery 
Importation, were designed to fac111tate the importation of whole plants 
under the import substitutio!" strategy pursued in the 1 970s. These policies 
allowed low or no import taxes on machinery while they placed heavy taxes 
on engineering raw materials. This distortion encouraged the importation of 
turn-key plants while at the same time inhibiting the local fabrication of such 
machinery or their spare parts. Under such cond1tlons, Investment proJects 
most likely contained a high foreign exchange content. As a result industrial 
projects tended to rely on borrowed finance and the government often offered 
to guarantee the foreign loans. 
The import licenSing system was divided tnto three major categories of 
schedules and was managed by the Trade and Supp1ies section of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry. Goods under Schedule I were considered priority 
imports and automatically received licence and foreign exchange. The 
category Included Industrial raw materials, capital goods and spare parts. 
The second category (Schedule Ila) included industrial and agricultural 
goods of middle priority. The third category (Schedule lib) tncluded 
consumer goods and luxury Items. The tariff schedules also favoured the 
importation of finished capital goods. For example, the tartff on steel was 
40 per cent While the rate on wind mechanical systems was only 20 per cent. 
In this case, there would be little incentive to tmport steel and manufacture 
windmills locally. Instead, it would be cheaper to import finished product. 29 
This arrangement was compounded by the financial participation of the 
government in projects, often through equity investment and joint ventures 
(Table 5.1). The Mehta and Madhvani projects were joint ventures under 
which the government guaranteed their foreign loans. The foreign exchange 
was obtained through contact with Swiss and Austrian businessmen who made 
arrangements with their respective local ban~s on condition that they 
supplied the technology. About 82 per cent of the foreign funds for the Mehta 
project came from Girozentrale und Bank der Osterreichischen Sparkassen 
Aktlengesellschaft of Vienna. As a result Mehta involved Vogelbusch In 
29.lnteni ..... Kenya A'iociation of Manufaclunn. Nairobi. NewUlher 19&4. 
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preparing the feasibility study because of the finance and technology link. 30 
Madhvant on the other hand tnvolved PEC due to the Sw1ss finance. The loans 
for the Madhvani project Initially came from the Union Bank of Switzerland in 
Zurich and PEC. But while Vogelbusch had Its own technology, PEe had to 
import technology from the Brazilian firm, Conger and ship it to Kenya. 51 
It appears from the evidence aval1able that while Triangle chose 
technoloQY on the basts of financial ltmltatlons, Mehta and Madhvanl chose a 
techno-financial package which restricted their technological choices. This 
underscores the fact that technology choice is intricately linked w1th finance 
and bound up In Inst1tutlonal frameworks which shape the direction of search 
and choice. While Triangle invested in learning, both Mehta and Madhvani 
went for options which did not require much learning effort at this early 
stage. The route taken by Kenya led to project choices which included tied 
commercial loans. The large sums of money involved required government 
guarantees. 
5.1.1 location and tnfrastructure 
One of the crucial pre-conditions for ethanol production Is the location 
of the plant and the availability of Infrastructure required for the 
distribution of the product. The Question of location Is Important because of 
the sensitivity of ethanol production to raw material costs tmd the Issues 
which may arise from energy balances. long distance transportation of raw 
materials may adversely affect the final costs of ethanol. Moreover, the 
location of the market may also add to the costs of transporting ethanol. In 
this respect, the choice of locatfon Is an Important consideratfon in the 
reallzat10n of ethanol niches. 
It was noted in the previous section that the robustness of the three 
proposals was partly accounted for by the control over the production of raw 
materials. In this respect, the robustness of the Madhvant project was 
greatly weakened by the fact that they did not have direct access to raw 
materials while Mehta and Triangle controlled mt11s and therefore had 
30. See VOCelbusch. F6.lilJility Study. 
31.IDtenift'l. Cooter. Pi.-.cicab .. Bruit. March. 1985. 
access to molasses production. Thts was an Important consideration because 
one of the options for reducing the transporhtion costs was to annex the 
. 
ethanol plants to existing sugar mills from which molasses and steam could 
be drawn. This was the strategy adopted by Triangle and Mehta. 
Mehta decided to annex the plant to their mtll at Muhoroni in western 
Kenya. The mtJI was to provide about 30 per cent of their molasses needs and 
the rest could be bought from other mtlls in the sugarbelt. The mfll's 
surplus steam could be pumped to provide process energy to the plant. 
TrlanQle took the same approach and annexed the plant to their sUQar ml1l. 
Although these arrangements look Similar, there were some differences In 
the way the two groups organized their management. Triangle subsumed the 
operations of the plant Into the management of the mfll thereby reducing 
overhead costs. Mehta, on the other hand, entered a joint venture with the 
government and YEW and formed a separate firm, Agro-Chemlcal and Food 
Company (ACFC) to manage the project. By doing so, the symbiotic synergy 
between the mm and the plant was reduced. 
Madhvant, like Mehta formed the Kenya Chemtcal and food Company 
(KCFC) which entered a joint venture with the Kenya Government, PEC, 
Chemfood Investment Corporation (Switzerland), Advalt International 
(Luxembourg) t and Eximcorp (Panama). Madhvant decided to locate the plant 
on the outskirts of Kisumu town on the shores of Lake Victoria some 80 
kflometres away from Mumias sugar mfll which was expected to be the main 
source of mOlasses. Madhvani claimed that the location was chosen after 
·havlng carried out an exact study relating to the supply of molasses and 
transportation. water avaf1abtltty. waste water treatment, storage of raw 
materials and finished products· .52 Other considerations allegedly Included 
accessibiHty to road and rail transport as well as cheap labour in Kisumu, 
the third largest town In the country. 
What is even more Interesting In Madhvanl's choice of location is the 
view that ·[bllendino and transportation of Qasoltne and alcohol t as well as 
the distribution, does not present any problems ••• consldering direct access 
32. Madhnni Group. Fill.1 PrllplIs.ls. liP cit .• pp. IS. It "i11 be arcued later that this location 
had political underpinninp. 
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to road and railway·.53 This statement implled (and Is supported by a 
diagram of the plant layout) that the blending of ethanol with oasol1ne would 
be done at Klsumu. This was Indeed an untenable proposition because the 011 
refinery Is located at the coast to the east of the country while the main 
market was Nairobi somewhere between the refinery and the plant. 
Considering that the plant was going to meet about 10 per cent of the 
country's liquid fuel needs, some 75 per cent of all the refinery output would 
have to be transported all way across the country to Kisumu to be-blended 
with ethanol before being shipped baclc to Nairobi. It appeared more logical 
to send the additive to the main blendstock Instead of doing 1t vice versa. 
This may seem like logistic Idiocy but it masked more complex strategiC 
Interests. 
The view at Madhvanl was that they could only guarantee that blending 
took place If they themselves did ft. It was clear from the very beginning 
that Madhvanl did not take seriously the question of blending and the related 
infrastructure. Mehta did not consider the Issues either and hoped that 
Madhvanl, who was pioneering the path, would help establish the pattern of 
distribution and they would simply follow suit. 54 In Zimbabwe, Trianole and 
the government finalized all the key aspects of distribution and the related 
Infrastructure before the plant was buflt. 
Issues related to the disposal of stillage or waste from ethanol 
production became another major problem of consideration. Here the three 
projects pursued different alternatives. Triangle, on the basis of studies 
conducted In Brazil. decided to use the stillage as fertilizer by settling it In 
lagoons, mixing ft with irrigation water and finally returning it to the 
caneflelds. Mehta Incorporated an effluent-treatment component In the 
project while Madhvani proposed to Install the Anamet waste treatment unit 
sold by Sorigona (Cardo Group) of Sweden. The Anamet unit was desioned to 
recover some by-products such 85 ammonia and methane from stf11age. 
There was 1fttle Information about the sultabtltty of the Anamet process since 
It had only been commercially operated since 1971. Triangle went for a much 
33. /lJitl.. pp. 19. 
34. Inteniewa. Aero-Chemical and Food Co •• Muhoroni. September 1933. 
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cheaper option and later attempted to use concentrated molasses sttl1age 
(eMS) es animal feed. 
This section has examined some of the main features of the adoptive 
terrain which Influenced the development of fuel ethanol In the two 
countries. It was argued that Zimbabwe Instituted a series of measures to 
smooth the terrain and make possible the successful introduction of the 
technology. These measures were part of an overal1 strategy to cope with 
expected disruptive soclo-economlc fluctuations. Kenya, on the other hand, 
continued to pursue pol1cles which assumed a surprise-free world. The next 
section looks et the main edaptive variables end how they shaped the 
technology acquisition process. 
5.2 Adaptive Parameters 
5.2.1 Technology supply Issues 
The adoptive requirements outlined above are necessary but they do 
not constitute sufficient conditions for niche realization. Since this process 
ental1s the entry of a technological system Into a techno-economic 
landscape, the key variables which make this process necessary need to be 
spelt out. They include the technical parameters, capital Investment and 
priCing structure. 
One of the key aspects of niche realtzation Is the type of technology 
chosen. The previous chapter showed that the development of fuel ethanol 
has gone through three main stagesi batch, semi-continuous. and 
continuous. Batch and semi-continuous systems co-existed at the period of 
chOice of teChnique and the three countries had the option of choosing any of 
their variants. Any technological variant retains the Icey characteristics 
which are associated with Its dominant functions and configuration. Although 
the dominant features may remain the same, there may be wide differences 
resulting from the fact that a particular technological system is an 
embodiment of different functional units with different operattng parameters 
and morphology. 
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The functional and morpholoolcal features of a particular 
technological system may also be influenced by adoptive pre-conditions such 
8S finance availability, ecological considerations and labour availability. A 
technological system Is therefore not a fixed unit with pre-determined 
characteristics; it Is constitutive of purposive Imperatives. This view 
f11ustrates the fact that the ability of a technological system to adapt to new 
market environments entails more than just capital, labour and skill 
reqUirements. Fuel ethanol technological systems also Involve Hquid flows 
rather than the movement of mechanical parts thereby lowerino the labour-
capital ratio or raising the capital intensity of the operation. 
After a detailed examination of the internatfonal technology market, 
Zimbabwe opted for a batch process with a rated capacity of 120,000 Htres 
per day. The plant was a conventional process which was well established 
and fairly stable. By chOOSing an established technolooY, the management 
had more access to related process know-how and could therefore rise up 
the learning curve relatively faster than would have been the case if they had 
opted for a new process. This is partly because the process know-how of new 
technologies had not been widely diffused or protected to maintain corporate 
monopoly. 
Triangle had another consideration as well. They hoped that they would 
Improve the technology whenever foreign exchange was available and 
therefore they chose a technological system that was flexfble and more 
amenable to modification. A batch system is more flexible In this respect 
than a continuous process because the functional units of the latter are more 
tightly linked tooether to achieve high system efficiency. Moreover, 
continuous processes rely on centrifuges which cost about U5$100,OOO each. 
As far as this condition was concerned, batch systems were therefore more 
adaptive to the Zimbabwean cond1tlons because they met the conditions 
needed to realize Triangle long-term strategy. 
Kenya, on the other,. opted for different systems. As suogested 
above, the choice of technology by Madhvanl and Mehta was foreclosed by the 
choice of finance and therefore the decision lay In the offices of Vogelbusch 
and PEe. Vogelbusch had then developed 8 cascade process which had not 
been widely tried. Madhvani, on the other hand, accepted the batch process 
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fabricated by Conger, which was, Ironlca11y, partly based on Austrian 
technology transferred to Brazil in the 1930s. 35 This process had undergone 
minor improvements over time and was adapted to Brazilian conditions. The 
feasibility study, however, promised that PEC would supply a continuous 
process. 56 
Given the fa~t that Triangle did not have experience In ethanol plant 
management, it was logical for them to go for 8 process that they could 
master as quickly as possible. Furthermore, they could not Justify paying 
addItIonal management fees In foreign exchange. This was not part of the 
Kenyan agenda because the payment of management fees to foreign firms was 
such an attractive proposition that some local entrepreneurs were 
assocIated with management firms registered In foreIgn countries. It was 
therefore not a surprise that the joint ventures were managed by firms 
registered in Panama and Bermuda. It appears that the adoptive pre-
conditions of the acquiring end puts selective pressures on the adaptive side 
and therefore limits the number of suppHers that may meet the 
requirements. In the case of Triangle. the choices were narrowed down to a 
handful of technological systems of which the Herrman-Buckau Walther 
technology was the most suitable option. 
There were other pre-conditIons as we11. Triangle was looking for a 
supplier who would forgo the supply of hardware and se11 only the know-how 
In the form of drawings and other disembodied technological knowledge. The 
supply side therefore had to make a decision on the basis of its corporate 
strategy as part of Its adaptive response to changing market conditions. 
Herrman-Buckau had a long-term strategy to enter the African market at a 
time when oil prices were prOjected to rise. A successful plant In Zimbabwe 
w~s likely to give the firm high vlsibnity and therefore create possible 
market opportunities. Indeed, this vision paid off because the ethanol plant 
erected in Malawi in 1982 is a Herrman-Buckau process. 57 The vision of 
35. InterYi8Tt'l. Conaer. Plracicaba. Marcb 1985. 
56. Madbnni GrouP. '186/ PropOS6/S. pp.43-44. 
57. Ricbard Jager. Jager and Allocillel. Personal Communication. Blantrye. Mal."i. january 1985. 
The Mal."i plant WII executed by J&A. buUdinc larlely on the tnowledle pJned durinc the 
Triana1• operation. 
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future plant sales made the supplters Insist on stringent quality control to 
ensure the successful operation of the plant. 
The three plants did not differ much in their release of stillage. Their 
output was 12-15 lltres of stt11age per litre of ethanol produced. At the Ume 
of technology choice, there were no low-cost, non-polluting ways of 
disposing of the stf11age. It was also the time when firms such as Alfa-Laval 
were working on new stillage reducing technologies such as the Biostil 
process. However, options such 8S molasses evaporation existed. Indeed, 
the Vogelbusch process was equipped with a facility to evaporate stillage to 
65 per cent solfd concentration before lagoon disposal. The decision to 
include this waste treatment unit was influenced by the Kenyan laws on water 
qualfty control. 
The other technical consideration was the net energy balance of the 
processes. This was not a major conslderatfon at the time partly because 
sugar-based ethanol plants do show positive energy balances. The energy 
balance of the Madhvanl project, however, was expected to be negative 
because the location did not allow them to use surplus bagasse for steam 
generation. They planned to use petroleum products for this purpose. 
5.2.2 Capital Investment 
The adaptability of a particular technoloQY is linked with its capital 
costs. This is partly because the capital invested is eventually reflected tn 
the production costs thereby affectinQ the competitiveness of the fuel w1th 
conventional sources of enerQY. Triangle's capital costs were relatively 
lower than the other projects at US$6.4 million for a plant producinQ 42 
mfJlfon 11tres a year (Table 5.2). In thefr tnfttal proposals, Madhvanl and 
Mehta planned to spend US$60.4 mlllion and US$18.3 million respectively on 
their projects (Table 5.3). These figures are misleading because they 
Include the manufacture of other products. The capital costs given by 
Madhvanl and Mehta were not independently evaluated before they were 
approved by the government. A study conducted by ISPC In 1978 argued that 
the project had been overcapitellzed, suggesting on the basis of Brazilian 
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experience that a fiQure of US$30 mt11ion would have been reasonable. 35 But 
thIs was too late sInce the dec1s10n had already been taken. 
TABLE 5.2: Capital Cost of the Triangle Plant 
Item 
Site preparation end foundations 
Bufldfngs and structures 
Vats and tanks 
Pumps and blowers 
Heat exchangers 
Distillation columns 
Piping and installation 
Valves 
Electricals and installations 
Instrumentation and 1nstallat10n 
Paint end insulation 
SUllage d1sposal 
Molasses sti118'J8 concentrators 
Engineering fees 
Project charges 
Interest 
M isee llaneous 
Total 
Source: Trianale Limited. Trianale. 
Cost (US$ '000) 
264 
536 
864 
330 
305 
453 
910 
205 
244 
169 
213 
233 
221 
523 
149 
154 
635 
6.408 
At the Ume the Madhvanl project had been planned to produce 9.Z1 
mfIJion litres of ethanol, 1,000 tonnes of baker's yeast, 2,200 tonnes of 
cftrfc aCfd, and 1.7 mf1lton lftres of vfneoar a year. Mehta, on the other 
hand, planned to produce 18 mfllion litres of ethanol and 1,151 tonnes of 
baker's yeast annual1y. These production capacities were not determined by 
the country's oasoltne consumptfon patterns and theIr choIce was not oulded 
by any policy guidelines on the development of fuel ethanol. It is most ltkely 
that the chOice of capacity was largely influenced by the technologies already 
aval1able on the market and could be easl1y obtaIned wIth minImal capital 
expenditure by the suppliers (PEe and Vooelbusch for this matter). 
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TABLE 5.3: Origin6! C6pite/ Cost Structure (USI) 
Item Mehta MOOhvenl 
L8f'ld 720 
Site preparation 132,320 250,000 
Buildings (civil) 1,700,000 
Production and yeast 664,940 
Others 156,670 
Residential buildings 460,510 
Mochlnery end eQuipment 45,400,000 
Yeast plant 3,642,740 
Alcohol plent 4,968,510 
Evaporation plant 710,700 
Service 8I'ld safety units 
Enerw supply 360,190 
Water supply 390,110 200,000 
Storage tanks 480,000 
Others 50,000 
Effluent treatment 197,140 
Training 250,000 
P re-start - up - interest 2,000,000 
Furniture, fixtures and vehicles 100,000 1,500,000 
Total 12,344,550 51,300,000 
OVerheOO end resign costs 
Construction and design 2,444,700 2,000,000 
Sales tax and HAL fee 1,173,090 4,994,000 
Freight, insurance and other cher1J3s 1,500,000 400,000 
TOTAL C'APITAL COSTS 1 7,462,340 58,694,000 
emu ngencies 873,120 1,716,000 
GRAND TOTAL 18,335,460 60,410,000 
Source: Industrial SU"ey and Promotion Centre, Nairobi. 
It Is interesting to note that the two countries toole different 
approaches to the questfon of capital Investment. The fact that there were no 
overall policy guidelines controlJlng foreign exchange expenditure on 
Investment projects accounted for part of the laxity In the level of capital 
Investment. This argument applies only to the Mehh project which, however, 
had been rated to be more reasonably costed than the Madhvanl proJect. A 
more serious problem Is the fact that the deSign of the Madhvanf project 
carried ImpliCit attempts to make the capihl Investment as high as possible. 
From the evidence available, it appears that the Madhvani proposal was 
partly aimed at making profit on the sale of machinery. One of the ways for 
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dofng so was to keep the capital costs as hfgh as possfble. The faf1ure of thfs 
investment had its roots in the design of the project itself. Although the 
Mehta costs were relatively high compared to other projects elsewhere, its 
capital costs were lower than Madhvanf's and the detaf1s of the proposals 
show intent to carry the project through successfully. 
The Project Implementation and Manaoement Aoreement (PIMA) 
entered between KCFC and Eximcorp stipuhted that the management should be 
paid 5.0 per cent of 811 capital expenditure on the project (excluding the cost 
of land whfch was to be leased to the company for 99 years) fn US dollars 
upon the completion of the project. 39 In addition, Exlmcorp was to be paid 8 
net fixed fee of US$lS0,OOO annually by a US dollar draft on the London 
(Berkley Square) branch of Moroan Guarantee Trust Company of New York. 
Another 2.0 per cent of sales based on packed ex-factory floor prices net of 
discounts was to be paid monthly in US dollars. Finally. the company had to 
pay EXimcorp 3.0 per cent of its annual profits which was to be calculated 
before interest and tax deductions but after deduction for the depreciation 
schedule allowable by the Income Tax Act. 
It appears from this contractual agreement that the management of 
the company had an interest in higher capital investment because it enabled 
them to earn correspondfngly hfgher management fees. Thfs suooestton fs 
supported by the evidence collected from Conger in Brazil where PEC asked 
for technical specjfications which added to the capital costs. For example, 
Conger included expensive shinless steel parts In places where cheaper 
materials would normally be used. Moreover, the support structure of the 
dfst1JJery was bul1t to wfthstand earthquakes measurfno 5.0 on the Rfchter 
scale. 40 Triangle abandoned steel support structures altogether and used 
concrete fnstead. These seemingly superfluous additions to the capital costs 
Indfcate that the project was partly desIgned to maxlmfze on machfnery-
related payments such as pre-stert-up manaoement fees. 41 It appears 
39. The 99-year land leue ftI illelC questionable becaUie the project did not hue luch a Jifapan. 
Moreoyer, the land ftI on the oulltirll of a rapidly expandilll urban area. The request for land ftI 
bued on artillie fmprealfon. and not detailed land enJUilfODl. 
40. InterYien. Miniltry of Commerce and IndUitry. September 1984. Nairobi: Con,er. Plrlaclcaba. 
Bruit. March 1985. 
41. More evidence or thi. will be li'eD in lubsequent chaplerl on the i.plementation 01 the project. 
.peci ... yon I«tion. dealinl with COlt cwerrunl. 
i53 
therefore then whfle Triangle planned to mlmlmlze Its cap1tal expendIture, 
Madhvanl planned to do exactly the opposite; to maximize on capital 
expenditure so as to earn high management fees. 
The actual capital costs of the Madhvan! project were much higher than 
the given figures because the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) committed the 
government to providing other capftal-embodylng !nfrastructural facl1ttles. 
The JVA shted that the government shall procure or cause to be procured at 
no cost to the company the provision of a wide range of facilities and 
services. These Included electric power (6.0 MVA), water (1,000,000 
gallons per day), effluent disposal (225,000 gallons per day), road, water 
supply, electriCity connection, telephone, rail access, effluent disposal 
faCilities and the relevant government l1censes. The government was also 
expected to provide permits, authorizations, approvals and licenses 
required for the operations of the Joint venture, as well as port factllties for 
Imports and expor:ts of materials and products related to the Investment 
project. These requirements constituted a subsidy and If costed, they would 
have added enormously to the already high cap1tal costs. 
Other hidden capital costs were Included in the JVA stipulation that the 
government undertake al1 the necessary measures to guarantee the 
aval1abl11ty of raw materials at reasonable prices and arrange for the sale of 
fuel ethanol to the oil companies. This requirement put the burden of 
acquiring blending facilities and the related capital costs on the government. 
Apart from capital expenditure, the government was also going to lose 
revenue due to the requirements of the agreement. For example, the JVA 
listed a wIde range of Imports for whIch Import duties were to be waived. The 
very terms of the agreement meant that 8 large number of government 
officials would be deployed to ensure that the project was Implemented on 
schedule. The fact that the assumptions on which the feasibtllty study was 
based were themselves shaky meant that the government had to virtually 
push the project throuoh the Implementation phase before It was subjected to 
the selecting pressures of the external environment. At this stage, the 
benefits of vicarious selection had been foreclosed and the selection 
pressures were to act directly on the proJect Itself. 
5.Z.3 PrIcIng structure 
Prices playa crucial role in determining the competitive level of new 
products. They also serve as an Indicator of the relative adaptation of a 
product In the market environment. In other words, prices are an Important 
factor In the techno-economic landscape because they reflect to a certain 
extent the adaptive relationship between a new technological system and 
traditional ones. It Is In this context, and not necessarily In the supply-
demand relationship, that prices attain their Importance. In these 
countries, ethanol prices, either hypothetical or real, had no relationship to 
supply and demand factors. But even more interesting was the fact that both 
Madhvanl and Mehta avoided the Issue of pricing In their feasibility studies 
except In calculating the expected production costs. It Is notable that both 
countries avoided the economics of priclnQ and opted for either technical 
valuations or political approaches. 
JU developed for Triangle a technical value of ethanol based on the 
fact that ethanol was not just a source of motive power but an octane 
booster. It was argued that premium gasoline was valued higher than regular 
gasoline because of the higher octane value. Since octane numbers were 
Influenced by altitude, J!.A put the normal octane requirements some 5 
points lower than those required at sea level. On the basis of this and other 
technical parameters, J&A developed the followlnQ formula for prlclnQ 
ethanol: 
Eo - Ro 
E- ---- (P - R) + R 
Po - Ro 
where E, P, R are values In cents per litre of ethanol, and the 
blending components Eo, Po and Ro are the octane ratings of 
ethzlnol, blended gasoltne and other blended fuels. 
AccordlnQ to this equation, the technical value of ethanol was shown to 
be higher than that of gasoline. For example, If it Is assumed that regular 
gaSOline of octane rating 87 is blended with ethanol, showing 8 blending 
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octane number of lZO, to premium gasoline with an octane rating of 93 and 
the import parity prices for regular and premium are 14 and 15 cents per 
litre respectively, then the equivalent value of ethanol would be 19.5 cents 
per Htre. This formula shows a high price for ethanol as an octane booster 
which would be comparable to the production costs. 
This formula Is only relevant in cases where only refined products are 
imported. The situation is more complex in Kenya because of the presence of 
an oil refinery. The technical value of ethanol in such cases would depend on 
whether there Is a balance between the products refined from Imported crude 
oil and the demand patterns. In most cases, refineries produce less ·white 
products- from imported gasoline thereby leaving uneconomical ·black 
products·. In some of such cases, white products are added to the crude to 
enhance the balance. Apart from the ·spiking·, lead is added to the process 
to raise the octane rating. Under such conditions, the technical value of 
ethanol would be equivalent to the backed out spiking component. imported 
lead and the related conversion yield changes. Such a value is ususally 
arrived at with a refinery I1near programme. 
Given such complexities. both Madhvani and Mehta did not consider 
seriously the price of ethanol. While Madhvan! relied on the government to 
fix the price of ethanol as suggested In the JVA, Mehta took a Slightly 
different approach. They hoped that the government would fix the price on 
the basis of the Madhvani production costs (which were expected to be much 
higher than the landed cost of gasoline). This would then have given Mehta a 
higher prof!t margin because their capital costs were lower than Madhvani's. 
It appears therefore that although Mehta did not argue Initially for prices on 
the basis of production costs. they intended to raise their profit margins by 
relying on differences in production costs. 42 
To arrive at any price depended largely on the relationship between 011 
companies and ethanol producers because the new product was intended to 
displace petroleum products and possibly reduce the earnings of petroleum 
importers, refiners and distributers. This problem was not severe in 
Zimbabwe because the oil companies had agreed to market ethanol and the 
refinery was not operational. In Kenya, the 011 companies Issued no 
42.lolerYi8WI, Avo-Chemical and Food Company, Muhorooi, September 1983. 
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statement of Intent and were operatlno a refinery In which the Qovernment 
had 50 per cent of the shares. The matter would not only brino about 
conflicts between ethanol and gasoline producers, but the various 
government departments responsible for the promotion of the two fuels 
would also enter Into conf1fct. 
There was another element of the prlcino that was not considered 
which impinged not just on the economic viability of the projects, but also on 
the ability of the projects to meet their foreign loan obligations. The price 
fixed had to take tnto account the debt payment schedule. SInce the 
government had guaranteed the foreign loans, it was in its interest to grant a 
price that enabled the projects to survive while at the same time be able to 
re-pay the foreton debts. This requirement meant that the prices had to be 
fixed at relatively high margins due to the high foreign exchange content of 
the projects. 43 
The pre-adaptive changes in the techno-economic landscape al ready 
illustrate some of the basic differences between Zimbabwe and Kenya. In the 
first place, Kenya did not develop the kind of overal1 policy guidelines and 
institutional behaviour that could ensure the emergence of more adaptive 
business practices. Secondly, the instltutlona 1 climate provided idea 1 
conditions for the Introduction of ill-SUited technological systems. But even 
In cases where there were no problems with the technological systems 
themselves, the evidence sugoests that the posslbllftles for project fal1ure 
were higher In Kenya than they were in Zimbabwe. This is largely because the 
Institutional reforms and learning necessary for modifying the adoptive 
terrain took place much ear1ter In Zimbabwe than they did In Kenya. 
These conclusions tend to overturn the general view that developing 
countries ,need first to formulat~ policies on technology transfer, develop 
guidelines and then outline tactical approaches before they can move tnto 
technology acquiSition. The evidence here, which wi11 be reinforced In 
subsequent chapters, tends to suggest that the process may follow a reverse 
pattern where policy guidelines are drawn from project Implementation and 
fed tnto subsequent stages in the evolutionary process as new knowledge and 
experiences get Incorporated Into the economic management tradition. 
43. Detail. on the price conflicts will beli,en in lublequent chapten. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped the key features of the techno-economic 
landscape which were significant for the reaJ1zation of ethanol niches tn the 
two countries. These features were divided tnto two categories; adoptive 
pre-conditions which dealt wfth developments at the technology acquiring 
end. and adaptfve parameters whfch concentrated on varfables on the supply 
side of the technology. It was shown that the techno-economtc landscape 
constftuted not only technological and economic factors. but it also covered 
tnstftutfonal varfables as well. The next chapter will deal with the efforts to 
realize the ethanol niche in the two countries. 
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6. THE PROCESS OF NICHE REALIZATION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter mapped the techno-economic landscape for fuel 
ethanol and identified the major adaptive and adoptive pre-conditions for the 
successful implementation of the ethanol technological system. This chapter 
w111 examine the process of nIche rea11zatlon In ZImbabwe and Kenya. The 
chapter stresses the Interactions between adaptive and adoptive parameters 
and shows how they affected the development of fuel ethanol In the two 
countries. 
6.1 Project Implementation 
At the time of plant construction, the Mehta and Triangle proJects 
remained the same whOe Madhvanl had changed the compOSition of the project 
In various Important aspects (Table 6.1). The changes suggest lacle of 
appreciation for the need to attempt matching adaptive parameters to 
adoptive pre-conditions. These changes were made after the JVA had been 
Signed. The expanded project Included units for the production of oxygen and 
sulphuric acid. The most important change was an Increase in the capacity 
of the ethanol unit from 9.2 mOHon Htres a year to 16 lltres tonnes a year. 
ThIs Increase was done w1thout any correspondIng Increases In capital costs, 
thereby Indicating that the plant had been over-costed In the first place. 
The capacity Increase made production costs look much beUer than tn 
the previous case. But there was another reason why the capacity was 
increased. Mehta had been working on a fuel ethanol proposal since 1975 but 
did not submit it when Madhvanl did. They waited for about six months after 
the signing of the JVA In July 1977 before submitting It. It is remarkable that 
the Madhvanl proposal was approved by the government In less than two 
months after submlulon. It Is not clear whether the government wu 
convinced that the project was sound or whether the haste was partly aimed 
at pre-emptlng possible oppos1tlon to the venture. Comments and suggested 
amendments by the Attorney General's Chambers, the legal advisor to the 
oovernment, were not Incorporated In the proposed venture.' 
TABLE 6.1: Ch6nges In the ff6dhY6nl Product Composition 
Fuel ethane I 
C1trlc ~Id • 
Dry b8k.er's yeest 
Fresh baker's yeest 
V1neg!1' 
Sulphuric ~Id 
Ammonium sulphste 
0xyI)1n 
Methane 
Original (May 1977) 
9.2 m111ion Htres 
2,200 tormes " 
1 ,200 tonnes 
1.7 m11110n l1tres 
1.7 m11110n l1tres 
Sourte: (eaya CllemicaJ aod Food Corporation, NairobI. 
Revised (March 1978) 
16 m11110n 11tres 
3,000 tonnes 
1 ,000 tonnes 
3,000 tonnes 
2.2 m111100 l1tres 
7,500 tonnes 
2,000 tonnes 
6,600 tonnes 
60 b111ion BTOs 
other sections of the government had analysed the proposal and 
Indicated that the Joint venture was over-costed. for example, the Industrial 
Development Bank (lOB) showed In a 1977 study that the venture would 
produce alcohol at KShs.3.87 per litre while gasoline cost KShs.l.S". This 
was based on the original (1977) capital cost. The same study concluded that 
walvlno Import duty and sales tax would lead to a KShs.90.7 million loss to 
the Treasury. But If the government was to charge duty and sales tax on 
purchases. the project was bound to lose some KShs."S.2 million annually. 
lOB, which lends to the private sector on the basis of economic viability. 
I. Nat all the nctlODl of the]VA .... 11nD to the AUDrDeY GeDen.I'I a.a.ben 'or ",lew. II 
DClfaally 'ooe. For IUIIpl •• the Technical Eoaloeerloc AVltlMOt (TEA) ftI Dot anJlabl. to the 
Qaaben for COIUIeOti W ... the Ilplne of the ]VA. 
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concluded that the project was not viable without subsidies. The study was 
not used by the Treasury when the joint venture was epproved. 2 
Concern over the high capital costs of the project was also expressed 
at a higher InsUtuUonallevel by the Centre for Industrial Development (CID) 
of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Carrlbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries based In Brussels. CID informed the Kenya 
government In July 1977 that a plant of such capacity should cost US$ 18-24 
mf1l1on as opposed to the proposed US$60. 5 mt11lon. This advice could not be 
used by the government as the JVA had already been sioned. 
It appears that the decision to increase the capeclty of the plant was 
influenced by the Mehta proposal. The expansion of the project raised the 
demand for molasses, thereby making It difficult for the government to 
justify other molasses-based projects. The original project had been 
designed to utf1tze some 55,000 tonnes of molasses annual1y but the revised 
version required 110,000 tonnes of molasses a year.' It Is therefore not a 
coincidence that the Mehta proposa 1 was submitted In F ebrua ry 1078 and the 
revision of the Madhvanl proposal was done In March 1978. It can be argued 
from the sequence of events that the deCision by Madhvanl to expend the 
project was a pre-emptive move to maintain monopoly In the ethanol industry 
by cornering the raw material base. What Is not clear Is why the government 
approved the Mehta proposal In July 1978 when It appeared that the two 
projects were likely to compete for molasses. 
Ethanol and yeast were not the only products planned by Hadhvani. In 
addition, they Intended to recover 6.000 tonnes of oypsum and g,OOO tonnes 
of carbon dioxide. The economiCS of producing these products was 
questionable. But even more important was the fact that there was no 
evidence of available local or export markets for these products, especially 
at the proposed production capacity. For products such as sulphuriC aCid, 
2. Intenien, Indultrial Dsyelopment Dant, Nairobi, October 1984. IDB WII then reputed for the 
competence of ill technical ltarr and .,.. one of the feY parutataJ inatltutlonl that operated Ilflely 
U a printe busineal. The competence of their Itudi81 allowed them to alGid lome of the rllta 
iDTOIYed io public enterpriles. 
'.lntenit!W1. Kenya Supt Authority. October 1984. NairobI. More detaill 00 molulet availability 
will be liven later. 
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the capacity already existed In the country and Increased demand could have 
. been readily echieved through the expansion of existing facilities. of 
The local market for citric acid was estimated at 400-500 tonnes per 
year In the early 1980s while the Madhvanl capacity was 3,000 tonnes. About 
70 per cent of the demand was In soft drinks, with Coca Cola importing about 
150 tonnes. The consumption of baker's yeast was 33Z.8 tonnes In 1976 which 
deClined to 268.3 In 1977, and 207.9 tonnes in 1978. The decline was partly 
attributed to price changes over that period from US$ 1. Q8 per tonne In 1 Q76 
to US$2. 73 In 1977. A total productfon capacity of 4,000 tonnes could not be 
justtfied unless there was an export market thet would absorb the remaining 
3,700 tonnes. The mismatch between production and market avaiJabllfty 
suggests that Madhvanl had other reasons for expanding productton capacity. 
These reasons Include raising the project's capital costs and locking most of 
the national supply of molasses Into their production processes as a way of 
pre-emptlng the entry of other molasses-based Industries. 
The choice of products In this case was Influenced by restrictive 
control over the availability of strategiC Inputs on the one hand. and ralslno 
capital Investment to Increase earnings from management fees, on the 
other. The Increase In plant capacity seems therefore to have also been 
aimed at Increasing the earnings from the supply of machinery. The 
allocation of capital In the revised proposal i11ustrates the pOint (Table 
6.2) • 
Although Triangle maintained flexibility In their project to 
accommodate further capacity expansion, they did not make any major 
chanoes In the proposed proJect. This Is partly because of possible 
disruptions In the pre-8tart-up learning which was crucial to the eventual 
Implementation of the project. The proposal, which was a revision of 8 1975 
proposal, was submitted In early 1978 and approved In November, 1978. 
After the approval, construction did not start untf1 July 1979. During this 
period. Trianole and J&A undertook a series of measures to ensure the 
successful completion of the project. The technical drawings that had been 
-t. Intani"". Miniltry of CoauDercl and IndUitry. Nairobi. Aucust 19&4. 
obtained from West Germany had now to be converted Into an operatfno 
plant. 5 
TABLE 6.2: 118dhv8nl C8plt8/ Alloc8t1on (KShs. '000) 
Item 
Land and preparation 
Bul1diop 
Machinery and equipment 
Oxylen plant 
Sulphuric acid plant 
Fire filhtins equipment 
Factory equipment 
Incoaina Wiler I)'It .. 
PEAL 
Sal .. tax 
elwina. (reisht and iDlunnce 
Erection and cocalDiliioniq 
Trainina 
Furniture and fixture 
Wiler treatment 
V.hiet .. 
Pre-ttart expenaa 
Original 
2,125 
1 ..... 50 
335.900 
3.359 
33.590 
3."00 
17.000 
2.12' 
1.700 
12.750 
17.000 
Source: ICenYI Olemiclland Food Corporation, Nairobi. 
Revised 
10.702 
I7.S"9 
564.619 
13.47& 
6.534 
3.750 
6.610 
5.082 
".755 
59.649 
21.747 
"0.126 
2.142 
2.677 
10,711 
114.397 
Herrman-Buckau had aoreed that only the desion would be bought and 
all construction would be done In Zir:nbabwe. However, they insisted on 
provldlno a constructton supervIsor to oversee the fabrication of the 
distf1lation columns~ The pre-commissioning checks and tests as well as the 
commissioning itself were to be done by a Herrman-Buckau team. The 
construction was done under a Project Team composed of Trtanole, Hulett·s, 
J&A, and Herrman-Buckau personnel. The equipment that was not avaf1able 
In Zimbabwe was imported mainly from South Africa. This Included plate heat 
exchangers, air blowers, special pumps as well as Instruments. Other 
imports included stainless steel plates, special pipes and valves. 
After the approval of the proJect, Trlanole and ~ undertook another 
search of the local market for fabricatfno capabntty. This was not a general 
process of capab111ty identificatfon, but a detailed review of the existing 
,. Thit period i. the leut documented in the hiltory or ethanol d8Yelopment in Zimbabwe putly 
due to the intensity or ".,. In the country. The rat of the details are buecl 00 inteniewa with 
Triancll manllement. 
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capab111ty to fabricate specific components. The search was carried out with 
the help of samples obtained from Herrman-Buckau. The samples were 
compared with copies made by local manufacturers and were checked against 
Herrman-Buckau specifications and requirements as part of the agreement 
entered Into between the two parties. 
This phase of sample-tendering was fo11owed by the development of 
specific fabrication capabl1lty. This was mainly because much of the 
fabrication had to be done on site, especla11y because the process Involved 
large tanks which could not be easily transported across the country. To 
acquire this capabl1lty, Triangle set up a special on-site school at which 
special fabrication techniques were taught to a carefu11y selected cadre of 
technicians. The process Involved a wide range of Incentives and created a 
hierarchical structure among the trainees. It should be noted that the 
trainees were already skt11ed In related aspects of plant fabrication and the 
training equipped them with specific skt11s required for the fabrication of 
ethanol plants. 
The training Involved the production of samples which were checked by 
experts assembled by J8A using equipment such u X-ray detection. Those 
who produced sub-standard samples were asked to re-do the job or undergo 
re-tralnlng. But those who produced high qual1ty samples were given bonuses 
In addition to their normal pay. At the end of the training, the successful 
candidates were given special certificates of competence. The training 
programme was conducted tn two weeks after which the fabrication of the 
plant started. 
The fabrication of the plant proceeded In a hierarchical manner as 
we11, starting with non-critical parts such as pipes and rising to more 
critical components such as distil1ation columns. This approach helped to 
match the Posslb11tties of error with their costs. It was based on the fact 
that the error chances are reduced as one rises up the learning curve and 
accumulates experience. The chances of error were I1kely to be higher at the 
early stages of the fabrication process. If this stage was devoted to the 
fabrication of non-critical parts, then the cost of errors made during the 
process would be relatively non-critical 8S well. But as work continued and 
experience accumulated so did the chances of error diminish. However, this 
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experience curve approach to fabrication only eliminates error possibility 
but not the seriousness of anyone error made. For example. the cumulative 
errors made during the welding of pipes may be less critical than one error 
made In the fabrication of dlstt11atlon columns. 
The workers had special numbers which enabled the management to 
Identify the producer of a particular part. This had two effects. First. It 
enabled the management to maintain control over the production process. 
Second. the workers Identified themselves with the sections they built and 
therefore attempted to maintain a high level of fabrication quality. This was 
the most critical phase in the whole process end wes overseen by a South 
African management team of engineers with experience In this field. Those 
components which could only be manufactured under special factory 
conditions were fabricated in the industrial town of Bulawayo end transported 
to Triangle. 
The most critical aspect of the process was fabrlcatfng the distl1latlon 
columns. The columns were 2.0 metres wide and 30.0 metres high and 
contained 55 Internally-supported perforated trays. The trays had to 
maintain specific levelness and symmetry which could only be achieved 
through high quality fabrication. To ensure this, the fabrication process was 
continuously controlled by a Local Inspection Authority. The standards were 
set by a Herrman-Buchu construction supervisor. 
The fabrication of the Triangle plant f11ustrates the links between the 
initial search and the final Implementation of the project. The choice of the 
Herrman-Buckau process was made partly because of its ease of local 
fabrication. The choice. was made on the basis of 8 general survey of the 
local Industrial base and not on identified specialized sk111s. These skills 
were developed during the Implementation process. It appears therefore that 
the level of sophlsUcaUon of the Industrial base and diversity of actlvltfes 
makes it more possible to recombine or re-traln existing expertise for 
special1zed operations. The capacity to fabricate stainless steel existed In 
Kenya but the approach taken by Triangle was precluded by the technology 
pOliCies operating In the country and the financing structure of the projects. 
It Is notable that Triangle maintained a record of the workers and used 
it as a reference base for specialized operations. New industrial projects 
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which required such sk111s requested Trlan(Jle for detal1s of the workers who 
were then contracted for short-term jobs. Even more Important Is the fact 
that Trlan(Jle needed to maintain the list for their own subsequent work either 
In maintenance or In new projects. As Indicated, the plant was bul1t to allow 
capacity expansion which would necessartJy need on-site fabrication. In this 
case, Trlan(Jle would recall the workers from their respective positions. The 
construction of the Trlan(Jle plant was completed In June .1980, several 
months ahead of schedule.' 
As noted elsewhere, there was no local search In Kenya to establish 
the potential contribution of the industry to the project. The Kenyan metal 
fabrication sector Is well developed and has served to supply en(Jineerin(J 
equIpment to the Eastern African countrIes. Kenyan firms such as DynamiCS 
EnQlneerlng (Nalrobt), Scope En(Jlneerln(J (Mombasa), Meta I Equipment 
(NairobI), Hartz and Bell (NairobI) and Industrial Plant (NairobI) speclal1ze 
In metal workln(J. Two of these firms, Dynamics Engineering and Industrial 
Plant specialize In stainless steel. Industrial Plant has been Involved In 
staInless steel work since Its Inception In 1950. The company has 
accumulated brewing-related technoloQY from Its work In Kenya. UQanda. 
Malawi and Zambia. Industrial Plant's sister company, Alrduct, was 
establ1shed In 1975 to speclal1ze fn ml1d steel and concentrates on product 
research, deSign and development. Ironically. Industrial Plant has bu1Jt a 
brewery at Klsumu InvolvlnQ stainless steel fabrlcatlon. 7 
It can be argued that fabricating dtst111atton columns requires more 
sk11led expertise than fs needed for fermentation tanks. This argument can 
be countered In two different ways. First. If such expertise did not exist, 
then the Kenyans would have still been beUer off utilizing at least the tank 
fabrication skf1ls they already had. Second, the expertise to fabricate 
dlstt11atlon columns existed and local firms had Indeed fabricated plants 
which were more sophisticated than distillation columns. Dynamics 
6. The only major concern durina the CODItruction period YII lecurity apjnst tuerUJI attacb. 
After dllcul.lon. between the lovernment and Trlanale. the lovernment luuealed that the plant 
could be painted in colours wbicb made it les. ,llible. An earth nil lell than '0 feet hlp ftI 
built around the plant. wbieb i. located in I plain lurrounded by hUl. and towers .",era! hundred 
feet abcwe the lI'ound. 
7. Inteviewa. Induatrial Plant Limited. Nairobi. September 19&5. 
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Engineering. for example. fabricated all the key components for the phase II 
of the Olkarla geothermal plant at Neivasha for the Kenya Power Company. a 
state-owned company.S The project involved high pressure steam and was 
therefore more critical than dlstl11atlon columns. The welds were X-ray 
tested and found to have no flaws at all. Dynamics Engineering has an annual 
turnover of USS3.0 ml11lon and has links with firms in the UK, West Germany. 
France and the US. It is clear therefore that the capacity to f~brlcate major 
sections of ethanol plants existed in the country but was not utilized. 
The Madhvanl project was hit by problems from the start. The first 
major problem was related to its location. Because of ltmtted co-ordination 
and collaboration among the various government departments, the provision 
of facl11tles and services as stipulated in the JVA could not be accomplfshed 
in time. For example, the government could not release the promised land 
for the Siting of the plant In time. Some of the departments In charge of this 
issue felt that the amount of land required by the company as well as the 
terms of the lease (99 years) was beyond the requirements of the proJect. 
Even at a more technical level, there was concern over the fact that the 
requirement for land was not based on competent valuation but on an artist's 
impression of the layout of the industrial complex. The firm expected the 
government to release the land by June 1978. By March 1979, only 60 acres 
had been released out of the requested 245 acres. The remainder of the land 
was not given untn December 1979.9 
KCFC engaged Epcil (Kenya) to undertake civil engineering work from 
June 1979. The firm withdrew from the project in January 1980 for allegedly 
1.lnteYitnrl,lenya Power Company, Nairobi: Dynamici EnaloeerlJll. Nairobi, September 198'. The 
lenya Power Company hu a COIlIiltent policy of buJldlDi III own Internal tecbnolOCical capabiUty 
and relyinc extensively GO local experti.e. The .teel compooenll for the plant yer. I_ported frOil 
japan butlhe fabrication.,.. done by lenyaDl. The dnelopment 0f,eothermal tnerlY required the 
accumulation or .dentinc knowled,. on local ,eolOCital and etolCllical cODditlOOI. Thi • .,.. dooe 
ewer a 1001 period and the company II now prewldiDl COIlIultJDI expertile on leolherlllJ 
dnelopment to neiahbouriDl countries luch u Ethiopia whleh haY. leotbermal potential. Thil cue 
II different becaUie tapplDl,eothermai enerlY cannot be done without 11t&-lpeeific tnowled,e. 
9. Shi. Sharma. Project Manlier, lac. quoted In r6SY6 ESIJS66r. -BulldiDl Troubles Betet 
lenya'i Power Alcohol Projecta-, pp. 10. The prcwision ollhe land .,.. partly delayed bee.U1e 01 
lepJ probl ... with itllnnarer. Th. MiDistry of Land had to cOtllpen ... te lCFC for the delay but 
.. en alter that the preYioUi ownen or.ome or the land refused to let lCFC Ule the land. 
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fatling to meet the required turnover. to The breach of contract by Epetl was 
compensated out of court In fear that a court case would delay constructIon 
for at least six months. The task was re-tendered and the Israe1f firm, Solel 
Boneh won the bId. Solel Boneh's work, Jointly with Coastal Kenya 
Enterprises, was to prepare the ground for the erection process which was 
to be handled by the Indian firm, Deweto International under a PEC sub-
contract. It Is notable here that even construction work did not Involve much 
local participation 8S most of the functions, including architectural work and 
quantity survey work, were sub-contracted to foreign firms. 
During this period, some of the deals entered by KCFC with contractors 
had no fixed figures and the contractors kept asking for more funds. This 
raised the capital expenses. Such practices were, either by default or by 
design, in the interest of the management because they raised the pre-start-
up capital costs and therefore earned them more money. The management 
agreement was written In such a way that delays in construction benefitted 
the management since the incurred expenses added to the capital investment. 
Numerous reasons were evoked by KCFC to explain delays, many of which 
were related to the obl1gations of the oovernment. In response to the 
inabl1ity of the government to meet all these obligations, the other 
shareholders (CIC and Advaft) resolved at one time to withhold the 
disbursement of their equity. This was aimed at putting pressure on the 
government to provide the subsidfes required to complete the construction of 
the plant. 
6. Z Corporate Confllctl 
One of the most important features of a fuel ethanol programme Is that 
it involves II large number of other sectors of the economy. The range of 
activities spans the entire spectrum of development plannfng from 
agriculture to transportation. Some of the key actors In these fIelds are 
usually long-standing and well established firms which are Intricately I1nked 
10. EpcU wu subsequently reported to ban lODe bankrupt. See W •• lly I.".", ·MoluSM PIlOt: 
Another Crilis-. pp. 29-30. 
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Into the country's Institutional and pol1tlcal networks. The Introduction of 
fuel ethanol often faces a large number of entrenched interests. The most 
crucial areas in this process relate to the availability of raw materials and 
the distribution of fuel ethanol. Subsumed In these two areas are Issues 
related to prices. 
The Triangle plant was built after guarantees on the distribution of fuel 
ethanol had been made by the 011 companies. The main Issue of. concern at the 
time of project deSign was the availability of raw materials (Table 6.3). To 
guarantee that feedstock would be available. Trianole designed the plant to 
operate on both molasses and cane juice or a combination thereof. Their 
strateoy was to use cane juice In case there was no market for sUlJar. The 
fleXlbl11ty therefore enabled them to I1nle the plant to the rest of the sugar 
production process. This was not the case with either the Madhvanl or Mehta 
projects. The two plants were planned to operate on molasses alone. II 
TABLE 6.3: Sugar 6nd ffo/asses Production In Zimbabwe 
Yeer Sugar ('000 tonnes) Molasses ('000 tonnes) 
1975 280.0 75.6 
1976 292.6 79.0 
1977 284.4 76.8 
1978 301.4 81.-4 
1979 309.5 83.6 
1980 299.2 80.8 
1981 427.5 115.4 
The molulea fiCUfll are bued on • yield of 0.27 tonnel per toone of IUpr. 
Since the mill and the plant were owned by the same firm, the two 
activities were integrated to maximize returns on the tohl Investment and 
not on the separate operations. As a result, Triangle adjusted the output of 
either molasses or sugar to suit the profltab111ty of the total operation. For 
example, the content of fermentable sugars in molasses could be raised at 
the expense of sugar production depending on market prices. Triangle also 
entered an agreement with Hippo Valley for the supply of molasses at Z$50 
II. The ."itch from molulea to lupr does DOl require any chinlea iD the bule techDolOl)' but ODly 
ID feedstock preparation. 
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per tonne. Thls arrangement was made easler by the fact that Hlppo Valley 
and Triangle had become part of the Anglo-American complex. J2 This 
fntegration and flexlbflity were precluded In the Madhvanf and Mehta projects 
because of corporate project ownershlp and management. 
The ffrst mafn confJfct fnvolvfng the Madhvanl Group was the prfce and 
avaflabf1ity of molasses. The JVA had stipulated that the government would 
enable KCFC to obtain molasses at reasonable prices. The figures used In the 
feaslbfllty study assumed that the price of molasses would remafn at KSh. 
160 per tonne. The justification for ethanol producUon from molasses was 
partly based on the declining export prices. However, the prices started to 
ptck up in the mfd-1Q70s partly because of Brutl's decfsfon to use fts output 
In ethanol production. The prices were therefore likely to rise and therefore 
Increase the production costs of ethanol. Indeed, the cost of ethanol was 
highly sensitive to molasses prices (Table 6.4). 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
TABLE 6.4: Ethanol Sensitivity to "olasses Prices ill KenY6 
(KShs.//itrl1 1981 Prices) 
Molasses Ethanol Who less Ie Ethanol Blend Price 
( KShs.ltonne) Price Pump Price (101 EthMol) 
400 7.77 10.90 6.63 
350 7.50 10.63 6.60 
300 7.23 10.31 6.57 
250 6.96 10.09 6.54 
200 6.68 9.81 6.52 
150 6.41 9.54 6.49 
Sourte: Minillry or En8f1Y and Recional De¥'elopmenl, Nairobi. 
It appears from the sensitivity analysis that even at the low price of 
KShs.1S0 per tonne of molasses, ethanol would sUll not be competitfve with 
the 1081 pump price of premium Q8soline of KShs.6.35 per litre. Then, the 
Kenya SUQar Authority had set a minimum price of KShs. 160 per tonne for 
sale to farmers (supposedly as animal feed) while the rest of the molasses 
was sold according to mark.et demand and its price therefore fluctuated 
12. Trianale bu on oceuiona imported molules. For example. in 5eptember-oetober 1980. Trianale 
imported &,804.24 tonne. 01 lDolules ·C· eontaJnlOl 4,004.934 lODDeI of toW fermeatables u 
luc:rOlI (TF AS) from ZaabiL 
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accordingly. Over the same period. the average net earning from molasses 
exports was over KShs.300 per tonne. These conditions made It difficult for 
Madhvanl to acquire molasses at favourable prices. Their claim that 
molasses had a zero opportunity cost was countered by the sugar Industry 
whose representatives asserted that a resource that had effective demand 
could not have a zero opportunity cost. I! 
The conflict over molasses pricing became a major Issue of concern 
and the government arranged a series of meetings between the sugar 
Industry and Madhvani aimed at finding a compromise over the Issue. 
Madhvani asked for a ban on the export of molasses and a fixed price for 
molasses sold to their industrial complex. This request was resisted by the 
sugar Industry whose representatives preferred to sell the resource on the 
most competitive market available. This view was strengthened by the fact 
that the world molasses prices had started showing an upturn. Compromises 
such as imposing an export duty on molasses to encourage local utt1fution 
were resisted by the sugar Industry. The government's view was that the two 
parties should start negotiations to establish procurement procedures and 
fix prices. 
Despite efforts by KCFC to secure long-term assurances on molasses 
prices which would enable the project to show favourable returns, the sugar 
Industry InSisted that the price of molasses be determined by market forces. 
This dispute was compounded by the fact that some molasses producers were 
also consumers. For example, Mlwanl sugar mms operated a potable ethanol 
distillery and could not give long-term guarantees on molasses availability 
on the grounds that they planned to Increase the capactty of their dlstt11ery. 
A Similar reason had been given In Zimbabwe by Hippo Valley partly to 
prevent another firm from using the surplus molasses. Mlwanl had reasons 
to worry because Madhvanl had the potential to sell different types of ethanol 
In markets that were either under Mlwant's control or had been Identified for 
future entry. 
While molasses prices were being discussed. new concerns over the 
availability of the resource emerged. In the early period of the project, It 
had been assumed that there would be enough molasses to meet all the needs 
13.lnteni..,.. Kenya Supr Authority. Nairobi. October 19&4. 
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of the complex. This View, however, was Invalidated by the approval of the 
Mehta proposal and the subsequent doubling of the capacfty of the Mad,hvanf 
project. The oovernment did not seem to have had reltable data on the 
avallabll1ty of molasses 1n the country at the tfme of the signing of the JVA. 
This fs supported by the fact that the sugar Industry received requests for 
data on their molasses output from the oovernment a few days after the 
signing of the JVA. The fndustry had not been officially consulted on the 
matter before. 
Esttmates of actual productton and projecttons from dIfferent sources 
varied widely. Even figures from the same agency (83 In the case of the 
Kenya Sugar Authority) varied from time to time thereby ma~lng the 
dec1sl0n-matlng process more difficult. What was even more crucial was the 
tact that dlscusstons were often based on quantities of molasses measured In 
either volume or weight. The different sugar mf11s In the country had 
different recovery efficiencies and therefore the value of molasses depended 
largely on the content of fermentable sugars .14 These technical 
requ1rements dId not feature prominently at the early stages of the 
discussions. 
The figures provided by the KSA In 1geO for the projected avat1abilfty 
of molasses showed that there would be derlc1ts In the molasses output If the 
two projects went on stream as planned (Table 6.5). These projections were 
based on the assumption that sugar production would oeneral1y expand and 
that the growth rate in the demand for animal feeds and other non-speciffed 
uses would expand at the rate of 2.5 per cent per year. At the time, the 
sugar mtlls were operating below capacity and 1t was felt that If capacity 
utl11zatton improved, there would be enough molasses to meet the needs of 
the two projects. If for example, capacity uttltzation for 1979 was raised 
from an estimated 60 per cent to 90 per cent. then molasses output would 
rise from 97.200 tonnes to 145,639 tonnes. Such calculations, however, 
Ignored the economiC, technical and manaoerlal sources of low capacity 
utlltzatton. 
The molasses question was not resolved because the sugar fndustry 
was unwl1l1no to bow to e1ther polttlcal or bureaucratic pressure to sell 
14. See chapter 3 for. dilcualion of molul. rec:cwery efficieoci •. 
molasses to Madhvanl at preferential prices. Moreover, various sections of 
the government did not support the Idee and suggested that all arguments 
take tnto consideration preval1ing export prices for molasses. The molasses 
qUestl?n became more critical as construction approached completion. By 
the beginning of 1981, about 7S per cent of the complex had been completed 
but the avaf1abt1ity and price of molasses had not been ouaranteed. 
TABLE 6.5: Projected /fo/l1sses Production I1nd lise ('000 'onnes) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
PlODUCTlON (Actual) 
Minnl 12.9 14.0 13.0 20.0 22.0 23.0 25.0 
Cbemelil 15.7 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 13.0 21.0 
Muborool 20.6 17.3 20.2 24.0 24.0 26.0 26.0 
MUlDiu 27.7 "3.0 "3.0 "3.0 "3.0 "A.O "A.O 
NlOil 12.9 11.0 16.7 19.5 20.0 24.0 24.0 
Ruai.1 6.9 3.5 10.5 12.1 13.0 15.0 17.0 
Sony 14.4 16.0 20.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 
Othan 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
TOTAL 97.2 131.7 147.9 162.6 170.0 180.0 137.0 
UTILIZA TION 
Minnl Dlltlllery 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Exports 
' •. 6 60.3 0.' 
Animal feed 29.6 30.4 51.2 32.1 32.3 53.7 34.6 
lCFC 35.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 110.0 
ACFC 50.4 63.0 63.0 63.0 
TOTAL 109.0 151.' 1"'.9 19a.5 221.3 212.7 213.6 
BALANCE (35.9) (" 1.&) (32.7) (26.6) 
Source: Kenya Suear Authority, NairobI. 
One of the options suogested by the Ministry of Energy was to switch 
from molasses to cane juice as a feedstock. Irrigated sugarcane was 
growing 60 kilometres from the plant under a National Irrigation Board (NIB) 
project. The West Kano canefleld lay equidistant to the Madhvanl plant and 
Mlwanl sugar m111. The growers were having problems transporting cane to 
Miwanl and consequently much of their yield was rotting In the field. The re-
direction of the cane to Madhvanl would have helped solve both the molasses 
question and the farmers' problems. This shift required additional 
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Investment to Instal crushlnQ equipment. The KCFC manaQement objected to 
this sUQoestion clalmlno that the plant had been desloned to use molasses end 
not cane juice. I, This claim was erroneous because the ConQer process 
could easily use cane Juice with minor changes In the feedstock preparation 
staoe.16 
While the molasses question remafned unresolved, the 011 Industry 
Introduced new Issues such es blending end distribution. As mentioned 
. . 
earlier, Madhvanl originally planned to have QlSollne transported to Klsumu 
for blendlnQ and then shipped back to the 011 companies tn Nairobi for 
distribution. This view did not take Into consideration the political strength of 
the 011 companies, not to mention the 100lstic problems and costs associated 
w1th such an operation. Uke the sUQar Industry, the oil companies expressed 
their Interest to participate In the project but put forward their own 
conditions. However, wh11e the sugar Industry eppealed to market 
mechanisms as a reoulator of molasses prices, the 011 Industry took the 
more tedious and tlme-consuminQ strateQY of call1ng for formal 
agreements, qual1ty standards and other technIcal requIrements whIch were 
fn fact legal and even desirable. In most Instances, the 011 companies called 
upon KCFC to do what should have been done before the JVA was sloned. 17 
In the first place, the 011 companies Insisted that any pricing formula 
must take Into consideration the effects of IntroduclnQ ethanol on the 
operations of the refinery, especially olven Its rioldity In product 
confiQuration (FiQure 6. 1). This was an Important technical issue which had 
previously been ignored. Whl1e Zimbabwe could easily produce ethanol and 
replace a volume of 085011ne with an equal volume of ethanol, Kenya could 
not do so because any litre of gasol1ne replaced would mean that other 
refinery products contained In the same barrel would have to be Imported. 
The foreign exchange savino formula used In earl1er calculations assumed 
that the displacement was one-to-one as in Zimbabwe and therefore did not 
Include the other costs of producing ethanol. Moreover. the 011 companies 
15. Inttniewl. Miniltry or En8fIY and Regional Development. NaIrobi. October 1954. 
16.lnteniewl. Conaer. Piracicaba. Bruil. Martb 1985. 
17. The appeal appeared Ute. lenuine interest in ImOOlhina the terrain (or the introduction or 
ethanol. The difference "u thalthe eompani81 "ere 1tandina finaly in laCI "rI. 
17-4 
stressed they d1d not want any blend that would require them to make 
modifications in the refinery. 
The 011 industry also Insisted on conducting road tests to ascertain the 
suitability of using fuel ethanol. The Industry's approach was to ensure that 
KCFC toole all the responsibt1fty for the effects of fuel ethanol and also 
accepted the risks Involved. KCFC was asked to Indemnify the Industry from 
legal ltabflfty arising from the use. blending. handltng. storage. sales. 
supply and distribution of ethanol. The 011 Industry demanded that blending be 
done In their depots but KCFC talee the responsibility to ensure that quality 
standards end delivery schedules were met. Moreover. the Industry was 
wi11ing to undertalce 811 the modifications required for the Introduction of 
ethanol at the expense of KCFC. All consumer education and legal matters 
required for the Industry to be Involved had to be paid for by KCFC. In the 
process. the Industry and KCFC continued to discuss tn great detan a series 
of draft agreements which were never raUfled. 
FIGURE 6.1: Ref/ned I'r6ct!ons from Ar6bl6n L Igh! Crude 011 
Dt.Ml 10.1'1 
Differences emerged between KCFC and the oil industry on the prfcfnQ 
formula With each side trying to maximize Us gains. The oil companies 
8uQQested that in order to achieve optimal fuel performance. the blend would 
need to contain ~O per cent premium oasol1ne. Z7. 5 per cent reoular 
ODSoline and 12. S per cent ethanol. In addition to thiS, the 011 companies 
proposed that KCFC should sell to them ethanol at 8 prfce equfvalent to the 
wholesale prfce of premium oasol1ne In bond at Nafrobf less a mutually 
agreed discount. The offered prfce was KShs. 3, 003 per 1,000 Htres. Thfs 
price was nearly half the KCFC production costs and was therefore not 
acceptable. 
Thfs offer also concealed the fact that if the ethanol was sold at the 
price of re'lular and then blended to Include the premium 'las01lne and sold at 
the price of 'lesoHne, then the 011 companies would rehln revenue from the 
difference between regular and premium 'lasoJine. At that time the 
difference was KSh. 610 per kl1011tre. In this case, the prlcln'l formula 
suggested by the 011 companies would have enabled them to earn some KSh. 
176 per kl10litre of blended premium oasoline sold. Moreover, the 011 
companies would have used ethanol as a substitute for tetra-ethyl lead as an 
octane booster without Including refinery savinos In the price of ethanol. As 
In the case of molasses, KCfC did not enter Into any significant arran'lements 
with the oil fndustry, making the process of niche realization less 
prospective. 
6.3 Public Knowledge Ind Institutional Lelrnlng 
Concern over the KCFC project reached the public arena throUt~h 8 
series of Press Investloatlons over loss of oovernment funds throu'lh 
questionable jOint ventures with the private sector. The approval of the 
Mehta project raised questions concerning the avallablJlty of raw materials. 
The KSA, which had Informed the Press about possible molasses shortfalls. 
released new floures in May 1979 showing that the country had enough 
molasses for two or even three alcohol plants. This was possibly to justify 
the approval of the Mehta plant. At this moment, the Press started 
questioning the costs of the projects. OwinO to the lack of comparative 
fioures for ethanol capital costs, the Press Initiated research on the tssue 
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but did not Qet much Informatton until the World Bank released comparative 
data the seme yeer. IS 
The Press was the only sector In Kenya that publicly questioned the 
Viability of this project. The government, which was the majority 
shareholder in the· project, did not participate In the debate or Issue any 
public statements on the matter. It was left to KCFC who fssued statements 
arguing that It was not legitimate to compare the Industrial complex with any 
other plant and that the World BanI{ did not have experience In the 
Implementation of fuel ethanol proJects. 19 During the debate, some of the 
local politicians attacked the Press claiming that the critics of tho project 
were in the pay of foreign firms which were opposed to the development of 
the local Industrial base. 20 KCfC maintained close l1nks w1th local 
poHtlclans and used thefr influence to seek government support. The 
POliticians, on the other hand, evoked natfonalistlc sentiments clafmfno that 
this was the first project of its kfnd In Africa and needed full government 
backing. The prospects of employment at KCfC was a possible source of 
pol1ttcal capital for them. especially during electtons. 
The main gist of KCFC defence was that the project could not be 
compared with any other plant In the world because It was unique In 
complexity and product mix. However. In the same Press release they 
provided figures of production costs In Braztt and the US to show that their 
costs were comparable. While they did not want comparisons at the level of 
capital investment, they evoked production costs because this made their 
investment 1001{ more attractive. The Press was alleged to be "divisive and 
malicious· .21 The management also sought pol1ttcal support by appealing to 
18. A review of the role of the Presl II lummarlzed In 1Y66Jly 16ri6F. "Indultry: Presl Power". 
pp.22-25. 
19. ICFC, Pr611 1616616. atated: "Comparllont to World Bant and UNIDO lourees ... bDe DO 
credibility u neither or these Internl1ionailnatitutiODl ban promoted or financed anywbere In lbe 
world. project that In any .en .. resembles the ICPC'. complex·. pp. 5. A UNIDO repreaentatl .. 
wu ioyoledln lbe 1975 ISPC en.IuaLion. wbicb .bowed that the project wu O¥er-prlced. 
20. I/Jitl.. pp. 25. We .baIl return to the cooflict between the World Bant and ICPC In",ton later. 
21. I/Jitl., pp. 5. 
the import substitution policy and Presidential statements. 22 As mentioned 
above, the export mark.ets for these products had not been Identified and the 
JVA required the government to help find these export options. 
As the Press increased 1ts coveraoe of the project, so did the intensity 
of counter-reports increase. By 1982, the Madhvani group was already 
buying advertising space in the local newspapers to answer fully their 
crttics. The rep11es appealed to the complextty of the proJect. 1ts ~elevance 
and benefits to the country. Issues such as cost escalation were justified In 
terms of the risks of being pioneers in a new venture. They compared their 
proJect, 1nadvertently, w1th the development of nuclear energy and space 
satellites in the US whose final costs were usually higher than the original 
estimates. "For Kenya, whose economy is at a very different shoe of 
development, new and complex hioh-technology investments such as the one 
in Kisumu are liable to even higher cost· escalation. "23 This reasoning, 
however, tonores the fact that Kenya did not have the same amount of 
financial resources as the US and that is exactly why they could not afford 
high cost overruns. Zimbabwe built its plant largely on a strategy aimed at 
reduc1ng such losses. 
The level of public debate on the project was limited by the aval1abf11ty 
of Information on the Investment projects. The fact that the government was 
the majority shareholder (over 51 per cent) In the Investment made the 
project a parastatal undertak,lr:'g. By virtue of this, 811 the Information 
pertaining to the project was governed by the Official Secrets Act. And since 
some of the crucial aspects of the project were being questioned, 1t was not 
In the interest of the government or the prfvate fnvestors to release any 
Information that might be used by crltfcs. This arrangement undermined the 
requirements for public accountability In government decisions that Involved 
tax-payers' funds. 
But as the construction of the project continued, more Information 
started reaching the public. Matters such as cost overruns and construction 
22. "KCFC represents. dynamic approacb to IndUltrlllllition In whlcb lIorl tban 801 or the 
linanclna bu been prcwlded from Ixternal .ources. In addition, at • tlill wben ... lh. Prllident bu 
called upon Kenyan industry to realize fully Kenya', export potential, no mention bu been made 01 
KCFC •• xport orientation lor citric acid and bater', YIUl." ill ill. 
23. Mldbnnl Group, "Tbe Cha.lIIDIM 01 c.o.plexity". pp. 18. 
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stoppages could not be kept away from the public, especially when they 
Involved the largest joint venture the country had hitherto entered. Debates 
continued among government departments and even spi1led over to Involve 
the World Bank. Intra-governmental conflicts arose when the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, which was Instrumental In the approval of the JVA, 
started calling upon the other ministries to help Implement the project. 
Several Inter-ministerial committees were set up to look Into the various 
aspects of project Implementation. 
The fact that some of the ministries had not been consulted before the 
Signing of the JVA became a source of disagreement and even withdrawal 
from Implementation efforts. For example, on May 16, 1979, the Minister 
for Power and Communications Instructed members of his ministry through 
his Permanent Secretary not to participate on any of the committees formed 
to look Into ways of Implementing the projects. Although the Minister 
expressed his respect for the business acumen of Madhvanl and Mehta, he 
remained sceptical about the success of the projects. His view was that the 
government should have solicited studies from Industrial experts on the 
viability of the projects instead of moving in such haste to sign the Joint 
ventures. The Minister's main concern was that his Ministry, which was 
charged with dealing with energy matters, should have been properly 
consulted before such heavy financial commitments were made. As I matter 
of principle, he wanted to go on record as having dissociated himself from 
the two projects. Which he did. 
The criticism emerging from various government departments led to 
the formation of a Working Party on KCFC to examine the history of the 
project, Indicate and evaluate progress on Implementation, and undertake 
economic, financial and technical revaluation of the Joint venture. The 
findings would be used In the possible restructuring of the proJect. The 
Working Party was formed on July 24, 1980 under the chairmanship of the 
Office of the Vice President and the Ministry of Finance. The Working Party, 
which was composed of representatives from the Ministries of Energy, 
Agriculture, Industry, and Economic Planning and Development, was 
required to produce a Cabinet paper In 10 days. Concern over the project was 
for the first time going to be discussed at the Cabinet level. By that time a 
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lar(Je number of Issues had emer(Jed whIch raIsed not only economIc and 
financial matters, but also legal issues, especially on the constitution of the 
project. 
FIGURE 6.2: OriginlJl ShlJreholding Structure (KShs. l1il/ion) 
ct.Imfood 
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One of the key techno-le(Jal Issues was the interlocking partnership in 
the project. For example, CIC, which was one of the key contrlbuters of 
equity would only participate in the venture on condition that KCFC signed the 
Technical Engineering Agreement (TEA) which allowed PEC to become the 
supplier of machinery and equipment. Similarly, Advatt's investment in the 
project was conditional to the acceptance of Exlmcorp 8S project managers. 
In the JVA, PEC and CIC were represented by the same Signatory Indicating 
that they were actively related while Advait and KCFC had the same 
Signatory, who happened to be Nittin Madhvani, the organizer of the venture. 
The Signatures confirm the link between KCFC and Madhvan1. But Madhvanl was 
also the principal Investor in Advalt and participated actively In Exlmcorp.l4 
24. Tbil ,iew il confirmed in. publilbed ltatellenl by Madbnni Group, TA, KI,u.u PrDj,cl : 
"Tbe foreip in'eltorl -- Cbemfood In'elUDeDt Corporation. S.A .• and Admt International. S.A. --
Ime contributed 1.lhI. 83.3 lIillion ... -- or 491 -- or the equity capital. Tbe Madbnni Group wu 
the initial orpnil8f" or the Y8Dture. il the major in'eltor in Adnit International. and participalel 
actiYlly in Eximcorp. the aanapIIenl qenc:y." pp. I. 
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CIC and PEC shared the same office, telephone, and address at Mannedorf, on 
the outskirts of Zurich, Switzerland. In other words, the main actors In the 
project were the Kenya government and a handful of Investors Interlocked in 
a manner that allowed them to benefit at the expense of the government's 
participation, mainly through machinery supply and management fees. 
This tnterlocklnQ ownership raised Questions concerning conflict of 
Interest. One of the directors of KCFC was also a director of Exlmcorp. The 
view was that this constituted a conflict of Interest and was t11egal according 
to section 200 of the Companies Act (Cap. 486) which requires the director to 
disclose his Interests to fellow directors. Fatttng to disclose one's Interests 
carried a fine of KShs.2,000. Under more serious conditions, KCFC could 
avoid the PIMA but this had been precluded by other sections of the JVA which 
made Advait's Investment conditional to Eximcorp's participation as 
managers. 
Following the cost overruns and the need for further foreign loans to 
bridge the finance gap, the government realized that the risks of 
Implementing the project rested largely In Its own hands. As a consequence, 
the government sought the re-negotiation of the JVA to ensure that the other 
shareholders, CIC and Advalt, counter-ouaranteed the loans. Before this, 
the previous loans had been guaranteed by the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) 
on behalf of the government. KCB was later (December 1979) to produce an 
update of the Madhvanl feasibility study In which It argued that the 
oovernment had put so much money Into the project that It would not be wise 
to abandon It.25 The oovernment's deciSion to call upon shareholders to 
counter-ouarantee forelon loans was an Indicator that the oovernment was 
starting to learn from the project and was revlewlno Its own policies on 
foreign loans. 
The government also proposed other measures which would have 
strengthened Its Influence on the project. For example, the government 
would seek the rloht to approve the appOintments of the general manager of 
KCFC as well as the heads of departments. But doing so required an 
amendment of the PIMA. This agreement had other curious clauses that came 
to light during the review. Take the case of force majeure. Even If the 
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project were terminated because of Industrlal dIsputes, war, cIvil 
disturbances. order of any public authority such as nationalization or 
expropriation, fire. natural catastrophe or other disasters, the management 
would stf11 be paid no less than US$500, 000 In foreign exchange. 
At its second meeting held on August 5, 1980, the Working Party 
considered a number of options Including rescinding the agreements If over-
pricing In machinery and equipment could be established through agencies 
such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Then 
a UNIDO representative, who had earlier been Involved In the 1978 ISPC 
study, was sti11 based in the Ministry of Industry and participated on the 
Working Party. But establishing fraud would have been difficult because the 
government did not have any reliable way of knowing what was Included In the 
TEA. This was compounded by the fact that a Swiss firm, General 
Superintendence, had been appOinted to certify that the machinery and 
equipment paid for was the same as that deltvered. The firm had no mandate 
to compare prices. Further sti11, even If the government rescinded the 
aoreements, they would have had to repay the guaranteed loans rloht away. 
The debate over the Madhvanl project took an International outlook 
when the World Bank, at the request of the Kenya government, started 
preparing for a mission to Kenya to review the ethanol sub-sector. 26 The 
government was then already looking for possible sources of bridge funding 
for the project. The World Bank concluded that only the Mehta project 
seemed financially and economically favourable. This was at a critical time 
when Madhvani was seeking funds to cover the cost overruns and would not 
appreCiate critical reports from an InfJuenclal Institution such as the World 
Bank. 
The Bank's own analysis relied on conventional approaches and 
assumed that the Mehta project would be Implemented as planned. The main 
conclusions and recommendations of the study focussed on the need to take 
sugar and ofl price projections Into conSideration before embarking on 
ethanol projects. Although valid, the recommendations did no take Into 
consideration the fact that issues relating to technology acquisition and 
project lmplementat10n could easfly bring down a project that appeared 
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viable when examined In the narrow context of financial analysis. The 
adaptive terrain in which the project had to survive contained a wide range of 
other financial, economic technological and institutional issues whose effect 
on project implementation required a view that transcended the conventional 
approach. 
In anticipation of the World Bank's cr1tlclsm, KCFC commissioned the 
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis law firm of Philadelphia and Washington, 
DC to prepare a report whose release coincided with the World Bank mission 
to Kenya. The report Included sections by an executive vice president of the 
Equator Bank, a former World Bank economist, and a for~er executive of 
ESSO. Their analysis relied on data provided by KCFC. The report expectedly 
concluded that the project was viable and required three main steps to be 
fully Implemented. First, the closing of the financial gap created by cost 
overruns, arrangements for the supply of molasses at reasonable prices, 
and satisfactory plans for the blending, distribution and sale of gasohol. 21 
The fact that the government had guaranteed the foreign loans and 
could be called upon by the lenders In case the project failed, forced the 
government to look Into possible ways of making the project work. But the 
project could not work without additional knowledge on fuel ethanol 
operations. As a result, government officials visited Brazl1 In May-June 
1980 to acquaint themselves with fuel ethanol production. The trip enabled 
the officials to obtain comparative data on turn-key projects exported by 
Brazman distfllery producers such as Codistl1 and Zanlnl. This post-
Investment knowledge search enabled the officials to re-evaluate the project 
on the baSis of experiences elsewhere. The officials. for example, found out 
that Codistil had exported 8 dist111ery producing 210,000 Htres a day (more 
than four times the Madhvanl capacity) to Costa Rica In 1978 at the cost of 
US$13 m11110n (KShs.9Z.2 ml11fon).2S 
In August '981, another team of government officials as well as Shell 
and KCFC representatives visited Zimbabwe to learn from their experiences. 
21.lCfC. TIJ6 A,rlJ-CIJ6.lc.1 CII.pI6K. pp. ao. The report ftI printed In the US and copies 
Ihlpped to lenya. It WIt beUeved In the Mlnlltry of EoerlY that laC bad enpaed • firm In 
Wuhinaton, DC to lobby apinlt the World Bant reporL fbi. may or may Dot be the lame firm that 
prepared the IC CFC report. 
23.lnterYien. CodiIW. Pincicaba. BnzH. Marcb 1935. 
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Whl1e the fIrst group concentrated on the economIcs of ethanol production, 
the second group was more Interested In the Introduction of ethanol, 
especla11y blending techniques. It Is clear that all these concerns should 
have been consIdered before the signing of the JVA and not after. The 
effective use of the knowledge acquired during these trips had been 
precluded by the developments which had already ocurred In project 
Implementation. 
This knowledge later became a major source of policy reform In the 
government. The process was cumulative, startIng with other project 
fanures such as the Ken-Ren fertilizer venture which collapsed whtle the 
machinery was on the high seas. Indeed, It was durlnQ Press InvestlQattons 
over Ken-Ren that details on the Madhvanl project came to 1tQht. EvIdence 
was startfng to build up Indicating that existing government po1icles Qave 
room for corporate as we11 as bureaucratic malpractices In Investment 
projects. The Madhvani project was the largest and latest of such IndustrIal 
projects. The pOlitical visibility that the Investors Intended to use for 
fInancIal benefIts became a 1fabflfty for the whole country and also a source 
of insitttutionallearninQ. 
The process of Institutional learning had two main sources: Internal 
and external. Internal1y. the government had to deal wIth a large number of 
IneffiCient public sector Investments. This coincided with the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund's Initiatives on reductions In government 
expenditure. In February 1979, the President appOinted a commIttee to 
review a11 parastatal bodies. The committee reported In May that -there was 
clear evidence of prolonged Inefficiency, financIal mIsmanagement, waste 
and malpractices ••• A confused situation of this sort can be exploited In 
many ways, e.g. to resist publfc accountab11tty and to engage In corruption 
and nepotism- .29 At the time of the review. the problems of KCFC were Just 
emerging. 
This report was followed In January 198Z by the appointment of a 
Working Party by the President to look Into ways of containlnQ government 
expenditure within the limits of government revenue receipts. The working 
party dealt wIth a wIde range of matters but IdentifIed the management of 
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government Investments 8S 8 major source of financial waste. It 
recommended reductions In public investment and withdrawal from 
guaranteeing foreign loans for JOint ventures. It 81so recommended that a 
task force be set up to help the government divest itself of Investments In 
non-strategic activities which Included, among others, fuel ethanol. 30 
Concurrent initiatives were also beino taken by the Ministry of 
Economic Planning 8nd Development which launched 8n intensive programme 
aimed at strengthening existing procedures and where possible -instituting 
new procedures which would ensure that the Implementatton of development 
projects Is properly scheduled end regulerly monitored- .3' The initiatives, 
which were contained in 8 circular to all the other ministries, emphasized 
the costs of project delays and tied-up Qovernment funds, increased project 
costs and delayed receipt of foreign exchange from externally-financed 
projects • 
The initiatives were followed by detailed Quldelines on the preparation, 
appraisal and epproval of new public sector Investment projects. The 
guldel1nes Included those specific Issues which had arisen from the Madhvanl 
project. This was not surprising because the project had become 8 major 
source of knowledge on project Implementation 8S government officials 
prepared detailed reports on all the aspects of the venture for the numerous 
meetings that were held to try to resolve the situation. According to the 
guidelines, government -equity contributions, Joans or loan Quarantees to 
enterprises will as a rule be restricted to economic activities fundamental to 
development and wt11 be subject to detailed finanCial and economic 
analysis ••• there w111 ••• be no Import duty concessions ••• exclusive 
technology licensing arrangements will be time-limlted".52 The guidelines 
applied to all investments In which the government provided financial inputs 
In the form of equity, loans or Joan Quarantees. Apart from the normal 
30. Republic 01 Kenya. l,pDrl .JJd I'CD •• 'JJd.IJDJJ. 111111, IYllrJIJJI P.rty. pp. 42-43. 
Thil report. known popularly u the Ndecwa Report (PbfUp Ndepa. cbaJrlllD 01 the wortiDl party 
and hu been Ilona-ltandJna advocate of economJc and ,overnmenl errlcJency), later became the 
bull ror the 1933-33 Development Plan and lource or poUcy auldance on other economic plannlDl 
IUlten. 
31. Miniltry of Economic PlanniDl and Denlopment, '.pl'.'JJI.UDJJ III J)'~'IDp.'JJI 
PrDi,cl •. 
52. Republic or Kenya. Guid,/J.", pp.5-'. 
matters of fInancIal and economIc analysIs. the Quldellnes Included project 
location and environmentDl effects DS significant considerations. These 
issues directly resulted from the the controversy over the Madhvani project. 
One of the major areas of concern In the JVA was the number of 
concessions that the Qovernment made to the project. The new guidelines 
souoht to close this loophole by emphasizing that no special concessions 
would be provided by the government. However, those seeking such 
concessions would be required to give full costing detans to help the 
government establtsh the level of support or subsidy. Other requirements 
such as duty and tax exemption or remissIon on inputs would be calculated at 
the amount which would be collected with no exemption or remission. 53 
To ascertain the foreign exchange savings of new proJects, the 
guidelines required foreign and local costs to be separ.ated. Moreover, the 
issue of local manufacture of some of the inputs was starting to enter pol1cy 
guidelines. -Where a project Input Is locally suppl1ed, Is a significant part of 
total annual cost, and contains a hlOh Import content, project sponsors 
should examine at least the last stage of domestic production of that Input to 
determine its local and import components. -34 The Issue here was not to 
encourage local manufacturing but to establish the level of foreiQn content 
as 8 tool for quantification. 
One of the problems with the Madhvani project was that the foreign 
Investors made their partiCipation conditional on the acceptance of PEe as the 
suppliers of technology. The new guidelines now required that the sourcing of 
Inputs be subjected to open local and International tender together with 
estimates of the percentage by which the project costs were Moher than 
competitive prices. Detans of differences In the qualfty of inputs were also 
required. The Madhvanl project used arbitrary figures In their estimates and 
the new guldel1nes now require that -a11 sources of Information and bases of 
estimates should be documented- .35 
On the whole, it appears from the detafJs of the new Quldel1nes that the 
government had learned the signmcant lessons of the Madhvanf project and 
53. IlJid.. pp. 14. 
34. IlJid.. pp .• 6. 
35. IIid.. pp. 17. 
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was w1111ng to guard against similar projects by devising relevant polley 
approaches. This again reinforces the view that policy formulation may 
result from project Implementation as new reaJities emerge from practice. 
The guldeJines form the criteria for project selection and are aSSOCiated wfth 
Institutional reform. In this case, the reforms Included the strengthening of 
the Project Appraisal and Monitoring Division of the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development. 
The reforms, however, stiJJ remained in the traditional mould of 
financial analysis and did not take Into consideration some of the main 
lessons relating to technolog'y acquisition. By emphasizing financial issues, 
the reforms relied on Improving some of the short-term elements of project 
Implementation such as prices. Long-term conSiderations remained 
unexamined. For example, there was no systematic examination of the 
relationship between technology acquisition and the utfllzation as well as 
development of local technological capabl11ty. The reforms therefore did not 
have any major Influences on broader Issues of technology policy although 
most of the problems that faced the ethanol proQramme related directly to 
long-term technological Issues. 
These reforms and institutional re-organlzation legitimized a 
procedure of incremental policy reform that was already underway. The 
government had already stopped guaranteeing large foreign loans In 1981, 
fndicatinQ that the lessons of the Madhvanl project were belnQ Incorporated 
into pol1cy practice. The first venture to face the consequences of this poJicy 
change was another fuel ethanol project proposed by a consortium of Kenyan 
and French Investors. This autonomous ethanol project was to be located at 
Riana In western Kenya. It was planned to produce 45 mt1110n I1tres of ethanol 
a year from cane juice and was costed at US$76 ml1110n (excluding the 
development of 10,000 hectares of land for cane production). 
The project was slml1ar In structure to the Madhvanl investment. It 
was based on 8 turn-key technology to be suppl1ed by the French firms 
SOCiete d'Etudes et de Construction pour les Industries Agrlcoles SA 
(SODECIA) and Five-Cail Babcock (FeB). The project was to be managed by 
another French firm, SUDE and consulting work was done by OTH International 
of Paris. The project was promoted by 8 local engineering firm, J.T. 
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Cottlngton & Partners who hoped to get local loans from the Industrial 
Development Bank (lOB) and foreign loans from French banks led by Banque 
de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The foreign loans were expected to be guaranteed 
by the government whose proposed equity partlc1pat1on was 5 t per cent, 
thereby creating another parastatal body. 
Unlike the Madhvanl project. the Rlana venture Involved the French 
government who Intended to include the loans as part of their Protocol aid on 
condition that the Kenyans acquired French equipment. The French protocol 
long term credit was estimated at Fr.300 mlll10n and carried a low weighted 
interest rate of 5.8 per cent. The project Involved Total 011 (France) and 
Birlas Company (India) and was supported by the Ministry of Energy. The 
Kenya government was expected to participate 1n the project through the 
Industrial Development Bank (lOB) and the Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC). 
TABLE 6.6: Revised Copitol Costs for the RI6n6 Project (1980) 
Item 
Plant infrastructure 
Buildings 
Machinery (milling, distillery, briQuetting plant) 
Tractors and transport 
Furniture 
Professionol fees 
Contingencies 
Working capital 
Preliminary expenses 
Pre-stert-up interest 
TOTAL 
Source: Industrial Development Bank, Nairobi. 
US$ ('000) 
6,240 
4,289 
43,764 
518 
138 
2,854 
2,419 
1,709 
287 
3,259 
65,339 
The Riana proposal was thoroughly discussed and evaluated mainly 
against the background of the Madhvani project. Some of the loopholes which 
led to cost escalation in the Madhvani project were sealed and the New 
Project Committee of the government approved it in March 1981. However, 
the approval was made on condition that the government would not be asked 
to subscribe equity or guarantee any loans. The government remained firm 
on this condition and the project was finally shelved. Attempts were 
subsequently made to change the concept from ethanol energy production to 
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resins manufacture in the hope that the government would possibly consider 
participating in the manufacture of plastics. The collapse of Riana indicated 
that the government was going through a learning phase by eliminating some 
of the sources of fin2lnci2l1 loss inherent in the industri2ll policies. 36 
At this moment the government's energy policy had not been spelled 
out. The first attempt to produce a policy document on energy made clear the 
concerns of the government over investment in eth2lnol projects. The policy 
document, prepared by the Ministry of Energy which had earlier been 
supportive of ethanol projects, stated that the government would not 
increase its investment in alcohol programmes although they did not 
discourage private initiatives. 37 Given this background in institutional 
reform and lea rnlng, !t was therefore difficult for the Madhvan! project to 
survive given its failure to incorporate suitable adaptive parameters and at 
the same time smooth the adoptive terrain. 
6.4 The Madhvani Collapse 
The implementation of the Madhvan1 project started with a series of 
problems, many of which could have been anticipated. Indeed, sections of 
the government felt at the very beginning that the project was likely to face 
serious problems. The previous sections have shown that the main features 
of the techno-economic landscape which required to be changed to 
accommodate the project were not mod1fied. But even more important is the 
fact that the in,ternal parameters of the project were counter-adaptive. Not 
36. It i. notable that the changes in lewernment policy ewer thi. period were u.ociated with 
political changes in the country. Jomo Kenyatta had died and President Daniel &rap Moi had become 
a champion of administrative eHiciency and justice. He strongly spoke against corruption and made 
major changes in the bureaucratic machinery. This period was also marked by severe foreign 
exchange constraints. The era of profligacy which followed the 1977 coffee boom had ended and I 
new mood of rationalization was setting in. This tranSition in policy learning bas now become I 
major component of current (1985-86) economic practice and guidelines for future policies. 
37. InterYiews, Ministry of Enerer and Regional Development, Nairobi, October. 1984. It is 
interesting to note that the 1984-88 Development Plan .,oids the issue of fuel ethanol altogether. 
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only was the total capital Investment too high. but the project was designed 
In a manner that made Its ultimate failure almost Inevitable. This section 
looks at the adaptive features and how they Influenced the Implementation of 
the proJect. 
TABLE 6.7: The l1adhYanl Projecl Escalation (KShs. '000) 
Item 
Lend end site preparation 
Bul1d1ngs 
M~hinery and ~ipment 
Swiss a:Jljlpment and services 
~plant 
Sulphurlc~ld plant 
F~tory equipment 
Fire fighting equIpment 
Incoming water system 
fEAl 
Sales tex 
Clearing, freight and Insurance 
Erection end commissioning 
Training 
Furniture 80d fittings 
Vehicles 
Pre-prOOuction expenses 
Formation and stamp duty expenses 
Contingency and referred expenses 
Pre-start-up finance rosts 
TOTAl 
1977 
2,102 
12,297 
385,165 
1,682 
3,852 
38,517 
3,364 
25,229 
2,102 
12,615 
10,697 
16,819 
516,441 
Source: Kenya Cbemiclland food Corporation, Nairobi. 
1980 
17,849 
78,112 
564,619 
13,478 
6,587 
6,420 
3,750 
5,082 
4,755 
59,649 
21,747 
40,126 
2,142 
2,677 
10,711 
1,192 
34,959 
78,746 
952,598 
. Increese 
15,747 
63,815 
179,454 
13,478 
6,587 
6,420 
3,750 
3,400 
903 
21,132 
18,383 
14,897 
40 
2,677 
( 1,904) 
1,192 
24,262 
61,927 
136,157 
The possibility for cost overruns was built Into the JVA under a large 
number of clauses, the most obvious beIng the terms of the management 
fees. It was Indeed In the Interest of the manaoement for cost overruns to 
occur because this would Increase the total capital Investment and therefore 
enlarge their management earnings. By 1980, the project costs had risen 
from the original KShs.516,441,000 to KShs.052,508,OOO, escalations of 
about 80 per cent (Table 5.7). sa This cost escalation dId not only require 
more equity Injection, but also needed additional foreign exchange which 
could only be obtained through borrowIng and further government 
guarantees. 
38. The filUret [or the orilinal propOlallinn in Table 6.2 differ IUahtly [rom thOle li,en in Table 
6.7. The differentes have been presented u prcwided in KeFC documentation. 
190 
Several reasons accounted for the escalation of the costs. In the first 
place. the foreign contributions to the project were valued in Swiss francs. 
This Included the equipment suppJted by Waagner-Biro of Austria and 
Sorlgona of Sweden. As the value of the Swiss franc appreCiated over the 
1977-1980 period. the relative value of the Kenya shf1ling declined, thereby 
leading to cost escalatfon. In 1977, SFr.l.0 was equal to KShs.3.36. By 
1980, the rate was KShs.4.50. an increase of nearly 34 per cent in three 
years. This appreCiation alone added another KShs.l00 m1llion to the cost of 
the project by 1980. This. and the related Inflationary trends, were the only 
sources of cost escalation exogenous to the project. The other two sources 
of escalation included increased project capacity and delays In construction. 
TABLE 6.8: KCFC's Financial ()ap (198tJ) 
Item 
TOTAL fUNDINO REQUIRED 
Project cost 
Net working capftal 
Contingenty fund 
TOTAl 
AVAILABLE fiNANCES 
Equity share cepft81 
Keny8 <mernment 
Mloit Internotionol 
ChemflXXf Corpor8t ion 
Outstanding 106flS 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
Process Engineering Company 
BEDCO-Euro1l11or 10m 
TOTAl 
TOTAl FI~IAl GAP 
Source: [eaya Clemical and Food Company. Nairobi. 
86.7 
25.5 
57.8 
438.0 
52.0 
90.0 
KShs. m111ion 
955.00 
49.00 
14.00 
1,018.00 
170.00 
580.00 
750.00 
268.00 
Other delays resulted from sections of the political arena such as the 
Parl1ament. The Swiss loan agreement Which Included the purchase of 
. 
equipment was signed in November 1977 but the necessary sessional papers 
were not presented to Parliament untn June lQ78. The papers were 
withdrawn from Parl1ament only to be re-Introduced several days later. 
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Because of the delay, KCFC mtssed the deadl1ne for the tendered prtce of the 
TEA and had therefore to start new negotiations at escalated prices. This 
delay reportedly led to an increase of KShs. 18 ml1lion (US$2. 4 milHon). 39 
The provtsion of electricity was not done 1n t1me because the East Afr1can 
Power and Lighting Company insisted on down payment for all its services 
which included the installation of step-down transformers. KCFC had to 
install a temporary generator to power its acitivities. 40 By the end, of 1980, 
a substantive financial gap of KShs .268 million had emerged which needed to 
be bridged before the project could be completed (Table 0.8). 
To fill the gap, KCFC proposed a wide range of measures which 
required more contributions from the government. These measures included 
additional equity (KShs.30 ml1lton) by the shareholders, conversion of the 
KShs.31 ml1lion owed to the government as sales tax on machinery to a loan, 
payment of the deferred cred1t agreement of KShs. 5 mtllton owed for the 
sulphuric acid plant, and the provision of KShs.22 ml1lion as working capital 
cash credit. These measures still left a gap of KShs.180 million (US$24 
m111ion) which had to be fmed through loans. The rising costs of the project 
led to increased search for solutions and the government included the 
possibiJity of scrapping it altogether. 
By the end of 1980, the cost of the project was approaching KShs. 1.0 
billion, twice the original estimate. The capital intenSity of the project was 
111ustrated by the fact that it took KShs. 1. 5 ml1110n to generate one job, an 
estimate that does not take into account the fact that the number of experts 
working on the project far exceeded the normal requirement. The project had 
by that time become 8 subject for Intense Cabinet discussions. The 
government had guaranteed about KShs.600 million in loans and there was no 
Sign that the project would become operational soon or even realize any 
profIts In the first nine years of operation. 
The government was at this time faced with three main options. First, 
the project could be terminated. Second, it could be reconstituted (both 
technically and legally). Third, the government could opt for a major re-
negotiation of the various agreements in order to minimize government 
39. Thi. 81calllion alone yu equivalent to the .. ouot plid to Conaer ror the distillery. 
40. KaC, Til, Alrll-CII,.iGd EII,rIYo lip. GiL. pp.34. 
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risks. The first option was ruled out because the government would be called 
upon to honour the loans immediately and a whole set of legal actions would 
be initiated involving shareholders and creditors. 
The second option was only feasible if the project could be made 
economlcal1y viable in another form. This option too, required the 
government to repay the foreign loans. At least in principle, the 
government's pOSition was to inftiate a series of negotiatfons aimed at 
reconstituting the project. In the meantime, the costs of the project 
continued to rise thereby making the case for l1quldatlon even stronger. 
Attempts were made to search for bridging loans from different sources. 
These loans, which were usual1y smal1 compared wIth the total 
requirements, were supplemented by additional equity, but the gap 
remained. 
In April 1981. the government decided that they would guarantee loans 
to meet outstanding expenses but stressed that any future loans would be 
guaranteed equitably with the other shareholders. In response. the 
shareholders Issued a memorandum under which their e~ulty contribution 
(KShs.1S million) would only be made if the government agreed to guarantee 
a foreign loan of US$24 millton from Blyth Eastman. The shareholders also 
asked that the government reimburse them all the expenses Incurred by KCFC 
as a result of delays caused by the Treasury's refusal to honour the terms of 
the JVA. Other demands included the provision of factlittes such 8S 
electricity, land allotment and reimbursement of land expenses, 
construction of rail siding and other items. 
At this moment, the first repayment of foreion loans by KCfC was 
approaching and they demanded that the government issue a letter of support 
for thefr request to reschedule the loans borrowed from the Union Bank. of 
Switzerland and PEe. These demands amounted to pressure on the 
government to honour the JVA at a time when it was calling for re-
negotiation. The government was t~en still committed to the completion of 
the project. This was partly because of local political lobbying and concern 
over Kenya'S' record and credibity among the lender and donor community. 
The government therefore remained ftrm on tts position. 
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By the end of 1981. the oovernment was al ready 100k1no Into the 
consequences of continuing with the project. Government estimates in early 
19S2 showed that the country would lose some KShs.135 ml1lion annually in 
the next 10 years 1f the project was completed. Th1s subsidy would have to be 
met by increasing general taxation, raiSing taxes on petroleum and reducing 
oovernment expenditure in other areas. But 1f the project was stopped then, 
the government had to meet loan obligations which then amounted to 
KShs.780 ml1lion. If the government repayed the loans under the existing 
terms of borrowing, the country was expected to spend an average of 
KShs.120 million annually for next 10 years. 
In the meantime, efforts by KCFC to secure foreign loans became 
increasingly difficult as reports on the problems of the project reached the 
international banking community. Syndication arrangements through Blyth 
Eastman hfled laroely because the bank was aware of reports suggesting 
that the project was on the verge of collapse and KCFC did not have enough 
operating funds. Blyth Eastman contacted some 30 bank.s 1n the US, United 
Kingdom, Belgium, France, Canada, Italy, Switzerland and the Arab 
countries but there were no positive responses. The banks required an 
assurance that the government fully supported the project either throuoh 
Parl1amentary approval or the Treasury. 
Pressure on KCFC was increased by action from local creditors. The 
most critical was the decision in May 19S2 by the East African Power and 
Lighting Company to disconnect power supplies due to non-payment of 
KShs.5S,000. Solel Boneh had ceased to do construction work 1n December of 
1981 due to non-payment. In Apr11 19S2, PEC notified KCFC that they were 
going to demobi11ze their operations since Deweto could not undertak.e further 
erection work as the civil contractor had stopped work1no. PEC demanded the 
payment of SFr. 1. 1 ml1110n as demob111zatlon fees. 
By this time the total capital expenditure on the project had reached 
USS125 million (Table 6.9). According to KCFC figures, 39.S per cent of the 
capftal expenditure was accounted for by the citric acid plant while the yeast 
component claimed some US$Zg.5 m111ion. Fuel ethanol accounted for only 
18.4 per cent. This distribution of cap1tal expend1ture was aimed at showing 
that the ethanol component was not 8S hiOh 8S had been claimed and was in 
fact comparable to the Mehta's capItal cost of US$Z7 million. But by doln~ 
this, a lar~e sum of money was allocated to facilities which were not the 
original Justification for the project. Energy had been marginalized and 
products for which there was no readl1y available market to absorb all the 
output had acquired central positions In the complex. 
TABLE 6.9: Capita! Allocation of the Ifadhvanl Complex (1982) 
Unit US$ mf11ion Percent~ 
Citric fr;id 49.7 39.8 
Yeast 36.9 29.5 
Ethanol 23.0 18,4 
Anamet water treatment 7.6 6.0 
Vinegar 4.1 3.3 
~n 2.6 2.0 
Sulphuric fr;id 1.2 1.0 
TOTAL 125.0 100.0 
Source: (eoya Chemical and Food Corporation, Nairobi. 
It was obvious by then that there would be molasses shortfalls and the 
demand for the Madhvanf plant alone would consume some 94,000 tonnes a 
year, while available molasses In the su~arbelt was estimated at 85,000 
tonnes a year in 1981. This figure excluded the requirement for the Miwanl 
distillery. It was clear then that the commiSSioning of the Mehta plant would 
definitely lead to molasses shorta~es In the area even without considering 
the reqUirements for animal feed. The government had just formed the 
Ministry for livestock Development which was at this time considering 
molasses as one of the main sources of animal feed for an expanded 
1fvestock production programme. 
But even If molasses were readily available from the nearby sugar 
mms, the cost of transportation was becoming Increasingly prohibitive. The 
alcohol plant alone would require about ZZ5 tonnes a day at the haulage cost 
of KShs.120 per tonne or KShs.Z7.1Z0 per day. This added enormously to the 
final cost of delivered molasses. For example, at an ex-factory price of 
KShs.200 per tonne for molasses, transportation alone added another 60 per 
cent, bringing the delivered cost to KShs. 72 ,3Z0. These changes would also 
be reflected In the price of ethanol (Table 5.10). 
TABLE 6.10: /1adhvani's Cost of /1olasses per Litre of Ethanol 
Price (KShs.ltonne) 
150 
200 
250 
Total Q)st 
33,900 
45,200 
56,500 
SouRe: Kenya Chemical and Food Corporatioo. Nairobi. 
Cost per Litre 
W1thout Haul1ng 
0.57 
0.75 
0.94 
W1Ul Haul1ng 
1.02 
1.20 
1.39 
The location of the project also affected the energy requirements of 
the plant. Because of the lack. of access to surplus bagasse, the plant was 
designed to rely on bunker fuel for 1ts energy requirements. The complex 
included the Anamet unit which was to produce methane. But this eccounted 
for only 30 per cent of the total energy requirements of the complex. The 
alcohol plant required about 300 tonnes of steam a day generated from 
burning 24 tonnes of bunker fuel a day. The delivered cost of bunker fuel was 
KShs.3,500 per tonne. An additfonal 15,360 Kwh of electrictty was required 
per day. The two sources of energy accounted for KShs.91,680 per day. At a 
production level of 60,000 litres per day, the energy costs alone accounted 
for KShs. 1. 53 per l1tre. which was over twice the Mehta costs of KShs. O. 61 
per litre. The costs of inputs thus started to show high production costs 
which raised questions concerning the viability of ethanol as a substitute for 
gasOline. 
All these developments were compounded by the demand of Union Bank 
of Sw1tzerland and other lenders for loan re-payments. The government took 
no action on the project end the situation worsened. This silence brought 
KCFC to its knees, as creditors sought legal redress and workers went 
w1thout pay. In August 1982, Exlmcorp resigned from 1ts directorship 
because of the non-payment of due management fees. In effect, the KCFC was 
insolvent but had not been declared bankrupt. Efforts by the management to 
push the government through local pol1ticians did not yield any results as the 
government made no decisions on the project. For all practical purposes the 
project had collapsed. The situation thereafter was summarized by the World 
Bank thus: -[The government] has not initiated a formal review although the 
196 
debacle of the KCFC Investment Is clearly now the subject of cab1net 
discussions regarded by the civil service as highly sensitive and 
confidential. -41 
The collapse of the Madhvanl venture tllustrates clearly the 
importance of the linkages between the adaptive parameters and the adoptive 
terrain in project implementation. The approach, which was counter-
adaptive, contrasts sharply with the Triangle experience where most of the 
major adaptive and adoptive factors influencing fuel ethanol projects were 
studied in detan and incorporated Into a learning process which eliminated 
most of the major risks. The Madhvanl debacle left Kenya with the Mehta 
project which had to introduce modifications in the adoptive terrain during 
the Implementation process In order to survive. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the the process of project Implementation In 
Zimbabwe and Kenya and stressed the importance of the interaction between 
adaptive and adoptive parameters in the introduction of technological 
systems. It was shown that the successful Introduction of the ethanol In 
Zimbabwe depended on a long history of changes in the adoptive terrain 
which offered conducive conditions for project Implementation. The htlure 
to link adaptive parameters to the adoptive pre-conditions led to the 
elimination of the Madhvani project. Unlike Zimbabwe where the selecting 
pressures were tested vicariously throuoh a series of studies and 
evaluations (followed by gradual terrain modification), the Madhvant project 
was directly planted in an unmodified terrain with grave consequences. The 
next chapter '11111 examine further developments In the Mehta and Triangle 
projects • 
7. DIVERGENT TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUT ION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the process of niche rea1iution and 
identified the main features of the techno-economic landscape that influenced 
the different approaches In Zimbabwe and Kenya. It showed that the mismatch 
between the adoptive pre-conditions and adaptive parameters of the Madhvan; 
project made it difficult for the Joint venture to succeed. All the errors 
embodfed In the project could not be eliminated wfthout the collapse of the 
venture itself. It was noted that the Mehta project had more favourable 
adaptive conditions. This chapter looks at the performance of the Trianole 
and Mehta projects and stresses that the differences in thefr performance 
record was largely influenced by the same factors identified in the previous 
chapters. It wl11 be shown that over tfme, Kenya attempted to ouarantee the 
survival of the project by modifying the adoptive terrain. 
7. 1 Project Timing 
The rise and {all of the Madhvani project in Kenya directly affected the 
Mehta project in various ways. especfally in its timing. Mehta decided to 
follow Madhvanl into the market instead of takfng the lead. The possfbt1lty for 
Mehta to commisssion their plant before Madhvani arose from the delays of 
the latter. But it was in the interest of Mehta to come second. By following 
the tral1 of Madhvanl, Mehta did not have to Incur the costs of smoothlnQ the 
techno-economic terrain to enable the technological system to take root. 
Indeed, the adaptive parameters of the project did not require as much 
terrain modification as the Madhvan; project did. 
By taking second position, Mehta had the advantage of learning from 
the challenges and opportun1tles Madhvanf faced. The Mehta group, together 
with Vogelbusch, closely studied the unfoldinQ of events and made the 
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necessary adjustments to theIr project. For example, efforts were made to 
ensure that their project did not undergo the k.ind of cost overruns that were 
bringing down the Madhvani project. Much of the institutional and legal 
matters requ1red to br1ng ethanol to the market were be1ng undertaken by 
Madhvani and Mehta did not have to incur the costs of lobbying for the 
chanoes. In a sense, some of the costs incurred by Madhvani related to the 
creation of institutional ZlrrZlngements for ethZlnol development Zlnd should 
have been shared by Mehta as well. However, since Madhvan; decided to take 
an early lead 1n the market, they had to bear all the costs whl1e subsequent 
entrants benefitted from the initial efforts. 
There were other reasons why the Mehta group and their associates 
had to study the Madhvan1 developments closely and internalise the lessons. 
Madhvani attempted to pre-empt the Mehta entry through the expansion of 
their project to use most of the molasses produced in the country. In 
response, Meht21 had to use a survival strategy which included mak.ing their 
project appear more viable than Madhvani's. This was done through 
reductions 1n capital costs as well as ex-factory prices. For example, the 
revised Madhvani proposal gave the local price of bak.er's yerlst as US$3,750 
per tonne while Mehta valued it at US$2,200. Madhvani was caught 1n a 
situation where they could only justify the high capital costs of the project by 
allocating high prices to their products so as to show favourable cash flows. 
But by dOing so, they exposed themselves to competition from those who 
could offer projects with lower cZlpital costs zmd ex-fZlctory prices (among 
other adaptive parameters). Mehta did exactly that. 
The lessons of the Madhvan1 project on management arrangements 
were also incorporated into the Mehta deal. Insterld of fixing the manrlgement 
fee as a percentage of the total capital invested, Mehta fixed an annual fee of 
KShs.600,000 to be pa1d In Sw1ss francs. The Mehta management contract 
was for five years while the Madhvani one was for 10 years. The duration of 
the Madhvani contract became a matter of government concern and Mehta did 
not want to face the resulting problems which included re-negotiation to 
reduce the duration. 
Such problems were not experienced in ZImbabwe for two reasons. 
First, most of the institutional requirements for the introduction of ethanol 
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were met before the ethanol was Introduced. Second, the fact that Zimbabwe 
had only one plant did not provide opportunity to learn from the experiences 
of others. The risks involved in the learning process in Kenya were so high 
as to include possible project collapse. In Zimbabwe, these risks were 
eliminated by the knowledge acquiSition and retention which took place in the 
pre-commissionino period. Apart from the adoptive chanQes which enabled 
Triangle to implement the project with relative ease, the adaptive 
parameters of the plant were stripped of almost all the possible sources of 
risk. Unlike the Madhvanl plant, which was larQely baroque, Triangle 
introduced a system th8t produced ethanol alone. Additional processes such 
as the recovery of carbon dioxide were added after the ethanol plant was 
shown to be working satfsfactorlly. 
The timing of the Triangle plant was also fortuitous. The plant was 
constructed durinQ the last days of UOI and came on stream soon after the 
government of Robert Mugabe came to power. It was the first industrial 
project to be offiCially commissioned by the Prime Minister. This gesture 
signalled approval and Interest on the part of the oovernment In the proJect. 
This type of political support, symbolic as it may be. was virtual1y lacking in 
the Kenyan case. Government officials did not want to publicly associate 
themselves with the projects. The controversies that surrounded the 
Madhvani project right from the start limited the level of public support for 
the project, except from local politicians. 
7.Z Stlrt-up Performlnce 
As indicated above, the timing of the Mehta project was partly 
influenced by the progress of the Mt.ldhvt.lni venture. The time leg between the 
two projects had to be long enough to enable Mehta to interna1ise the lessons 
from Madhvanl's lmplementatfon process. However, It also had to be short 
enough to enable Mehta to benefit from changes in the adoptive terrain 
resulting from Madhvanj's early entry. But the collapse of Madhvani forced 
Mehta to facilitate the construction process while at the same time taking 
over the challenges of modifying the terrain for smooth ethanol introduction. 
The constructfon of the plant started In Aprt1 1961 and was completed In May 
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1982. Trial runs were conducted In June 1982 and commercial production was 
expected to start in July 1982. 1 It did not start because the price of ethanol 
had not been settled and there were no facilities for blending ethanol with 
gasol1ne. The two requirements proved to be more difficult to Implement 
than had been expected; they became a major obstacle to the completion of 
the final stages of niche realization. 
The issue of pricing and blending now brought Mehta Into direct confl1ct 
with the oil companies, with the government attempting to find a solution 
amid Its own Internal conflicts as reflected by the dIffering positions of the 
various ministries and even departments within ministries. As early 8S 
January 1982, the government had decided that an inter-ministerial 
committee under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Energy would be formed 
to review the price of molasses and ethanol. While the Ministry was 
collecting data on ethanol-related issues to establish a pricing formula, the 
oil comp2Jnies submitted detzliled information on the technical and financial 
impact of the introduction fuel ethanol on their operations. 
TABLE 7.1: Cost Saving for a L ilre of Ethanol (1982) 
White 011 Rule Applied White Oil Rule Waived 
Item Litres Cost (KShs./l) Litres Cost{ KShs.ll) 
Crude reduction 1.9530 4.646 6.752 16.063 
Surplus naphtha revenue 0.7110 0.768 
LPG Import Cost 0.0023 (0.075) 0.078 (0.254) 
Distillates Import 0.6880 (2.294) 2.379 (7.934) 
Less residue export 0.8620 ( 1.364) 2.982 ( 4.718) 
Foreign exchange saving 1.681 3.157 
Source: Mobil Oil Kenya Limited. Nairobi. 
It Is notable that not all the 011 companies shared the same views on 
the issue. Most members of the group preferred to retain the ·white oil rule· 
while others suggested that it should be waived to facl1ftate the Introduction 
of ethanol (Table 7. 1). Under the rule, the ofl fndustry was required to 
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process sufficIent crude 011 to meet the total demand for whIte 011 products. 
Waiving the rule would mean the country would import enough crude oil to 
meet the demand for gasoline alone and the rest of the fractions would be 
Imported. Under the rule, the IntroductIon of ethanol would leave the country 
with about 20,000 tonnes of gasoline blendstocks a year which would have to 
be exported. Handling the export would reduce the foreign exchange savings 
from the introduction of ethanol. However. the 011 refiners resisted efforts 
to waive the rule. 
After detailed dfcusslons with the various ministries, the MinIstry of 
Finance recommended that ethanol be sold at KShs.5.60 per litre in bond. 
This price included the transportation costs of about KShs. o. 35 per litre 
from the plant (Muhoron1) to NaIrobI. Th1s meant that the ex-factory prIce of 
ethanol was valued by the Ministry of Finance at KShs.5.25 per litre. But 
ACFC argued that such a price would be uneconomical for the plant and would 
not enable them to meet their foreign loan obligZltions. This figure was much 
lower than the price requested by ACFC in March 1083 based on the cost of 
production. The ACFC argued that a more realistic way of arriving at the 
price was to either use the cost of production method or a cash break-even 
approach that would take into account the requirements for debt servicing. 
A cost of production approach worked out at KShs.S.18 per l1tre 
(Table 7.2). In addition, ACFC wanted a guaranteed 15 per cent return on 
investment which raised the ex-factory price to KShs. 5. 64 per litre and 
excluded dividends to shareholders. This figure was based on a molasses 
price of KShs. 175 per tonne and a minimum capacity utilization of 85 per 
cent. A cash break-even approach requIred another KShs.O.51 per lItre to 
finance loan repayments, bringing the ex-factory price to KShs. 5.76 per 
litre. Another KShs. O. 3S was needed to meet transportation costs, bringing 
the NaIrobI prIce to KShs.6.11 per 11tre. In ant1c1patlon of resIstance from 
the oil companies, ACFC requested a lower ex-factory price of KShs.S.64 per 
litre. This was sugQested by ACFC to be the minimum price required to enable 
the project to survive. 
The ACFC figures. however. carried biases which reflected a much 
higher cost of production. For example. their price applicatIon to the 
government was based on 8 production capacity of 12.6 million litres per 
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year Instead of the rated capacity. The plant maintenance were based on fu11 
capacity utilization and used a deferred period (1985) u the bese yeer. The 
pre-paid expenses were calculated for four years (1982-1985) yet they had 
been amortized over the economic life span of the project. The prfcfng 
structure included questionable expenses such as marketing whereas the 011 
companies were expected to undertake this function. The ex-factory price of 
ethanol suggested by ACFC was considerably higher and the fact that ACFC 
was willing to settle for 8 lower figure than the requested price tends to 
strengthen the view that the fuel was over-priced. 
TABLE 7.2: Cost of Ethanol Production at ACrC (1942) 
Item 
1. Variable Costs 
Molasses (8t KShs. 175 per tonne) 
labour. enervt end other materials 
Sub-total 
2. Semi-variable and fixed Costs 
Salaries, w~ and benefits 
Plant maintenance 
Depreciation 
Marketing and ministration 
Amort i28t ion and pre-product ion costs 
Sub-total 
3. Interest Md finance Charges 
TOTAL 
4. 151 return on equity 
5. Ex-foctory price 
Source: AIfO-Chemicai and Food CoIIPIOY, Nairobi. 
Cost (KShs.llitre) 
0.604 
1.907 
2.511 
0.197 
0.525 
0.512 
0.416 
0.197 
1.849 
0.820 
5.180 
0.460 
5.640 
Ironically, the question of foreign exchange savings did not enter the 
d1scusslons. This was partly because of the complexity of the calculattons 
involved and the variations in the prices of key items, especially molasses. 
Simple calculations show that the project had a positive impact on the foreign 
exchange Savings. At full capacity utll1zatlon, the plant was expected to 
displace the crude oil equivalent of US$13.7 million. However, a total of 
U5$23.7 m111ion had to be spent on importing displaced fractions. The foreign 
loan obligation of ACFC amounted to US$l. 5 mf11ion, leavfng a balance of 
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US$8.5 m111ton. The foreign exchange earntngs from the 62. 100 tonnes of 
molasses required for the plant was US$2. 5 million. The net saving therefore 
worked out to US$6.0 mmion or US$0.33 per litre. 
This ftgure excludes foreIgn expendIture on spare pa rts, Inputs, 
dividends to foreign investors and other related expenses. It also assumes 
that the import for crude on based on the requirement for gasoline alone and 
the other white products are met through the import of refined products. 
However, if enough crude 011 Is tmported to meet all the requirements for 
white products, then the foretgn exchange savings would be eroded. 
Moreover, the calculations do not take Into consideration the fact that Kenya 
exports refined products to neighbouring countries thereby adding foreign 
exchange value to the imported crude 011. 
In the absence of a concensus on the price of ethanol, especially from 
the oil companies, the government could not make a decision. This delay had 
sever81 effech on the vi8bility of the project. Alre8dy, 8 devaluation of the 
Kenya shilling in December 1982 had increased the interest and loan 
repayment Jtabl1tUes to Glrozentrale und Bank by 15 per cent. The Austrian 
foreign loan of AShs.250. 75 mmion (KShs.190.3 mf11lon) accounted for 82 
per cent of the total ACFC foreign borrowing. Over the period, ACFC required 
higher working capital to meet their Inventory costs. The total cost to ACFC 
due to the prolonged closure was estimated at KShs.3.0 million per month. 
The closure meant that any further prices would have to take Into 
consideration the accumulated interest requirements as well as other 
additional costs. Consequently, delays in fixtng the price required even 
higher ex-factory prices. 
Because of shut-down and other reasons, the cost of the project 
escalated from KShs.259,582,OOO estimated in October 1980 to 
KShs. 300, 208, 000 In January 1983. Nearly 90 per cent of the cost escalation 
was due to exchange rate fluctuations. The Kenya shilling was effectively 
devalued by 20 per cent in 1981 and 15 per cent in 1982. The rest of the costs 
were accounted for by the high pre-production expenses resulting from 
delays in the commercialization of ethanol. Unlike the Madhvani project, the 
plant and machinery was suppJted under a fixed price contract and therefore 
did not undergo unnecessary cost increases. The liquidity of ACFC was 
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drastically drained during the closure and the company relied on overdrafts 
to meet essential payments. 
Even more serious was the fact that the company was not able to repay 
Its first loan Insta11 ment of of KShs. 7.517 ml1llon to Glrozentrale und Bank 
due in December 1982. In order to put pressure on the government to 
facilitate the introduction of fuel ethanol. ACFC asked the government. which 
had guaranteed the loan. to repay the outstanding amount and any further 
default interest. The money would then be converted to a long term loan to 
be repaid by ACFC when their liquidity conditions Improved. As a result an 
application was made to the bank to reschedule the loan. 
Efforts to re-start productfon were undertaken by the company. the 
Mehta group and sections of the various ministries. As early as October 
1982, the Austrian embassy in Nairobi had contacted the government on the 
matter. The issue was part of the agenda for discussion between the Austrian 
Ambassador to Kenya with senior government officials on bilateral Issues. 
The Austrian mission in Nairobi expressed its concern over the closure of the 
plant and possible ACFC default. The view of the Ministry of Energy was that 
ACFC was to blame for the delay because they went ahead with construction 
without making the necessary pricing and blending arrangements. 2 The 
Austrfan embassy was concerned because VEW, an Austr1an state-controlled 
firm, was a shareholder in the venture. 
In January 1983 the Ministry of Energy fixed the ex-factory price of 
ethanol at KShs. 5. 60 per litre net in bond as had been suggested by the 
Ministry of Finance (Table 7.3). The retail price for the ethanol blend was 
put on par w1th prem1um gasol1ne. By d01ng so, the government had to forego 
taxes on ethanol, which was another form of subsidy. This price was 
considered even less favourable to ACFC than it appeared before because the 
closure of the plant had worsened the l1qufdfty posftton of the ffrm .. Instead, 
ACFC suggested that a price of KShs.6.85 per litre in bond would be adequate 
for loan obligations. 
The price build-up maintained the same retailer's margin for premium 
and gasohol but did not include a city delivery allowance for ethanol. 
Although the government taxed ethanol, the Treasury lost KShs. 13. 1 m11110n 
• 
2. Interviews, Ministry of EoerlY and Resional Development, Nairobi, October 1984, 
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annually due to the torte1t of 1mport duty on alcohol and the dlfferenUal 1n 
tax between regular and premium gasoline. The oil companies lost a total of 
KShs.S.9 milJion in the foregone sales of premium and the price differential 
between gasol1ne and ethanol. Poss1ble ways of reducing losses to the 
Treasury included lowering the ex-factory price of ethanol or raising the 
pump price of all the fuel types and thereby shiftinQ the costs to consumers. 
TABLE 7.3: L il/uid Fuel Price Build-up in Kenya in 198.5 (KShs. //) 
Premium Regular Ethanol Gasohol 
EX-foctory 4.042 3.863 5.600 4.117 
KPC Fee 0.254 0.254 0.300 0.259 
Government tax 3.369 3.078 3.300 3.289 
Depot price ( Nairobi) 7.665 7.195 9.200 7.665 
City oo11very 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Retail margin 0.305 0.295 0.305 
Pump pr1ce 
. 8.000 7.520 9.200 8.000 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Regional Development. Nairobi. 
In the meantime, ACFC was facing other technical challenges, mainly 
on the 1nstallat10n of blenders. The Kenya Plpel1ne Company (KPC), wholly-
owned by the government through the Treasury and Ministry of Energy, had 
accepted to store ethanol at a fee and supply it to the oil companies for 
blending. An agreement was signed between KPC and ACFC for ethanol storage 
in March 1983. This was the only formal agreement entered Into all through 
the h1story of ethanol development 1n Kenya. KPC also undertook to purchase 
blending faCilities to be installed on the premises of the oil companies. 
The choice of the blend and the technical facilities were largely 
influenced by the conflicting interests over the fntroductlon of fuel ethanol. 
The government did not relax the octane limits of 93-94 and therefore the 
blend had to meet these requirements. To achieve this, a three-part blend of 
65 per cent premium, 25 per cent regular and 10 per cent ethanol was the 
most optimal combination. The other option was a two part blend (regular 
and ethanol) but the octane ratlno of reoular oasollne had to be raised from 
84 to 87 and the vapour pressure lowered. KPC preferred a two-part blend 
partly because they were going to bear the costs of the operation and 
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preferred a cheaper option. However, the 011 companies preferred a three-
part blend. 
The three-part blend was chosen and it was decided that the blenders, 
Imported from West Germany, would be located at the depots of 011 
companies. The storage and blending facilities cost KPC some KShs. 2S million 
of which KShs.1S million was in revalued Idle capacity and the rest was 
additional capital eqUipment, mainly blenders. The blenders earned KPC a fee 
of KShs.0.03 per litre of ethanol. After the blenders were Installed, the 
CJovernment Instructed the 011 companies to start taldng ethanol despite the 
fact that no formal egreement hed been entered Into between the parties 
involved. There were several outstanding issues such as the ownership of 
ethanol whl1e In tranSit or storage and Indemnity for losses or 
contamination. The ownership of ethanol during transit was critical because 
the government planned to tax any lost ethanol at the rate of potable alcohol. 
While the debates continued, the government forced the fuel into the 
market. A notice was issued to the 011 companies in March 19S3 giving them 
four days to run down their stocks and prepare to receive ethanol for 
blending from KPC. The notice also took into consideretion the need for 
government procurement in enabling the fuel to sell. The oil companies were 
asked to give priority to bulk consumers such as parastatal bodies and 
government agencies in the conversion process. The refinery was requested 
to maintain its specifications since the blend was to maintain an octane ratino 
of 93. The consumers were not informed about the introduction. On the 
morning of April 16, motorists in Nairobi found a new fuel on the market. 
The decree was Issued by the Ministry of Energy which was handl1ng 
most of the work related to the introduction of ethanol. The decree overrode 
the Traffic Act, Chapter 403, Section Sl (1) which states that -no fuel shall 
be used In any motor vehicle except that specified 1n the vehicle licence 1n 
respect of such vehicle or, in case of a motor vehicle the motor unit which is 
a compression ignition engine, liOht amber mineral 011-. This offence carries 
a fine not exceeding KShs.l0,OOO, a maximum three-year prison term, or 
both. In addition, the vehicle Is liable to be forfeited. The Ministry of 
Transport and Communlcatfon drew the attentfon of the Ministry of Energy to 
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this section of the Act but the proposed amendments were not carried further 
then inter-ministeriel exchenges. 
Different views emerged on the legality of fuel ethanol with the 
Attorney General's Chambers suggesting that the product should be treated 
as an additive (such as tetra-ethyl lead) therefore avoiding the introduction 
of a new Parliamentary bill on the blend. But the Ministry of Energy 
suggested that the Act be emended to include gasoline substitutes approved 
by the government. The Ministry of Energy had an interest in having ethanol 
treated as a new fuel and not an add1tlve. If ethanol was classified as an 
edditive, the centrel role p18yed by the Ministry of Energy in this metter 
would be challenged by other ministries. 
In the meantime, ACFC entered another trying period; the ethanol niche 
was effectively blocked and the first two years of their operations were 
devoted to unlocking the niche from constraints In the adoptive terrain. 
These constraints not only weakened the liquidity of the firm, but they nearly 
brought ACFC to collapse. Unlike the Madhvani project, ACFC were able to 
come on stream in time and the economics of their project looked more 
fevoureble. The government was therefore more willing to help open up the 
niche. It already carried the burden of re-paying the Madhvani loan and did 
not wish to see another project collapse. 
TABLE 7.4: Production Cost of EtIJanolat Triangle 
Cost item 1980/81 1982/83 1983/84 
Raw materials 10,439,837 15,070,192 13,127,126 
Salaries and wages 107,084 89,423 88,893 
Depreclatfon 223,384 187,500 230,985 
Insurance 30,242 33,653 22,561 
Utilities 196,010 518,269 744,235 
Maintenance 162,804 185,576 106,381 
Miscellaneous 36,764 
Total 11,548,618 16,084,613 14,320,181 
Ethanol output 30,400,000 40,000,000 36,630,000 
Prodution cost (US$/J) 0.38 0.40 0.39 
Source: Triangle Limited, Triangle. 
The introduction of ethanol tn Zimbabwe did not go through these 
challenges. The pricing formula agreed upon by the government and Triangle 
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allowed for all the production costs and a 5.0 per cent return on Investment. 
Because this was agreed before commissioning, there was no delay in the 
marketing of fuel ethanol. In keeping with the original goal, the operation 
showed a saving of foreign exchange In 1ts first years of operation. The 
savings, however, were dependent on the world market for sugar. 
The average production cost over the 1980-83 period was US$0.35 per 
litre or US$16.28 per GJ. Over the same period, the hnded cost of gasoline 
(at Triangle) was US$O.50 or US$14.66 per GJ. This means that the cost of 
producing ethanol was 11.0 per cent more expensive than Imported gasoline. 
This favourable margin was accounted for by low initial capital investment in 
the plant and the manner in which it had been designed. The fact that the 
pricing formula guaranteed a return on capttalinvestment allowed additional 
gains to be made through plant-level improvement. 
The foreign exchange saving of producing ethanol at Trianole was 
dependent on international sugar prices. The plant was designed to respond 
to these variations. Not much foreign exchange was saved 1n the first two 
years of the plant's operatton because of the repayment of the foretgn 
exchange component of the project. However, foreign exchange savings were 
reflected in the 1983/84 production period. From 7.72 tonnes of sugarcane, 
the plant could either produce 1.0 tonnes of sugar or 623 lItres of ethanol. 
Given the 1984 landed cost of gasoline of US$0.70 per Htre, the foreign 
exchange saving from ethanol production was US$436. 10. At the world sugar 
price (New York) of US$130 per tonne (with US$55 per tonne for 
transportation through South Africa) the net foreign exchange saving was 
US$175 per tonne.' 
7.3 Progress In a Constricted NIche 
The fact that the adoptive terrain in Kenya had not been adequately 
prepared for the introduction of ethanol resulted in 8 constricted niche. The 
installation of the blenders was not the end of ACFC's problems. As soon as 
production resumed new problems emerged, this time from the distribution 
side. The first problem related to the functioning of the blenders. Sales 
3. Lewia. ·Some Aapeets or Production of Ethanol.· pp. 391. 
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dropped In the months of May and June because one of the main blenders was 
broken and a dispute arose on who should meet maintenance costs. It 
emerged then that there was a logistic imbalance between the location, 
ownership and strategic importance of the blenders for the three parties 
involved. Malfunction in the blenders strongly favoured the oil companies 
because they then sold their traditional products and left ethanol stocks to 
accumulate at KPC and ACFC depots. Although KPC lost revenue, the effects 
were not as drastic as those suffered by ACFe. 
The problem was worsened by the llmfted storaoe capacity for 
ethanol. While ACFC had only 13 days' storage capacity, KPC had about 50 
days' capacity, making a total of 63 days. With this level of storaoe 
capacity, production became sensitive to sales. Reductions in sales did not 
only reduce revenue, but they also added to working capital as stocks 
accumulated. Reductions in sales therefore affected production levels since 
stocks could not go beyond the 63 day storZlge limit. 
KPC realfsed after repeated mechanical problems that the costs of 
maintaining the facflitfes were much higher than antiCipated and suspicion 
over possible industrial sabotage emerged." This allegation was difficult to 
prove and much of the discussions were concerned with maintenance 
liabilities and not proving sabotage. KPC demanded assurances from the 011 
companies that the blenders would not break again; an assurance that the 011 
companies could not give. Attempts to pass on the maintenance costs to the 
oil companies were unsuccessful since the blenders were ZI KPC investment. 
While the debate was underway, ACFC attempted to undertake the repair 
themselves but were denied access to the blenders by the 011 compan1es. 
later KPC attempted to sell the blenders to the oil companies but the offer 
was rejected outright and KPC had to continue maintaining them. 
".Interviews. kenya Pipeline Company, Nairobi, October 19&4. 
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TABLE 7.5: Ethano/ Production and .sa/8s (L ilr8s) 
Month OpenIng Stock Proouctlon Sales ClosIng Stock 
1982 
September 388,603 254,303 642,906 (ktober 642,906 642,906 
November 642,906 642,906 
December 642,906 579,675 
1983 
January 579,675 519,615 
February 579,675 541,362 
March 541,382 879,155 65 1,346,626 
April 1,346,626 883,795 2,230,991 
May 2,230,991 395,502 271,200 2,354,287 
June 2,354,287 762,885 555,400 2,561,203 
July 2,561,203 393,069 543,524 2,410,368 
August 2,410,368 586,600 1,792,598 
September 1,792,598 872,937 572,540 2,093,226 (ktober 2,093,226 446,489 545,700 2,060,046 
November 2,060,046 717,817 640,700 2,131,114 
December 2,137,114 694,019 592,800 2,190,542 
1984 
January 2,190,542 777,910 548,300 2,419,054 
February 2,419,054 488,921 660,900 2,261,036 
March 2,261,036 347,445 677,100 1,921,681 
April 1,921,681 592,663 621,100 1,895,144 
May 1,895,144 716,552 505,700 2,082,313 
June 2,080,927 513,829 318,700 2,269,749 
July 2,269,749 667,612 368,700 2,568,656 
August 2,566,608 445,842 531,200 2,481,260 
September 2,485,197 765,649 564,127 2,686,766 (ktober 2,694,029 1,212,686 591,400 3,301,312 
November 3,307,372 533,144 497,700 3,370,607 
Source: Agro-Chemical and Food Company, Nairobi. 
But even after the blenders were repaired, ACFC was not able to sell 
more than a daily average of 42 per cent of its production capaCity. Various 
rellsons were given for the constriction of the niche. It wu suggested thllt 
consumers had switched to regular gaSOline which was not blended with 
ethanol.5 Since ethanol was being marketed In Nairobi alone, It was thought 
that consumers were obtaining their supplies on the periphery of the city 
where the blend was not being sold. Interestingly enough, the use of the 
5. Thil period also coincided with a government decilion to restrict the movement of lovernment 
tabides, wbose effect on ethanol consumption tfU considered marlina!. 
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blend was not mandatory and varIous Institutions such as the UnIted NatIons 
Environment Programme (UNEP). the State House and sectIons of the army 
sought exemption. In addition. the oil companies continued to seIJ premium 
gasoline to some consumers. The combined effect of these constraInts 
contributed to the low capacity utilization of the plant. This level of sales 
could not enable the firm to meet its loan obligations. More pressure was 
therefore put on the government to stabilize the niche. 
Several options emerged for ensuring that the plant realized its full 
capacity of 45.000 litres a day (Table 7.6). One of the options was to expand 
the area served by ethanol to cover the whole country. But according to 011 
company sales figures such an expansion would absorb only 24,000 lUres of 
ethanol a day. accounting for about 53 per cent of the rated capaCIty of the 
plant. The extension of the blend zone would also require additional capital 
investment for new blenders, meters, piping and associated piping. These 
costs were rellJtively high for a minor increlJse in the overall consumption. 
Another alternative was to Increase the ratio of ethanol in the blend 
from 10 per cent to 15 per cent (wIth 44 per cent premIum gasoline and 41 
per cent regular gasoline). This option could be implemented in less than 8 
month in Nairobi, compared to six months required to market ethanol 
throughout the country. The only major technIcal needs were adjustments In 
the blenders estimated to cost KShs.S,OOO and road test expenses. The ratio 
could only raise sales to 28,500 litres per day, or 63 per cent of capacity 
utilization. This option could have led consumers to switch to regu18r 
gaSOline and therefore reduce the consumption of ethanol. The increase of 
ethanol In the blend ratio would also have necessitated a KShs.O. 10 increase 
in pump price from KShs.8.61 to KShs.8. 71, thereby reducing the loss of 
revenue to the Treasury from ethanol. 
The 011 companIes objected to a blend with 15 per cent ethanol In 
January 1984 on the grounds that the price structure could not support it and 
they stood to lose in the process. They demanded a price adjustment that 
could compensate them for the reduced earnings. Instead they proposed a 
long-term strategy which included working out the legal agreements. 
effectIve blender maIntenance, centralIzIng blenders at the KPC terminal 
and then introducing a regular-ethanol blend. Most of the suggestions were 
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either time-Intensive or required additional capital outlay and constituted 
delays which worsened the survival chances of the ethanol project. 
The oil companies were interested in getting rid of the blenders 
altogether because the Customs Department InSisted on charging any "lost" 
ethanol as potable alcohol. Some of the losses allegedly arose from blending 
errors. Any differences in the tank arising from disproportionate blendlngs 
was charged at the rate of KShs.162 per lftre (29 times the ex-factory 
price). Since there was no agreement between the oil companies, KPC and 
ACFC on ownership of ethanol at various stages, the Customs Department 
applied existing regulations and the blending losses were charged to the oil 
companies. It was therefore in the interest of the oil companies to shift the 
burden to KPC or any other Interested party. 
TABLE 7.6: Addltlona! Losses to the Treasury 
Ethanol Blend Loss of 
Sales Option ( litres/day) ( litres/day) Revenue (KShs.) 
Target capoclty uti11zed 45,000 300,000 13,100,000 
Extended up-country 36,000 240,000 8,640,000 
15~ ethanol blend 28,500 190,000 6,840,000 
Multiple blend 45,000 450,000 5,616,000 
Another option for extending the blend zone included a combination of 
the exlsttng arrangement, with the rest of unsold ethanol blended w1th 
regular gasoline. This multiple-blend option could bring the operation of the 
plant to full capacity. The last option was to get rid of premium gasoline 
altogether and Introduce a mono-grade regular gaSOline for blending with 
ethanol. After a long period of de liberation, the government decided in 1985 
that all gaSOline shall be blended with ethanol to allow the ACFC plant to 
operate at full capaCity. This was the option hken by Zimbabwe right from 
the beginning. This option has opened up the ethanol niche and renewed 
Interest In rehabl11tatlng the Madhvanl plant as well. 6 
6. This enthusium is expected to decline due to the 1986 fall in oil prices. Moreover. any decisions 
to produce ethanol will bale to consider the current 011 exploration efforts In the country. More 
recent deyelopments include a proposal by Mumiaa Supr Company to produce fuel ethanol. Mumiaa 
bu been the proposed lite for the relocation 01 the ethanol plant It Kilumu. An independent 
propOial by Mumiu would mOlt likely pre-empt or complicate current .rrortl to transfer the plant. 
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The opening up of the ethanol niche resulted from pressure from the 
producers, bringing sections of the government into conflict with one 
another. The government is the main shareholder in the project, accounting 
for 56 per cent of the equity through parastatals. The government also 
controls 50 per cent of the refineries; it also guaranteed the foreign loans. 
The parastatal shareholders have previously withheld equity subscription to 
ACFC as a way of putting pressure on the government to ma~e favourable 
decisions on matters such as price increases or market zone expansion. 
FIGURE 7.1 : Equity Subscription in the AC;:C Yenture 
~ternationa 1 
k'lvH1mfnt 
Corpor .tion 
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The introduction of ethanol in Zimbabwe was simplified by the 
agreement reached by a II the relevant actors on the basic issues; it was 
relatively easier to work out the logistics of blending and distribution. The 
range of conflicting interests was narrower. The fect that both Hippo Valley 
and Triangle were later owned by Anglo-American made agreements on 
molasses easier to reach. Moreover, the 011 companies were wtlling to 
distribute the fuel and there were no refinery vested interested to infuence 
the price structure or technical specification of the fuel. 
Even more important was the fact that in Zimbabwe all the liquid fuels 
were procured by a government agency which resold the products to the oil 
companies for distribution. This arrangement did not exist In Kenya because 
214 
KPC's role was only to transport and store the liquId fuels and not to trade In 
the produch. This was why the blending fDcilities had to be operated by the 
oil companies because KPC had no legal right to handle any distribution 
related aspects. By doing the blending, KPC would also have had to accept 
responsibility for losses, contamination and any other resulting costs. 
7.4 Energy Balance 
Energy balance Is a key Issue in ethanol projects. A study of Triangle 
by lewis showed that the net energy ratio of the plant Is 1. 15 If ethanol is 
treated as the only output. 7 The ratiO, however, was gIven as 1. ~2 If all the 
major products are considered. No comparable data on Kenya were 
avallable. Moreover, 1t Is difficult to compare the two plants because of 
differences in feedstock configuration. While Triangle was designed to use 
both juice and molasses, the ACFC plant uses only molasses. The analytical 
boundary for Triangle Is therefore much wider than the one for ACFC whose 
main energy input is steam from the sugar mill and electricity from the grid. 
A partial energy balance for the ACFC plant is positive as we11. 
The energy Input into the agricultural sector was relatively high 
compared to other countries. Consequently, the yields were also high (112 
tonnes per hectare per year) compared with Brazil (60 tonnes per hectare 
per year) and Mauritius (78 tonnes per hectare per year). While cane 
production at Triangle was done under irrigation, non-irrigated cane growing 
was dominant in other countries. The energy input into non-irrigated cane 
production was equally lower. Most of the sugarcane grown In Kenya is 
rainfed and the energy inputs were possibly lower than Zimbabwe. 
An approximation of the energy picture of the ACFC plant shows 8 
favourable energy balance. The ethanol component of the plant requires 
82,476 tonnes of steam a year. Producing 1.0 ml1l1on Iltres of prima spirit 
requires 13,362,194 MJ of steam (calculated at 2,904.8 MJ per tonne of 
steam at 10 bars). In addition, 120 MWh or 132,000 MJ of electricity was 
needed, amounting to 13.79 ml1l1on MJ or 13.79 MJ per 11tre. The plant 
7. Lewis, 'Some Alpectll of the Production of Ethanol.' pp. 379-382. 
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oenerated about 176.100 tonnes of slops a year from the distillery which was 
treated at the cost of 107.14 million MJ. For 1.0 million Htres, the eneroy 
requirement for evaporation was 5.95 million MJ. 
TABLE 7.7: Energy Input into Sug6rc6ne Production 6t Trl6ngle* 
Input 
Fertilizer 
Ammonium nitrate 
Single super phosphate 
Potash 
HerbiciOOs 
Insecticicils 
Seed 
L8bour 
Fuels and lubricants 
Electricity 
Maintenance and repairs 
TOTAL 
·Sugan:ane field coyer 12.200 bectares. 
(GJ/ha/yr) 
38.50 
3.30 
1.00 
0.21 
0.03 
1.31 
2.37 
4.16 
10.51 
13.20** 
74.60 
*"fbe annual energy used in manufacturing. commerce and tranlport II 2.171.000 tonnea of oil 
equivalent whUe the nlue of gross domestic output from the lectorl II $1295 mUllon. Thul the 
energy nlue of expenditure in these lec:torI il (2171 x 10 6 tl x 42 MJ/tS)$1295 x 106 - 70.4 MJ 
per doll,c). 
Source: Lewis (1984). 
TABLE 7.8: Energy Input into Sugarcane Processing at Triangle 
Input 
ElectriCity 
Coal * 
Maintenance and repairs 
Labour 
TOTAL 
Total enerw into processed sugarcane for ethanol prtXfuctlon** 
(GJ/h8/yr) 
23.61 
83.93 
9.81 
0.02 
117.37 
87.84 
-Dagule from fuetl for boiten for , mootbJ a year and coal il Uled durina tbe rest or tbe year. 
*"fbe totallugar procesled il 1.360.060 tonoes. Input into the plant il 35.276 toones of invert from 
motules plUl 21.960 tonoes of invert from juice. amountiOl to 57.236 toones of invert in 
Iugarcane equivalent (15% invert in lugarcane). The area required to produce lugarcane for ethanol 
i. (381.573/360.060 X 12.200 hi) 3.423 hectares. Invert production (juice and molules) cOOIumes 
20% about 20 per cent of energy in lugar procesling. The energy input into the procesling of invert 
I. 0.20/0.28 that of the total figure for tbe IUgar procesling plant (expresled u GJ/hllyr). 
Source: Lewis (1984). 
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TABLE 7.9: Energy Inputs into Industritl/ Process for Ethtlno/ Production* 
Input 
Fermentation 
Disti11mion 
Chemicals and Irllitives 
Diamonium phosphate 
Urea 
Sulphuric ~id 
Benzene 
labour 
Maintenance and repairs 
Total 
Total (in GJ per hectare per year )** 
(GJ/l itre/yr ) 
353.43 
42.41 
79.39 
27.04 
150.00 
146.80 
o . .q I 
115.13 
914.61 
8.12 
*The units apply to a titre of ethanol produced (out of a total output of 30.4 million litres). 
DThe area of land required to produce .ugarcane for input into ethanol plant i. 3423 hectares 
(3s 1.573/1.360.060) x 12.200 hectares). Effective ethanol yield i. thUi ass I littel per hectare. 
Source: Lewis (195'1). 
Output 
Ethanol 
Stillege 
Fuseloils 
AloohyOOs 
TOTAL 
TABLE 7.10: Energy Output from the Tritlng/e P/tlnt* 
-The effective area of land i. taken to be 3423 bectarel. 
Source: Lewi. (198'1). 
(GJ/ha/yr) 
190.9.q 
62.71 
0.29 
1.74 
255.68 
Desptte the fact that the energy balances of Triangle and ACFC cannot 
be compared, it appears that there are differences In the way matters 
pertaininQ to enerQY use were conceived. For example. the decision by 
Triangle to use stillage for irrigation was partly influenced by the need to cut 
down on energy expenditure on waste treatment. It was also shown that 
decfsfons on energy use affected the mf111ng process. The ACFC plant. on the 
other hand, incorporated an evaporation unit which accounted for over 20 per 
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cent of the total energy input. Possible shortages of energy became a matter 
of concern while construction was underway and attempts to burn stl11age 
and recycle the steam failed because of lack of funds to Import the 
equipment. The ACFC plant could not return the st11lage to the canefields 
because they do not use irrigation. 
TABLE 7.11: P6rti6/ Energy B6/6nce of the ACrC Pl6nt 
Item Quantity MJ 
INPUT 
Pnxiuction 
Steam 4,600 tonnes 13,362,494 
Electricity 120MWh 432,000 
Evaporation steam 3,049 tonnes 5,952,248 
Tottll 19,746,742 
OUTPUT 
Ethanol 1.0 million litres 21,500,000 
BALANCE 1,753,258 
7.5 Plant Performance and Technical Drift 
In the prevfous chapter 1t was argued that the Tr1anole project was 
deSigned to enable the management to underhke plant improvement end 
process rationalization. The Mehta project, on the other hand, relied on 
technical expertise from the suppl1ers under a technical agreement. The 
choice of the Triangle process was done under conditions of foreign exchange 
constraint and therefore some of the technical advances in ethanol 
production could not be incorporated in the original project design. Instead, 
provisions were made to enable the incorporation to be undertaken 1n the 
post-start-up period. Apart from these dynamic chanoes, provisions were 
also made for static changes such as capaCity expansion through additional 
tanks. 
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These provisions were made In anticipation of changes In the external 
environment such as improvement 1n the foreign exchange situation or 
potential expansion of the size of the ethanol market. However, technical 
pressures originating from the production process Itself led to attempted 
technical changes at various stages of the process. These pressures were 
expected because some technical specifications had been lowered because of 
foreign exchange problems. The plant had therefore to be monitored closely 
so as to identify and solve various resulting problems. Additfonal pressure 
to Improve the process resulted from the fact that higher conversion 
efficiencies reduced the demand for sugar for fermentation and therefore 
left an exportable surplus. This reduced the Intensity of competition between 
export and energy requirements for sugar. 
Fermentation feedstock could be collected at different bOiling stages 
of the milling process. This could vary from the stage immediately after 
juice extraction or down the line to the molasses stage. Normally molasses 
·B· is further processed to leave molasses ·C· which has lower sugar 
content. laboratory tests showed that the third b0111ng (which left molasses 
·C·) considerably reduced the amount of fermentable sugars. Triangle 
therefore decided to abandon this last stage and collect juice before 
evaporation. The decision also led to energy savings (almost equivalent to 
the energy required for distillation or 25 per cent of all the energy required 
for ethanol production). It was no longer necessary to build additional 
boilers as low pressure steam could be obtained from the inshl1ed power 
station. 
The first critical point during the post-start-up period was a shortfall 
of 3,000 tonnes of molasses due to unreliable measurement. Hitherto. 
Triangle had normally measured the inflow of molasses in volume and then 
converted the units Into tonnes using an average number. This method had 
several shortcomings. Errors in measurement could easily distort expected 
yields. The most serious problem was that it did not give relfable 
information on fermentation yields. This information was necessary both for 
process improvement and decision-making because the amount of ethanol 
expected from a unit of molasses was dependent on Its content of 
fermentable sugars. 
219 
These pressures required the oeneratlon of Site-specific technical 
knowledge on which improvements could be besed. The management decided 
to hire a biochemist to monitor the plant and make the necessary 
Improvements. The first major challenge to the plant was Instrumentation, 
especially for measuring the various constituents of molasses and cane 
juice. A choice had to be made between the widely used oas liquid 
chromatography (GLC) and high pressure Jiquid chromatography (HPLC) 
techniques. The two techniques are fundamentally similar because they 
Involve separating the components of Interest from other substances In the 
analytical sample for quantification. 
However, there are practical differences. In GLC, volatile materials 
In a stream of Inert gas are separated by passIng them over 8 stationary 
liquid phase of low volatility. But since sugars are not volatile, they must 
first be converted Into volatl1e derivatives before they can be subjected to 
GLC. In HPLC, the moving phase is a liquid and the sttltionary phase is 8 solid. 
Since sugar is soluble in water, HPLC can be used without having to prepare 
sugar derIvatives. Sample preparatIon In HPLC Is limIted to f11tratlon. 
Triangle chose HPLC because it was easier and faster to use than GLC. The 
equipment was bought from Waters (USA) at Z$18, 000. 
TABLE 7.12: Comporison of C/6ssic6/ 6nd HPL C tte/hods· 
Ethanol yield (1Ikg of fermentables) 
Substrate Purity ( ~ ) •• Classical methcx1s HPLC 
Juice 8.55 6.06 6.11 Syrup 8.-48 6.05 6.07 
-A - molasses 6.91 5.83 6.13 
-S - molesses 5.28 5.6~ 5.91 
"C" molasses 3.72 ~.98 5.95 
'The result. are means of file determinatiOlll for each cue. 
DPurity i. calculate u a percentage of lucrose 09er total dillolyed lolidl. 
Source: Triangle Limited. Triangle. Zimbabwe. 
Other considerations were included in the choice. HPLC is relatively 
cheaper to use and has lower operating costs. In addition, the results are 
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aval1able within 15-20 minutes of samples belno taken and quantification of 
all the substances of interest (sucrose, glucose, fructose, ethenol end 
glycerol) Is done In one sample. Because of its slmplfcity of use, HPLC does 
not require specific sk111s among users. ·The introduction of HPLC at Triangle 
did not only Influence the technical aspects of the plant, but also gave the 
manaoement more flexibility tn decfsfon-makfno. For example. data on the 
completeness of fermentation could be obtained in 15-20 minutes Bnd 
therefore the management could decide either to stop or continue 
fermentation in time and with relative certafnty.a 
The Introduction, however, was not done without resistance, 
especially from the technicians and the associate laboratories of Hullet's. 
The technicians viewed the Introduction largely In the context of their 
specialist knowledge of the use of GLC equipment. HPLC made their skills 
almost redundant because the new method could be used by any worker at the 
plant with minimal training. Hullet's, on the other hand, was concerned with 
conformity in data collection since their other operations used classical 
methods such as GLC. The reSistance, however. took a technical outlook with 
arguments on the reliability of HPLC. A series of tests were conducted to 
establish the reproducibility of the results. Mean reproducibility tests over 
May-July 1983 showed standard deviations of 0.67 per cent for sucrose, 
1.12 per cent for glucose, 0.80 per cent for fructose and 0.97 per cent for 
sucrose, showino relatively hiOh reliability.9 
With the help of HPLC, Triangle was able to initiate a number of 
experiments aimed at improving the process. The changes were in fact 
slml1ar to those already Included in the advanced plants aval1able on the 
merket. The planned improvements constituted efforts to re-trace the 
innovation path followed by ethanol technological systems. The choice of the 
improvement path, however, was determined by internal imperatives of the 
plant. The first experiment involved the recycling of yeast by using a 
centrifuge borrowed from a local firm. The objective of the experiment was 
to find ways of saving on the sugar used in the growing of fermentation yeast. 
s. Tannock, -The Applic:ation or High Pressure Liquid Chromatograph.- pp.77-77. 
9. I/Jid., pp. 74. 
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The novelty of this experiment Included the partial conversion of the process 
from batch to semi-continuous. 
The experiment showed that recycling yeast saved about 3.0 per cent 
of the sugar used In ethanol production. This experiment had strategiC 
considerations as well. Triangle envisaged possible increases in ethanol 
consumption. Such demand could easHy be met by making the process 
continuous instead of batch by adding centrifuges for recycling yeast. 
Centrifugation could increase the residence time of fermentation by 50 per 
cent thereby raising the volumetric efficiency of the plant. By January 1985, 
the management estimated that an Investment of 2$180,000 In an Alfa-Laval 
FESX 512S centrifuge could be repayed In six months. Apart from ethanol-
specific knowledge on yeast, Triangle attempted to use the plant as a base 
for generating and diffusing knowledge on yeast. This was envisaged as a 
training project for firms with yeast-re1ated activities In the country. 
TABLE 1.13: Effects of Stillage Recycling on Fermentation 
Sti11fJ'je Time for Complete Ethanol Yield Dissolved Solids 
mntent (z ) Fermentation (hrs) 
(z)** 
(111 00 ~g TFAS)* in Sti11lr)e 
0 36-40 51.9 7.9 
10 28-34 57.7 9.9 
20 30-36 51.9 10.6 
30 34-38 57.2 11.1 
40 34-38 51.5 14.7 
*Total rennentablea lugan expressed U lucrose (TfAS). 
DDissolved lolidl were determined by daily composite ltillage lamp Ie analYlil. 
Source: Trilfl&le Limited. Trilfl&le. Zimbabwe. 
The second experiment undertaken by Triangle Involved stillage 
recycling. The need to recycle 5t111age resulted from two main concerns. 
The first was the waste disposal prob1em which forced Triangle to look Into 
different options. The second was the need to raise the solids content of 
st111age for the production of concentrated molasses stl11age (CMS) for 
animal feed. The alternative was to use additional energy to evaporate the 
st11Jage. One of the ways of achieving the two objectives was to return 
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stillage into the mash. which also reduced the demand for dl1utlon water. But 
the recycling of stillage required knowledge on Its effects on fermentation. 
A series of experiments established that the share of stfl1age In the 
mash could be raised to 40 per cent without adverse effects on the 
fermentation process. However, high solid levels increased corrosion in 
evaporators and scaling of distillation columns. The latter problem was 
solved by washing the stripping rebol1er with caustic every 6-8 weeks. Even 
after the CMS venture stopped. Triangle continued to recycle stillage as a 
way of raising fermentation temperatures In winter. The average winter 
temperature at Triangle is 230C while 3D-3SOC is required for optimal 
fermentation. In this case, stillage which Is normal1y 960C on outflow, is 
used to raise the temperature of the mash to required levels. 
Another innovation Triangle introduced Involved stt11age disposal. So 
far It had been shown that the production of CMS and the recycling of stl1Jage 
partly al1eviated the waste disposal problem. However. the plant still 
released vast quantities of stl11age that had to be disposed of. After 
considering various optfons. It was decided that the most suitable option was 
to dilute each litre of stillage with 40 litres of water and irrigate the cane 
with the mixture. This approach helped to improve cane yields in the 
st11Jage-Irrlgated areas by about 7.0 per cent. However, the long-term 
effects of this process were not known and the management continued to 
search for an alternative disposal technique. The worry sprang over the fact 
that the stillage contained compounds collected from over 34,000 hectares 
and returned to less than 10 per cent that surface area. The long-term 
effects of mineral concentrations on microbial flora and their potential 
effects on sugercane productivity were not known. 
One of the alternative approaches considered by Triangle was to 
Incorporate some of the components of the Alfa-Laval's 810stfl process Into 
the plant thereby changing it to a high brix fermenter. This option was 
Initially rejected because the raw materials at Triangle were aval1able In the 
form of molasses or cane juice which would have to be further concentrated 
before being fermented under the high brix requirements of the 8iost11 
process. Furthermore. Triangle did not foreclose the option of extending the 
area under stillage irrigation. 
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Other projects under consideration at TrlanQle Include InvesttQattons 
into ways of cutting down on the consumption of various nutrients in 
fermentation, especial1y urea and diamonium phosphate (DAP). One of the 
drawbacks of DAP Is that it leaves solid residues In the fermentation tanks. 
Alternatives to DAP include phosphoric acid which is a liquid and leaves no 
soJid residues. Such chanQes require contro1Jed studies to establish their 
effects on ethanol yields. 
All these experiments enhance the adaptive parameters of the plant 
while at the same time enablinQ the manaoement to acquire technical 
knowledge. necessary for the improvement of the plant or the potential 
expansion of the ethanol niche. Triangle has therefore become a vital node in 
the network of knowledge systems related to ethanol product1on In particular 
and other aspects of bio-processing. The experiments at the plant also 
represent efforts to respond to internal technical pressures by bul1dino a 
stock of knowledge that would enable them to respond favourably to changes 
in the external environment. 
It Is notable that the search of the International market for potential 
contributions to the adaptive parameters has become part of the regular 
operations of the Triangle management. Trade magazines and technical 
journals are constantly monitored for technical advances. The potential 
contribution of new equipment to the improvement of the plant Is part of the 
management routine. The knowledge search and accumulation process 1s part 
of the learning process of the firm and is guided by both short-term and 
long-term considerations. In the short-term, the firm requires a certain 
stock of knowledge with which to respond to technical problems. 
Since the source of such problems is unpredictable, the stock of 
knowledge must be broad enough to cover all the critical areas. These 
short-term conSiderations are associated with repair and maintenance. 
However, these are not normal activities because the original design of the 
project embodied relatively high break-down probab11ity due to the deviation 
from the design specifications. The long-term considerations include major 
changes in the process either through static expansions or dynamic 
innovations which embody more advanced functional units such as centrifuges 
for yeast recycling or even high brix fermentation units. These latter 
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cons1derat10ns are strateQ1c tn that they equ1p the f1rm w1th the capabl11ty to 
respond favourably to external changes. 
The efforts at Triangle to generate plant-specific technological 
knowledge contrasts sharply with the ACFC approach to technfcal 
improvements. In the first place, the low level of capacity utilization of the 
ACFC made it difficult for any reliable data on plant performance to be 
obtained in the first two years. Secondly, a technical agreement with the 
suppliers promised that any technical advances in the process would be 
prov1ded to the plant by the technology suppl1ers. As a result, ACFC rel1ed 
either on the agreement or on new equipment supply for plant modifications. 
The firm has a training programme which has a dual mandate. First, it 
1s a1med at phas1ng out expatr1ates and replac1ng them w1th Kenyans 1n 
accordance with (Jovernment requirements. Second, the programme plans to 
use training as a way to -increase the efficiency and productivity to ensure a 
smooth zlnd trouble free running of the plant so that all the products Dre 
manufactured at a most economical and profitable cost of production- .10 
Desp1te th1s asserUon. the train1ng programme concentrates on the 
Kenyanization of the staff and there is no cleer strategy to eccumulete pJ8nt-
level technological k.nowledge. The ACFC management argue that they could 
not 1nvest 1n long-term tra1ning and accumulat10n of technolog1cal knowledge 
because the employees could easily leave them for other jobs. As a result, 
the training proQramme was desioned to cater for medium-term operating 
requirements Dnd not long-term plant-level capability Dccumulation.1l 
As pointed out in the case of Triangle, the Qeneration of plant-level 
knowledge could not be effect1vely undertak.en w1thout adequate 
instrumentetion. The ACFC plant shrted operations with inedequete 
instrumentation and called on the suppliers to carry out repairs or replace 
some of them. These problems affected key tnstruments such as the 
research centrifuQe, Abbe refractometer (which was supplied without an 
instruction manual), electric crucible furnaces (which were not operatlno at 
10. ACFe, Tr.illilll Prlllr.1I1118. pp. I. 
11. Interviews, Auo-Chemlcal and Pood Company, Muboronl, September 1983. Thll ,lew II allO 
reflected in the traininB programme document: "It il probable that lome of the trained personnel 
"mleaye the company for other industries ... It i8 proposed, therefore, to blve certain flexibility to 
cater for lucb eventualities," i/Jid.. pp. ii. 
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the requIred temperature) and heating mantles. Without these fnstruments 
the laboratory team could not carry out the required tests adequately, leave 
alone initiate new experiments. 
TABLE 7.14: Changes in Ethanol Yield at Triangle 
Total fermentables 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
fermentables input (tonnes) 
Molasses 32,807 49,124 54,850 69,154 77,786 
JuIce 20,854 21,843 16,987 3,637 799 
Total 53,661 70,967 71,834 72,791 78,585 
Molasses as percent of total 61 69 76 95 99 
Yield 562 539 534 504 509 
Source: Triangle Limited. Triangle. Zimbabwe. 
Whereas at Triangle the generation of plant-level knowledge was 
viewed as a way of saving on capital outlays, the ACFC management relied on 
capital aval1ab111ty as a source of improvement. This was partly encouraged 
by the investment climate in the country which inhibited the local supply of 
technological inputs. The technical agreement also provided for the 
continued dependence on the suppliers for technical expertise. Under the 
agreement, the cost of some of the repairs was charged to the suppliers 
thereby pre-empting the need for plant-level skills. 
Over the first five years of the operation of the Triangle plant, the 
fermentation yield of the the plant steadily declined. The decline in 
fermentatIon yIeld Is related to changes in feedstock composItIon. In 1980 
molasses accounted for 61 per cent of the total feedstock. This share 
increased to 76 per cent in 1982 and 99 per cent in 1984. Over the same 
period, ethanol yield per tonne of sucrose declined from 562 lltres fn 1980 to 
534 litres in 1982 and 509 litres in 1984 (Table 7.14). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the process of niche realization and 
identified some of the main features of the techno-economic landscape which 
influenced the post-start-up development of ethanol projects in Zimbabwe 
and Kenya. It examined the record of the TrianQle and Mehta projects and 
stressed that the differences in their performance was largely influenced by 
the same factors identified in the previous chapters. It was shown that over 
time, Kenya attempted to Improve the adoptive terrain for ethanol by making 
modifications in the techno-economic landscape, thereby preventing the 
Mehta project from collapsing as well. While much of the time in Kenya was 
spent on bringing the plant to full capacity utilization, Triangle moved 
smoothly through the start-up period and introduced a programme to 
Improve the performance of the plant through the accumulation of plant-
level technological knowledge. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND CONJECTURES 
Introduction 
This study has come to a close. The previous chapters presented an 
evolutionary picture of the development of fuel ethanol technoloQY In 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. This chapter wl1l summarise the central arQuments of 
the study, examine the policy Imp1fcatlons of the findings and make a plea for 
further research using evolutionary approaches. The policy considerations 
wf11 relate to both national economic strategies as well as patterns of 
technological development. It wt11 also be pOinted out that the evolutionary 
approach taken in this study Is part of an emerging world view that is 
gradually permeating the natural and social sciences. 
8. 1 Retrospect 
This study has shown that fluctuations in the energy techno-economic 
landscape created favourable condltfons for the introductfon of new 
technological systems. The opportunities, however, could only be rea1tzed 
through an Implementation process under which the adaptive parameters of 
the candidate technological systems were matched with the adoptive pre-
conditions. The cases of fuel ethanol development In Zimbabwe and Kenya 
Illustrated this point. The evolutionary picture that emerged represented 
both gradual and major changes In the patterns of resource use as well 8S In 
the development of ethanol technological systems. 
The l1quld fuel sub-sectors of Zimbabwe and Kenya were viewed as 
landscapes In which different technological systems were adapted to the 
production and utl1lzatlon of different energy forms and occupied different 
market niches. Gasoline occupied a central role as a motive fuel In the 
energy balances of these countries. The 1973-74 011 crisis ushered In major 
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fluctuations which created favourable conditions for the Introductton of 
alternative liquid fuels. The process of niche realization largely depended on 
the availability of technological options whose technical and financial 
features allowed them to compete favourably with conventional energy 
sources. This was aided by the decline in molasses prices which made Its 
local use 8S an ethanol feedstock possible. The niche realization also 
necessitated the modification of the adoptive terrain to facilitate the 
Introduction of the new technological systems. 
The process took an evolutionary perspective because It Involved the 
generation. selection and retention of technological options under constantly 
changing conditions. The evolutionary trail reveals periods of gradual 
change (associated with technological drift). punctuated by moments of 
Increased innovations (both novel and recombinant) which were often linked 
to periods of major fluctuation. The process was associated with a complex 
network of institutional arrangements which were also reformed either in 
response to the changes or in anticipation of emerging niche opportunities. 
InStitutions played a central role because the process was not random; 1t was 
purposive and based on socio-economlc expectations. Variations in 
expectation and purposive action resulted In different forms of institutional 
organization. It was precisely this point that led to major differences In the 
process of niche realization in Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
This study has presented a long trail of events in a historical 
perspective and attempted to unravel the logic underlying long run 
technological change. It has attempted to show that long run transition 
manffests an fnternal evolutionary logfc whfch can be fsolated on close 
examination. especially when attention is given to detail. The study has also 
dealt with a process that Is Irreversible. As pointed out tn the study, the 
problem of irreverslbl11ty IS taken for granted In conventional thinking since 
the notion of equilibrium fs timeless. The comparison of statics also 
assumes that change through time does not Influence the events being 
compared. 
The economic structure has been presented as an open system which 
undergoes fluctuations and Internal re-organlzatlon through Innovattons. The 
ethanol niche is but a small section of a much wider system that is in 
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constant flux. As Prlgoglne et 41. have argued, fluctuations are the main 
source of re-orgemization In open end non-equl1lbrlum systems. I It Is my 
view that such an evolutionary logic enables us to see technological systems 
as constantly changing entIties with no fIxed InitIal conditions. They are, 
however, products of purposive action based on soclo-economlc 
expectatlons. 2 
8.2 Polley Conslderltlons Ind Conjectures 
The fIndings of this study cannot be generaltzed to other technologies 
or be used for formulating definitive energy or economIc pottctes. There are 
limits to what one can learn from case studies. However, there are 
conjectural policy lessons which can be drawn from the studies. Two sets of 
policy considerations have emerged in the course of this study. The first 
relates to the organization of economic systems and role of energy diversity 
In reducing vulnerability to fluctuations. The second set pertains to 
technology policy. More generally, they pertain to technological change as 
part of a broader development strategy. 
8.2.1 Energy diversity Ind economic stability 
One of the most significant policy lessons of the 10705 was the 
economic vulnerability of the developing countries to fluctuations In 
streteglc resources such as oil. Their heavy dependence on oil Imports 
developed over a period which was marked by the absence of major price 
fluctuations or disruptions In supply. Such conditions led to the assumption 
that trends In oil prices would continue along past patterns and would be 
fairly predictable. This l1near view resulted In polfcles and Institutions which 
I. PrllO£lne III .l. Ordllr Oullll' CIJ.III. pp. I n-2D9. 
2. Although the procesl or Innovation II purposive, III final outcome II ltocbutlc. New Innontlonl 
introduced into the economic l)'ltem lead to unpredictable errecll. Thil co-exiltence between 
purposiYl and ltocbutic processes bu major policy implicatiODl that will be dilcussed in the next 
HCtioa. 
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pre-occupied themselves simply with 011 procurement and payment 
procedures. The basic procedures became part of business practice and 
were not added to governments' agenda of critical Issues. The steady supply 
and stable prices that marked the supply side, together with the 
procurement routines which evolved in the developing countries combined to 
form a fairly reliable oil trade. The 011 crisis changed all this of course. 
The assumed reliability was also reflected In the view that Increases 
In energy consumption corresponded with similar rises In economic growth 
as measured in GOP. This piece of numerology was shattered by the post-
1973 growth patterns in various countries as wider gaps started to emerge in 
growth indices of GOP and energy consumption. The dependence on imported 
011 and the assumed stabl11ty of prices and supply also carried the seeds of 
vulnerability. There were no Immediate reasons to allocate financial and 
institutional resources to the search for alternative sources of energy. Most 
countries were therefore ill-equipped to deal with major fluctuations in the 
prices and availability of oil. This point Illustrates the extent to which 
institutions and technological or resource patterns co-evolve. 
It was not just the dependence on Imports that led to vulnerability. The 
fact that these countries relied heavily on petroleum as a motive fuel made 
the economies vulnerable to disruptions In its supply. But such a problem 
would still occur even If oil was locally produced. What is needed is 
therefore diversity as a basis for reducing the sources and effects of 
fluctuations. Diversity in this case Introduces an element of flexibility and 
stab11ity in the economic system. The case for diversity almost Immediately 
runs contrary to the absolutist view of the world In which only one 
economically viable form of energy becomes the dominant source. This view 
is supported by arguments such as economies of scale and production 
efficiency. It Is Indeed a powerful argument 1n a world that attempts to 
adhere to certain prinCiples of absolutist rationality. 
Most conventional cost-benefit analyses tend to operate against the 
need for diversity because they seek to establish one viable option of doing 
things. The case for diversity can be established through more 
comprehensive cost-benefit approaches which take Into consideration the 
need for economic stability. This may be done at the cost of economic 
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efficiency and that Is why economic arguments become the basis on which the 
decisions are judged. The choice to sacrifice economic efficiency for the 
salce of diversity is largely a political one because it Includes the 
redistribution of costs. benefits and risks In the economic system. 
Brazil Is an example of this. While the fuel ethanol programme can be 
argued to be uneconomical In strict economic terms, the economy has over 
the last decade introduced diversity and possible stability in the energy 
environment. The diversity that the programme Introduced goes beyond the 
energy environment. The wide ranoe of technoloolcal projects initiated 
through the progremme ere likely to spread to other sections of the 
agricultural sector. On a smaller scale. the Zimbabwean plant has become a 
source of knowledge on fermentation-related technolooY for other 
Industries. The Introduction of energy diversity adds to the general 
technological stock of the country In ways that cannot be ascertained by 
erguing for single options. 
The development of fuel ethanol in the developing countries suggests 
that one of the ways of deal1no with economiC crIses whIch result from 
dependence on single strategic resources Is to Introduce a certain degree of 
diversity by generating alternatives. This seems to be a logical Imperative 
which suggests that the effects of fluctuations In strategIc resources could 
be minimized by the planned introduction of diversity. What crises seemingly 
do Is to bring to the forefront special cases which cell for diversity. The 
cases are speCial because they relate to particular resources end specific 
periods tn history. What Is needed Is a more comprehensive strategy to 
strengthen the economic base throuoh diversity. 
The oil crisis did not just highlight the problems related to liquid 
fuels, it created the need for diversity tn the energy environment tn general. 
One of the ways to Introduce energy diversity and reduce dependence on 
exhaustible resources was to develop the so-called renewable sources of 
energy.' These resources are numerous and vary widely in their 
characteristics. They range from science-Intensive technologies such as 
3. The Dotion of renewability relalel both to the use or lolar Influl( and resource manaaemeot. The 
JOIlI-term renewable potential CID only be reaJiled through resource management. Renewability 
dOlI Dot apply to CU8I lucb U for8lt depletion. 
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photovolta1cs to 1ncremental 1nnovatlons such as efflcfent wood-burn1ng 
stoves. One renewable resource base that has received increased attention 
Is biomass. 
B10mass fs one of the most abundant resources on earth and can be 
used as a source of energy In various forms such a8 charcoal, methane and 
fuel ethanol. Its versatility already suggests that It could contribute to 
"energy diversity. The fact that the resource is renewable makes It a suitable 
source of stability because it can be managed to maintain a balance between 
productfvfty and harvestfng. But the degree to which any of the varfous 
sources of biomass energy can be introduced depends on the structure of the 
economy. income patterns, end-use characteristics and the aval1able 
conversfon tec.hnologles. This suggests that polfcfes to Introduce dfverslty In 
the energy environment also imply changes In social organization and the 
related Institutional arrangements. This re-affirms the view that these 
changes have far-reaching social and polftlcal Implfcations which have to be 
considered when formulating energy-related polfcies. It is therefore not a 
surprise that the 1ntroductfon of fuel ethanol 1n Zimbabwe and Kenya needed 
pOlitical goodwt11 and bure8ucratic support. 
As noted elsewhere, politics is largely about choices between 
varlatfons in antfcipated social changes. Politfcal conslderatfons are often 
presented in different ideological outlooks which provide a context through 
which the future can be antfclpated. The role of anticipation is even more 
crucial if one considers that the outcome of various actions is stochastic and 
irreversible. Politics then becomes a process of making choices about the 
future under condftfons of uncerta1nty. The element of uncertafnty.is usually 
hightened under a crisis and may lead to intense and differentiated polftical 
actfvtty. It Is precisely this point that makes political considerations an 
important aspect in the introduction of diversity in economic systems. 
Biomass aval1ability is necessary for the introduction of diversity in 
the energy environment. However, the 1ntroductlon 1s largely related to the 
abiltty to generate or acquire the required conversion technology. This shifts 
policy considerations to the general need to establish diversity in the 
economic systems to more detal1ed aspects of technological development. It 
Is through technical and institutional innovations that economic systems can 
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be re-organlzed to achIeve short-term crIsIs management goals and 
introduce diversity es a potential source of long-term stability." 
8.2.2 Technological and Institutional considerations 
The case studies present a large number of conjectural policy lessons 
on the acquisition and development of technological capability. These lessons 
fall tnto two broad categotesj those pertaining to economic policies that 
facilitate the accumulation of technological capability. and those which 
relate to operational approaches. We shall refer to the first category of 
tssues as strategiC. and the second as tactical. These two categorIes do 
not suggest a dichotomy because strategiC and tactical issues interact 
intimately in the process of project implementation and fnfluence each other 
over time. This Is precisely because project fmplementatfon as 8 I~arnlng 
process Influences overall national policies and Is In turn Influenced by 
them. 
The study showed that the Zimbabwean project was implemented more 
successfully than the Kenyan one. This comparison evoked institutional and 
historical reasons to explain the differences in policy formulation and 
Implementation. It can be counter-argued that the policy approaches were 
specffic to the different countries and cannot therefore be compared. 
Indeed. an approach that takes a conventional political economy approach 
would suggest that there were no alternatives for Kenya given the class 
structure and links between the local business communfty and foreign fIrms. 
especially transnational corporations. But this view cannot explain the fact 
4. The concept or diversity attainl "en more opentive nJue lr one considers that locial 
adnncement OCCUR partly tbrouah a leries or experimenll wbOie resulll articulate themlel,es 
through the economic l)'Ileal by lelection and imitation. Thil ,iew IUlleats that the dear" or 
diversity within the l)'Item and a certain meuure or IUtonomy would allow more experlmenll to be 
performed and thererore anil • laraer number or poalible optionl ror articulation. Thil lIates 
diversity a pre-condition ror loclal re-orpnlzatlon. The 'ery notion of re-orpnlzatlon presuppOiel 
the exiltenee or a range or optiona wbicb can only be enhanced through di ..... ity. The Ii .. or the 
experimenll allO matterl. An appeal to diversity carried an element or decentralization. There II, 
bow .. er, a danaer in adYocatilll divenity u an end in ille" beclUle aI. aorll or undeairable locial 
experiments could be perrormed under the banner or diversity. We are or coune uiumllll that a 
country hu a political rramework that providea adequate criteria ror the choice 01 locial 
experimenlland acCepll the principle or public accountability. Div .... ity Ibould thererore Dot be 
ConfUied with anarcby. 
that over the same period, Kenyans were developing geothermal energy 
resources using strategies that were similar to Zimbabwe's. The 
development of geothermal energy In Kenya also undermines the view that the 
state Is a homogenous unit that represents particular class Interests. This 
kind of analysiS has very Httle policy value and underestimates the 
variab1Jlty In soclo-economlc expectations and these are reflected In 
government cfrcles. 
There are clear differences fn the way the two governments related to 
Investment projects In general. The behaviour of the Zimbabwean government 
was guided by principles of self-reliance In Industrial development. The 
Zimbabwean government did not Invest In projects; that was left to the 
private sector. All they did was to regulate the patterns of Investment to 
ensure that they conformed to the long term economic objectives. The goals 
were clearly stated and government institutes were organized to reflect the 
related overall strategies. Policies pertaining to the use of local resources 
for industrial production were effectively Implemented and had a long history 
going back to the 1 940s. These kind of po1tcy gulde1tnes were not unique to 
Zimbabwe. Indeed, Kenya is currently attempting to introduce similar 
gufdeJines as a measure to improve efficiency In local Industrial production. 
While Zimbabwean policies governing Imports favoured the use of local 
resources (both raw materials and industrial capacfty), those fn Kenya were 
largely inimical to the full capacity utilization of the Industrial base. They 
retarded Its expansion and diversification. Over the .19705, Kenya's 
Industrial sector experienced low capacity utilization and deClining trends In 
gross fixed capital formation. The foundries used only 23 per cent of their 
capacity while the metal engineering workshops uti1fzed only 34 per cent of 
the capacity in the 1980s.5 Over the 1976-1982 period, gross capital 
formation In machinery and equipment declined from K£102.67 m11110n to 
K£9S.16 mf11fon In 1982 (at constant 1976 prlces).6 Part of the decline was 
accounted for by the collapse of the East African Communfty and the closure 
of the Kenya-Tanzania border In 1977. The two events reduced the demand for 
Kenya's Industrial output. The economy was not effectively re-org8nlzed In 
5. Couchlin. CIID~'rliDI Cri.i. 111 BIII1 •• pp. 2-3. 
6. Republic of Kenya. SI.,i,lic.1 Allirlci. pp. 43-44. 
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response to the changed external condItIons. No systematIc efforts were 
underhken to search for local markets for the idle production capacity of 
the industrial sector. 
The policIes Introduced In ZImbabwe may appear to have been 
influenced by the war situation and international sanctions and therefore may 
not be apPJicable to the Kenyan conditions.' Whl1e this may be the case, the 
policies related specifical1y to economic disruptions and can therefore be 
applied to other countries with similar economic constraints. Indeed, the oil 
crls1s created s1ml1ar econom1c condlttons. The savIno of foreton exchanoe 
through the use of local industrial resources was not 8 problem unique to 
Zimbabwe under UDI. What the sanctions did was to make such policies the 
only viable option open to the country. 
One of the main concerns of the government which seems to have 
preval1ed a11 through the Implementatfon of the Triangle project was the need 
to find II balance between str6tegic and t1conomic considerations. The 
choice of projects in Zimbabwe was done both on strategic and economic 
benefits. This selection process was Influenced by the need to save on the 
available resources such as foreign exchange. For over a decade. the 
ethanol project could not be justified both on strategic and economic 
grounds. But when the economic gains seemed substanttal. the government 
gave its approva t. In Kenya. much of the controversy concerned both the 
strategic and economic value of the projects 1n retation to the level of 
investment. It is notable that Zimbabwe was concerned with strategic Issues 
even though the government had no plans to invest in the project. 
Strategic conslderat10ns bring us back to the theme of dIversIty. 
Whereas In Kenya the ethanol projects were Independent Industrial 
Investments J Zimbabwe pursued other alternatives under a wider energy 
progr6mme to reduce vulnerability. This was Indeed an attempt to 
Introduce diversity in the energy environment. Various government 
departments as well as research Institutes collaborated wfth the private 
sector In this endeavour. No similar efforts were initiated in Kenya and the 
ethanol projects represented isolated investment ventures. 
7. The re-orpnization of the Zimbabwean industrial Itructure to rely on more heayUy on domestic 
lII.,.tetl ltartecI with the break-up 01 the Federation 01 Rhodeaia and Nyualand. 
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The overall strategic guidelines are not themselves ultimate laws 
which do not change. It has been argued elsewhere that one of the problems 
j 
with conventional thinking is that it tends to ignore the flow of time and the 
related changes In economiC organlzat1on. The Situation Is even more serious 
where government poliCies do not undergo const6nt rfJvifJw in light of 
changing economic conditions. Pol1cy guldel1nes are usually abstractions 
from specific historical periods and do not necessarily rel8te to reality at 
other moments. It is however assumed that the guidelines are rational and 
would help establ1sh a set of desirable economic practices. But the constant 
re-organization of the economic system brings about new developments 
which necessitate a review of existing policy guidelines. 
The review of government policies was constantly done In Zimbabwe 
whereas in Kenya government technology-related polfcles remained almost 
unchanged all through the 1970s. Constant policy review would enable the 
country to identify emerging trends and formulate relevant str8tegies. 
Without the benefit of policy reView, the abl11ty of the country to reform Its 
Institutions fn view of the changing conditions would be very much l1mlted. 
But undertaking policy reform requires a certain measure of confidence and 
appreCiation for self-criticism. These are crucial elements In the ability of a 
system to change because It Impl1es questioning or even abandoning 
established practices in view of new realities and fJxpfJrimenting with new 
ones whose effectiveness is uncertain. 
This leads us to the role of institutions as sources of change. 
Institutions perform three basic functions which are crucial to long term 
socfal change. In the first place, they serve as a basiS for the generation 
and legitimization of development options. Secondly, they are Involved in the 
selection of desirable options. Thirdly, they are given the mandate to realize 
the agreed goals. The first and third roles Impose on Institutions conflicting 
patterns of practice. On the one hand, institutions must be flexible and open 
enough to generate new option. But on the other, they must retain the 
selected option and implement them through time. The latter Implies a 
certain degree of routine which may come with a measure of reSistance to 
change. The hierarchical existence of such varied Institutions may retard 
change due to the inability to find compromises. 
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This partly explains the differences In the links between the 
government, privete sector end reseerch Institutes In the two countries. In 
Kenya, a Ught hierarchy prevailed and government institutions continued 
theIr actIvItIes on the basis of establ1shed patterns, IgnorIng the research 
that was befng conducted Independently in academic Institutes. But a non-
hierarchical network between the government, private sector and 
research institutes was establ1shed to facl1itate the search for alternative 
sources in Zimbabwe. The Industrial Development Corporation was set up 
partly to provIde a Hnk between the d1fferent Institutions whl1e retaining Its 
legel mendete as e parestetel body. Similer bodies existed In Kenye but they 
related to the research and private institutions in a hierarchical way thereby 
dImInIshIng the degree of mutual collaboration. Moreover, the hferarchlcal 
structure robbed the institutions of the autonomy and relative freedom 
necessary for the generation of alternative options. 
It appears that the links between institutions operate effectively In a 
non-hierarchical way if they are associated with specific functions and the 
types of knowledge required. For example, research on fuel ethanol In 
Zimbabwe brought together dUferent types of institutions end networks from 
those required for hydrogenation research. What was important was that 
each participating Institution In the network possessed particular types of 
knowledge that were crucial in the realization of the proposed goal. The 
participant's position in the network was therefore as important as the 
others. The existence of networks does not invalidate hierarchies. What is 
different is that the structure of the network is shaped by the functional 
Imperatfves of the goals to be achieved and not the other way round. 
One of the points illustrated in the study are the links between linanc6 
and technology. These links operate at two related levels. In the first 
place, overall economic pol1cfes on foreign exchange Influence the patterns 
of technology acquisition. This point is illustrated by the policy introduced in 
Zimbabwe under which investors were required to recover the foreign 
exchange component of their projects In a year or less. This forced the 
investors to search the local market for inputs so as to minimize the foreign 
component of their proposed projects. 
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But for such a polley to be effecttve, there must be an fndustrfal base 
capable of providing some of the leey technological requirements for 
industria I projects. A certain degree of diversity must exist In the Industria i 
sector to provide the requirements directly or through the recombination of 
existing industrial capab11ity or skills. Such a policy enables the economy to 
place pressure on the Industrial sector to expand both in gross output and In 
complexity. Moreover, the local search helps to identify those industrial 
inputs which are in demand and therefore lead to the generation of new 
branches of Industrial spectaJtzatton. 
But there fs another effect which relates to the use of Industrial siems 
without necessarily forming new Industrial branches. This was exemplified 
by the training of sk111ed welders for the /0(4/ f4/Jr/C4t1on of the Trfangle 
plant. What existed prior to the construction of the plant was a skill pool 
that could be re-tralned to undertake specialized tasks without necessarily 
setting up new firms or Importing specla1fzed welders from other countries 
as the Kenyans did. This local ·sleill wheeling· also guarantees that the re-
trained people are aval1able in the country and can be called upon for stmllar 
or related tasks. This form of investment in human resources is much 
cheaper than the setting up of new industria I branches. 
The other tfnle between f1nance and technology relates to the supply of 
equipment. The case of Kenya shows that where local technological Inputs 
are not mandatory In project design. there fs a tendency to borrow from 
foreign sources so as to import .the required technology. Links between the 
source of finance and technology are established early enough to foreclose 
the open tender system. The source of finance would tend to determine the 
source of technology. This arrangement does not Involve much choice 
because there are no genuine options presented to the Importer of the 
technology. The very act of going for turn-key proJects suggests that a 
decision has been made not to include major local Inputs Into the project. 
Such decisions have long-term Implications for the performance of the 
project. They may involve equity subscription from the suppliers of the 
technolo~;'IY and even more stringent contractual agreements. It is also 
through financial col1aborat1on (In the form of Jofnt ventures for example) 
that further technical fnputs and spare parts can be fully guaranteed. This, 
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however. Is not the only way. But It Is certainly a soft option for those who 
do not want to invest in learning or accumulation of technological capabi1fty. 
Such cases emerge partly because there Is very little negoti4tion between 
technology Importers and suppliers. Often the two are In league and the 
contractual arrangements are entered to maximize their benefits at the 
expense of other shareholders who simply subscribe equity but do not 
partiCipate actively in project design and management. 
Also related to this Is the tssue of /o4n 9114r4ntees. The Kenya 
government guaranteed the foreign loans for the proJects. This was a major 
disincentive for effecttve project implementation because the managers knew 
that If the projects failed, the government would be called upon to bail them 
out. The guarantees. as we have shown. weakened the ability of the 
government to introduce new measures that would have shifted some of the 
risks to the other shareholders. In Zimbabwe, the guarantee was made 
against the projected earnings of the venture. Moreover. the amounts 
involved were so small that they did not pose a major problem to the 
government. It would be unw1se to argue aQalnst all forms of Qovernment 
guarantees for foreign loans. What is needed is a system that would provide 
an effective criteria for selecting strategic projects which cannot be 
supported by the private sector but are crucial to long-term economiC 
development. 
Apart from the guarantees, the Kenya government also Invested 
excessively in the projects through equity participation and it was in its 
interest to make the projects work. Both the guarantee of the loans and the 
excessive equ1ty participation seem to have been undesirable and even could 
have contributed to complacency among the managers. Considertng the scale 
of government support for the Madhvani project. it Is doubtful that any 
Investors would have gone ahead with a project with such risks without 
government participation. It Is therefore not a surprtse that the Riana 
project collapsed partly because the Qovernment was unwi111nQ to put In 
eqUity. 
The early stages of the development of the two projects were 
aSSOCiated with differences In the capacity to carry out reliable eV4/114t1ons 
and to se4rcll the market for technology. This study has shown that these 
two types of technolo<,;Jlcal capability were vital In the desl<,;Jn and 
implementation of the Triangle project. The evaluations conducted in 
Zimbabwe, especially during the period of niche exploration, had at least 
three important characteristics. First, they were linked to more general 
Industrial evaluations that were being conducted to find local avenues for 
local Industrial expansion and self-reliance. Second, the evaluatfon process 
was supplemented by independent consultants whose views were taken Into 
. consideration when selecting projects. Independent evaluations helped rid 
the projects of Instttuttonal and corporate biases. Third, the evaluations 
contributed to a knowledge pool on particular projects and maintained a 
certain measure of continuity in the aval1able Information. There was indeed 
a high level of Institutional memory maintained on parttcular projects. 
The evaluations also helped generate rtJsourctJ Information on 
which government and corporate decisions could be relfably based. In the 
case of Kenya, we have shown how resource informatfon was manipulated to 
justify particular decisions. Indeed, the projects were approved by the 
government before a comprehensive data base on the aval1ab11fty of molasses 
was compiled. While construction was underway, debates continued on 
whether the country had enough molasses to meet the requirements of the 
projects. The Kenya Sugar Authority. which was supposed to advise the 
<,;Jovernment on policy issues pertaining to sugar and sugar products, 
continued to release conflicting data on the avatJabiHty of molasses. 
The capability to search both local and international markets was 
crucial given the limitations placed upon potential investors by government 
polfcles. The search for the technology on the International market had to be 
done with some knowledge of the local industrial potential to fabricate the 
chosen option. Conversely, knowledge of the local industrial base influenced 
the search and choice of technology. This required the search to be a 
process of active learnlno and took the search team from negotiating tables 
to workshops. The local search was helped by the existence of local 
consulting firms such as Jager and Associates (J&A) whose knowledoe of the 
local industrial base provided information on the extent of Its diversity. 
It should be noted that J&A had International contacts wtth other 
firms In South Africa. Europe and the US which contributed to the flow of 
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knowledge on the available technolo01cal opt1ons. The 1nternat1onal 
dimension is imporhnt beceuse of the need to know the dominent trends in 
technology. This also required constant monitoring of trends in the 
international market for technology as wel1 as R~D. The study pOinted to the 
confusion over technical feaslbl1tty and economic viablHty over the choice of 
products at the Madhvani plant. Knowledoe on commercial1y viable opUons 
can be acquired through an International technology search. But the need to 
search the marleet does not arise if the supply of the technology is dlrect1y 
linked to the source of finance and the open tender system Is precluded. 
Most of these policies relate to situations where the desioners of e 
project are interested in the long-term viabflity of their venture. We have 
argued elsewhere that the Madhvan1 project seemed to have been designed to 
maximize the gains from the sale of machinery and not from long-term 
operation. S This should have been noUced at the early staoes of project 
design if the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) had been subjected to 
independent evaluation. Alternatively. a poHtical system that adheres to the 
need for publ1c 8ccountabflfty would have found It difficult to Justify a project 
which carried such excessive risks. 
The contractual arrangements of the Madhvani project made 
independent evaluations almost impossible to perform. Without such 
evaluations. it was difficult to decide on whether to stop the project as a 
result of the massive cost overruns. We have shown how independent 
evaluations by the World Bank met with opposition from the management who 
often made it look as if a criticism of the project was a direct attack on 
government policy. It was obv10us from the start that the Madhvant project 
should heve been ebandoned. But such 8 decision was already precluded by 
the JVA. The need for independent evaluations was indeed expressed in a 
section of the government but it was difficult to do so at the time. 9 
S. See Eooa, °Choice of Technique.' for an inter.tina Itudy or bow the choice or beneficlarin 
distorll the patterns of tecbnolOlY acquilition in d8Yelopilll countriea. 
9. °The difficulty of abandonilll a project after 18Yera! million dolll.l'1 have alreadY been 
committed .•. tendl to prevent objecUn review and recOltflll. For lbil reuon ... an independent 
management team ... lbould do lbe recOltilll and. If pOIlible, lbe entire review. Wben lbe 
technoloev ... il new to lbe company but already in uae ellewbere. it il always "ortJnrbile to try to 
brilll in a Itrons, outlide technelal man18ement team well-,ersed in lbe tecbnolOl)' to undertake 
lbil Itudy.o Davil. -New Projecll,o pp. 110. 
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There are other pol1cy considerations which relate to project 
loc6tion, op6r6tion61 f/6xi/Jility end infrllstructlJr6. Triangle and 
Mehta annexed their plants on existing sugar mi1ls from which they planned 
to draw molasses, steam and management expertise. Thfs was not the case 
with Madhvani. The important lesson here is that the Triangle project was 
designed to minfmize all costs and introduce flexlbfJlty in the industrial 
operations so as to use cane juice or molasses. But Madhvani maintained 
corporate infJexibt1ity and was unwil1ing to use cane juice as an alternatfve to 
molasses. The Kenyan projects were set up as separate ventures wIth 
additional overhead costs which were finally reflected in the price of 
ethanol. 
The establ1shment of vital Infrastructure such as blendIng facl1ltles 
seemed to have been ignored in Kenya untO the Mehta project was completed. 
The delay in install1ng blenders and agreeing on the pricing structure 
suggested that such vital issues should have been settled before the project 
was started. We can learn here from the experience of Malawi where nine 
legal agreements had to be signed before the financIers could disburse any 
funds. IO The 169111 6SP6CtS of the Kenyan projects have since been a 
matter of detailed discussions between the various conflicting interests. 
One of the most Important aspects of the Triangle project was the 
explicit efforts to bul1d plant-level technological capability and carry out a 
series of experiments to improve the process. The spirit of 
experimentation confirms further that Triangle had a long-term view of 
the project and considered the acquisition of the plant as part of a learning 
process. No such elaborate plans were Incorporated Into the Mehta and 
Madhvani projects. As noted elsewhere, the knowledge that is generated at 
Triangle Is used for plant improvement and also shared with other 
fermentation-related Industries In the country. The plant also offers 8 l1nk 
with academic research at the University of Zimbabwe through internships. 
As pointed out elsewhere. the generation of plant-level knowledge was 
part of the Triangle management from the start. It is also reflected in the 
way the manpower of the plant was organized. The integration of the plant 
Into the overal1 management structure of the company enabled the 
IO.ln~ien. Ethanol Company of Malawi. Blantrye. January 1985. 
experience accumulated In runnln~ the su~ar mill to be adapted to the plant. 
There was, however, an interesting twist to the learning process. The use of 
existing management resources enabled Triangle to hire additional people 
specifically to conduct experiments and accumUlate technical knowledge. 
This implies that there was conscious effort to create the basis for adaptive 
changes In the development of the project. This was In sharp contrast with 
the Mehta and Madhvani projects where the manpower of the plant was largely 
devoted to management and administrative tasks. 
The learning that Is occurlng at the Triangle plant Involves constant 
monitoring of the production process through the use of relfable 
Instrumentation. The Information generated from the monitoring process is 
used both for management purposes as well as for plans to Introduce 
modifications In the plant. Technical drift cannot occur without changes In 
the knowledge base. 11 It Is also through the learning process that Triangle 
constantly evaluates the possib111tles for adapting new production units 
Instead of relying on technical drift as the main source of change. In other 
words, the learnIng process allows the fIrm to determIne when to make a 
discontinuity in the current production practices and move to a new level. 
The case studies 111ustrate a few fundamental aspects of technical 
drift which relate to the varIous types of learnIng that have been IdentIfIed by 
8e11.12 These include learning through plant operation, plant modification, 
hiring, training and searching. The fact that constant changes occur both In 
the adoptive terrain and in the technological system requires the generation 
of new knowledge that aHows the plant to operate within the lfmits of the 
adaptive peak without fall1ng far below Its design specificatIon. Technical 
drift also allows for the solution of routine operating problems 8S well as 
the improvement of the plant to achieve higher performance. 
It should be borne In mind that technical drIft as represented by 
Incremental technical change only relates to selection pressures that affect 
particular aspects of the functional units but are not compelling enough to 
11. Sucb changes in the tnowled,e bue and the Ulociated now 01 Information do not occur 
automatically. "Tbelearnilll rrOlllucb non or information thUI II not ,lIortl8l1: nor II it without 
cost. CoIUIiI learnilll-by-doilll thUi bu limited relennce lor the Kcumuluion 01 tecbnoiocled 
capability," Bell '1.1.. AII'lIiDIIDI'.DIIDdu,lri6l, pp. 52. 
12. Bell, "'Learnilll' and the Accumulation ollndUitriaJ Capacity," pp. 187-200. 
lead to a new selection phase. In other words, technical drift allows for 
change within existing technological systems and does not require the 
introduction of alternative designs to replace existing ones. The shift to new 
Vintages Is largely a functton of the age structure of a parttcular generation 
of technological systems. This point is illustrated by the Brazilian case 
. 
where existing batch processes cannot be scrapped over the short-run and 
give way to new designs. At least the economic reasons are not strong 
enough to justify moving into a new selectton phase before the end of the 
l1fespan of existfng processes. Incremental Innovattons w111 therefore tend 
to dominate the changes fn the adaptive terrain. 13 
The study has shown how the Zimbabweans reJfed heavily on the 
benefits of technical drift in the search and choice of technology. They chose 
a process that allowed for subsequent improvement either through 
incremental technical change or through /echnic8/ gr8f1ing. With graftino 
we mean the replacement of whole functional units without scrapping the 
entire system. As Indicated, one possibf1fty was to introduce the Biosttl soltd 
fermentation unit from Alta-Laval while leavino most of the other units 
inhct. Such a decision could only have been made on the basis of plant-level 
experiments. Indeed, the experiments to recycle stf11age were partly aimed 
at oettlno Information that would help In subsequent technical graftlnQ. 
This process oives us a picture of both continuity and discontinuity. 
Every step 1n the process of incremental improvement Is both cumulative and 
oradual. But the very fact that it 1s cumUlative also means that 1t advances 
13. Thil view il cOGliltent with World Bant policies 00 the BrulUan procramme. The World Bant 
hu luUested I rationalization project for the next phue of their IUpport lor the programme. Thil 
pbue empbulzes technical and inilltutional improvementinltead of quantillliYe expanllon. The 
propoaed measures fall under the broad cll8lory of prOlfl1lUlle rationallZltlon and involve 
increued data collection. project monitoriq and R&D. Di.cus.ion. on this .bllt were undenray 
lone berore the recent 'all in oil prices wblcb baYe led the lovernmeot to freeze the proveme. It 
would appear that both institutional preslure and reductiODl in oil prien will ImpOle Dew 
conditionl on the procnmml and create conditionl wbicb require increued incremental innontion. 
The poalibiliUes for increuiq ethanol yield lend to lie more in the qricullurll lector ntber than 
in the industrial proeeslinc pbues. The pOilibilitin for technical improvemenl in fermenlllion or 
distillation In exlltilll proeesl are limited. The other option il of coune lbe introduction of 
radically new technolOlical tyltlm. with comparable capital coats but more efficient than lbe 
exi,Una proe ...... But ror atyltem to bl widely adapted will depend on its oyenll benefits and the 
lie Itructure 01 the exiltinl plants. It appears thererore that the current proc ... es are likely to 
dominate the Bruilian martel in the Ibort and mediua tara. 
towards some bifurcation point that is difficult to predict tn advance. The 
bifurcation pOint is reached when a discontinuity occurs end a new selection 
stage Is reached. There are several sources of bifurcation. The most 
fundamental Is at the level of R~D where new technological variants are 
generated. But incremental improvements can also lead to new 
breakthroughs which result In new technological variants. We do not, 
however, expect such a process to occur In places where only one plant Is 
operating. The chances for such a process to occur Is partly a function of 
dlvers1ty. 
Whet Is Important Is the role of enalogy end homology In the seerch 
process. The process of experimentation not only creates new types of 
knowledge, but It also helps In the Identification of areas of Ignorance. 
Whenever difficult problems emerge from the plant-level experimentation or 
monitorlno, It olves an Indicator of where to search for solutions. If for 
example, the problem is in the fermenhtlon process I the search would be 
directed In those areas with related expertise. This is a search by analogy 
because the problem Is a result of exposure to slm11ar pressures. In other 
cases, the search would be directed in areas with similar functional units 
because of common origins or phyletic Hnles. For example, solutions to 
dlst111atlon problems may be sought in the 011 refining Industry. 
This should not a surprise since we have argued elsewhere that 
technological evolution occurs largely through recombinant Innovation. 
Almost every technologicel varient is both a result of divergence end 
convergence. Divergence occurs as particular design concepts in use find 
other end-uses. On the other hand, the recombination of separate functional 
units to serve a particular function is en act of convergence. The 
recombination of design concepts to achieve new technological systems Is a 
fundamental process of technological evolution. But 1fmlts to recombinant 
innovation which are placed on system builders by physical, chemical and 
biological laws. Moreover, the way the recombination Is done Is largely 
influenced by non-technical factors. 
The findings of this study emphasize the role of purposive action In 
structural re-organizatlon. a factor whtch underscores the role of 
Institutions In socio-economic evolution. The domain of policy formuletton 
and Implementation IS therefore part ot the process ot technological 
evolution and not a separate set of guidelines for action. Polictes are only 
significant If viewed as part of the process of change. The study has so far 
Illustrated the role of tnstltutfonal learning In the process of project 
Implementation. To the contrary, conventional wisdom tends to offer policy 
guidelines as rules which assume perfect knowledge of the current and 
expected behaviour of particular parameters of the Implementation process. 
From this understanding, it fs meaningless to study projects In the 
context Of their success or faf1ure, which are only Important 11 viewed as 
part of a more general process of soclo-economlc transition. As the case 
studies Illustrate, the fa1lure of the Madhvani project was the beginning of 
new approaches to project implementation. Pol1cy formulation Is therefore a 
form of institutional learning In which key lessons become guideposts or 
reference points for further action. The manner In which the lessons are 
incorporated into the general policy guidelines depends very much on the 
ability of the existing institutional structures to undergo the required 
reforms and take on new practices. There are of course other obstacles to 
pol1cy reform, espectally from various Interest groups. Such interest 
groups often have access to pollUcal power and can undermine attempts to 
reform po1fcles or Introduce new practices. 
The tempo of policy learning also varies depending on whether II 
system has stabilized along an organizational path or is undergoing major 
fluctuations. In the case of the former, as was the situation In Kenya In the 
1 970s, existing policies became a dominant source of practice. Government 
departments settled Into routtne behaviour guided by linear thinking. 
Aberrations within the systems could easily be contained through minor 
adjustments. Under such conditions it was difficult to Introduce new Ideas. 
When the soclo-economlc system Is settled In such organizational patterns. 
new Ideas are easily eliminated or are simply Ignored. 
The Situation Is different under conditions of major fluctuation. Here 
the diffusion of new policies is made more likely, partly because the failure 
of existing policies makes the system more open to new Ideas. Moreover, 
fluctuations are l1kely to send Institutions and Individuals searching for 
alterntltfve options. Such a climate Increases the receptive end retentive 
capactty of 1nst1tut10ns. It also creates favourable cond1t10ns for the 
emergence of new institutional arrangements. Just as fluctuations create 
favourable conditions for the Introduction of new technological systems, so 
do they make It possible for concomit8nt Institutions 8nd polfcles to emerge. 
Under suitable conditions, technological change, policy formulation and 
institutional reforms tend to co-evolve. The altern8tive Is 8 fragmented 8nd 
haphazard response to fluctuations which may be counter-adaptive. 
Conventional thinking tends to treat policy guidelines as rules which 
govern movement along Newtonian traJectories. Investment projects are 
expected to obey fundamental laws of economics. The situation is also 
thought to be deterministic so long as market forces are allowed to operate 
freely. This study, however, shows that vital knowledge concerning project 
implementation is generated during the implementation process itself. The 
unfolding of events generates the required knowledge and policies are 
changed accordingly. This suggests that poliCies must be able to create 
suitable conditions for the generation of new knowledge for use In 
8ntlclpatlng or 8dapting to changing conditions. 
The ability of a country to formulate relevant poliCies is also 
influenced by its own historical development and institutional organization. 
Polfc1es are subjected to selection pressures in the organ1z8t1on81 8ren8 8nd 
the selection process is guided by the soclo-economlc expectations of the 
country 8S embodied in overall economic goals. Fluctu8tions In the techno-
economic landscape tend to Invalidate existing policies. The re-organlzation 
of the system in response to fluctuations Is guided by new policy 
interventions as well as Institutional support. 
The fect that soclo-economic systems tend to evolve towards 
complexity suggests that at anyone moment, the process brings about new 
interrelationships which were hitherto unknown. The effects of such 
developments are difficult to determine In 8dvance. This Imp1tes that policies 
8re not only responses to emerging Circumstances, but they also antlcip8te 
particular developments. This Is t11ustrated by the case of Zimbabwe where 
decisions on future .actlons were embodied In preceding practices. The 
selection of technology was not just a ret1ection of prevafllng 
circumstances. but also took Into consideration anticipated developments. 
Although the Implementation process appears to have been done In stages, 
the process itself was time-bound; the past, present and future were treated 
ho listica lly. 
The view that an evolutionary process Involves learning suggests that 
policies and institutions must maintain a certain measure of flexibility 
otherwise institutional rigIdity would be counter-adaptIve. Ironically, 
regulatory institutions tend often to be less flexible In relation to the 
Imperatives of technological change. This is partly because hIgher-level 
Instftutfons are more concerned w1th the retentIon of an already selected 
option and ere removed from the sources of change or the generetlon of new 
options. Fluctuations in the socio-economic system are felt more readily at 
the firm level. A wide communication gap between firms and state 
institutions tends to limit the rate of adaptive responses and anticipatory 
plannino. 
A suitable arrangement seems to be one of co-evolution between state 
Institutions and the techno-economic sphere with a greater degree of 
flexlbll1ty. positive feedbacks and mutual Interactfon. Whereas the structure 
In such an arrangement would remain hierarchical. its functioning would take 
the form of an interactive network guided by socio-economic expectations. 
Such 8 co-evolutionary approach to policy formulation and implementation 
requires a certain level of decentralized power and responsibility and would 
require new forms of non-hierarchical co-ordination. 
8.3 Reselrch Prospects 
An evolutionary approach Is a powerful framework for analyzing 
polley-related Issues because It deals specifically wIth the process of 
change itself. The elegance of abstract mode1Jlng may be lost In the 
complexity of real events. But that loss is not regretted because the concern 
here Is to unravel the central features of long run technological change and 
not to engage In abstract puzzle-solVing. Morever, an evolutionary 
approach provIdes the opportunIty to brIdge the gap between theory and 
policy by appealing to the process of change itself. 
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It has been suggested that a new world view Is gradually permeating 
the research establishment. especially within the natural sciences. The 
traditional approaches built on the works of Descartes and Newton are giving 
way to 8 more holistic and dynamic world view. In essence, scientists have 
traditionally engaged In pulling things apart. There seems to be a change 
under which emphasis Is being placed on putting thlnos together aoaln; It Is a 
tide against reductionism. The new world view has profound Impl1catlons for 
those social sciences which deal with volatile and constantly changing 
systems. 
This study suggests new directions for research. At an 
epistemological level. there Is an urgent need to buf1d alternative theories 
of knowledge which would equip us more adequately to deal with constant 
change and major fluctuations. Already Popper and Campbell have provided a 
start with their evolutionary epistemology. Their approach stresses the role 
of homology in undershnding evolutionary processes. But argument by 
homology has one fundamental lfmitation. The fact that evolutionary 
processes tend to advance towards complexity Implies that new factors and 
relationship emerge which did not exist at previous stages. 
But there is yet another major limitation In the current state of 
evolutionary epistemology. It understates the systemIc nature of 
evolutionary processes and places excessive emphasis on randomness. 
There Is 8 need to undertake further research on the ev()lutl()n ()f c()mplex 
systems and how they re-organize themselves in response to internal and 
external influences. Such an understanding requires the fUSing of the 
epistemological roots of general systems theory and evolutionary 
approaches. All these issues fall in the field of macro-evolution. There are 
other levels which require further research. The re-organization of socio-
economic systems involves the Interplay between human creativity. 
fluctuations and resources. This meso-evolutionary level also involves 
institutional change and policy formulation. Much has been written on the 
separate components of this level but their modes of interaction still remain 
unexplored. 
At an even lower level we are confronted wIth problems of how 
technological systems themselves emerge and evolve. Most of the existing 
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studIes which use evolutionary approaches admit that Innovation 1s 
endogenous to socio-economic transition just as Schumpeter did. Already 
work on internal technical change as well as the numerous case studies on 
1ndlgenous techn1cal change have suggested some of the 1nternal 1mperatives 
which determine the direction of innovation. This line of analysis needs to be 
pursued with greater emphasis because it will enrich our understanding of 
the internal evolution of technological systems. It would be advisable to 
start constructing taxonomies of technology in order to isolate the phyletiC 
l1nks between var10us systems and the range of recombination. 
But to get tI more compehrensive picture of the process of 
technological evolution, research will have to be directed at the interface 
between human perception and the deSign of technologtcal untts. Th1s may 
sound far-fetched but the core of 80cio-economic evolution is the re-
organization of knowledge systems. It is through the appl1cation of 
knowledge that purposive re-organization can be achieved in 8 fluctuating 
system. A more detailed understanding of knowledge systems will also give 
us more insights tnto the nature and structure of institutions, which exist 
hrgelyas frameworks for the socialization of information. 
This view raises other questions related to the application of 
1nformation technology to the process of socio-econom1c change. It 1s now 
possible to create extensive knowledge systems and networks by using 
information technology. This implies that the structure and nature of 
institutions are also changing. The organizattonal gains of such changes are 
enormous but their policy implications are difficult to establish. What is 
clear. however. ts that the application of Information technology may allow 
extensive institutional flexibility and therefore facilitate the process of 
change. Even more Important Is the fact that information technology can be 
used tn vicarious learning and therefore 1ntroduce efficiency into the 
evolutfonary process. More research on Information technology may reveal 
new aspects of the evolutionary process that may strengthen our 
understanding on how socio-economic systems change. 
One final area that requires research i8 the role of energy and energy 
technology in socfo-economlc evolution. Conventional thfnkfng treats energy 
tiS tiny other resource. It was suggested at the beginning of thfs study that 
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energy Is a special resource both because of Its fmportance fn lffe processes 
and because of its technological implications. The history of energy in the 
transition of different societies may provide us with useful policy lessons, 
especfally g1ven the variations In current development patterns. 
On the whole, the policy implications of the process of project 
Implementation suggest a closer examination of the adaptive landscape as the 
arena for economic re-organization. It is here that all the crucial technical, 
SOCial, economic and pol1tical factors interact. The process of niche 
realtzatfon. as has been argued In detal1. requires the careful mod1f1catlon 
of the adoptive terrain to facf1itate the introduction of new technological 
systems. The technologies themselves are equipped with adaptive 
parameters which need to be matched w1th the adoptfve condftions. Thfs 
evolutionary process Is knowledge-intensive. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has summed up the central argument of the study, 
examined Us policy implications and made a plea for further research. It Is 
noted that the evolutfonary approach used in this study Is part of an emerging 
world view that is gradually permeating the natural sciences. The fact that 
this approach deals spec1fically with the process of change makes it more 
relevant for the social sciences, which have for 8 long time been dominated 
by CarteSian and Newtonian reductionist 8S well as static concepts. It 
appears that 8 cognftlve shift In our world view is underway and the socfal 
sciences need therefore to re-examine their vantage positions. This study 
did not attempt to bypass conventional thinking, but to transcend it. One may 
rfsk the suggestion that If the SOCial sciences do not adopt the emerging non-
equilibrium systems approach, those who wfll in the future take over the 
analysis of socio-economic change wf11 come from the natural sciences, 
espeCially as barriers between the disciplines succumb to the pressures of 
the emerging holistic principles. 
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